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1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The fundamental experience which objective 
experience itself presupposes is the  
experience of the Other.
1
 
 
 
Despite the growth and depth of Levinasian scholarship towards the end of the last 
century, many crucial issues centring on the important topic of freedom in the work of 
Levinas are yet to be fully raised and addressed.  This is surprising given the undisputed 
prominence of „freedom‟ as a value and a concept not only in the history of modern 
intellectual thought, including philosophy, but also in the history of human culture, 
social and political movements.
2
  A recent exception to this is the collection of articles 
edited by Benda Hofmeyr, Radical Passivity. Rethinking Ethical Agency in Levinas.  In 
her introduction to this collection Hofmeyr remarks:  
The question concerning the „radical passivity‟ of the ethical agent undoubtedly 
constitutes the proverbial 64,000 dollar question in Levinas scholarship and 
reception.  In other words, the question concerning the radically passive ethical 
agent as opposed to the active autonomous agent, with the freedom to act 
independently without an inherent imperative or inner directive steering its 
actions, is the decisive issue separating supporters of Levinas from his critics.
3
 
                                                 
1
 Emmanuel Levinas, „Signature‟, in Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom, trans. by Seán Hand 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 291-95 (p. 293). Throughout this dissertation 
we will follow what has become general practice among commentators and translators of Levinas work, 
generally, „Other‟ will be used for the French „autrui‟, which designates a personal form of address used 
for a human being, and „other‟ for the French „autre‟ which is a more general term for „other‟.  In some 
places Levinas capitalises l’Autre and generally translations maintain the capitalisation in the English, 
when this occurs it is identified in the passage.    
2
 An exception to this oversight is Pierre Hayat‟s recent study, combining some of his old and new work, 
La liberté investie. Levinas (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 2014). This author emphasises the centrality of 
freedom in the thought of Levinas, writing in his introduction that the point of departure for his reading of 
Levinas is that for Levinas freedom is more than a right, freedom is a requirement that makes humanity 
human: „Plus qu‟un droit, la liberté se présente alors comme une exigence d‟où procède l‟humanité de 
l‟homme. Tel est précisément le point de départ de la philosophie de la liberté investie que nous lisons 
chez Levinas.‟ Ibid., pp. 10-11.  Hayat‟s focus and methodology is different from our own, as we present 
a chronological reading of the place of freedom in Levinas‟s thought up to and including Totality and 
Infinity, with the aim of clarifying Levinas‟s position.  Hayat presents a reading of Levinas whereby 
freedom comes from the inability to hide from one‟s responsibility to the Other.  Hayat‟s argument is 
similar in places to our own analysis, as he stresses the importance of rationality in Levinas‟s 
understanding of freedom, and he also states that the exercise of freedom is caused (provoqué) by 
consideration of the outside world. „Elle [freedom] apparaît d‟abord comme une injonction d‟agir pour 
d‟autres que soi. Avec Levinas, l‟exercice de la liberté est provoqué par la considération du monde 
extérieur.‟ Ibid., p. 11. The French term „provoqué‟ can also, however, be translated as „bring about‟, 
„give rise to‟, or „elicit‟, each of which capture how the Other can be thought of as a condition for the 
possibility of freedom.  For Levinas, this condition is not to be understood as foundational.   
3
 Benda Hofmeyr, „Editor‟s Introduction: Passivity as Necessary Condition for Ethical Agency‟, in 
Radical Passivity. Rethinking Ethical Agency in Levinas, ed. by B. Hofmeyr (New York: Springer, 2009), 
p. 1.    
2 
 
Hofmeyr goes on to identify, correctly, that „[t]he central problem underlying radical 
passivity is undoubtedly the problem of freedom‟.4  Yet this key issue is not explored 
further in the secondary scholarship, and Levinas‟s position is „more often than not, 
uncritically assimilated or taken as a matter of fact‟.5  Although this recent volume is a 
welcome addition that goes some way towards exploring key questions around the 
passivity of the subject in Levinas‟s work, there is still much further study and 
reflection needed on this specific problem of freedom in Levinas‟s thought.6  
Levinas‟s notable description of the self as a being that is responsible in front of 
(devant), for (pour) and to the (a) Other, before the actual exercise of individual 
freedom, calls into question the very foundation of ethical theories that find the 
justification of morality in the origins of the freedom of the subject.  This, therefore, is a 
radical critique because within the history of modern moral philosophy, by and large, 
moral responsibility is viewed as correlating with freedom.
7
  One is responsible for an 
act proportionate to which one can be said to have acted freely.  One, therefore, is 
                                                 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Another recent and worthwhile exception to this is the study by Rachid Boutayeb, Kritik der Freiheit: 
Zur »ethischen Wende« von Emmanuel Levinas (Freiburg/München: Alber-Reihe Thesen, 2013). 
Boutayeb reads Levinas‟s work as a critique of freedom understood in both the German Idealist tradition 
and the existential phenomenological understanding of freedom, that can be said, in part, to have 
continued that tradition, „Levinas‟ Ethik oder eher a-Ethik ist als Kritik der Freiheit zu verstehen‟ (ibid., 
p. 10). In place of such a view of freedom Levinas argues for a responsible freedom. As Boutayeb says; 
„Die Beziehung zum Anderen ist ursprünglicher als meine Freiheit und als mein Wissen‟ (ibid., p. 9). In 
presenting his argument Boutayeb situates Levinas‟s critique in relation to the understanding of freedom 
in the work of Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre. The methodology followed again differs from our own, as 
the development of Levinas‟s position in relation to freedom is not explored in detail.  
7
 The philosopher most often associated with viewing morality as autonomy and self-governance was 
Immanuel Kant.  For more on the historical development of the concept of morality as self-governance, 
and the importance that such a view had in shaping the Western liberal vision of the relationship between 
individual and society, see, J.B Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy. A History of Modern Moral 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). The relationship between Levinas‟s 
understanding of freedom in contrast to that of Kant‟s is one area of Levinas‟s thinking on freedom that 
has been explored among commentators, most notably, by Catherine Chalier, What Ought I to Do? 
Morality in Kant and Levinas, trans. by Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
2002). See, also, C. Chalier, „Kant and Levinas: On the Question of Autonomy and Heteronomy‟, in In 
Proximity. Emmanuel Levinas and the Eighteenth Century, ed. by Melvyn New with Robert Bernasconi 
and Richard A. Cohen (Texas, USA: Texas Tech University Press, 2001), pp. 261-83; Diane Perpich, 
„Freedom Called into Question: Levinas‟s Defense of Heteronomy‟, in In Proximity. Emmanuel Levinas 
and the Eighteenth Century, pp. 303-25; Peter Atterton, „From Transcendental Freedom to the Other: 
Levinas and Kant‟, in In Proximity. Emmanuel Levinas and the Eighteenth Century, pp. 327-54. Research 
has also been done on freedom in Levinas‟s work in relation to other thinkers such as, for example, Jean-
Paul Sartre, Jacques Derrida and Friedrich Nietzsche. See, for example, Holger Zaborowski, „On 
Freedom and Responsibility: Remarks on Sartre, Levinas and Derrida‟, The Heythrop Journal, 41(2000), 
47-65; Christina Howell, „Sartre and Levinas‟, in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, ed. 
by Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 91-99; Arne 
Johan Vetlesen, „Relations with Others in Sartre and Levinas: Assessing Some Implications for an Ethics 
of Proximity‟, Constellations, 1, no. 3 (1995), 358-382; Nietzsche and Levinas. “After the Death of A 
Certain God”, ed. by Jill Stauffer and Bettina Bergo (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).                    
3 
 
responsible for that which one has initiated, or failed to initiate, by choice.  If an 
individual did not act freely, then, generally speaking, they are not held responsible for 
that action and the consequences thereof.  For Levinas, however, autonomy cannot be 
the condition for ethics precisely because it is through the ethical encounter with the 
Other that the self becomes free.  This position, therefore, overturns the traditional 
approach, by claiming that the subject is responsible for the Other prior to being free, 
and therein raises a number of important philosophical questions along the way.
8
  
Before answers to these questions can be adequately addressed from a Levinasian 
perspective, it is essential to understand, in a straightforward sense, Levinas‟s position 
on freedom and his understanding of the concept of freedom.  In order to do this, we 
propose, in this study, to trace the place of freedom in the early work of Levinas, from 
his earliest writings in the 1930s up to and including his first major work, Totality and 
Infinity.  
When Levinas‟s thinking on freedom is presented in the secondary literature, 
most often the focus is on what could be termed his negative view of freedom wherein 
freedom is described as egoism and spontaneity, the latter understood as the absence of 
external restraint and the free reign of the ego unimpeded from the outside.
9
  Levinas 
                                                 
8
 Such questions as, „what is the moral significance of responsible action if it is not freely chosen but 
passively imposed?‟ are raised in Hofmeyr‟s edited collection Radical Passivity. Rethinking Ethical 
Agency in Levinas, (p. 1).  
9
 Levinas does not use the term freedom in an univocal sense, which is unsurprising given that the term 
itself has so many varied meanings and uses. The meaning of the word freedom can range from a word 
used to mean nothing, „the paper is free today‟, to designate emptiness and vacancy, „is this seat free?‟, to 
a word that means everything to people to the point of death, typified by the slogans of many revolutions, 
„Freedom or Death‟, and famously by Emmeline Pankhurst‟s speech of the same name. As is evident in 
Levinas‟s writings, the meaning of the term freedom can greatly depend on the context of use, be that 
rational agency, self-governance, representation, self-sufficiency, political and social freedom, or the very 
limited sense of the possibility of commencement and the freedom from exterior control. The term itself 
has even been used within the history of philosophy in a directly contradictory manner. See, Maurice 
Cranston, Freedom. A New Analysis (London, New York and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1953).  
Cranston illustrates this point well by referring to two main groups of thinkers within the tradition of 
political philosophy, using the example of Rousseau and Lord Acton. The latter believing that freedom is 
the freedom from the restraints of nature, brought about through the development of the State, and the 
former believing freedom to be freedom from the constraints of such political institutions and a return to 
nature. Ibid., pp. 7-8. In this study we will be focusing on Levinas‟s thinking in relation to „freedom‟ 
when it is used to describe a metaphysical property of the subject, in the sense of the spontaneous self-
sufficient egoism of the subject, and the freedom of consciousness understood as intentional meaning-
giving thought. Levinas also has a lot to contribute to the many discussions on freedom in relation to 
politics, culture and society, but that will not be our main focus here. Some very interesting work has 
already been done on politics in Levinas‟s thought and freedom in relation to politics is discussed in some 
of these studies. See, the collection of articles in, Levinas, Law, Politics, ed. by Marinos Diamantides 
(Oxon, Uk: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). See, also, Michael F. Bernard-Donals, „“Difficult Freedom”: 
Levinas, Language, and Politics‟, Diacritics, 35, no. 3 (2005), 62-77; Eric S. Nelson, „Against Liberty: 
Adorno, Levinas and the Pathologies of Freedom‟, Theoria, 59, no. 131 (2012), 64-83; C. Fred Alford, 
„Levinas and Political Theory‟, Political Theory, 32 (2004), 146-171. The work by Howard Caygill is of 
4 
 
illustrates this point by referring to moments in the tradition that for him typify this 
understanding, such as Hobbes‟s description of man in the state of nature, Victor 
Hugo‟s „a force on the move‟, and later Spinoza‟s „the right to existence‟ or conatus 
essendi.
10
  This view of freedom is aligned with the view of autonomy as the absence of 
external restraint in the sense of the ability to self-govern with the absence of external 
control.  It is also described by Levinas as having a complete lack of consideration for 
alterity because exteriority is perceived as a possible threat to one‟s own self-
determination, if it is perceived at all.  An equally important notion of freedom as 
autonomy which Levinas also places into question is the primacy of the thinking 
subject, wherein the understanding of freedom as self-governance is linked with 
rationality, objectivity, and representation, otherwise described as intentional meaning-
giving thought.  
In her article „Freedom Called into Question: Levinas‟s Defense of 
Heteronomy‟, Diane Perpich sets out these two different, yet linked aspects of freedom 
understood as self-sufficiency and as an „imperialism of knowledge‟, and also „in terms 
of self-preservation and self-valorization‟ of the subject.11  Despite pointing out this 
distinction, the focus of Perpich‟s approach is to question whether or not Kant‟s 
conception of morality can be said to fall prey to Levinas‟s criticisms of freedom as the 
basis of ethics, or if Kant is exempt from such a criticism given that for Kant freedom is 
self-limiting and the autonomy of the individual‟s will, for Kant, is based on the self‟s 
ability to formulate laws in line with the categorical imperative that the self must 
follow.  While there is much of merit in Perpich‟s analysis, this line of reasoning seems 
to undermine the importance of her earlier identified point that not only is Levinas 
                                                                                                                                               
particular note in this area, and we will be drawing on this work throughout this study. See, Howard 
Caygill, Levinas and the Political (London: Routledge, 2002). 
10
 See, Emmanuel Levinas, „Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity‟ trans. by Alphonso Lingis, in Collected 
Philosophical Papers (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1998), pp. 47-59, where 
Levinas refers to Hobbes‟s work to demonstrate the pride of place which freedom, viewed as an 
„incontestable right‟ of the subject, holds.  Within this same 1957 article Levinas borrows a term from 
Viktor Hugo‟s Hernani, which he will use time and time again, to describe the spontaneous freedom of 
the self, a „force on the move‟. In his later work Levinas introduces a new term to characterise self 
justified spontaneous freedom, borrowed from Spinoza‟s Ethica III, prop 6, „conatus essendi‟, the 
tendency in being to persist in its own being. In an interview Levinas described his philosophy as putting 
the conatus essendi into question, „[t]he effort to exist, the aspiration to persevere in being, the conatus 
essendi according to philosophers like Spinoza, is the beginning of every right. This precisely is what I 
attempt to put into question — starting from the encounter with the morality, or the face, of the other — 
when I insist upon the radical difference between the others and me.‟ Emmanuel Levinas, „The 
Philosopher and Death‟, trans. by Bettina Bergo, in Is It Righteous To Be? Interviews with Emmanuel 
Levinas, ed. by Jill Robbins (California: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 121-29 (p. 128). 
11
 See, Perpich, „Freedom Called into Question: Levinas‟s Defense of Heteronomy‟, p. 306.     
5 
 
challenging freedom as self-preservation but also the freedom of consciousness to 
represent the world and to be the foundation of all meaning.  In Kant‟s approach, 
although freedom may be self-limiting, Kant never questions the primacy of 
consciousness.  For Levinas, however, the freedom of representation and rationality 
calls for justification.  It is not self-justifying.  Thus, for Levinas, the unnatural ability of 
the self to place itself into question — objective rational thought — needs an 
explanation.
12
  As Levinas argues, „[k]nowing becomes knowing of a fact only if it is at 
the same time critical, if it puts itself into question, goes back beyond its origin — in an 
unnatural movement to seek higher than one‟s own origin, a movement which evinces 
or describes a created freedom‟.13  Perpich, then, is right to question whether Kant‟s 
understanding of freedom as self-limiting avoids Levinas‟s charges of egoism and 
imperialism, but Kant does not avoid Levinas‟s criticisms of freedom of representation.  
Criticism raised against Levinas also often focus on aspects of his thought that 
stem from his negative view of freedom understood as egoism and spontaneity, 
overlooking the vital importance of the freedom of self-reflective critical thought in his 
philosophy.  As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, Levinas argues that our 
ability to call egoist freedom into question, and hence the possibility of a moral life, 
rests on the investiture of freedom understood as critical self-reflective thought.  
Levinasian scholarship would benefit from a clearer understanding of the place of 
freedom in Levinas‟s work, most specifically, from a greater understanding of the 
integral place in his thinking for his less appreciated understanding of freedom.  We 
would then be better placed to accurately address important critical questions and to 
assess the extent to which other critical questions would still hold given the more 
nuanced appreciation of his wider position. 
                                                 
12
 A very recent article by James Mensch is a welcome exception to this trend. In „Freedom and the 
Theoretical Attitude‟, Mensch presents a reading of Levinas very similar to our own.  Mensch argues that 
for Levinas the theoretical attitude, and the freedom from a more immediate self-referential practical 
engagement with the world which it brings, is prefaced by the ethical interruption of the Other.  Arguing, 
„[s]uch freedom, when liberated from its arbitrariness by the Other, grounds the possibility of the 
theoretical standpoint.  Given that our freedom is not ultimate, but rather grounded by our relation to the 
Other, we have to say that what ultimately “lines” the world that is accessible to theory is not freedom but 
rather the Other whose alterity makes our freedom possible.‟ James Mensch, „Freedom and the 
Theoretical Attitude‟, <https://www.academia.edu/10504379/Freedom_and_The_Theoretical_Attitude> 
[accessed Feb 2015], (p. 16). The research presented in this study provides further support for positions 
such as Mensch‟s as it grounds this position in Levinas‟s work and traces the development of this crucial, 
yet often overlooked, aspect of Levinas‟s thought.     
13
 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority, trans. by Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 82-83. 
6 
 
Take, for example, the critical readings of Levinas offered by David Wood and 
François Raffoul in Addressing Levinas.
14
  Although both Wood and Raffoul address a 
number of important questions, nevertheless their analysis would both benefit from a 
greater appreciation of the place of freedom understood as critical self-reflective 
thought in Levinas‟s work.  Raffoul accurately describes Levinas‟s view of ontology 
and then goes on to question whether ethics should be understood as having a primacy 
over ontology, as Levinas argues, or if a more accurate portrayal of Heidegger‟s work, 
than that which Levinas provides, can accommodate an ontological ethics.
15
  Raffoul 
argues that there is a greater depth to Heidegger‟s thought than Levinas allows for, and 
that it is inaccurate of Levinas to maintain that Heidegger fits the description whereby 
„the thinking of Being is a solipsistic thinking which negates the other‟.16  What Raffoul 
is challenging is the characterisation of Heidegger‟s thinking of Being „as solipsistic‟, 
and by refuting this point he hopes to raise the possibility of opening a space for the 
consideration of developing an ontological sense of ethics, using ontological here in a 
specific Heideggerian fashion.  Even if Raffoul‟s argument can be said to achieve this 
goal by showing that Levinas was incorrect to label all thinking of Being as solipsistic, 
it does not address Levinas‟s lesser appreciated premise that the very freedom involved 
in the event of „thinking‟, be that solipsistic or otherwise, must in itself be justified.  For 
Levinas, this is equally true of a non-theoretical Heideggerian broad meaning of 
understanding.
17
  One could say that for Levinas, even if Heidegger‟s Mitsein can be 
said to show that thinking of Being is not solipsistic, as Mitsein is from the very start a 
fundamental characteristic of Dasein, being with others for Levinas is not radical 
                                                 
14
 Both Woods and Raffoul raise a number of important questions such as issues relating to Levinas‟s 
reading of the tradition and the accuracy of Levinas‟s reading of Heidegger, which Woods sees as „a 
somewhat one-dimensional view‟, and for Raffoul, „[w]e must indeed admit that a number of the analyses 
[of Heidegger‟s work] offered by Levinas are not devoid of a certain interpretative violence, and perhaps 
don‟t do complete justice to the philosophical advances that one can find in Heidegger […]‟. François 
Raffoul, „Being and the Other: Ethics and Ontology in Levinas and Heidegger‟, in Addressing Levinas, 
ed. by Antje Kapust, Eric Sean Nelson and Kent Still (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
2005), pp. 138-51, (p. 144); David Wood, „Some Questions for My Levinasian Friends‟, in Addressing 
Levinas, pp. 152-69, (p. 164).  
15
 Raffoul describes Levinas‟s main thesis as, „[o]ntology, the thinking of Being, as it has defined the 
entirety of Western philosophy from Parmenides to Heidegger, is a thinking of the Same, a thinking 
which reduces otherness to the Same by the very power of its theoretical comprehensiveness‟, and goes 
on to argue that Levinas incorrectly identified Heidegger‟s work as belonging to the classical 
understanding of ontology. Raffoul, „Being and the Other: Ethics and Ontology in Levinas and 
Heidegger‟, (p. 139).  
16
 Ibid., p. 148.  
17
 See, Ch. III, § 3.1.1 
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enough a disturbance to prompt the self to place itself into question.
18
  Hence, this is 
also why for Levinas ethics precedes ontology, because without the ethical interruption 
of the face of the Other one would lack the distance necessary for any thinking at all.  
By tracing Levinas‟s thinking on freedom from his earliest work, it will be shown that 
this less appreciated understanding of freedom is vital in an attempt to understand, and 
then only consequently, critically analyse Levinas‟s philosophy.   
 In his well-known interview with Richard Kearney, Levinas remarks that his 
description of ethical subjectivity „dispenses with the idealising subjectivity of 
ontology‟, which he further characterises as a „mastering centre of meaning, an idealist, 
self-sufficient cogito [...] autonomous freedom‟.19  This leaves unaddressed the question 
of the justification of freedom of thought, critical consciousness and the exercise of 
freedom.  And it is this very issue that renders Levinas‟s reflections on freedom to be 
much more profound and linked to his critique of the modern defence of the free subject 
as a rational agent capable of autonomous self-governance, sense-bestowing and centre 
of a meaningful world (Husserl) as well as one who can question the meaning of being 
itself (Heidegger). As Levinas puts it, at the end of Totality and Infinity: 
One is not against freedom if one seeks for it a justification.  Reason and 
freedom seem to us to be founded on prior structures of being whose first 
articulations are delineated by the metaphysical movement, or respect, or justice 
— identical to truth.  The terms of the conception making truth rest on freedom 
must be inverted.
20
 
 
Freedom, in other words, must rest on truth, where truth rests in justice.  Far from being 
a side issue or an issue that Levinas sets aside in his thinking, the question of freedom 
and its justification is a central concern of Levinas‟s thought. 
The aim of this study is to trace Levinas‟s thinking on freedom up to and 
including Totality and Infinity.  We will proceed by way of a chronological study of the 
most important works in terms of the idea of freedom in the first half of his oeuvre.  The 
                                                 
18
 For more on this point see Mensch‟s excellent analysis and defence of why for Levinas Heidegger‟s 
account in Being and Time of how Dasein can shift from a primordial pragmatic engagement with the 
world to a theoretical contemplation remains insufficient. See, Mensch, „Freedom and the Theoretical 
Attitude‟. See, also, Vetlesen, „Relations with Others in Sartre and Levinas: Assessing Some Implications 
for an Ethics of Proximity‟, in which he draws upon the work of Sartre who made a similar criticsim, „that 
in Heidegger my being-in-the-world von Haus aus entails being-with-others as one of its fundamental 
structures.  This being so, the empirical event of a particular Other‟s appearance, of my encountering him, 
is unable to make any difference to the kind of being that I am‟. (p. 360). The research presented in our 
current study contributes to this lesser appreciated, yet nevertheless crucial, aspect of Levinas‟s thinking.         
19
 Richard Kearney and Emmanuel Levinas, „Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas‟, in Face to Face with 
Levinas, ed. by Richard A. Cohen (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1986), pp. 
13-33 (p. 27).   
20
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, pp. 302-03. 
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study is divided into four chapters.  This division reflects significant philosophical and 
historical divisions both in the life of Levinas and in the development of his thought.    
Chapter one deals with Levinas‟s earliest writings before World War II, from 
1930 to 1940, noting that the question of the freedom of the subject was an issue that 
concerned Levinas from his early student days, in particular with reference to his 
encounter with Henri Bergson‟s philosophy.  Although Levinas found aspects of 
Bergson‟s work to be highly commendable, including his work on the metaphysical 
justification of freedom, he also, however, found Bergson‟s strict separation between 
reason and intuition to be problematic.  In Husserl‟s descriptions of intentionality 
Levinas found an account that preserved intuition and duration but did away with the 
dichotomy between the intellect and intuition.  This features in Levinas‟s 1930 doctoral 
thesis Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology.21  Yet Levinas was not entirely 
happy with Husserl‟s perceived intellectualism at that time, which proved to also be 
unsatisfactory, as can be seen from the final chapter of his doctoral study.  Here the 
influence of Heidegger‟s philosophy, however, is noticeable.  Indeed it was Heidegger‟s 
analytic of Dasein in Being and Time and Heidegger‟s attempt to call the primacy of 
intentional consciousness into question as the main issue in phenomenology and 
phenomenological research that cleared a path for Levinas to place the modern view of 
the autonomous free subject into question. We will see, however, that although 
Heidegger‟s approach opens up the non-theoretical concrete life to philosophical 
reflection, Levinas finds Heidegger‟s account of freedom to be the most deficient and 
fatalistic.  This chapter will end with Levinas‟s re-reading of Husserl‟s phenomenology 
in his „The Work of Edmund Husserl‟, published in 1940.  Levinas‟s return to the work 
of Husserl results in the discovery of latent possibilities (of active and passive 
dimensions of intentionality) in Husserl‟s description of the intentionality of human 
consciousness, which paves the way for Levinas‟s own departure after the war.  
Chapter two examines Levinas‟s writings after the War.  The division between 
chapter one and chapter two mirrors the division between these two periods of writing, 
which were separated by Levinas‟s five year incarceration as a prisoner of war during 
World War II from 1940 to 1945.  The chapter will focus on Levinas‟s first two 
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 Emmanuel Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. by André Orianne, 2nd 
edn (Evanston Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1995).  
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extended works, Existence and Existents (1947)
22
 and Time and the Other (1947).
23
  In 
these works Levinas begins to describe the passivity of the self, and he also introduces 
an idea that will prove pivotal to his later thought, the split within subjectivity between 
the affective self and the active ego.  Even at this early stage of his work, when Levinas 
is just beginning to introduce his idea of the other, we can begin to make sense of his 
position that responsibility precedes freedom.  In a manner reminiscent of many modern 
philosophers, such as Kant, Levinas views freedom as aligned with reason and the 
conscious cognitive subject.  As the affective self, however, is described as prior to 
intentional consciousness, objectivity and critical thinking, this leads Levinas to the 
view that the self is responsible prior to being free.  It is the interruption of the Other 
that breaches the closed totality of the instant, introduces time, and frees the self from 
an infinite present in which the self continuously returns to its self with no remainder 
and nothing new.  Without the possibility of novelty, which is introduced by the Other, 
the self would be trapped within a totality and destined to a determined fate.  Even at 
this early stage of his thinking, it is the Other that brings freedom to the self.   
Chapter three addresses Levinas‟s reflections on freedom in writings prior to his 
magnum opus Totality and Infinity (1961). In his work of the 1950‟s Levinas continues 
to question the primacy of objectifying intentionality, and returns to Husserl to unearth 
the dormant possibilities that lay hidden in his description of intentionality.  In doing so, 
Levinas opens a way to philosophically describe aspects of human existence that resist 
representation and objectification, and escape the totalizing gaze of objectifying 
intentionality, yet remain meaningful.  The excessive character of exteriority is a crucial 
aspect of what it means to be human, which is not only confined to the encounter with 
the infinite Other.  
Throughout his work in the 1950‟s Levinas continues to stress the alignment of 
freedom and the cognitive conceptual powers of the subject, believing „knowledge‟ to 
be a violent assimilation of the world whereby the object of knowledge is consumed by 
the subject without remainder.  Levinas argues that in order for critical consciousness to 
have arisen in the subject in the first place, the subject must have been placed into 
question from the outside, as he does not believe that critical consciousness would have 
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 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: 
Duquesne University Press, 2001).  
23
 Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. by Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne 
University Press, 1987). This is a collection of essays which Levinas delivered in December 1946 and 
January 1947 in the Philosophical College in Paris, and was first published in this format in 1948. In 1979 
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spontaneously arisen in the individual free subject.  Thus freedom needs to be 
accounted for.  Freedom in philosophy is generally discussed in terms of an already 
constituted ego.  Subjectivity and agency is not presupposed by Levinas, who in his 
analysis pushes back behind the constituting subject, and hence back behind freedom.  
Levinas will come to argue that only the face of the human Other is profoundly different 
enough, and other enough, to disturb the self, and to shock the self into the realisation 
that there is an outside that will remain outside.  This inaugurates the intentionality of 
consciousness at its most fundamental and transcendental levels.  It is this encounter 
that brings about objectivity and invests freedom.  This moment will be described as a 
moment of sensibility that brings meaning from the outside, a meaning not fully 
containable and consumable by consciousness. There is a discourse prior to a rational 
discourse, the facing of the Other.  
Chapter four brings our study to a close with an examination of Levinas‟s 
argument for the justification of freedom (understood as representation and intentional 
meaning-giving thought) to our reading of Totality and Infinity.  The important 
distinction between the passive affective self and the active ego, first introduced in 
Existence and Existents, is pivotal for Levinas‟s developed thinking on subjectivity and 
freedom presented in Totality and Infinity.  There is among commentators  of this work 
a tension between two somewhat conflicting readings of Totality and Infinity, both of 
which premised on two different accounts of freedom in Levinas‟s description of 
subjectivity.  The first, which is the most prevalent reading, views the encounter with 
the Other as an empirical or linear event, whereby the radically free self is given prior to 
the encounter with the Other, lives a self-sufficient egotistical „free‟ life that through the 
encounter with the Other is re-orientated, made good and becomes ethically free.
24
  By 
bringing our reading of Levinas‟s earlier work to bear on Totality and Infinity in this 
chapter it is argued that the empirical reading is not consistent with Levinas‟s earlier 
works, nor does it explain many other crucial aspects of Levinas‟s description of 
subjectivity given in the text.  A straight-forward empirical reading leads to a circular 
argument, as Peter Atterton remarks, as it presupposes that which the Other is said to 
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 Rudi Visker, for example, goes along with this reading of the text, „the Good liberates, institutes a new 
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Visker, The Inhuman Condition. Looking for Difference after Levinas and Heidegger (Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 2008), p. 165.  
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invest, such as rationality, objectivity, language and sociality.
25
 By comparison, other 
commentators, most notably Theodore de Boer,
26
 argue that for Levinas the encounter 
with the Other is better understood as a transcendental condition that makes possible 
and accounts for indispensable aspects of human life, such as, for instance, sociality, 
labour, and the freedom of representation.  For these commentators the encounter with 
the Other is a peculiar kind of transcendental event that invests freedom understood as 
both freedom aligned with reason and also free from fate, as the Other breaks the 
totality of the Same and brings new possibilities that would otherwise not be possible 
for the self alone.  This metaphysical transcendental event which invests freedom, 
nevertheless, is concretely encountered in the empirical world.  The self can „forget‟ the 
responsibility towards the Other and live an egotistical existence, and this is why it 
takes the infinite Other to shock the self and to „remind‟ it of its responsibility.  
Levinas, then, does not want to rest the encounter with the Other, or the 
constitution of the world, on a free activity of the subject, because this would then mean 
that the Other would also be a moment in the life of the subject that is reducible to the 
power and freedom of the I.  For Levinas, freedom must be given from the outside, or 
else how can the freedom of the subject be justified without avoiding solipsism, the 
social contract tradition, a Hegelian master-slave dialectic, or reducing morality to a 
mere social evolutionary adaptation that ensures the survival of the fittest individual and 
the species.  As Levinas famously opens Totality and Infinity, „[e]veryone will readily 
agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by 
morality‟.27  The stakes are high.  By describing morality as the basis of subjectivity, 
and as prior to freedom, Levinas not only provides a justification of morality but also a 
justification of freedom.  
Contra to the traditional modern view of man as a free spontaneous subject who 
ventures out into the world to come to know and possess it, Levinas provides a 
metaphysical description of the ethical subject who is disrupted by the face of the Other, 
in an encounter not of his choosing or making.  I do not turn my gaze freely to the Other 
in order to grasp it in a theoretical manner; it is, rather, the Other who faces me, disturbs 
me, places my freedom to be and my right to exist in question and arouses my goodness 
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 See, Atterton, „From Transcendental Freedom to the Other: Levinas and Kant‟.  Atterton is one of the 
few scholars who emphasises that for Levinas reason presupposes the relation with the Other, and that 
„the priority cannot be straightforwardly chronological or logical‟, (ibid., p. 344). 
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 See, Theodore de Boer, „An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy‟, in The Rationality of Transcendence. 
Studies in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben, 1997), pp. 1-32.  
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 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 21.     
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whilst founding critical consciousness.  Responsibility, in other words, precedes 
freedom.  Ethical meaning is built into the very constitution of self-hood.  A different 
way of looking at freedom is given in Levinas‟s account of responsibility, and it is a 
way that re-opens a philosophical meditation on the meaning of freedom and 
responsibility in the human condition as experienced; or, at least, so shall we argue in 
this study. 
 13 
CHAPTER I 
PRE-WORLD WAR II WRITINGS (1930–1940) 
 
The question of freedom was a question that Levinas had long reflected upon before he 
began to see and highlight the ethical significance of the Other and its claim on the 
exercise of individual freedom.  In fact, in this chapter we shall remark that his earliest 
reflections on the concept of freedom as he encountered it in the writings of Henri 
Bergson (1859–1941) was one of the major factors that lead him ultimately to 
investigate the importance of the alterity of the Other in ethical experience as well as 
noting the absence of this consideration in both Husserlian and Heideggerian respective 
phenomenological philosophies and their accounts of freedom in consciousness 
(Husserl) and in Dasein (Heidegger).
1
  From both a historical and a philosophical point 
of view, therefore, it is of importance to deal first with the influence of Bergson on 
Levinas‘s earliest thinking on the concept of freedom. 
 
§1.1 BERGSON‘S INFLUENCE AND THE FEAR OF FATE OVER FREEDOM  
 
Levinas was a student of philosophy at Strasbourg University from 1923–1928.  During 
this time Bergson was seen as a hugely influential and important thinker in France, and 
whose work philosophy students at that time in France could not have avoided.  Levinas 
was no exception.
2
  In an interview with Philippe Nemo in 1981, Nemo asks Levinas 
                                                 
1
 The methodology followed in this study is to retrace the development of Levinas‘s thinking on freedom 
in his early work; particularly the place in his thinking of freedom understood as critical self-reflective 
thought, in distinction to his more widely discussed relationship to freedom understood as spontaneity 
and self-interest. In following the development of his thinking it is important to consider Levinas‘s 
reading of his influences in this area, as it is this reading that guides Levinas‘s own thinking and early 
development. Although questions pertaining to the validity or accuracy of such readings warrant 
sustained reflection and research, and indeed much work has already be done on addressing such 
questions, due to our focus such questions will be mainly set aside. Even if Levinas‘s reading of such 
influences can be shown to be inaccurate, the direction and development of his thought cannot be 
retrospectively undone, and it is his development that we wish to trace here. It should be kept in mind 
therefore, that it is Levinas‘s reading of Bergson, Husserl and Heidegger that will be presented in this 
dissertation.    
2
 Reflecting on the classes he took in philosophy while at Strasbourg University from 1923 to 1928, 
Levinas, in an interview with Philippe Nemo in 1981, remarks that he was initiated into philosophy at 
eighteen by four highly respected professors, Charles Blondel (who taught psychology and introduced 
Levinas to Bergson), Maurice Halbwachs (who taught sociology), Maurice Pradines (who taught 
philosophy) and Henri Carteron (who taught classical philosophy). Although not noted by Levinas in that 
interview, his introduction to phenomenology at Strasbourg came from Jean Hering, who was a professor 
of Protestant theology. Hering studied under Husserl and had been a member of the early Göttingen 
Circle. See, Samuel Moyn, Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas Between Revelation and Ethics (New 
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about his earliest personal motivations in his study of philosophy, ‗[b]ut to what more 
personal question or anxiety has reading Bergson corresponded in you?‘, and Levinas 
replies, 
[c]ertainly to the fear of being in a world without novel possibilities, without a 
future of hope, a world where everything is regulated in advance; to the ancient 
fear before fate, be it that of a universal mechanism, absurd fate, since what is 
going to pass has in a sense already passed!
3
  
 
Given that this interview occurred in 1981, some 58 years after Levinas commenced his 
studies at Strasbourg University, one would need to exercise a degree of caution before 
accepting this self appraisal of his concerns unreflectively.  Yet a close reading of 
Levinas‘s earliest writings reveals that there is indeed a tension between fate and 
freedom as an underlying topic of philosophical concern.
4
  What is of significance in 
this later assessment, however, is that it reveals to us that in his early student days 
Levinas had already been concerned in safeguarding the concept of freedom from a 
mechanistic, deterministic view of man, and that he brought this concern with him to his 
reading of phenomenology.  
The presence of Bergson in Levinas‘s work is evident from the very first article 
which he wrote and published ‗On ‗Ideas‘ of M. E, Husserl‘ (‗Sur les „Ideen‟ de M.E. 
Husserl‘).  Indeed many commentators and critics acknowledge that Bergson was 
somewhat influential at an early stage on Levinas‘s thinking, but then proceed to 
prioritise the phenomenological context of his work, directing attention to the influences 
of Husserl and Heidegger.
5
  What is of importance for our present purposes is to shed 
                                                                                                                                               
York: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 38. In his response to Nemo, Levinas emphasised the 
importance of both Bergson and Durkheim, within university education, in France at that time.  ‗Initiation 
into the great philosophers Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and the Cartesians, Kant.  Not yet Hegel, in 
those twenties, at the Faculty of Arts of Strasbourg! But it was Durkheim and Bergson who seemed to me 
especially alive in the instruction and attention of the students. It was they whom one cited, and they 
whom one opposed.  They had incontestably been the professors of our masters.‘  Emmanuel Levinas, 
Ethics and Infinity. Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. by Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1985), p. 26.  At the age of twenty two Levinas attended University in 
Freiburg, during the 1928–29 school year, to study under Husserl. In Freiburg University Levinas was 
also then a student of Heidegger.   
3
 Ibid., p. 28. 
4
 This topic is explicitly central to one of Levinas‘s earliest articles, ‗Reflections on the Philosophy of 
Hitlerism‘, which we will discuss in more detail later in this chapter. 
5
 For example, one commentator, when discussing Levinas‘s years in Strasbourg remarks, ‗[a]lthough he 
[Levinas] briefly followed Henri Bergson‘s process philosophy, which was the intellectual fashion of the 
time, he soon devoted himself to the burgeoning school of phenomenology‘. B. C. Hutchens, Levinas: A 
Guide for the Perplexed (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), p. 9.  Hutchens, therefore, suggests 
that Levinas‘s interest in Bergson was a passing fad, in line with the fashion of the day, and soon to be 
forgotten.  There are of course notable exceptions to this understatement of the influence of Bergson, such 
as John Llewelyn, Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of Ethics (London and New York: Routledge, 
1995), in which Bergson appears right at the beginning and throughout.  See, also, Leonard Lawlor, The 
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some light on the kind of philosophical concerns that Levinas brought with him to his 
initial readings of Husserl and Heidegger‘s philosophies, and in particular, to show that 
one of those concerns was freedom, as influenced by his reading of Bergson‘s work. 6 
Throughout his career in philosophy Levinas makes references to the work of 
Bergson and stresses both the influence that Bergson has on his own thinking and also 
on the history of philosophy in general.  In several interviews, for example, Levinas 
notes with sadness that to the detriment of philosophy Bergson was very rarely cited or 
studied after the Second World War.
7
  Levinas held Bergson‘s thought in such high 
esteem that he listed him among the five philosophers that he believed to be 
indispensible for the way in which the history of philosophy developed, alongside Plato, 
Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger.
8
  One commentator who does not overlook the theme of 
freedom in the work of Levinas and who links this theme to the philosophy of Bergson 
in an explicit, however cursory a manner, is Howard Caygill.  In chapter one of Levinas 
and the Political we find a fifteen page section devoted to the topic of ‗Phenomenology 
and Freedom‘ in Levinas‘s earliest pre-War work. At the beginning of this section 
Caygill remarks that,  
[t]he role of Bergson and the problem of freedom in Levinas‘s reception of 
phenomenology is almost wholly unappreciated.  Nevertheless it is the key, not 
only to Levinas‘s understanding and critique of Husserl and Heidegger and his 
concept of the political, but also to the centrality of the issue of freedom in the 
work of French phenomenologists such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.  In 
reflecting on his debt to Husserl, Levinas was explicit about finding in Husserl‘s 
Logical Investigations a way of reconciling the demands of methodological 
rigour with the radical impetus of Bergson‘s concept of freedom.9   
 
                                                                                                                                               
Challange of Bergsonism (London and New York: Continuum, 2003), pp. 60-63.  This commenator reads 
Bergson as posing a possible challenge ‗to ethics in the Levinasian sense‘ (ibid.).  Richard Cohen also 
agrees with Levinas that Bergson was crucial in shaping and influencing the development of the themes 
of contemporary philosophy, and he features prominently alongside Levinas in Richard Cohen, Ethics, 
Exegesis and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  Simon Critchley does not 
underestimate the influence of Bergson either, in his, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, 
2
nd
 edn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999).    
6
 Bergson‘s presence in Time and the Other (Le temps et l‟autre) is undeniable as he is often referenced 
by Levinas.  The impact of how Bergson understands the themes of time, élan vital, duration, and also the 
image in relation to Levinas‘s writings on aesthetics, has been explored by scholars, but work remains to 
be done on the influence of Bergson in the area of freedom.       
7
 See, Is It Righteous To Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, p. 30, 86, 154, and 200-201. 
8
 Ibid., ‗Intention, Event, and the Other‘, p. 154.  
9
 Caygill, Levinas and The Political, p. 15.  As Caygill‘s study into freedom in the early work of Levinas 
is the only one of its kind, and is also highly creditable, we will be referring to his reading throughout this 
chapter.  For the most part we will agree with his reading, although we will explore further works that 
Caygill does not mention and also part ways on a few points, outlined below in the relevant sections.    
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Husserl‘s phenomenology was appealing to Levinas partly because he seen in Husserl‘s 
approach the methodological tools and intellectual thoroughness that went beyond that 
of Bergsonian intuition.
10
  In Caygill‘s estimation Levinas was reluctant to abandon the 
concept of freedom, yet he was not entirely satisfied with Bergson‘s intuition since it 
lacked the theoretical foundation that could protect it from fascist appropriation.
11
  
Caygill maintains that Levinas‘s consistent addressing of the theme of the relationship 
between intentionality and intuition in his early work reveals an aspiration to find an 
alternative ‗to the opposition of rationalism and irrational intuition‘ which he found in 
Bergson‘s work.12  Indeed Levinas‘s first two studies on Husserl, his ‗On ‗Ideas‘ of M. 
E. Husserl‘ (1929) and his doctoral thesis The Theory of Intuition in Husserl‟s 
Phenomenology (1930) are slightly coloured by this opposition between Bergson and 
Husserl.  In his article ‗On ‗Ideas‘ of M. E. Husserl‘ we can detect Levinas‘s argument, 
however implicit, that Husserl‘s understanding of intentionality is an answer that 
overcomes the strict separation between reason and intuition, simultaneity and 
succession, in Bergson‘s thought, and as such, potentially offers a more secure 
foundation for freedom than Bergson can offer.  Throughout this chapter, the exact 
nature of Bergson‘s influence on Levinas‘s early thinking on freedom will be indicated 
as it arises in the particular text under consideration. The first evidence of his influence 
can be detected in Levinas‘s first published article, which we shall turn to next.     
 
§1.2 THE INITIAL APPEAL OF HUSSERL 
 
Levinas‘s ‗On ‗Ideas‘ of M. E. Husserl‘ (Sur les „Ideen‟ de M.E. Husserl) was first 
published in 1929 in Revue Philosophique.  This was Levinas‘s first published article, 
and the purpose of this article, as he writes, is ‗to present the essential ideas of this 
book‘.13  For the most part, therefore, this article is an expositional piece on the First 
Book of Husserl‘s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
                                                 
10
 This is reflected in Levinas‘s interview with François Poirié from 1986, in which Levinas explains that 
one of things that drew him to Husserl‘s phenomenology was the possibility of thinking ‗a new way of 
unfolding ―concepts‖ beyond the Bergsonian appeal to the inspiration in intuition‘. Is It Righteous To 
Be?, p. 31.  
11
 Caygill here cites Georges Sorel as an example.  Sorel, who was a student of Bergson, appropriated his 
thought, particularly the concept of élan vital, for the purposes of defending the use of violence in the 
class struggle, in his work Reflections on Violence. The Classic Essay on Syndicalist Revolution.   
12
 Caygill, Levinas and The Political, p. 15.  
13
 Emmanuel Levinas, ‗On Ideas‘, in Discovering Existence with Husserl, trans. by Richard A. Cohen and 
Michael B. Smith (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1998), pp. 3-31 (p. 3). 
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Phenomenological Philosophy, following the same general plan as Husserl, dividing his 
exposition into four sections as Husserl does.  At the beginning of the article, however, 
Levinas notes that as Husserl‘s terminology is so uncommon in France he will avoid 
using the specific terminology unless it is necessary for clarity‘s sake to do so.  In place 
of some of the less well-known phenomenological terminology Levinas uses the better 
known language in France of Bergson, such as ‗animation‘ and ‗life‘.  It is made clear 
from the start that Husserl‘s Ideas does not present a system of philosophy, it rather 
demonstrates that philosophical problems can be posed in a new way and provides the 
possibility of ‗positive work‘ in philosophy, ‗the work of generations‘.14  Here Levinas 
first mentions one of the main appeals of phenomenology, and one which he will often 
repeat, that phenomenology presents us with a totally new way of both posing and 
solving problems in philosophy.  
Some of the most interesting elements of this article, in the sense of containing 
an original contribution by Levinas, come in the form of footnotes, which is 
unsurprising in a work that purports to be primarily expositional.
15
  In the footnotes of 
this article, nonetheless, Levinas presents Husserl‘s descriptions of intentionality as an 
indirect critique of Bergson‘s views on consciousness as spatalizing duration.16  
Bergson‘s contention was that reality is constantly changing and can only be 
apprehended through intuition.  On this account reality is not to be reached through 
concepts which break up the continuous flow of conscious life, which is duration.  Our 
everyday view of reality rather, in Bergson‘s view, is mediated through concepts and 
the mechanical view of time as something that is broken up into consecutive moments 
in homogenous space, which enables us to do many things such as have a language and 
to engage with one another.
17
  However, when we illegitimately translate the 
unextended quality of our experiences into extended quantifiable units of time, 
simultaneity as succession, problems arise.  One such problem is that this view of 
reality, which is a misconception of the duration of lived experience, is consistent with 
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 ‗The book of Ideas means to be an invitation to work‘. Ibid., p. 4.  In his interview with Nemo from 
1981, Levinas again comments that an element of what he found attractive in phenomenology was the 
possibility of ‗working in philosophy‘, beyond the activity ‗of a purely pedagogical activity or the vanity 
of fabricating books?‘ Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, p. 28. 
15
 See, Caygill, Levinas and The Political, p. 16, n. 26.  
16
 See Levinas‘s footnote in the section ‗Consciousness and the perceptual world‘ which reveals his 
preference for Husserl‘s description of intentionality, as it overcomes the dichotomy between reason and 
intuition in Bergson. 
17
 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will. An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. by F. L. 
Pogson (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, INC., 2001), p. 167. 
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determinism (both physical and psychological) and, as such, makes any defence of free 
will problematic.  Bergson, nevertheless, does not attempt to defend freedom within the 
parameters of that world-view, he critiques, rather, this approach by presenting an 
alternative view of consciousness as amenable to measure and constantly becoming.
18
  
Although we mostly operate within the view of reality mediated through concepts and 
viewing time as ‗strung on a special line‘, and so, as seemingly consistent with causal 
necessity and determinism, we can get back ‗into pure duration‘ and perform a free act, 
‗which springs from the self and from the self alone, the act which bears the mark of our 
personality is truly free, for our self alone will lay claim to its paternity‘.19  As we 
progress through Levinas‘s work we shall see that Levinas was struck by Bergson‘s 
ideas on time and duration, and also his views on freedom as the possibility of ‗novelty‘ 
and alterity.  However, on the question of the role and the nature of intuition Levinas 
finds Husserl‘s account superior to Bergson‘s description, partly because it offers the 
possibility of saving freedom from irrationalism.   
In the preceding section on intentionality Levinas stresses that Husserl‘s great 
originality lies in his insight into the nature of consciousness as intentionality, that is to 
say, that consciousness is always a consciousness of something.  Consciousness, viewed 
in this light, is not understood as the mediating principle between the perceiver and the 
world, between a subject and an object.  It is not a dormant potentiality that has the 
possibility of being filled with various intentional (real or mental) knowable objects; 
consciousness, rather, is always relational.  Levinas claims that this great insight into 
the nature of human consciousness does away with the traditional problem of 
knowledge precisely because here there is no longer a chasm between the subject and an 
object to be theoretically breached in order to account for the possibility of knowledge.  
In this section Levinas also turns to another aspect of the traditional approach to the 
perceptual world of which phenomenology provides an alternative account, and one he 
notes that does away with the Bergsonian tenet that a permanent object undergoing 
change whilst maintaining its permanency is a distortion of consciousness.
20
  In this 
regard, Husserl‘s view of consciousness as intentionality rejects the traditional view of a 
radical dichotomy between primary qualities belonging to objects in the external world 
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 Ibid., p. 231.  
19
 Ibid., p. 173. 
20
 ‗To put duration in space is really to contradict oneself and place succession within simultaneity.  
Hence we must not say that external things endure, but rather that there is in them some inexpressible 
reason in virtue of which we cannot examine them at successive moments of our own duration without 
observing that they have changed.‘ Ibid., p. 227. 
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while secondary qualities of experiences are viewed as an edifice of subjective 
consciousness, comparable to the view of consciousness as a container in which certain 
secondary qualities are stored and then attributed to certain objects in the world when 
appropriate.  From an experiential-phenomenological point of view, there is no evidence 
for this dichotomy.  We do not simply perceive ‗red‘, but we perceive many variations 
of red and still describe each experience as a perception of ‗red‘.  What belongs to the 
content of consciousness is not the quality, red, that is attributed to the object, but the 
sensation of red (the sensed red).  In a footnote Levinas notes that this approach makes 
Bergson‘s thesis of viewing the extended permanent object as a distortion of 
consciousness redundant.
21
  The question of the permanency of substance, or of the 
subject-object division, then, is overcome. In reference to the transcendental-
phenomenological epoché put forward by Husserl in Ideas I, Levinas explains how 
through the reduction the natural attitude is set aside, including the belief in the absolute 
existence of external objects — and this also includes belief in the absolute separate 
existence of one‘s own empirical ‗psychological consciousness‘ — and what is left over 
or revealed is ‗absolute consciousness‘ (‗pure transcendental consciousness‘).22  Hence, 
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 ‗This apparent antinomy between the multiplicity of sensuous moments which represent the object and 
the identical unity of the object itself does not, therefore, necessarily imply the Bergsonian thesis that the 
identical object is a distortion of consciousness: it allows for a resolution through the distinction between 
the act and the object of consciousness.‘ Levinas, ‗On Ideas‘, p. 182, n.16.  Levinas is here referring to 
the Bergsonian thesis that consciousness continuously flows, and in principle successive states are 
indistinguishable from one another.  In space, however, we must not attribute this same endurance, and 
the idea of a permanent identical object undergoing change is a distortion of consciousness.  Bergson, 
Time and Free Will, p. 227. 
22
 The epoché that is methodologically applied in Ideas I (1913) is significantly different from, what 
Husserl will later come to call, the ―eidetic reduction‖ of his earlier  Logical Investigations (1900-01), and 
it marks the distinction between the two points to Husserl‘s development from descriptive-eidetic 
psychology to transcendental phenomenology.  In Logical Investigations the distinction Husserl operates 
is between empirical fact and essences.  In this work, Husserl had conceived of consciousness as part of 
the empirical person, of the experiencing person, but since the essential features of the experiences of a 
normatively valid logical consciousness as such is the goal of his enquiry, he methodological sets aside 
all matters of empirical fact and the question of the external existence of the objects of consciousness, in 
order to focus on a description of our perception of our own logical experiences of consciousness.  In 
Ideas I the reduction is a methodological requirement in order to get outside of the natural attitude and to 
reach the new intended area of study, that of ‗transcendental consciousness‘.  Thus the distinction is not 
between ‗eidos‘ and ‗fact‘, but between mundane consciousness and pure consciousness.  Theodore de 
Boer sets out the distinction between the reduction of Logical Investigations and the epoché of Ideas I, 
remarking that, ‗It is clear that something more, something different, is at issue here than in Logical 
Investigations.  This is immediately apparent from the fact that all of reality, including our consciousness, 
is disconnected, and that the residue is now called ―pure‖ or ―transcendental consciousness‖ [...] It [the 
epoché] then appears to be an operation that makes a new area accessible to us, an area that can become 
the field of a new science.‘ Th. De Boer, The Development of Husserl‟s Thought, trans. by Theodore 
Plantinga (The Hague, Boston and London: Nijhoff, 1978), pp. 328-31, (p. 331), see, also, ibid., pp. 454-
63.  Although Levinas does not explicitly compare the eidetic reduction in the Logical Investigations with 
the epoché of the natural attitude in Ideas I, he clearly demonstrates an appreciation for Husserl‘s new 
and radical understanding of ‗consciousness‘ as ‗pure consciousness‘ in Ideas I, and how on such an 
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after the reduction is implemented, what is reflected on in phenomenology is the 
‗animation‘ of consciousness and its objectivities, that is, the experiencing of, for 
example, ‗red‘.23 
Just as in the section mentioned above, where Levinas presents intentionality as 
an alternative approach to the opposition between rationalism and irrational intuition 
and the problem of the relationship between consciousness and an object, Bergson is 
again eclipsed by Husserl when it comes to Husserl‘s view of the concept as necessarily 
incomplete in our experiences.  This indicates that Levinas‘s interest in phenomenology 
was, at least partially, due to the alternative way of thinking it provided, a way that was 
not limited to the strict opposition between intuition and concepts.  One does not have 
to choose between the two opposing options left open to us by Bergson, where 
consciousness is either viewed as intuition and, as such, not possible as an object of 
study, or known through stifling concepts. As Levinas eloquently phrases it in the 
footnote,  
[w]ith Husserl there is a third possibility.  Intelligence does not work solely with 
the help of geometrical concepts — there can be essence without there being 
immobility and death in it.  The spirit of finesse and the spirit of geometry are 
not the only possible ones: knowledge knows other paths.
24
  
 
Caygill suggests that what is at stake in this couched discussion, relegated to footnotes, 
is the concept of freedom.  In Time and Free Will Bergson aligns freedom with intuition 
and duration, as well as in opposition to conceptuality and geometrical space.
25
  When 
Levinas calls this strict separation of intuition and reason into question, he is also, 
                                                                                                                                               
understanding, consciousness cannot be the object of study from a natural-scientific empirical-
psychological perspective.  When discussing the epoché of Ideas I Levinas points out that one could 
query if in the transcendental reduction from the natural attitude to the transcendental-phenomenological 
attitude consciousness is not also bracketed as part of the existing world.  He then goes on to explain that 
this is not the case, pointing out that what resists the epoché, and what is therefore the object of study, is 
one‘s own actual consciousness but purified of naturalistic conceptions and ‗considered from a certain 
point of view‘. Levinas, ‗On Ideas‘, p. 13. He goes on to draw a distinction between ‗absolute 
consciousness‘ (‗pure transcendental consciousness‘) and ‗psychological consciousness‘, and to point out 
that although it is true to say that ‗consciousness‘ as a psychological object of study is within nature, and 
is indeed set aside in the transcendental reduction, what remains, for Husserl, is ‗absolute consciousness‘ 
(‗pure transcendental consciousness‘) which is independent of nature. Levinas, ‗On Ideas‘, p. 16.  
23
 Caygill notes that Levinas‘s use of the phrase ‗sensations are moments of life and not space‘ to 
characterise how intentionality ‗animates‘ the content of consciousness, explicitly leaves the Bergsonian 
view behind. Caygill, Levinas and The Political, p. 17.  
24
 Levinas, ‗On Ideas‘, p. 183, n. 20. Levinas is referring here to a distinction Pascal made between the 
‗esprit de géométrie‘ (spirit of geometry) and ‗esprit de finesse‘ (spirit of refinement/delicacy), in his 
treatise De l'Esprit géométrique.  
25
 ‗It is because, finally, even in the cases where the action is freely performed, we cannot reason about it 
without setting out its conditions externally to one another, therefore in space no longer in pure duration.‘ 
Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 240. 
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therefore, questioning the understanding of freedom as located solely in intuition.  Thus 
it is his indicated preference for Husserl‘s third way — the possibility of attaining an 
inexact (non-mathematical) concept through the description of an individual Erlebnis, 
guided by an eidetic intuition — which leaves open the possibility of a description of 
freedom that is neither opposed to a concept nor lacking any firm foundation in intuitive 
experience.  We will see that at the end of his The Theory of Intuition in Husserl‟s 
Phenomenology Levinas has in no way left Bergson completely behind because in that 
work Levinas will favour Bergson‘s approach to freedom as it provides a metaphysical 
foundation that is lacking in Husserl.     
The next section that Levinas mentions Bergson, again in a footnote, is in a 
section entitled ‗Subjectively oriented phenomenology‘.  In this section Levinas draws 
his reader‘s attention to certain issues of concern to Husserl regarding subjectively 
oriented phenomenology, such as, the constitution of time in consciousness as duration 
as opposed to cosmic time or measurable objective clock-time, that are similar to 
concerns in Bergson‘s thought and that overlap in places, despite Husserl‘s lack of 
knowledge of Bergson‘s work.  Caygill believes both this and the two earlier footnotes 
provide us with further insight into the underlying theme that is directing the entire 
commentary, which is ‗a set of variations on the themes of an intuitive conceptuality 
and a conceptual intuition‘.26  This implicit focus is what Levinas termed ‗the third 
alternative‘ offered by Husserl, against the strict opposition between intuition and 
concepts.  Both the preceding sections and the sections that follow, and the continued 
focus on the role of intuition, understood in the broader Husserlian sense of including 
eidetic intuition, can be seen to support this hypothesis.  Intuition is given an extended 
role in Husserl‘s description.  It has a double function as an intuition of both object and 
essence.  The immediate data of consciousness, through intuition, is intuitable not only 
as, for example, pure individual sensed objects (e.g., seeing a piece of white paper), but 
also in categorial form that are expressed in, for example, a synthetic judgement (e.g., 
‗this paper is white‘).27  The categorical object is given as immediately or directly to a 
logical-categorical consciousness as is the individual sensed object given to sensuous 
intuition.  In addition to this, Husserl notes that at the basis of universal a priori 
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 Caygill, Levinas and The Political, p. 19.  
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 See, Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. II. trans. by J. N. Findlay, ed. by Dermot Moran 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), Logical Investigation, VI, Ch. 6 Sensuous and Categorial 
Intuition, § 40. ‗The problem of the fulfilment of categorical meaning-forms, with a thought leading 
towards its solution,‘ pp. 271-73.   
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judgements, such as, for instance, colour implies extension, are ‗general objects‘ that are 
also given to intuition; that is to say, one can see immediately  that it is of the essence of 
colour (as a universal object) to be extended.  This basis in eidetic intuition provides the 
experiential basis for the validity of this judgement for not only every actual colour (or 
coloured thing) that one sees empirically but also for all possible individual colours (or 
coloured thing) that can be experienced by any rational consciousness.  This implies 
that in experience there is more than individual colours given to sensuous intuition (or 
sense judgement) because ‗essences‘ themselves are given to our experience, albeit to 
eidetic ideation or eidetic intuition.  Thus it follows for Husserl that no longer is the 
judgement mediated through a concept, such as was in the case of Kant‘s descriptions of 
consciousness, but an intellectual intuition ‗grasps them‘ [essences] based on the 
sensuous intuition.
28
  And it is ‗[i]n this view,‘ as Levinas remarks, that ‗rationalism and 
empiricism are in a way reconciled.  The source of knowledge is indeed experience, but 
experience in the broad sense of the term, understood as intuition, which can see 
essences and categories in addition to sensuous empirical facts‘. 29   
Intuition, then, serves a double function in Husserl‘s account, to present 
individual objects to sense experience whilst, at the same time, to be open to intuiting 
higher objects of intelligible structures that are necessarily true of our actual experiences 
embedded in experience itself.  That consciousness is always a consciousness of 
something includes ‗essences‘ or intelligible structures that make our sensible 
experiences possible.  It is this phenomenological concept of intentionality, as Levinas 
correctly comments, that supports the third alternative, ‗conceptual intuition‘.  
It is not without reason, then, that as Levinas proceeds through his commentary 
on Ideas he stresses that the great originality of Husserl lies in his description of 
consciousness as intentionality.
30
 No longer is consciousness viewed as a bridge 
between the subject and the object, rather consciousness is the relation with an object 
itself.  Caygill, however, highlights a problem with this view of intentionality as the 
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 Levinas, ‗On Ideas‘, p 6. Husserl‘s discovery of categorical intuition paves the way for eidetic 
intuition, in the sense that it widens the basis of intuition from sensuous intuition to directly intended 
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Husserl‟s Thought. 
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 Levinas, ‗On Ideas‘, p. 7, my emphasis.  
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 Ibid., p. 20 and p. 22.  
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fundamental property of consciousness itself, and not as a bond between consciousness 
and an object.  As a ‗fundamental relation‘ intentionality would need to precede 
consciousness and its object, and yet consciousness itself is already intentional.  If 
consciousness is viewed as intentionality, which is the fundamental property of 
consciousness, how can intentionality precede consciousness when consciousness is 
intentional?  A more fundamental relation would need to be posited, which would itself 
need to overcome the same problem, and theoretically this view of intentionality could 
dissolve into a ‗bad infinity‘.31  How can consciousness be both the object of reflection 
and the means of reflecting?  This problem is overcome through the transcendence of 
intentionality.  Although consciousness is both the object and the means of study 
through intuition, this does not result in a bad infinity, as thought always transcends 
itself.  The transcendental nature of consciousness is one of the crucial elements of 
Husserl‘s approach that made it so appealing to Levinas, and will become of ever more 
importance to his own position as his work progresses.  Consciousness as the object of 
inquiry is immediately accessible through inner perception, however, as thought is 
thought that always transcends itself, consciousness is both directed to itself and yet 
always beyond itself.  The problem that faced Descartes‘ cogito, that of having to justify 
the belief in the existence of an external world once the existence of the ‗I‘ was deduced 
from the premise ‗I think‘, is overcome through a similar basis, that of the nature of 
consciousness.  The difference being that for Husserl the essence of consciousness is to 
be relational.  It is in the next section, through a contrast between Descartes‘ cogito ‗I 
think‘ (cogito) with Husserl‘s ‗I think something‘ (cogito cogitatum) that Levinas 
stresses this originality again.  The relation to the object, which is intentionality, can be 
immediately known to intuition, and it is this that leads Levinas to characterise 
phenomenology as the ‗intuitive study of intentionality‘.32  Similarly, Levinas notes that 
the distinction between a ‗mental‘ and a ‗real‘ object, attributed by him to the 
scholastic-Aristotelian tradition, is destroyed.
33
  As thought transcends itself the relation 
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 ‗[T]he ―relation to the object‖, intentionality, in all the wealth of its modifications and forms, becomes 
accessible to immanent intuition. This intuitive study of intentionality — is phenomenology.‘ Levinas, 
‗On Ideas‘, p. 22. 
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 ‗Husserl‘s discovery was that it is the so-called real object itself that in reflection is given as a mental 
object.‘ Levinas, ‗On Ideas‘, p. 183, n. 23. On this point, Levinas overlooks the importance of Husserl‘s 
relation to the work of Husserl‘s teacher, Franz Brentano. In his Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint (1874) Brentano already rejected this particular distinction, believed to be a feature of 
Scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy, between a ‗mental‘ and a ‗real‘ object as two objects directly intended 
in perception.  On this point Husserl was in agreement with Brentano.  A member of Brentano‘s school, 
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to an object is with that of an existing object, and given through intuition.  As we will 
see below, in Levinas‘s later writings he will be critical of the ‗meaning giving‘ 
(Sinngebung) role of intentionality and also come to view it as more significant than 
Husserl himself realised, as, for Levinas, in Husserl‘s account the ego is credited with 
too much.  In his not too distant article ‗The Work of Edmund Husserl‘, written in 1940, 
Levinas will align this meaning giving role of consciousness with a particular view of 
freedom, which we shall examine in more detail below.   
Although it is not directly related to freedom, it is interesting to take note of the 
final section of this paper, which Levinas entitles ‗The intersubjective reduction‘.  
Levinas remarks that the work he has been commenting on focuses mainly on the 
solitary ego and, as such, cannot ‗exhaust the meaning of the objectivity of this reality‘, 
which could only come through the agreement of multiple egos.
34
  At this very early 
stage Levinas harbours hope that Husserl‘s later researches in phenomenology will offer 
an adequate account of intersubjectivity, through the theory of empathy (Einfühlung), in 
his yet unpublished works (of Ideas II), and in doing so do away with the threat of 
solipsism that hangs in the background, securing a firmer foundation for truth beyond 
that of the lone ego.
35
  If phenomenology is to be successful,  
it must pass beyond the quasi-solipsistic attitude in which the [transcendental-] 
phenomenological reduction, which may be called the ‗egological reduction,‘ 
leaves us [...].  But all the investigations of egological phenomenology must be 
subordinated to the ‗intersubjective phenomenology‘ which alone will be able to 
exhaust the meaning of truth and reality.
36
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Kasimir Twardowski, develops Brentano‘s doctrine of intentionality in the direction of the Scholastic 
doctrine, but Husserl was critical of this development.  Husserl, nevertheless, was critical of Brentano‘s 
belief that the directly intended object (the intentional object of sense), e.g., a colour given to outer sense 
perception, was an ‗immanent‘ object in consciousness and also a ‗sign‘ for an extra-mentally existing 
‗real object‘ that is discovered by natural scientists, i.e., molecular movements (light particles or light 
waves).  From a phenomenological point of view, the intended object of perception is the end term of 
perception, and not a sign for something else, as Husserl correctly argues. See, De Boer, The 
Development of Husserl‟s Thought, esp. his section on ‗the intentional object and ―real‖ object‘, pp. 190-
95. See, also, Cyril McDonnell, ‗Brentano's Revaluation of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality into a 
Root-Concept of Descriptive Psychology‘, in Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society, (2006), pp. 
124-71.    
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 Levinas, ‗On Ideas‘, p. 30. 
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 As this is mostly an expositional piece Levinas rarely diverges from the purpose of presenting a 
summary of Husserl‘s Ideas I.  One can sense, nevertheless, Levinas‘s own concerns couched within the 
article, such as the questions he raises at the end of section 13.  ‗How can one distinguish consciousness 
from the object toward which it is directed?  And in the special case of the world, toward which 
consciousness is directed as toward an object, and to which it is bound in animate being — is 
consciousness truly distinct from it [qua living being in the world]?‘ Levinas, ‗On Ideas‘, p. 13.  
36
 Ibid., p. 30. 
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At this early stage we can see Levinas‘s preference for questions relating to inter-
subjectivity and not to the lone ego‘s constitution of its self and the world.  A preference 
that is again evident in his choice to select the fifth and sixth meditation for translation, 
in his joint translation with Gabrielle Peiffer, of Husserl‘s Cartesian Meditations 
(1931).  
Levinas carries over his interest in ‗intuition‘ into his next substantial work The 
Theory of Intuition in Husserl‟s Phenomenology (Théorie de l‟intuition dans la 
phénoménologie de Husserl) (1930).  The opposition between Husserl and Bergson 
hinted at in his earlier ‗On Ideas‘ article is likewise carried over to this text.  Levinas 
will maintain his position in the article above, where he argued that Husserl‘s 
intentionality and ‗conceptual intuition‘ provides an alternative to Bergson‘s view of 
intuition, as in Bergson‘s account there is no rational basis for intuition.  Yet despite this 
position, Levinas has become critical of Husserl‘s intellectualism and, under the 
influence of Heidegger, will raise the question whether the primacy of theoretical 
consciousness and the transcendental reduction leads the phenomenologist away from 
concrete life as it is actually lived, and from the historicity of man, and hence will result 
in an inaccurate philosophy of life.
37
  Although this is not a criticism that could be made 
of Heidegger‘s philosophical approach — precisely because Heidegger incorporates 
central features and tenets of Wilhelm Dilthey‘s (1833-1911) historical hermeneutics 
and philosophy of life into his elaboration of hermeneutic phenomenology — when it 
comes to the question of freedom Heidegger‘s approach will also be shown to be both 
inaccurate and insufficient.  We will examine this below on Levinas‘s work from the 
period that deals with Heidegger more specifically.  For now, it is suffice to say that 
Levinas will end his doctoral thesis on the question of freedom, by criticising Husserl‘s 
position for lacking the metaphysical foundation of freedom that Bergson provides.  
 
§1.3 THE ALLEGED INTELLECTUALISM OF HUSSERL 
 
Despite the lapse of time, the addition of scholarship on Husserl‘s phenomenology, and 
the youthful age of Levinas at the time of its composition, The Theory of Intuition in 
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 ‗It is in life that we must search for the origin of reality, for the origin of the objects of perception as 
well as of the sciences.  This life has a historical character in the sense in which it is said that ―all men 
have a history‖ [...] this historicity is not a secondary property of man as if man existed first and then 
became temporal and historical. Historicity and temporality form the very substantiality of man‘s 
substance.‘ Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl‟s Phenomenology, p. 156.  
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Husserl‟s Phenomenology (1930) still remains to be a great introduction to Husserl‘s 
phenomenology.  At the time of its writing only a limited number of Husserl‘s writings 
were published.
38
  Levinas, however, was a student at Freiburg from 1928-1929, where 
Husserl was teaching and had just retired, making way for Heidegger‘s return to take up 
the chair of philosophy that Husserl bequeathed in 1928.  This gave Levinas direct 
contact with both Husserl and Heidegger and thus an additional insight into both 
Husserl‘s phenomenology and one of its arch-critics (though at that time Husserl still 
had not seen Heidegger as a radical critic but as a follower of his idea of 
phenomenology). Indeed Levinas‘s reading of Husserl is heavily influenced by 
Heidegger, which is evident throughout the text, though it is also not lacking in 
originality.  Though Levinas will move on later to re-evaluate his positions contained in 
this text, despite these later nuances and a later return to additional favourable aspects of 
Husserl‘s‘ thought, Levinas‘s critical reading of Husserl from this time will broadly 
remain the same.
39
  In his article ‗The Work of Edmund Husserl‘ (‗L‟Oeuvre d‟Edmond 
Husserl‘) (1940), Levinas will delve deeper into the form which his criticism of the 
absoluteness of consciousness and Husserl‘s intellectualism took in The Theory of 
Intuition in Husserl‟s Phenomenology, and come to slightly revaluate his position.  
Given that a main focus of that article is the concept of freedom, we will examine that 
article in more detail in a separate section below.  The most crucial section of the 
current text for our understanding of Levinas‘s development, in relation to freedom, is 
the short conclusion. 
It becomes increasingly obvious throughout Levinas‘s thesis that the central 
point of criticism that he wishes to raise against Husserl is the alleged primacy of theory 
and Husserl‘s intellectualism in the elaboration of Husserl‘s idea of phenomenology.  
This intellectualism is revealed in and through the role of representation in Husserl‘s 
phenomenology.
40
 Levinas characterises Husserl‘s philosophy as an objectifying 
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 The only books by Husserl that were published at the time of writing were Philosophie der Arithmetik 
(1891), Logische Untersuchungen (1900-01 and 2
nd
 ed. 1913-1920), Ideen (1913), Vorlesungen der 
Phänomenologie des inner Zeitbewusstseins (1920), and lastly Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929) 
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 As late as 1984, in ‗Ethics as First Philosophy‘, Levinas describes Husserl‘s intentionality as 
‗understood as ―consciousness of something‖, and so is inseparable from its ―intentional object‖.  This 
structure has a noetic-noematic composition in which representation or objectivization is the incontestable 
model.‘ Emmanuel Levinas, ‗Ethics as first philosophy‘ (1984), trans. by S. Hand and M. Temple, in The 
Levinas Reader, ed. by Seán Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), pp. 75-87 (p. 76).  
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 Although it is accurate to say that Husserl always stressed the role of objectifying reflection in his 
description of phenomenology, it should be noted that in his later work Husserl saw that life is in fact 
prior to reflection. This can be seen most notably in his The Crisis of European Sciences and 
 27 
(Gegenständlichkeit) thought that gives priority to representation (Vorstellung), a view 
which Levinas will maintain throughout his work.  Intentional analysis takes place 
through the act of consciousness reflecting on itself.  It is when consciousness turns on 
itself to reflect on what was already present to consciousness.  As Levinas says, ‗[t]he 
whole philosophical value of reflection consists in allowing us to grasp our life, and the 
world in our life, such as they are prior to reflection‘.41  What you grasp in reflection is 
identical to the representation of the original lived experience.  Levinas, however, 
wonders whether the form of representation exhausts the structure of intentionality.  Are 
all intentions reducible to a purely theoretical representation?  Although Levinas does 
not refrain from criticism throughout his presentation of the Husserl‘s position, his 
criticism should be seen as criticism from the inside of phenomenology because Levinas 
is not trying to undermine the phenomenological approach.  He is, rather, criticising 
Husserl‘s limited application of his own method, and seeking to broaden this method to 
include the forgotten aspects of pre-reflective life, experiences that have a sense other 
than those that are reducible to representation.
42
  As Levinas puts it himself,  
[i]t is precisely the very wide extension of the Husserlian notion of intentionality 
that makes it interesting. It expresses only the very general fact that 
consciousness transcends itself, that it directs itself toward something other than 
itself, that it has a sense.  But ‗to have a sense‘ does not mean the same as ‗to 
represent‘.43          
 
Levinas uses love as an example of an intention that has a sense, yet is not reducible to 
representation.  ‗The characteristic of the loved object is precisely to be given in a love 
intention, an intention which is irreducible to a purely theoretical representation.‘44  
Affectivity will play a crucial role in Levinas‘s own later philosophy.  As we shall see 
in the subsequent chapters, through affectivity the power and the freedom of the 
transcendental ego is put into question.  Here, however, Levinas uses affective life as an 
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example of an intention that is not reducible to theoretical representation.  ‗Value or 
affective predicates therefore belong to the existence of the world, which is not an 
―indifferent‖ medium of pure representations.‘45  Just as in his ‗On Ideas‘ commentary 
above, in his thesis Levinas once again points out that Husserl‘s work up to that point is 
mostly concerned with the solitary ego.  Here Levinas stresses how this is another 
example of how the reduction as interpreted will not reveal concrete life (of human 
intersubjectivity).  Descriptions limited to the lone ego‘s constitution of objects will 
give us a distorted view of the world, and concrete being will remain unexamined.  Only 
when Husserl includes the study of the intersubjective experience will a more adequate 
picture of reality emerge.  ‗If we limit ourselves to describing the constitution of objects 
in an individual consciousness, in an ego, we will never reach objects as they are in 
concrete life but will reach only an abstraction.‘46 Levinas states that Husserl‘s 
phenomenological reduction can only be a first step towards phenomenology, as we 
must also discover ‗others‘ and ‗the intersubjective world‘.47 Levinas references 
Husserl‘s work on Einfühlung (empathy) to date, and also his influential unpublished 
works (of Ideas II, which comprises Edith Stein‘s editorial and contributions to this 
debate) that further describe how empathy gives us a phenomenological intuition of the 
life of others.  In a later chapter Levinas again asks if the intellectualism of Husserl is an 
accurate portrayal of our ‗attitude towards reality‘, placing Heidegger‘s ‗field of activity 
or of care‟ in contrast to this.48  Moving away from the modern idealist conception of 
the subject, and following Heidegger‘s approach, Levinas asks, does theoretical 
contemplation really characterise our main attitude towards the world?  This crucial 
criticism of the intellectualism of Husserl is the main focus of his conclusion, only in 
his conclusion Levinas explicitly looks at this criticism in relation to freedom.  
In the final chapter of his doctoral study, and then again in his conclusion, 
Levinas criticises Husserl for not questioning the impetus behind the epoché nor the 
subsequent transcendental reduction itself. Husserl himself  describes the epoché as an 
act of our ‗perfect freedom‘.49  Levinas notes that Husserl offers no explanation for 
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where the desire to perform such a highly theoretical-intellectual operation comes from.  
‗How does man in the naïve attitude, immersed in the world, the ―born dogmatic‖, 
suddenly become aware of his naïveté?‘50  Levinas wonders what gives rise to the 
situation of the Homo philosophus.  It would appear that Husserl‘s reflections began too 
late, taking the critical attitude of the philosopher for granted.  The foundation of the 
freedom that is needed both to firstly question one‘s position and then to subsequently 
perform the reduction is not sought.  The freedom of theory is taken as a given and the 
metaphysical foundation of the freedom of critical thinking is not questioned.  
Although he [Husserl] solves this problem by talking of our freedom to 
neutralize the ‗existential thesis‘ of the naïve attitude in order to begin looking at 
it, the freedom in question here, analogous to doubt, is the freedom of theory.  
We are led to effectuate the reduction because we can, and because it opens a 
new field of knowledge.  The freedom and the impulse which lead us to 
reduction and philosophical intuition present by themselves nothing new with 
respect to the freedom and stimulation of theory.  The latter is taken as primary, 
so that Husserl gives himself the freedom of theory just as he gives himself 
theory.
51
 
 
In his foreword to his translation of this text André Orianne focuses on this problem of 
the metaphysical foundation of the reduction, and he reminds the reader that Husserl 
does raise this question in § 31 of Ideas.  Husserl rests the possibility of the reduction 
on the Cartesian methodical doubt, which is itself based on our freedom to suspend 
theoretical judgments.
52
  Levinas refers to Husserl‘s explanation in the first line of the 
quotation above.  Levinas, nonetheless, is dissatisfied with this explanation as he argues 
that this freedom is restricted to the level of theory, and is detached from the historicity 
and temporality of man.  Also, crucially, Husserl takes this theoretical freedom as a 
given, and does not seek to find its basis.  
Adrian Peperzak claims that in order to raise such a criticism, the critic, in this 
case Levinas, must at least suspect the possibility of a fundamental attitude different 
                                                                                                                                               
such a free act, nor does he explain how a subject in the natural attitude can come to doubt such an 
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from the one he criticises.  Peperzak then wonders what alternative position could have 
possibly influenced Levinas in such a way so as to enable him to raise such a criticism.  
Who could have inspired him to put into question the universality and fundamental 
importance of ‗the theoretical ideal and the realm of representation‘?53  What influence 
led him to ask from where does the ‗freedom of theory‘ as critical consciousness come 
from?  Peperzak entertains two possible sources only, the religious tradition of Levinas 
or the writings of Heidegger.  Ruling out the religious tradition of Levinas, as Levinas 
himself makes no reference to his religious tradition in the early works, Peperzak 
concludes that the influence must be Heidegger.
54
  One should not downplay the crucial 
influence of the thought of Heidegger on Levinas‘s thinking at this time, and it is clearly 
evident throughout this work.
55
  With regard to the question of needing a firm 
foundation for the theory of freedom, however, Bergson is a more likely candidate.  
Heidegger may have influenced the formation of such a question, but Levinas does not 
go along with Heidegger‘s answer.  At this stage Levinas was well aware of the 
Heideggerian answer to the question of what shakes man out of his naïve attitude and 
brings about the desire to confront it; it is the awareness of one‘s own Being-towards-
death in the affective disposition of anxiety.  This will bring Dasein back to an 
understanding of its own finite condition, taking Dasein out of its inauthentic fallen 
state that assumes, naively, the meaning of being to be unquestionable.  From an early 
stage, however, Levinas did not believe that this experience was sufficiently other to 
generate such a critical reversal, or to found freedom.  On the question of the foundation 
of freedom Levinas turns to Bergson, believing him to still have something important to 
offer, even if, on his final assessment, Levinas finds Bergson‘s account of freedom to 
also be insufficient. 
But it is another aspect which shows the deeply intellectualist character of 
Husserl‘s intuitionism.  Bergson‘s philosophical intuition tightly bound to man‘s 
concrete life and destiny, reaches to its highest point, namely, the act of 
freedom.  This metaphysical foundation of intuition is lacking in Husserl‘s 
phenomenology, and the ties which relate intuition to all the vital forces which 
define concrete existence are foreign to his thought.  Philosophy begins with the 
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reduction.  This is an act in which we consider life in all its concreteness but no 
longer live it.
56
     
 
Levinas goes on to criticise Bergson‘s position on the division between the intellect and 
intuition, and on this point again favours Husserl.  Although Levinas finds Husserl‘s 
approach to be intellectual and theoretical, Bergson‘s account of freedom has the 
opposite problem.  He argues that there is a strict division between intuition and reason, 
and thus places freedom firmly on the side of intuition rendering freedom to be 
understood as spontaneous, sporadic and irrational.  Husserl‘s understanding of the 
intentionality of consciousness, one‘s consciousness as always a consciousness of 
something, as self-surpassing of itself, is an alternative answer to this strict separation 
between reason and intuition in Bergson.  Yet concrete life will be left aside by Husserl 
in his implementation of the transcendental reduction to ‗pure [disembodied] 
consciousness‘.  Or, as Levinas succinctly puts it in the quote above, ‗[t]his is an act in 
which we consider life in all its concreteness but no longer live it‘.  Bergson‘s division, 
nonetheless, between intuition and reason, placing freedom on the side of intuition, and 
so, spontaneous, sporadic and irrational is unphenomenological.  Undoubtedly 
Heidegger was hugely influential in opening up the concrete world and man‘s lived 
experience, prior to theoretical contemplation of ‗pure consciousness‘, as a field for 
phenomenological reflection, yet Levinas will become increasingly dissatisfied with 
Heidegger‘s view on freedom.  
Caygill maintains that already, at this stage, Levinas views Heidegger‘s 
philosophy as presenting a view of man as wholly conditioned by the past and his 
finitude, and hence fatalistic and determined.  He references Levinas‘s conclusion in 
support of this view.  ‗It is through this sui generis phenomenon in the constitution of a 
personality that man has a specific manner of being his past [...]. Historicity and 
temporality form the very substantiality of man‘s substance.‘57  Caygill‘s conclusion 
may not be so clearly evident from this passage alone, but it is significant that in 
relation to the particular question of the foundation of freedom, Levinas turned to 
Bergson‘s position and not to Heidegger‘s.  If, at this stage of his work, it remains to be 
shown without doubt that Levinas was already assessing Heidegger‘s understanding of 
freedom as fatalist and determined, then the seeds of the criticism to come can be 
identified here.  Levinas will very shortly begin to associate more explicitly Heidegger‘s 
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view on freedom with fatalism and determinism, and as transcendence towards nothing, 
as we shall argue below.   
Levinas believes that underlying Husserl‘s view of the primacy of theory, as 
Levinas interprets it, is a particular concept of freedom and autonomy.  The primacy of 
theory is caught up with a particular understanding of being, and one that is 
ahistorical.
58
 After the reduction consciousness is looked at from an ahistorical 
transcendental standpoint.  
The historicity of consciousness does not appear as an original phenomenon, 
because the suprahistorical attitude of theory supports, according to Husserl, all 
our conscious life.  The admission of representation as the basis of all acts of 
consciousness undermines the historicity of consciousness and gives intuition an 
intellectualist character.
59
    
 
The experience of conscious theoretical-cognitive reflection is not reducible to 
reflection on (human) experience.  Human experience contains more than the ability of 
consciousness to reflect ahistorically on itself.  This particular point of criticism not 
only indicates the influence of Heidegger, but also, indirectly, the influence of Dilthey, 
who was very influential on Heidegger‘s own thinking, in particular in relation to the 
importance that Dilthey had placed on the historicity (facticity) of man and the necessity 
for a historical-hermeneutical approach to any philosophy of man in the human 
sciences.  Dilthey stressed the point that human life, as lived, is historical and that 
experiences of human life (Erlebnis) implicitly contain understanding (Verstehen), 
which individuals attempt to further understand through articulating that understanding 
in expression (Ausdruck) in poetry, plays, works of art and all ‗objects‘ of culture.  Cyril 
McDonnell has decisively argued that this particular historical-hermeneutic emphasis in 
phenomenology, which comes to Levinas through Heidegger, can be traced to the work 
of Dilthey, who argued against such ahistorical methods of reflection for the human 
sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) in their attempts to understand the human person.
60
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This critique of ahistorical transcendental consciousness will be returned to in 
Levinas‘s 1940 article ‗The Work of Edmund Husserl‘.  On Levinas‘s reading of 
Husserl, the subject gives meaning to Being without any limitations placed on it from 
the outside, such as by history or by others.  In his commentary on Levinas‘s 
interpretation of Husserl‘s work during this period, Peperzak remarks, ‗[t]he inner secret 
of Husserl‘s preference for the contemplative attitude is a desire for sovereignty‘.61  
This evaluation is perhaps a little too harsh. Though Levinas identified an ethical 
problem in Husserl‘s approach — that the subject is unquestionably held as the source 
of all meaning — the failure on Husserl‘s part to identify this particular problem does 
not mean that Husserl gave no consideration to ethics.  Husserl was aware of, and 
perhaps driven by, his own personal responsibility, and that of other ‗scientists‘ engaged 
in research in both the natural (Naturwissenschaften) and human sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften), and in this sense he could be said to have a desire for 
sovereignty, but such sovereignty does not rule out consideration for fellow human 
beings.  Even though Husserl would not go as far as to say that responsibility precedes 
freedom, he was aware of the responsibility that comes with freedom.
62
  
It is interesting to note that Levinas ends his doctoral thesis reflecting on the 
foundations of freedom.  Levinas will continue to question this view of freedom, where 
                                                                                                                                               
contrary to [natural-] scientific psychology, does not take him for its object as a thing of nature, 
explaining and construing him by means of other universal laws of ―events‖, but instead understands him 
as a living person actively involved in history and describes and analyzes him in this understanding.‘ 
Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. by Theodore Kisiel 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 117.                
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the subject alone is seen and deposited as primary and as the giver of meaning to Being.  
Not only will Levinas refuse to simply accept this view of freedom as a given, 
questioning where does it come from, but, he will also later ask, what is it for? For 
whom is my freedom a good? 
 
§1.4 THE INFLUENCE OF HEIDEGGER AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCRETE LIFE 
 
In Levinas‘s ‗Ideas‘ article discussed above, we noted why Levinas favoured Husserl‘s 
stress on the intentionality of consciousness because, in some sense, it can be viewed as 
a middle way between the strict opposition involving concepts and intuition in 
Bergson‘s philosophy. A short early article by Levinas, ‗Freiburg, Husserl and 
Phenomenology‘ (1931) (‗Fribourg, Husserl et la phénoménologie‘), helps us to 
appreciate what drew Levinas to Freiburg and the status of his relationship with 
phenomenology at that time.
63
  It also gives us an insight into the direction that Levinas 
took in his early reading of Husserl, and the influence of Heidegger in this regard is 
once again evident.  The implicit presence of Heidegger is hard to ignore in this short 
text, with Levinas‘s numerous references to ‗concrete existence‘ and ‗concrete 
situation‘.  It is, in other words, Heidegger‘s approach to phenomenology, and the 
possibility of examining concrete life, that impressed Levinas (as it did on many others 
at that time)
64
 at this early stage, beyond that of Husserl‘s phenomenology.65  In one of 
the most telling passages, which reveal to us Levinas‘s interest in phenomenology, one 
cannot help but read the references to Heidegger. 
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The world overflows nature, recapturing all the contours and richness that it has 
in our concrete life; it is a world of things interesting and boring, useful and 
useless, beautiful and ugly, loved and hated, ridiculous and anguishing.  The 
phenomenological method wants to destroy the world falsified and impoverished 
by the naturalist tendencies of our time — which certainly have their rights, but 
also their limits.  It wants to rebuild; it wants to recover the lost world of our 
concrete life.
66
  
 
Implicit in this passage are two distinct understandings of the term ‗world‘.  ‗World‘ 
understood purely in the sense of physical and biological objects (and the collection of 
those objects), which is the object of study for all of the natural sciences, and the 
‗world‘ understood, from a human perspective, as a context of significance, meaning 
and value that transcends the ‗world‘ understood as a physical place or as a mere 
collection of objects.
67
  Levinas claims that it is the human world of meaning and value, 
which is ‗interesting and boring, useful and useless, beautiful and ugly, loved and 
hated‘, which ‗overflows nature‘, that is of interest to the phenomenologist.  The human 
world of culture and value is inhabited by subjects for whom it has a meaning and 
worth.
68
  Levinas describes the understanding of the ‗world‘ that is the object of study 
for the natural sciences as an abstraction, as it is removed from the more basic ‗world of 
our concrete life‘, and is ‗equivalent to a leap into nothingness‘.69  
The influence of Heidegger is again apparent in this short article in relation to 
how Levinas approaches this question of space. Levinas critiques Bergson‘s 
understanding of geometrical space and in place of this understanding sets out an 
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argument that sees the natural-scientific understanding of geometrical space as a 
derivative of the concrete human experience of space as relational to one‘s 
situatedness.
70
  When space is taken as an example Levinas points out that human space 
as experienced is not a homogenous space, but an intentional space, that is to say, as 
something that is always relative to someone‘s ‗presence in space‘, thus the experience 
of a left and a right, top and bottom and the significance of that space.  Heidegger 
discussed a similar idea in his lectures in Freiburg during the summer of 1923, wherein 
he gives an example of the table upon which he wrote his dissertation or had meals with 
his wife and children.
71
  
Levinas defines the purpose of phenomenology as ‗the determination of the true 
nature of the human, the proper essence of consciousness‘.72  He moves on then to 
define consciousness for phenomenologists as intentionality.  Consciousness is always 
in relation with that which is beyond consciousness itself, consciousness always tends 
toward the world, and as such is transcendence. Heidegger‘s influence is again 
displayed in Levinas‘s nuanced definition of intentionality, as not only a theoretical 
relation but as grounded in and shaded by our human feelings such as fear and love.
73
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 ‗Geometrical space is indeed an abstraction. The concrete situation which reveals extension to us is our 
presence in space.‘ Ibid., p. 35.  
71
 See, Martin Heidegger, Ontology — The Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. by John van Buren (Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 1999).  This is the text of a lecture-course that Heidegger gave at the University 
of Freiburg during the summer of 1923.  In §§19-26 Heidegger goes into a lengthy discussion during 
which he refers to many examples of everyday household objects, such as a table or old worn out skis, to 
illustrate that the meaning of such objects extends far beyond the material composition of those objects.  
Human beings do not experience objects purely as extended material spatial objects, but meaningful 
objects that accommodate particular practices and that have a history, a story, and as a result the object 
has meaning beyond immediate sense perception.  The vast meaning that is contained within the table 
depends on the particularity of a situation, and what the table is used for — what Heidegger refers to as 
the ‗There-in-order-to-do-this‘ —, such as the celebration of a meal at the table during a significant 
holiday, the place at which his children play, where his wife stays up late to read, or the table that is used 
by Heidegger to write upon. Ibid., pp. 67-80.  
72
 Levinas, ‗Freiburg, Husserl and Phenomenology‘, p. 34.  
73
 ‗Phenomenologists consequently maintain that the world itself, the objective world, is not produced on 
the model of a theoretical object, but is constituted by means of far richer structures which only these 
intentional feelings are able to grasp.‘ Ibid., p. 35. On this point we can again detect Heidegger‘s 
influence on Levinas.  Heidegger has a very different understanding of intentionality from that of Husserl.  
Heidegger introduces the term Verhalten ‗comportment‘ to capture Dasein‘s directing oneself towards the 
world, which Dasein has been ‗thrown‘ (geworfen) into and has pre-given structures of meaning, within 
which it is always already with other beings.  In a lecture-course given in the summer of 1927 at the 
University of Marburg Heidegger explains his understanding of intentionality, maintaining that, ‗[t]he 
statement that the comportments of the Dasein are intentional means that the mode of being of our own 
self, the Dasein, is essentially such that this being, so far as it is, is always already dwelling with the 
extant.  The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own sphere and is not 
yet outside it but encapsulated within itself is an absurdity which misconstrues the basic ontological 
structure of the being that we ourselves are [...] in opposition to the erroneous subjectivizing of 
intentionality, we must hold that the intentional structure of comportments is not something which is 
immanent to the so-called subject and which would first of all be in need of transcendence; rather, the 
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The world is constituted through a ‗rich‘ intentional relation, one that is always 
coloured by feelings.  These feelings also aid us in grasping the structures that our 
world is constituted by.  In an implicit reference to Heidegger, Levinas cites ‗anxiety‘ as 
an example of a ‗privileged intention‘ that reveals to us ‗the mark of nothingness in the 
world‘.74  Such an insight could never be attained through the methods of the natural 
sciences (which rely upon observation, hypotheses and experiment) as contemplation is 
blind to nothingness.  Caygill maintains that the emphasis on transcendence in terms of 
nothingness again reflects the influence on Levinas of his reading of Heidegger.
75
  
Within this article, nevertheless, we cannot yet detect any dissatisfaction on 
Levinas‘s part with this aspect of Heidegger‘s thought, or any other aspect for that 
matter.  The article, rather, is highly praising of Heidegger.
76
  However, in the not-too 
distant future, in his next article ‗Martin Heidegger and Ontology‘, Levinas‘s 
presentation of Heidegger‘s philosophical approach not only clearly reveals the 
influence of Heidegger‘s work on Levinas, but it will also indicate that Levinas was 
beginning to rethink how transcendence as elaborated by Heidegger in Being and Time 
is a transcendence towards nothingness.  When we come to examine ‗Reflections on the 
Philosophy of Hitlerism‘, we will see that by 1934 Levinas identifies fatal consequences 
of Heidegger‘s view of transcendence towards nothingness, precisely in relation to the 
question of a justification for freedom.  Far from finding a basis for justifying freedom 
within Heidegger‘s thought, then, Levinas will come to identify freedom in Being and 
Time as ‗fatalism‘.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
intentional constitution of the Dasein‘s comportments is precisely the ontological condition of the 
possibility of every and any transcendence.  Transcendence, transcending, belongs to the essential nature 
of the being that exists (on the basis of transcendence) as intentional, that is exists in the manner of 
dwelling among the extant.‘ Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, pp. 64-65.  Heidegger 
emphasises the ‗openness‘ that permits the directedness of consciousness towards its objects, hence his 
understanding of intentionality deviates away from Husserl‘s focus on intentionality as the link between 
the intended objects of consciousness and the acts that present them.  Whereas Husserl can have a science 
of the correlation of acts and their intended objects, in aiming to discern the essential and therefore 
universal features of those acts, Heidegger can have no ‗science‘ of the ‗openness‘ of Dasein.  This is 
why the ‗scientific‘ character, so essential to  Husserl‘s idea of phenomenology, is absent in Heidegger‘s 
elaboration of a phenomenology (of Dasein). 
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 Levinas, ‗Freiburg, Husserl and Phenomenology‘, p. 35.  
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 Caygill, Levinas and the Political, p. 21.   
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 The last paragraph of the article is particularly extolling of Heidegger. ‗His [Husserl‘s] chair was 
passed on to Martin Heidegger, his most original disciple, whose name is now the glory of Germany.  A 
man of exceptional intellectual power, his teaching and his works are the best proof of the fecundity of 
the phenomenological method.‘ Levinas, ‗Freiburg, Husserl and Phenomenology‘, p. 38.  
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§1.5 ‗MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND ONTOLOGY‘ (1932)  
 
‗Martin Heidegger and Ontology‘ (‗Martin Heidegger et l‟ontologie‘) was written by 
Levinas in 1932, two years after his dissertation.  Although Levinas will later distance 
himself both personally and philosophically from the work of Heidegger, at this stage 
the influence of the philosophy of Heidegger and the new direction that he brought to 
phenomenology is of pivotal importance for Levinas.
77
  Levinas follows Heidegger in 
his critique of the metaphysical conception of subjectivity, and will continue to be 
indebted to his prioritising of concrete existence over intellectual abstraction.  While 
Levinas was very much taken by Husserl‘s phenomenology, and believed that it 
contained the possibility for some ‗work‘ in the area of philosophy more than other 
methodologies, he still held some reservations about the intellectualism of Husserl‘s 
approach in phenomenology, as is evident from Levinas‘s comments towards the end of 
his doctoral thesis.  As was also evident in this study, this gap was partly filled for 
Levinas by Heidegger‘s Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) (1927) as Heidegger opened up 
a new approach that moved beyond the transcendental Ego and reflected on concrete 
life and everyday existence.  The criticism of Husserl‘s intellectualism, and the 
understanding of consciousness as ‗objectifying‘ or ‗representationist‘, that was 
outlined in Levinas‘s thesis, is also subtly present in this article.  As Peperzak notes, 
‗[t]he world of the ready-at-hand (Zuhandenheit) and of care (Sorge) is firmly opposed 
to the objectivity of representationism‘.78  This early article further highlights for us the 
elements of the early Heideggerian approach that Levinas found so attractive, and sheds 
some additional light on Levinas‘s own thinking at that time.  Certain themes that will 
be explored in more detail in Levinas‘s later works are evident in this early paper, such 
as the putting into question the primacy of the subject and knowledge in the history of 
Western Philosophy, and the importance of reflecting on the pre-theoretical everyday 
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 Even though Levinas will later become thoroughly disappointed with Heidegger, he always retained his 
belief that Sein und Zeit was an outstanding philosophical work.  In his 1984 interview with Salomon 
Malka, when asked about his debt with respect to Heidegger, Levinas remarks: ‗What is important for me 
is the excellence of his phenomenology.  I especially admire his early book, Being and Time.  It is 
actually a series of marvellous analyses testifying to what phenomenology is capable of.  It is always with 
a feeling of shame that I admit my admiration for the philosopher.‘ ‗Interview with Salomon Malka‘, in Is 
It Righteous To Be?, pp. 93-102 (p. 94). Also, in his interview with Nemo in 1981, when asked about 
Heidegger‘s phenomenological method, Levinas answered, ‗Sein und Zeit has remained the very model of 
ontology. The Heideggerian notions of finitude, being-there, being-toward-death, etc., remain 
fundamental.  Even if one freed oneself from the systematic rigors of this thought, one remains marked by 
the very style of Sein und Zeit‟s analyses, by the ―cardinal points‖ to which the ―existential analytic‖ 
refers.‘ Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, p. 41.        
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 Peperzak, ‗Phenomenology—Ontology—Metaphysics‘, p. 121.    
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life of the subject.  For our current purposes, this article provides us with an insight into 
the aspects of Heidegger‘s philosophy that Levinas found helpful in inspiring and 
contributing to his later thinking on subjectivity. Given that Heidegger was an important 
influence on Levinas and how he develops his own thinking, in order to better 
understand Levinas‘s later position it will be helpful to briefly highlight some of 
distinctive characteristics of Heidegger‘s approach. It also provides us with an 
opportunity to reflect further on how the Heideggerian understanding of freedom can be 
said to be ultimately transcendence towards nothing.  Just as Levinas‘s found problems 
with the explanation of freedom in Bergson‘s account, and the lack of an explanation in 
Husserl‘s thought, Heidegger‘s account of the foundation of freedom will be also be 
deemed deficient.    
For the most part the article can be read as an exposition of Heidegger‘s 
argument in Being and Time, but, as is the case with Levinas‘s earliest expositional 
pieces, there is more to it than that.
79
  In her work Emmanuel Levinas. Ethics, Justice 
and the Human beyond Being, Elisabeth Thomas notes about this paper that:  
A cursory reading of Levinas‘s paper Martin Heidegger and Ontology reveals 
Levinas‘ starting point and subsequent focus to the question of being and the 
critique of the metaphysical subject by Heidegger in Being and Time.  
According to Levinas, Heidegger not only reveals the presuppositions regarding 
the concept of the subject as thinking substance but also uncovers the latent 
intellectualism of the idealist position.
80
  
 
Thomas‘s reading of this paper supports the claim that one of the most crucial elements 
of Heidegger‘s thinking that Levinas found appealing was the putting into question the 
metaphysical conception of the subject in modern philosophy, and the opening up of the 
concrete lived life of Dasein as a field of phenomenological reflection.
81
  In order to 
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 Levinas outlines the goal of the article in the opening paragraph: ‗In this study, it is important for us to 
understand, above all, the true intentions of our author, to illuminate what he thinks really needs to be 
said, and to surmise what is most critical for him.‘ Emmanuel Levinas, ‗Martin Heidegger and Ontology‘ 
(1932), trans. by Committee of Public Safety, Diacritics, 26, (1996) 1, 11-32 (p. 11).  This does not mean 
that the ‗true intentions of the author‘ are actually known by the author himself, as there are factors 
determining that author‘s thought that are of critical importance to any expressed meaning. Hence 
Schleiermacher‘s bold injunction that the interpreter must understand the author better than the author 
himself. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism. And Other Writings, trans. by Andrew 
Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 33.   
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 Elisabeth Louise Thomas, Emmanuel Levinas. Ethics, Justice, and the Human beyond Being (New 
York and London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 14-15. Thomas also claims that, ‗[t]here is little doubt that 
Heidegger‘s fundamental ontology provides the point of departure for Levinas‘. Ibid., p. 1.  
81
 Moving away from any earlier understanding of the subject within the history of philosophy, Heidegger 
gives Dasein a particular and unique meaning. Dasein (from the German da ‗there‘ and sein ‗being‘) is a 
term that Heidegger gives unique significance to, meaning the awareness of the ‗there‘ (Da) of ‗Being‘ 
(Sein).  Dasein is a being for whom being is a ‗mineness‘ (Jemeinigkeit) and as such being is an issue for 
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shed some light on Heidegger‘s original approach, in place of a straight forward 
exposition, Levinas chose to frame his exposition within the context of the problem of 
knowledge.  The selection of this particular problem at such an early stage is interesting 
as ‗knowledge‘ will feature time and again in Levinas‘ writings, as he brings the priority 
that is placed on knowledge in the Western tradition into question.  Levinas will also 
align ‗knowledge‘ with the primacy of the individual autonomous meaning-giving 
subject, which epitomises ‗freedom‘ in the modern philosophical tradition.  In this 
article Levinas argues that the modern problem of knowledge is as a result of a 
particular view of subjectivity, selecting the Cartesian understanding of the subject to 
illustrate his point.  The problem, that of reflecting on whether or not objects correspond 
to thought, he claims, boils down to a more fundamental question: ―How does the 
subject take leave of itself to attain the object?‖82  On Levinas‘s reading, as the subject, 
in his view of the modern tradition, is held as having a unique and privileged place in 
being, contained within its own ‗immanent sphere‘, and in some sense removed from 
the world, how then is this gap between subject and object bridged?
83
  He goes on to 
argue that one of the consequences of the Cartesian view of subjectivity is Idealism 
precisely because as the content of thought is already within the subject, the subject 
itself becomes its own object.  Idealism then leads to a further problem.  As idealism 
views ‗substance‘ as that which is, and existence is linked to time as the subject as 
temporal unfolds in time, how then can the subject be called a substance, and have 
being, except in a purely nominal sense?  Levinas then describes how Idealism 
overcame this problem, by overcoming time itself.
84
      
Levinas goes on to outline how Heidegger‘s approach reveals to us that this 
problem is only a problem for subjectivity understood within the dominate tradition of 
modern philosophy.  The strict subject/object distinction, and the problem that this 
approach gives rise to, that of accounting for how this distance is bridged, is no longer a 
                                                                                                                                               
it.  Dasein is a being who has a pre-reflective implicit ‗understanding of Being‘ (Seinverständnis).  See, 
Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 67-77, (SZ 42-52).    
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 Levinas, ‗Martin Heidegger and Ontology‘, p. 12.  
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 Such a question, of course, belongs to the modern philosophical tradition from Descartes on. Such a 
question does not and cannot arise for Aristotle or the Medieval Aristotelians as one has to have senses 
and sensation activated before any (intellectual) reflection on them by higher powers of the soul.  
Aquinas, for example, would never has posed the problem of the ‗gap‘ between the subject and the object, 
just as he would never have worried if the object as we perceive it corresponds with the world 
independent of a human knower, which was addressed by Kant.  
84
 ‗It is fundamentally here that the true passage into subjectivity- in all its opposition to being, that is to 
say, in its opposition to temporal substance- is accomplished. This step is taken by means of an evasion of 
time.‘ Levinas, ‗Martin Heidegger and Ontology‘, pp. 12-13.  
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problem when man is seen as embedded in the everyday history of concrete existence.
85
  
Levinas then moves on to sketch Heidegger‘s revolutionary philosophical approach in 
Being and Time.  We shall summarise Levinas‘s reading of Heidegger‘s position below, 
not only because this work had a huge influence on the development of Levinas‘s own 
later work, but also because this reading will begin to reveal to us what Levinas found 
to be deficient in the understanding of freedom in Heidegger‘s work. 
For Heidegger, knowledge is a founded mode of access to the world, founded on 
the basic state of Dasein‘s Being-in-the-world, which itself is underpinned by the more 
primordial state of Being as care (Sorge).  In this understanding the very posing of the 
question of the existence of an external world, and how the subject can be said to have 
access to this world, makes little sense.
86
  Dasein finds itself always already thrown 
(Geworfenheit) into an established definite world, filled with definite entities.
87
  ‗Being-
in-the-world‘ is a question of the dynamics of possibility, yet unlike other entities that 
that is equally true of, this is crucially different for Dasein, for whom the being of one‘s 
possibilities is to understand them.
88
  This ‗understanding‘ is not an understanding in a 
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 ‗It is concrete man who appears at the centre of philosophy, and in comparison with him, the concept of 
consciousness is only an abstraction, arbitrarily separating consciousness — i.e. illumination as 
illumination — from history and existence.‘ Ibid., p. 24.  
86
 As Heidegger himself puts it, ‗But the world is disclosed essentially along with the Being of Dasein; 
with the disclosedness of the world, the ―world‖ has in each case been discovered too.‘ Being and Time, 
p. 247, (SZ 203).  
87
 Levinas chooses to translate the German Geworfenheit (which stems from the verb werfen), which is 
generally translated into English as thrownness in English translations of Heidegger‘s work, into the 
French déreliction, which is then translated into the English dereliction.  This choice of translation 
captures the stark abandonment of Dasein to imposed possibilities.  Levinas, ‗Martin Heidegger and 
Ontology‘, p. 24.  In a much later work, ‗Transcendence and Height‘ (1962), Levinas will contrast the 
ineluctable responsibility that the self has for the Other, prior to being free, with Heidegger‘s idea of the 
pre-given structures of meaning which Dasein finds itself thrown into (geworfen).  Though in both cases 
the self finds itself in a situation not of its making or choosing, the crucial difference between them, for 
Levinas, is the ethical significance of the event.  For Levinas, the subject comes to feel ashamed of its 
self-centred living, and comes to realise their responsibility for the Other precedes their freedom. The 
freedom of the self is given an ethical significance. Heidegger‘s Geworfenheit, in contrast, fatally 
compromises freedom and provides guilt with no ethical significance, ‗it results from the alienation of 
liberty and not from the unscrupulousness of its very exercise. Such a guilt has tragic and not ethical 
overtones. It is finitude.‘ (p. 18). In Heidegger‘s description freedom is shown to be limited and 
constrained but it is not called into question.  Rather, for Levinas, it is reduced to fate.  Implicitly 
referencing the work of Hobbes and Heidegger, Levinas goes to say that the encounter with the face of 
the Other is ‗a movement that is more fundamental than freedom but that returns us to neither violence 
nor fatality.‘ Emmanuel Levinas, ‗Transcendence and Height‘, trans. by Tina Chanter, Simon Critchley, 
and Nicholas Walker and revised by Adriaan Peperzak in Basic Philosophical Writings, ed. by Adriaan T. 
Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1996), pp. 11-31 (p. 20). ‗Transcendance et hauteur‘ was first published in Bulletin de la Société 
Française de Philosophie 56 (1962).       
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 ‗The relation of man to his possibilities is not the same as the indifference a thing manifests with 
respect to the accidents that could occur to it‘. Levinas, ‗Martin Heidegger and Ontology‘, p. 23. ‗Dasein 
is an entity which does not just occur among other entities.  Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact 
that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it [...] there is some way in which Dasein understands 
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conceptual way, nor is it a cognitive faculty. This understanding goes beyond the 
subject-object distinction, and so, overcomes that epistemological problem; or, perhaps, 
it is more accurate to say that in this approach the problem would not even arise.  
For the understanding is not a cognitive faculty that is imposed on existence in 
order to allow it to become aware of its possibilities.  The distinction between 
the knowing subject and the object known — an inescapable distinction in the 
phenomenon of knowledge — no longer has purchase here. Human existence 
knows itself prior to all introspective reflection and, indeed renders the latter 
possible.  But to say that does not imply a return to the concept of self-
consciousness [...].  The originality of the Heideggerian conception of existence, 
in contrast to the traditional idea of ‗self–consciousness‘ (conscience interne), is 
that this self-knowledge, this inner illumination, this understanding not only 
refuses the subject/object structure, but also has nothing to do with theory.
89
     
        
A crucial point in this summation by Levinas is that this ‗understanding‘ has nothing to 
do with theory, as it is not an intellectual registering of what one is.  Rather, it is how 
Dasein in the world is, ‗this understanding is the very dynamism of this existence‘.90  
The mode of understanding is the manner of existing for Dasein, who is being in such a 
way that it has an understanding of being, as is displayed in our every day being-in-the-
world, and our interaction with it, revealed by such statements as ‗the sky is blue‘.  
Dasein‘s manner of Being-in-the-world, the way in which Dasein understands itself, is 
always in and through a certain affective disposition (Befindlichkeit).  In Dasein‘s 
everyday interaction with the world it loses sight of the reality of its being, and is lost in 
the ‗they-self‘ (das Man), and engrossed in the world understood as a totality of things.  
The crucial affective disposition which can return Dasein to the understanding of the 
world, and Dasein‘s being in it, as possibility of being, is Angst.  Anxiety reveals 
Dasein‘s most basic possibility, that of being authentically or inauthentically.91  It also, 
critically, for Heidegger, reveals freedom to Dasein, as Dasein is brought back to its 
Being-in-the-world as possibilities.
92
      
                                                                                                                                               
itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly.‘ Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 32, (SZ 
12).  
89
 Levinas, ‗Martin Heidegger and Ontology‘, p. 23. 
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 Ibid. 
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 ‗This character of Being-in was then brought to view more concretely through the everyday publicness 
of the ―they‖, which brings tranquilized self-assurance- ‗Being-at-home‘, with all its obviousness- into the 
average everydayness of Dasein.  On the other hand, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its 
absorption in the ‗world‘. Everyday familiarity collapses.‘ Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 233, (SZ 188-
89).  
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 In his article ‗Primordial Freedom: The Authentic Truth of Dasein in Heidegger‘s ‗Being and Time‘‘, 
Craig M. Nichols argues that the fundamental concern of Heidegger‘s Being and Time is the problem of 
freedom.  He argues that Heidegger presents a positive conception of freedom, a ‗towards which‘, in 
opposition to the more common negative conception of freedom that see‘s freedom as a freedom ‗from‘ 
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In the final section of the article, section nine, Levinas briefly hints at how the 
foundations of the theory of freedom are accounted for in Heidegger‘s approach and 
how it fits into his description of Dasein, although he unfortunately does not explore 
this theme in great detail.  At the time of writing this article Levinas intended to write a 
book on Heidegger‘s thought.93 This article is the first section of the then planned 
longer study Levinas subsequently abandoned.  When Levinas briefly raises the issue of 
the theory of freedom in Heidegger‘s work, he mentions that this is ‗a theory which we 
will be occupied later‘, referring to the yet unfinished further sections of the planned 
work.
94
 In the concluding paragraph, after a brief summary of the article, Levinas 
further indicates what the next section of the then intended book long study would be, 
‗[f]rom there, the interpretation will be pursued to the unique sources of solicitude.  We 
will find there the root of personality and of freedom.  We will deduce from it finally 
the phenomenon of theoretical knowledge‘.95  This passage also supports our reading of 
Levinas that from an early stage he was interested in the question of the foundation of 
critical thinking, or as he says at the end of his thesis discussed above, an explanation 
for the phenomenon of Homo philosophus.  Levinas did not take the freedom of critical 
consciousness as a given.    
Although brief, the comments that Levinas does make in relation to the theory of 
freedom in ‗Martin Heidegger and Ontology‘ are enough for us to know which aspects 
of Heidegger‘s description of Dasein Levinas has in mind.  Freedom is revealed in the 
affective disposition (Befindlichkeit) of anguish/anxiety.  Anguish saves existence from 
inauthentic being, as it brings it back to its possibilities.  As was said above, Dasein‘s 
primordial relation with the world is one of ‗care‘ (Sorge), but in everyday existence 
this is manifested for Dasein in how Dasein is caught up with objects in and of the 
world, such as involvement with a project, waiting on something, intrigued by 
                                                                                                                                               
restraints. ‗Freedom is thus thought by Heidegger as Dasein‘s authentic potentiality for being‘. The 
authentic mode of being-towards-death is resoluteness (Entschlossenheit). ‗Resoluteness consists in the 
freedom from the they attained in becoming free for one‘s own death (SZ 264)‘. Craig M. Nichols, 
‗Primordial Freedom: The Authentic Truth of Dasein in Heidegger‘s ‗Being and Time‘, Thinking 
Fundamental, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conference, Vol. 9: Vienne 2000.      
93
 This is indicated in the second footnote in which Levinas thanks the Revue Philosophique de la France 
et de l‟Etranger for ‗publishing the first sections of the first part of the work in preparation‘. Levinas, 
‗Martin Heidegger and Ontology‘, p. 11.  
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 Ibid., p. 30. 
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 Ibid., p. 32. 
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something, anticipating something etc.
96
 However, in anguished solicitude Dasein is 
brought back to Dasein‘s own isolation and understands itself in its own terms, and not 
in relation to objects of the world. In the affective disposition of anxiety Dasein 
understands the most fundamental possibility of Dasein, as it understands that one is 
being-in-the-world in a particular fashion.  It is anxiety that returns Dasein to the own-
most possibility of being authentically or inauthentically.  This, fundamentally, comes 
down to the resoluteness to accept one‘s fundamental finitude and fate, to be what one 
is, a Being-towards-death (Sein-zum-Tode).  As Heidegger puts it,    
We may now summarise our characterization of authentic Being-towards-death 
as we have projected it existentially: anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in 
the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, 
primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an 
impassioned freedom towards death — a freedom which has been released 
from the illusions of the ‗they‘, and which is factical, certain of itself, and 
anxious.
97
  
 
In the mood of Angst Dasein is brought back to what Dasein is.  Back to the 
understanding that Dasein‘s being in the world is to find itself open to possibilities, with 
the most fundamental possibility being a possibility that cannot be seized.  Death is the 
impossibility of possibility.  In the affective disposition of anguish, Dasein understands 
the possibility of existing authentically.  With the own most possibility is to be a Being-
towards-death (Sein-zum-Tode).
98
 ‗Existing authentically means to accept this condition 
and to submit to this fate.‘99 What is interesting about the above long passage from 
Heidegger is that it clearly shows why one might begin to think of freedom in 
Heidegger‘s account as transcendence, ultimately, towards nothingness.  Dasein is free, 
essentially, to die; or, perhaps more accurately stated, free to understand the 
significance of the being of its own finitude.
100
 Levinas‘s ‗Martin Heidegger and 
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 In this version of the article Levinas uses the term sollicitude for both Sorge and Besorgte. In the 
abridged version he renders Sorge as souci, in order to maintain the distinction between both terms. 
However, in this version he uses solicitude for both. 
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 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 311, (SZ 266).  
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 Death is Dasein‘s own most possibility as it cannot belong to the they-self, as one can only die one‘s 
own death.  One must become free from the they if they are to face death authentically and become free 
for death. ‗When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one‘s own death, one is liberated from one‘s 
lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and one is liberated in 
such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factical 
possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped.‘ Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 
308, (SZ 264).      
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 Peperzak, ‗Phenomenology—Ontology—Metaphysics‘, p. 122. Peperzak is here paraphrasing Levinas 
in L‟ontologie dans le temporal.  
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 In Being and Time Heidegger goes as far as to say that this brooding over ones death, in the existential 
mood of Angst, should be cultivated. ‗[I]n such Being-towards-death this possibility must not be 
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Ontology‘ essay alone is insufficient to support Caygill‘s assessment that Levinas 
increasingly found Heidegger‘s thinking on freedom to be fatalistic, as transcendence in 
Heidegger‘s Being and Time is transcendence towards nothingness.  However, even 
though Levinas did not complete the then intended book long study, we do have another 
article that came out of the preparation for the unfinished book to consider, in which 
Levinas more clearly presents his position.
101
   
 
§1.6 FREEDOM AS FATE IN BEING AND TIME  
 
Though Levinas never completed the proposed book on ‗Martin Heidegger and 
Ontology‘, which he intended to publish after 1940, he used notes he had earlier 
compiled for this study to formulate a lecture on Heidegger for the students of Jean 
Wahl, later published as ‗L‟ontologie dans le temporal‘.102 That article also 
concentrated on exposition for the most part, but unlike „Martin Heidegger and 
Ontology‘, Levinas briefly raises some criticisms of Heidegger‘s position towards the 
end of the article.  As this article was a lecture that he gave to students studying 
Heidegger, Levinas mostly concentrates on a summary of the crucial points, which he 
also outlined in the article above.  Again Levinas outlines how, through the affective 
disposition (dispositions affectives) of anxiety (l‟angoisse), Dasein is brought to its 
understanding of itself and ‗the bare possibility of its existence, left to itself‘.103  The 
understanding revealed to Dasein in Angst is the condition for Dasein existing 
authentically, and so as the basis for freedom.  Such a freedom, however, is a strictly 
predestined freedom, it is ‗a freedom for death‘.104 In this article Levinas draws 
attention more explicitly to how Dasein‘s existence is already fated, destined, and 
                                                                                                                                               
weakened: it must be understood as a possibility, it must be cultivated as a possibility, and we must put 
up with it as a possibility, in the way we comport ourselves towards it‘. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 
306, (SZ 261).    
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 Caygill does not reference either Martin Heidegger et l‟ontologie or L‟ontologie dans le temporal in 
support of his position, but both texts lend further credibility to his hypothesis.  
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 This lecture was subsequently published first in 1948 in Spanish in Sur no. 167, and then in French in 
1949 as L‟ontologie dans le temporal.  At the time of writing this article is not yet available in English 
translation, and so the original French text is given in footnotes.  
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 ‗L‘inquiétude de l‘angoisse tient précisément au néant de toute chose qui ramène le Dasein à lui-
même, à exister en vue de soi dans ce néant, à la possibilité nue de son existence, livrée à elle-même.‘ 
Emmanuel Levinas, ‗L‘ontologie dans le temporal‘, in En découvrant l‟existence avec Husserl et 
Heidegger (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2010), pp. 111-28 (p. 122).   
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 ‗En elle le Dasein se comprend à partir de lui-même et par conséquent est libre. Mais sa liberté est une 
liberté pour la mort. La mort seule rend possible sa liberté ou son authenticité.‘ Levinas, ‗L‘ontologie 
dans le temporal‘, p. 124, my emphasis.          
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‗doomed‘.105  From the beginning Dasein is determined by this final cause, existing 
towards nothing.  It is the future that marks out and determines Dasein‘s present.  
Dasein is already his future, it is a future that has already, in a sense, arrived.  Thanks to 
the future Dasein can be authentically in the present (but only as a being for its own 
death).
106
  As Peperzak succinctly summarises Levinas argument, ‗such a possibility 
does not have a real future, because its predestination prevents all newness. The future 
is already contained in the essence of its past‘.107  
The importance of openness to the possibility of radical newness, in order for 
freedom to be possible, is a theme that Levinas will later return to, and his thinking on 
the subject as influenced by Bergson will be outlined below.  It is a criticism of 
Heidegger that Levinas first raises in ‗L‟ontologie dans le temporal‟.  Levinas places 
Heidegger within a broad description of the Western Philosophical tradition, which he 
will further expand on in his work to come.  Levinas characterises the Western 
tradition‘s interest with the question of being as an extension of its desire to control 
their destiny, a desire for freedom, control, and sovereignty.  The distinction between 
the Western tradition and Heidegger‘s thought is that within the tradition the 
‗sovereignty of self has never been separable‘ from the prestige of transcendence.108  On 
Levinas‘s reading, there is little room for (genuine) transcendence in Heidegger‘s 
account.  In Heidegger‘s philosophy the person is the place of the accomplishment of 
the understanding of Being, based on nothing other than itself.  Dasein‘s existence is to 
be a being whose own being is to have a relation to Being.  There is no room for 
alterity, no room for exteriority, in the relation between a being with its understanding 
of Being (Seinsverständnis), which the being is in its essence and through which it 
comes to understand itself.
109
  As Peperzak remarks, ‗Other beings cannot enter into the 
self-identity of a being in which the understanding of Being realizes itself without any 
appeal to otherness‘.110  As there is no space for alterity, except in the form of time — 
which Heidegger acknowledges in his analysis of the inability to represent the meaning 
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 ‗[S]a possibilité d‘exister est une possibilité à laquelle elle est d‘ores et déjà vouée.‘ Ibid., p. 122.        
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 Peperzak, ‗Phenomenology—Ontology—Metaphysics‘, p. 123.  
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of one‘s own death — Heidegger‘s analysis, alas, results in defence of a tragic form of 
liberty.  Levinas ends the article by stating that though Heidegger‘s ontology has tragic 
overtones, it bears witness to a time and a world that perhaps will be possible to 
overcome tomorrow.
111
   
 
§1.7 ‗MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND ONTOLOGY‘: REVISITED  
 
In the remaining paragraphs of ‗Martin Heidegger and Ontology‘, Levinas writes of 
how Heidegger‘s approach goes beyond the empiricist/rationalist distinction, as it 
reveals the effectivity of human existence, and man‘s understanding of being in the 
world prior to any theoretical reflection or concept of man.  This point will prove to be 
crucial for Levinas‘s own thinking yet to come on subjectivity.        
All intellectualistic philosophy — empiricist or rationalist — seeks to know 
man, but it means to do so through the concept of man, leaving aside the 
effectivity of human existence and the sense of this effectivity.  The empiricists, 
whilst beginning from real men, did nothing else.  The sense of the individuality 
of the person had to escape them, for the very level in which this individuality is 
could not appear to them, in view of the intellectualism of their attitude, which 
consists in objectifying (se trouver devant) the fact.  They lacked the 
Heideggerian notion of existence and of understanding, that is, of an inner 
knowledge in the most specific sense of the term, of a knowledge that comes 
about throughout its very existence.
112
      
 
Heidegger, then, revealed to Levinas the possibility of a path within phenomenology 
that moves away from the transcendental Ego and towards concrete life, and so, aided 
him to move through phenomenology and yet away from the intellectualism he 
associated with Husserl‘s path.  Despite this, Levinas was very aware that Heidegger‘s 
main concern was the question of the meaning of Being as such, and not the question of 
the meaning of the human being, which will become a main concern for Levinas.  
Dasein as ontological facticity is central for Heidegger‘s analysis, not because he is 
interested in the being of the human being, but because Dasein is a being for whom its 
being is an issue for it, and as such reveals an understanding of the meaning of being.
113
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 ‗Par là, l‘ontologie de Heidegger rend ses accents les plus tragiques et devient le témoignage d‘une 
époque et d‘un monde qu‘il sera peut-être possible de dépasser demain.‘ Levinas, ‗L‘ontologie dans le 
temporal‘, p. 128.     
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 Levinas, ‗Martin Heidegger and Ontology‘, p. 31. This emphasis of course comes, in turn, from 
Heidegger‘s appropriation of Kierkegaard‘s starting-point that I can only argue from existence — in the 
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 This very different direction that Heidegger introduced to phenomenology again shows the influence 
of Dilthey on Heidegger‘s manner of thinking.  Although Heidegger did not follow Dilthey completely, 
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Heidegger‘s hostility toward epistemology in the specific and distinctive sense 
which we have given it — namely, of being opposed to ontological inquiry — 
his attempt to grasp the subject ontologically is a logically subsequent move to 
make (Sein und Zeit 2, 15, and passim).  But, as we will see, the ontological 
analysis of the subject is alone capable of yielding a solution and even a sphere 
of investigation to ontology in the general sense that Heidegger seeks.
114
  
 
Unlike Heidegger, who fundamentally was concerned with the question of the meaning 
of Being, Levinas will become more concerned with the question of the meaning of the 
human being, and formulate his question in an ethical context.  ‗Not ―Why being rather 
than nothing?‖, but how being justifies itself.‘115  Levinas will much later phrase this 
question, in explicit reference to Heidegger, in ‗Ethics as First Philosophy‘ (1984): 
The ego is the very crisis of the being of a being (de l‟être de l‟êtant) in the 
human domain.  A crisis of being, not because the sense of this verb might still 
need to be understood in its semantic secret and might call on the powers of 
ontology, but because I begin to ask myself if my being is justified, if the Da of 
my Dasein is not already the usurpation of somebody else‘s place.116     
 
The subject‘s freedom to be is put into question, with specific reference to ‗usurping‘ 
somebody else‘s ‗thereness‘ of being.  This gives rise to the subject asking what 
justifies my right to be above someone else‘s, questioning ‗my place in the sun‘, and not 
the question of what is the meaning of being.
117
  Levinas will not only question the 
foundation of freedom but, more importantly, the point of freedom.  Not only where 
does it come from, but, what is it for? 
Critchley notes that in order for Levinas to sketch such a picture of subjectivity, 
a view in which the subject is responsible for the other prior to questioning, this entails 
the deconstruction of a particularly modern idea of the subject as portrayed in the 
philosophy of such thinkers as Descartes, Kant and Husserl.  He maintains that Levinas 
                                                                                                                                               
the influence of Dilthey‘s triad (Erleben, Verstehen, Ausdruck,) can be seen in Heidegger‘s analysis of 
Dasein, especially in Heidegger‘s understanding of Dasein as a being for whom its own being is an issue 
for it.  Dasein expresses its own understanding of Being in the experience of its own being, as a Being-
towards-death. As McDonnell notes, ‗Heidegger, however, seems to apply this general triadic-
hermeneutic model of understanding to his own methodological use of the very term Dasein itself [...] for, 
in Heidegger‘s interpretation of that term, Dasein expresses the meaning of its own experience and its 
own ‗(pre-) understanding of Being‘.‘ McDonnell, ‗Heidegger, Dilthey, and ―the Being-Question‖‘, p. 
375.                    
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116
 Ibid., p. 85.  
117
 As Levinas remarks in the same article: ‗My being-in-the-world or ―my place in the sun‖, my being at 
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stripping, killing? Pascal‘s ―my place in the sun‖ marks the beginning of the image of the usurpation of 
the whole earth.‘ Ibid., p. 82.   
 49 
does this via Heidegger‘s analysis of Dasein in Being and Time, citing ‗Martin 
Heidegger et l‟ontologie‘ as demonstrating this move.118  One could also argue, 
however, that Bergson was another significant influence on Levinas in this regard 
because Bergson likewise places the view of the subject in modern philosophy into 
question.
119
  One of the original contributions contained in Bergson‘s philosophy, which 
brings about a major shift from the Cartesian view of the subject to the contemporary  
anti-humanist position, is the overcoming of the duality of mind and body.  Showing 
that the dualistic approach of maintaining two distinct and unrelated substances can 
only ever end up in problems, in its place Bergson presents a view of a unified and 
integrated whole from the beginning.
120
  Although both Heidegger and Bergson can be 
said to have influenced Levinas‘s thinking with regard to unity of human subjectivity, 
one striking difference between the two approaches remains in relation to freedom, 
which Levinas subtly highlights in the article discussed above, is the safeguarding of the 
openness to novelty just as Bergson had argued in his philosophy, and in opposition to 
the fatalism of Heidegger‘s thought. This is of importance as it maintains the 
importance of genuine transcendence, which Levinas believes to be lacking in 
Heidegger‘s analysis of Dasein.  Along with this openness to transcendence comes the 
introduction of ‗new‘ possibilities that would otherwise be absent from the life of the 
subject, without such possibilities the subject would be condemned to fate.  Such new 
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 ‗As is clear from the 1932 essay ‗Martin Heidegger et l‘ontologie‘, the move from Husserl to 
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can be viewed as inaugurating a major shift in the history of philosophy and that Bergson‘s thought 
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he accepts the reality of both spirit and matter and consequently the distinction between them, his work 
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hopes to overcome some of the difficulties that have arisen from the traditional modern divide, ‗it [Matter 
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philosophers‘. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer 
(New York : Zone Books, 1991), p. 9. The philosophical consideration that Bergson gives to both 
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can be understood as prefiguring certain postmodern concerns. See, Bergson, Time and Free Will. 
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possibilities preserve an idea of freedom as the genuine possibility of moving beyond 
the immanence of the subject and of a future not wholly contained in the present.  
 
§1.8 OPENNESS TO NOVELTY  
 
Levinas‘s article ‗The Old and The New‘, written as late as 1980, is testament to the 
claim that the openness to radical ‗novelty‘ in Bergson‘s interpretation of psychological 
time as duration and creativity as élan vital was an important influence on Levinas‘s 
own thought in regards to freedom, and so, we will momentarily break away from our 
chronological approach in order to turn to an examination of this article.  In ‗The Old 
and The New‘ Levinas outlines how the notion of the ‗new‘ is possible only if there is 
an openness to novelty which, as ‗new‘, is linked to radical alterity, and so, seen as an 
openness to transcendence outside of the totality of Being. For Levinas, the disturbance 
to the ‗same‘ (même) by exteriority accounts for this possibility of novelty. If this were 
not a possibility, then there would be no accounting for difference and creativity, 
rendering it increasingly difficult to avoid fatalism and determinism, and hence no 
possibility of justifying freedom.
121
  
Levinas begins the article by stating that one possible way of defining the human 
is ‗the desire for the new‘ or ‗the capacity for renewal‘, which fundamentally comes 
down to a desire for the other, that is, transcendence, the desire for what is beyond.
122
  
Within our common sense view we constitutes the present as ‗new‘.  This novelty, 
however, is brief, for it is new only while it is present.  Once time passes the present 
slips into the past, making room for a ‗new‘ present.  When viewed along this linear 
time model nothing remains new, as all things age, becoming old.  True to his 
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 As our study progresses we will encounter this unique Levinasian term some more. Commenting on 
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Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 43. Levinas also characterises the Western philosophical tradition as 
prioritising structures belonging to the same over and against the Other. 
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 Emmanuel Levinas, ‗The Old and The New‘, in Time and the Other, trans. by Richard A. Cohen 
(Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne University Press, 1987) p. 121. 
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phenomenological heritage, Levinas asks whether this linear description is an accurate 
portrayal of how we experience the old and the new, or not.  The human ordering of 
experience is not limited by this strict chronological outlook.  Simple phrases, such as, 
for instance, ‗we have seen it all before‘, or ‗history repeats itself‘, serve to illustrate 
this point, and of how we superimpose a different conception of novelty both on top of 
and not restricted by the chronological succession of time wherein every individual 
moment is strictly speaking a ‗new‘ moment and any chance of repetition is impossible.    
Levinas then moves on to specifically address the ‗modern‘ because the 
‗modern‘, as in the world of human value and cultural history, is seen as inherently 
‗new‘.  Not only is the modern viewed as ‗new‘ by virtue of the fact that it is the 
present, but the novelty also stems from the attribute that seems to characterise the 
‗modern‘ the most, that of an unrelenting ‗freedom‘ that is unfettered by any memories 
of the past.  It pays no heed to the weight of the past.  The past is viewed as a 
‗preparatory stage‘ leading up to the present.  The sovereign modern subject can master 
the world through knowledge, leaving no room for alterity.  Thus,   
[t]his situation makes possible the fact — for freedom — of keeping to the 
element of knowledge, thereby comprehending the world and the past in terms 
of being which knowledge assimilates, thus mastering the alterity which is 
manifest in being.
123
  
 
Freedom is seen as a power over alterity in being, in the form of the assimilation of all 
alterity into the domain of knowledge, not only in philosophy but also in the natural 
sciences.
124
  The whole world is seen as subsumed by consciousness, as man moves 
towards the pinnacle of history.  Levinas here refers to Hegelian philosophy and how it 
represents this idea of the modern as the culmination of history, with totality as an aim.  
Truth is seen as synonymous with totality, and goes beyond the distinction between the 
old and the new.  Time itself seems to lose the feature that has always characterised it, 
that of bringing the ‗new‘ with every present.  In the modern age novelty does not pass 
into the past, making room for the present.  Once the new of the modern becomes the 
true which is grasped by consciousness, time does not eradicate it.  
In the next section, ‗Duration and Change‘, once again Levinas asks of this 
modern conception of novelty, which he sees as promoted through Hegelian philosophy, 
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freedom is lived essentially in correlation with the development of science and the techniques that 
civilization brings.‘ Ibid., p. 125.   
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if it can account for the human experience of ‗novelty‘.  He turns to Bergson to aid him 
in contesting the view presented.
125
  Invoking the definition of the human given at the 
start of the article, Levinas asks if the Hegelian analysis presented can answer for the 
human being‘s desire for the new and for renewal.126  Bergson‘s distinction between 
linear geometrical time and the time of the inner life of consciousness, duration, offers 
us a better way of beginning to think through the human desire for novelty.  Duration as 
pure change is the ultimate safeguard of novelty as there is no permanent substance 
beneath this ceaseless change.  Although this may jar with our common sense everyday 
interaction with the world, which is needed in order for one to navigate the world and 
one‘s daily life, this insight is accessible to intuition.127  When reality is understood as 
constant novelty and continuous change, freedom, for Bergson, is safeguarded.  The 
threat of determinism and fate is done away with as life is constant renewal.
128
  Levinas 
praises Bergson for prioritising, in his philosophical reflections, the experiences that 
philosophers have traditionally seen as ‗secondary‘ and ‗subordinate‘, and in doing so 
he is a forerunner to the whole problematic of contemporary philosophy.  Bergson‘s 
approach does not have the totalising intellectualism of which Levinas was so wary.  
There is a space for alterity and transcendence, as in reality seen as duration, reality 
consists of constant change that is beyond the totalising assimilating powers of self-
consciousness and its self-determination.  
It no longer returns to the assimilating act of consciousness, to the reduction of 
all novelty — of all alterity — to what in one way or another thought already 
supported, to the reduction of every other (Autre) to the Same (Même).
129
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In Bergson‘s philosophy, the priority of duration over permanence opens up a space for 
novelty independent of the Same.  Thus freedom can be defended without running up 
against fate and determinism.  
The human would be the original place of rupture and would have a 
metaphysical bearing: it would be the very advent of mind (esprit).  Mind is no 
longer absolute knowledge as consciousness of self and equality to self, but the 
emergence of the new as duration.
130
 
 
This new approach to understanding time opens up new horizons of meaning that are 
older than our scientific time engagement with the world.  Heidegger, too, is accredited 
with similarly opening up an understanding of a horizon of meaning and an 
understanding of time that comes before logic, and this originary way of being in the 
world is the understanding from which the scientific approach is derived.  
In the final section of the article Levinas turns to critically reflect on Bergson‘s 
position, and he asks himself whether Bergson‘s description goes far enough.  Does 
Bergson‘s description of intuition as consciousness really preserve absolute novelty as 
alterity, or does it stay within the confines of the self?
131
  It seems that, in Levinas‘s 
view, even though intuition, for Bergson, is pre-reflective, spontaneous and immediate, 
in the end the object of thought is still seen as correlative with thought.  There is no 
room for surplus and hence no alterity.  Levinas then asks whether there is another way 
to think through this problem, avoiding the complete identification of mind with being 
and also avoiding an unbridgeable chasm between the I and alterity.  Can thought break 
the relation of correspondence between noesis and noema, and think a thought that is 
greater than what can be contained by thought?  In answer to this question Levinas 
proceeds to set out, at this stage of his writing, a well thought-through and familiar 
argument that rests, to a great extent, on the appropriation of a famous philosophical 
concept that he deploys in a very new and radical way.  This concept is the Cartesian 
concept of the infinite, which Levinas makes use of in order to try to describe how 
thought can think more than can be contained by thought.  We shall encounter this 
important argument in more detail again in chapter three, wherein we will deal with 
how it is deployed to describe our encounter with the Other.  In this article, however, it 
                                                 
130
 Ibid. 
131
 ‗Is not Bergsonian intuition as consciousness - be it pre-reflexive, as the spontaneous and immediate 
―actually lived life‖- confusion and coincidence and, thus, an experience still rediscovering its standards 
in a worked over alterity? The aging of the new!‘ Ibid., p. 133.     
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is deployed by Levinas to aid him articulate how the idea of true novelty can only be 
preserved by preserving alterity, even when it is encountered by thought.  
Levinas argues that the thought of the infinite must be regarded as beyond, and 
as something that is older than the confines of consciousness.  Whereas a knowing 
consciousness seeks to possess its object, without remainder, the more ancient thought 
of the infinite is marked by a ‗dis-interestedness‘ and ‗patience‘.  This passivity resists 
the relation that characterizes impatient consciousness, which strives to know and grasp 
the object without remainder, therein destroying any alterity and novelty.
132
   Patience, 
as the most profound thought of the new, is experienced as time, in the sense that 
tomorrow never arrives, as it is always today.  Passivity, understood as time, is a letting 
being be, and in this letting be there is a space for alterity that is not and cannot be fully 
grasped by consciousness.  As does Bergson, Levinas also links novelty with a different 
understanding of time than that of scientific-objectifiable time.  Time can be understood 
as the thought of the infinite, as it always evades coincidence with, and possession by 
thought.  The past is never present and likewise the future will always remain beyond 
our grasp, as the present is inescapable.  
It is not in the finality of an intentional aim that I think the infinite.  My 
profoundest thought, which bears all thought, my thought of the infinite older 
than the thought of the finite, is the very diachrony of time, non-coincidence, 
dispossession itself: a way of ‗being avowed‘ prior to every act of consciousness 
and more profoundly than consciousness, through the gratuitousness of time.
133
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meaning ‗earth‘ or ‗ground‘. One could say that phenomenology begins from a kind of humble patience, 
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When the subject is depicted as self-sufficient and the whole world can potentially be 
taken in and grasped by consciousness, there is no space for mystery and novelty.  The 
desire for the ‗new‘, which is one way of defining the human, is fundamentally the 
desire for difference, which can only come from ‗alterity‘.  Fundamentally, the desire 
for the new in us is the desire for the other, and it is this, Levinas argues, which sets our 
being apart from self-sufficient existing.      
Although Bergson‘s position accounts for the intuition of radical newness, when 
time is understood as duration, Levinas argues that his description does not go far 
enough as it is still accepts the freedom of the self as a given, even though this concept 
of ‗freedom‘ is not intellectualist nor linked with ‗fate‘ as is the case with Heidegger.  
Levinas asks, what is the foundation of this freedom as spontaneous creation in 
Bergson‘s thought?  If freedom is the possibility for novelty, then the foundation of the 
‗new‘ must first be discovered.  This, for Levinas, comes from alterity, which 
introduces difference, in turn, the possibility of free spontaneous creative action.  For 
Levinas, freedom will still be linked with novelty, as it is with Bergson, but true novelty 
can only come from outside and not grounded in the self.   
Although this essay was written quite late in Levinas‘s career, one can see the 
presence of these themes in his very early work, specifically ‗Reflections on the 
Philosophy of Hitlerism‘, examined shortly.   
 
§1.9 DASEIN AS DOOMED TO DEATH  
 
In his 1934 article „Phenomenology‟ (‗Phénoménologie‘), Levinas presents the reader 
with a review of the Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 11.  
Levinas begins the article by briefly outlining what he terms ‗phases in the 
phenomenological current‘, firstly, what he terms Husserl‘s realism associated with his 
                                                                                                                                               
than Being diachrony and synchrony correlate to Levinas‘s discussion on the two orders of discourse, the 
Saying and the Said. See, Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, pp. 156-69.  
Critchley also draws our attention to the parallels between Levinas‘s understanding of ‗diachrony‘ and the 
‗the saying‘, to Bergson‘s insight into duration (la durée). ‗In a Bergsonian sense, diachrony is the real 
time of subjectivity: unique, unrepeatable, and mobile.  It is the time of la durée as opposed to the 
simultaneous time of res extensa [...]. Diachrony is the primordial, or authentic, time from which the 
vulgar, inauthentic conception of time as synchrony is derived.‘ Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: 
Derrida and Levinas, pp. 165-66.           
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earliest works (Logical Investigations, 1900-01),
134
 secondly Husserl‘s transcendental 
idealism (the First Book of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy 1913), and the third period being that of Heidegger‘s 
existential phenomenology (Being and Time 1926).
135
  The subsequent reviews of five 
articles contained within this addition of the Yearbook is done in reference to these three 
‗phases‘, and Levinas notes which of these tendencies the articles can be said to belong 
to.  The article contains little of what could be read as explicit originality, yet it does 
reveal to us implicitly some aspects of Levinas‘s thinking at the time.  One aspect that is 
of interest for our current purposes is that this early article provides us with another 
insight into how Levinas regarded Heidegger‘s contribution to phenomenology, 
specifically in relation to how this new direction came to be so indispensable for 
Levinas‘s  own thinking.  As is the case with some of Levinas‘s other early works, such 
as those commented on above, we can see the element of Heidegger‘s thinking that 
Levinas gave preference to, specifically the opening up of concrete existence as a field 
of phenomenological reflection and study.  Although this preference is not always 
overtly stated, in retrospect we can, to some extent, make this judgement given the 
direction that his thought took later. When describing the third stage of phenomenology, 
existential phenomenology, Levinas describes Heidegger as ‗faithful to the method of 
phenomenology‘ and yet wholly original, explaining that he,  
reforms the very idea of the subject and conceives the goal of philosophy in an 
unexpected and original way.  For him the subject is no longer the 
transcendental and purely contemplative consciousness of Kant or Husserl, but a 
concrete existence doomed to death and caring about the very fact of its being.
136
  
 
Although it is very subtly stated, keeping in mind Levinas‘s reading of freedom in 
Heidegger as ultimately tragic and fated to die, this description of the subject for 
Heidegger as ‗doomed to death‘ conveys this sense of destiny and fate that we will more 
clearly see in the Hitlerism article examined below.     
In discussing the second article in the yearbook, ‗Representation and Image‘ 
(‗Vergegenwärtigung und Bild‘) by Eugen Fink, Levinas reflects on the nature of 
consciousness that Fink, identified by Levinas as belonging to the second phase of 
phenomenology (transcendental Idealism), has in mind.  Levinas suggests that Fink is 
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 Levinas, ‗Phenomenology‘, in Discovering Existence with Husserl, pp. 39- 46 (p. 39). 
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 Ibid. 
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closer to Husserl than to Heidegger when it comes to consciousness.  Contained within 
this reflection is Levinas‘s view on one of the most important differences between 
Husserl and Heidegger on the nature of consciousness,  
[i]s it the concrete consciousness of our daily existence, which is familiar with 
itself prior to any reflection, dispersed in everyday occupations, capable of 
pulling itself together in the anxiety of death before the injunctions of an inner 
voice?  Is it concrete, finite, and mortal?  Is it not, on the contrary, the 
transcendental consciousness, which is independent of the world and which, 
before being part of the world, constitutes it?  Here lies the whole opposition 
between Heidegger and Husserl: finite existence is already a product of 
transcendental consciousness, which humanizes itself and perceives itself in the 
world.
137
  
 
Levinas identifies the main divergence in the thought of both Husserl and Heidegger as 
centring on the question of whether transcendental consciousness is independent of and 
prior to the world, and the concrete self a derivative of it, or, is concrete consciousness 
always in and of the world, occupied with everyday existence, and on some pre-
reflective level familiar to its self.  As we shall see, the pre-reflective level of activity 
and pre-reflective awareness of embodied concrete experience in the world will become 
all the more important for Levinas as he develops his own thought further, although he 
will move away from the Heideggerian priority given to care for the fact of one‘s own 
being.  Levinas‘s growing discomfort with the ‗fatalism‘ of Heidegger‘s philosophy in 
relation to freedom becomes even more apparent in the next article.    
 
§1.10 PAGAN FATE AND MONOTHEISTIC FREEDOM 
 
Levinas‘s 1934 article ‗Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism‟ appeared in the 
journal Esprit.
138
  On the occasion of the translation into English, by Seán Hand in 
1990, Levinas provided a brief prefatory note.  In addressing the ‗bloody barbarism of 
National Socialism‘ Levinas remarked: 
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 The journal Esprit was founded by Emmanuel Mounier in 1932 in an attempt to philosophise for the 
wider public.  Levinas wrote for the journal many times up until the 1980‘s.  In the prefatory note to the 
English publication of ‗Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism‘, Levinas described the journal as 
‗representing a progressive, avant-garde Catholicism‘. Emmanuel Levinas, ‗Reflections on the 
Philosophy of Hitlerism‘, trans. by Seán Hand, Critical Inquiry, 17, (1990) 1, 62-71 (p. 63).  Caygill 
notes that Levinas‘s essay ‗is one of the first philosophical reflections on racism and National Socialism‘, 
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regime after 1940.‘ Caygill, Levinas and the Political, pp. 29-30.    
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 Such a possibility still threatens the subject correlative with being as gathering 
 together and as dominating (l‟être-à-reassembler et à-dominer), that famous 
 subject of transcendental idealism that before all else wishes to be free and 
 thinks itself free.  We must ask ourselves if liberalism is all we need to achieve 
 an authentic dignity for the human subject.
139
 
 
Even at this very early stage Levinas was beginning to call into question the primary 
role that freedom held in the history of Western Philosophy.  Levinas is well aware that 
the rise of National Socialism did not happen in a vacuum, and in some respects the 
trajectory of Western Philosophical thought brought us to that point, or at the very least 
did little to counter the possibility of such a threat.
140
  In his letter dated 28
th
 March 
1990 Levinas points out that the highest value of the ‗transcendental subject‘ is to be 
free, ‗before all else‘.141  This very question, of the primary place of freedom in the 
dominant view of the subject in the tradition, will continue to be a major question for 
Levinas in relation to freedom and the honoured place it has been given in the European 
cultural tradition. 
 In the opening paragraph of the article Levinas states that the typical approach of 
‗certain journalists‘ in trying to understand the phenomenon of Hitlerism, at the time of 
writing in 1934, was to frame the phenomenon as a ‗racist particularism‘ in contrast to a 
‗Christian universalism‘. Levinas wishes to go beyond this simple distinction by 
examining where this distinction stems from, by taking a step back behind this idea in 
an attempt to get to the source.  What is the meaning behind this logical opposition?  
Caygill outlines that this methodological approach, of wishing to get to the ‗source‘ of 
the two opposing ideas, comes from a combination of both philosophical and 
sociological influences, 
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 ‗The article stems from the conviction that the source of the bloody barbarism of National Socialism 
lies not in some contingent anomaly within human reasoning, nor in some accidental ideological 
misunderstanding. This article expresses the conviction that this source stems from the essential 
possibility of elemental Evil into which we can be led by logic and against which Western philosophy had 
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Levinas tries to bring the anthropological and phenomenological methods 
together by showing the elementary forms of experience — their constitution of 
past, present and future — that inform [both] Nazism and its Christian and 
liberal opponents.
142
 
 
Levinas brings together aspects of the phenomenological method with that of the 
approach taken by Sociologists in the Durkheimian school.  Terms such as ‗source‘ and 
‗intuition‘ will be familiar to readers of phenomenology, and likewise, readers familiar 
with the work of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl will recognise the method of striving to 
find the ‗elementary feelings‘ and ‗elementary force‘ behind a phenomenon.143      
 In the next section Levinas moves on to outline the elemental source of the 
difference between the two approaches, and in the subsequent sections he will elaborate 
on this difference and to some extent loosely trace the intellectual and historical 
development of this idea.  The underlying metaphysical difference that separates the 
two approaches and the ‗source‘ of this ‗logical opposition‘ (which Levinas 
distinguishes as Monotheistic and Pagan) stems from the difference in their 
understanding of freedom and time.  Levinas does not state this distinction in such clear 
terms at the beginning of the article, but his position becomes more apparent the further 
one reads.  On the one hand is the monotheistic tradition that views man as ‗free‘ and 
unbounded by history, and in opposition to this is the pagan idea of man as bound by 
time and history, and in some sense predetermined by history and fate.
144
  When 
Levinas introduces the term ‗freedom‘ he aligns it with terms such as ‗action‘ and a 
‗true beginning‘, and so, ‗[t]his conception is a feeling that man is absolutely free in his 
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 The Elementary Forms of Religious Life was published by Émile Durkheim in 1912 and studied 
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Bettina Bergo (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 90-91. 
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relations with the world and the possibilities that solicit action from him‘.145  Levinas 
depicts the Monotheistic tradition as viewing man as free to act, unrestrained by time 
and history.  This view is contrasted with the pagan view of man as fated, and restricted 
by destiny and the past.  Time and history are viewed as a ‗profound limitation‘ and as a 
‗condition of human existence‘ that is ‗irreparable‘.146  An action that would signify a 
true beginning, and as such true freedom, is not possible within this understanding as 
man is tied too tightly to the past.  Levinas makes a reference to the Atrides of Greek 
mythology to illustrate how within that tradition man is cursed by destiny and chained 
by fate.  In contrast to this view Levinas presents Judaic and Christian Monotheism.  
What they have in common is the possibility of ‗remorse‘ that leads to ‗repentance‘ and 
eventual pardon and redemption.  One can be freed of the chains of the past, thus ‗[t]ime 
loses its very irreversibility‘.147  Judaism and Christianity somehow transcend time and 
offer the possibility of a ‗new order‘, ‗an order that triumphs by tearing up the bedrock 
of natural existence‘.148  This opening to transcendence offers the soul the potential for 
true freedom, as it can free man from the past and from the world, and in doing so 
render one free to truly act, to begin again.  In this view man is not determinately tied to 
the world and to its material conditions.  
We must remember the context in which Levinas is writing this article and what 
the main subject matter is.  Levinas wishes to understand the origin of the conflicting 
ideas of Christian universalism and racist particularism.  Levinas paints a picture of true 
freedom, in contrast to the notion of ‗destiny‘ and ‗fate‘, and doing so criticizes the 
view of man as determined by race and religion, and inadvertently reveals to the reader 
how dangerous such a view of man can be.
149
  In light of Levinas‘s reading of 
Heidegger presented above, it would seem that Heidegger‘s understanding of freedom is 
firmly situated in the pagan tradition that lacks any opening to transcendence beyond 
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being.
150
  This reading will again be hinted at in On Escape (De l‟évasion), written in 
the following year.   
 Levinas then takes a leap through time and equates the foundation of modern 
liberalism with the monotheistic tradition and grounds the liberal view of equality in the 
notion of freedom from that tradition, as he has presented above.  Levinas notes that 
Liberalism has moved away from many aspects of the religious tradition, such as the 
supernatural dimensions, but he believes it has retained an important element, the 
autonomy of reason.  ‗If the liberalism of these last few centuries evades the dramatic 
aspects of such a liberalism, it does retain one of its essential elements in the form of the 
sovereign freedom of reason.‘151  Freedom through grace is replaced by freedom 
through reason.
152
  The modern understanding of man as autonomous reason is in line 
with the depictions of the monotheistic tradition and its view of man as being free to 
make choices that impact on man‘s future, irrespective of the past and history.  Just as 
the religious transcendental dimension placed man in a certain sense apart from the 
physical world, through the power of grace, so too with the Liberal tradition is man 
‗outside the brutal world and the implacable history of concrete existence‘.153  The 
autonomy of reason places man above his circumstances and above the world.  The 
spirituality of reason becomes somewhat detached from the physical world.  Perhaps 
most importantly for the context of this essay, this understanding of man also preserves 
the dignity and equality of each individual, irrespective of any racial or religious 
affiliation.  
 The equal dignity of each and every soul, which is independent of the material 
 or social conditions of people, does not flow from a theory that affirms, beneath 
 individual differences, an analogy based on a ‗psychological constitution‘.  It is 
 due to  the power given to the soul to free itself from what has been, from 
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 everything that linked it to something or engaged it with something (engagée), 
 so it can regain its first virginity.
154
 
 
The picture of man that we are left with at the end of the first section is of an 
autonomous individual, who is free to choose between various possibilities, but who 
seems to do so in a somewhat detached and cold way.  ‗For him, they [possibilities] are 
only logical possibilities that present themselves to a dispassionate reason that makes 
choices while forever keeping its distance.‘155                
 Section two is the shortest section of the article and it continues to trace the 
development of this idea, by briefly looking at ‗the first doctrine in Western history to 
contest this view of man‘, Marxism.  Marxism contests the view of man as pure spiritual 
reason and contests the liberal view of freedom, as the concrete world and material 
needs play an important, even a determinate role in the life of man.
156
  Man is born into 
a place in the world that in many ways determines man‘s fate.  Levinas characterises 
Marx‘s contribution as reversing the liberal idea of man, summarising his contribution 
as ‗Being determines consciousness‘ in contrast to the ‗whole of idealist philosophy‘ 
wherein ‗―being does not determine consciousness,‖ but consciousness or reason 
determines being‘.157  The idea of absolute freedom, as the power of the spirit to break 
from ties and freely act, is placed into question by pointing out how the concrete 
material situation cannot be overlooked.
158
    
 Although the end of the second section seemed to close on a negative note for 
the tradition of absolute freedom, the third section opens with a slightly more positive 
note.  If Marxism calls this concept of liberal freedom into question, does that mean this 
philosophy comes down on the side of fate?  Levinas places Marxism within the 
tradition of the 1798 revolution and in equating Marxism with the fight for equality, 
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points out how fate does not have the last word in Marxism.  It would seem that not all 
is lost for freedom and equality within the philosophy of Marx.  Although deterministic 
ties that our material situation face us with may well be stifling and potentially 
crippling, they do not have to be necessarily so.  One can become conscientised and 
then communally act to change their situation.  ‗To become conscious of one‘s social 
situation is, even for Marx, to free oneself of the fatalism entailed by that situation.‘159  
Levinas then wonders just what view would be able to shake the ‗European‘ view of 
man and goes on to reflect on a possible candidate: 
 A view that was truly opposed to the European notion of man would be possible 
 only if the situation to which he was bound was not added to him but formed the 
 very foundation of his being.  This paradoxical requirement is one that the 
 experience of our bodies seems to fulfil.
160
     
 
Does the experience of having a body fit the requirement of being bound to an 
inescapable situation, and as such function as a limitation to this ‗European notion of 
man‘ as unbounded by time and free? 
 Levinas now moves on to a phenomenological description of what it is to have a 
body, and this will lead him to an analysis of the ‗Germanic ideal of man‘ and the 
importance it places on ‗blood‘ and race.161  Levinas begins with a brief reflection on 
how philosophers have treated the experience of body and selfhood.  Straight away we 
are reminded of just how long the idea of a separation between the self and the body has 
been with us in philosophy.  Levinas introduces Socrates and reminds us of how he 
experienced his body as ‗like the chains that weigh him down in the prison at Athens; it 
encases him like the very tomb that awaits him‘.162  His body was like a heavy burden 
that he was forced to carry, and an obstacle that needed to be overcome.  This feeling of 
the ‗strangeness‘ and foreign nature of the body did not end with Socrates.  In keeping 
with the earlier trajectory of the essay Levinas next points out how this understanding of 
body and spirit also formed a hugely important part of the monotheistic traditions and 
the ‗modern liberalism‘ that followed.  After having outlined the broad thrust of the 
dualistic understanding of the body-self distinction that has pervaded much of 
philosophy since the very beginning, Levinas then uses a phenomenological approach to 
question whether or not this classical distinction between body and spirit is really how 
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we experience ourselves as embodied.  Levinas wonders if this distinction is accurate to 
experience in explaining our relationship with our body as ‗something eternally 
foreign‘.  Reflecting briefly, yet astutely, on ‗a feeling of identity between our bodies 
and ourselves, which certain circumstances render particularly acute‘, Levinas reminds 
us that this experience of the body as ‗foreign‘ is not always the case.163  Among these 
certain circumstances that Levinas examines are the intense feeling of oneness with our 
body that comes from the satisfaction when one is released from the experience of 
physical pain, or in the experience of an extreme sport or a physically dangerous 
situation, when every slight movement of your body may bring about safety or injury, 
again ‗all dualism between the self and the body must disappear‘.164  Focusing more on 
the experience of physical pain, Levinas wonders if the feeling of a unity between body 
and spirit is the only insight into how we experience our bodies that pain offers us.  
Does our attempt to go beyond physical pain not reveal a feeling of duality between the 
spirit and the body?  Almost in answer to this question he goes on to ask if the futility of 
this desire, and the impossibility of escaping our bodies and the pain, does not reveal the 
absolute character of the unity between body and spirit.  
 The body is not only a happy or unhappy accident that relates us to the 
 implacable world of matter.  Its adherence to the Self is of value in itself.  It is an 
 adherence that one does not escape and that no metaphor can confuse with the 
 presence of an external object; it is a union that does not in any way alter the 
 tragic character of finality.
165
      
 
The way in which Levinas discusses the spirit and the body, then, implies a duality, 
even if it is a very close union between the self and the body.  In the Western tradition 
that Levinas focuses on, the experience seems to be one of having a body, as opposed to 
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being a body.
166
  In this view the body is seen as a limitation to the otherwise 
unhindered freedom of man.  
One year later Levinas will return to a deeper analysis of our experience of our 
bodies which he believes the tradition has overlooked, but in this paper he highlights a 
benefit of this understanding of man.  The identity of the self is not exclusively tied to 
the physical attributes and the biological aspects of the person, and so, it is an 
universalisable conception of man.  Levinas maintains that the Western conception of 
man has never felt at home with a strong feeling of identity between self and body.
167
  
He argues that the strong ideological separation that the Western tradition has made 
between the body and the spirit run counterintuitive to some of our most basic 
experiences, and in doing so this idea has left a void in which an alternative conception 
of man as more firmly rooted in their body can creep in.
168
  It is precisely this close 
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‗feeling for the body‘ that will lead Levinas into the next section of the paper, and his 
discussion on how such a ‗biological‘ concept of man forms the basis for the new 
‗Germanic‘ (Nazi) understanding of man, and very briefly looks at how this conception 
emerged.   
The mysterious urgings of the blood, the appeals of heredity and the past for 
which the body serves as an enigmatic vehicle, lose the character of being 
problems that are subject to a solution put forward by a sovereignly free Self.  
Not only does the Self bring in the unknown elements of these problems in order 
to resolve them; the Self is also constituted by these elements.  Man‘s essence no 
longer lies in freedom, but in a kind of bondage (enchaînement).
169
  
 
This new concept of man is one based on race and heredity, and along with this new 
conception of man comes a new base for society.
170
  Alluding to the social contract 
tradition Levinas argues that a society founded on a mutual agreement between free 
wills will no longer suffice, and in its place will come a nation based on blood and race 
ties, fictional or otherwise.  ‗A society based on consanguinity immediately ensues from 
this concretization of the spirit.  And then, if race does not exist, one has to invent it!‘171  
As if sensing the reader‘s wonder as to how such a society, based on an exclusively 
‗biological‘ conception of man, can rise up in the centre of Europe in a country that was 
deeply steeped in the contrasting philosophical Western tradition that Levinas depicts in 
the first half of the essay, Levinas presents a possible answer to this very question.
172
  It 
would seem that latent in the very tradition of man as ‗free‘ to choose man‘s own truth, 
lies the potential for the destruction of this concept of man, the possibility of extreme 
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 ‗This freedom constitutes the whole of thought‘s dignity, but it also harbours its danger.  In the gap 
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To Be?, p. 40.       
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scepticism as the disowning of any and all truth.
173
  As the spirit is in a sense ‗detached‘ 
from the body, this space allows for the space for free thought; however, this space also 
opens up a gap that makes scepticism possible and ‗deceit‘ can creep in.  The view of 
man as free to choose truth for oneself, and as free from the chains of time and history, 
brings with it the possibility of choosing no truth at all.  As one is not born rigidly tied 
to spiritual values, or unescapably aligned to the commitments and past of the spiritual 
culture one is born into, the possibility of not committing oneself to any values becomes 
a real possibility.
174
  This loss of truth and commitment, and the vacuum that it creates, 
brings with it the susceptibility to being duped by counterfeit versions of the ‗true ideal 
of freedom‘.  
 It is to a society in such a condition that the Germanic ideal of man seems to 
 promise sincerity and authenticity.  Man no longer finds himself confronted by a 
 world of ideas in which he can choose his own truth on the basis of a sovereign 
 decision made by his free reason.  He is already linked to a certain number of 
 these ideas, just as he is linked by birth to all those who are of his blood.
175
      
      
The bonds that tie this society together are the bonds of blood and heredity.  
When one reminds oneself that this article was written in 1934 it is striking just 
how accurate Levinas‘s attempt at a philosophical understanding of what lies behind the 
ideology of Hitlerism.  As is characteristic of the work of Levinas in places his 
argument consists of some very broad strokes, that are not fully argued out or 
supported, but one cannot deny, with hindsight, the unnerving portrait of the threat that 
Hitlerism presented.  Even before the full atrocities of the Hitlerism regime revealed 
themselves Levinas proclaimed that the very humanity of man was in jeopardy.  
It is not a particular dogma concerning democracy, parliamentary government, 
dictatorial regime, or religious politics that is in question.  It is the very humanity 
of man.
176
   
 
§1.11 THE POWERLESSNESS OF THE PASSIVE AFFECTIVE SELF  
 
Written one year after „Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism‘, On Escape (De 
l‟évasion) (1935) carries over many of the themes from Levinas‘s earlier work, such as 
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the inescapability of the body.  It is in this article that an independent Levinas starts to 
emerge more clearly and more decisively than has been the case in the work to date.  
The importance of affective intentionality, briefly mentioned in his The Theory of 
Intuition in Husserl‟s Phenomenology, crucial to Levinas‘s subsequent development, 
will be central to his thinking in this essay.  In distinction to the Heideggerian analysis 
of Dasein, which was necessary in order to open up the question of the meaning of 
being, Levinas shows an interest in exploring the subject‘s relation to being.  This 
article marks an important step in the direction of describing the self as affective 
sensibility, calling into question the primacy of representation, and the view of an 
autonomous free, self-sufficient subject.  We begin to see the emergence of themes that 
will still be evident even in his most mature works.  
  In his work Emmanuel Levinas Hand characterises On Escape as ‗the place 
where he [Levinas] first tries to reverse his involvement with Heidegger‘s ontology‘.177  
In this article Levinas begins to explicitly critique Heideggerian ontology, and begins to 
take the first steps towards his philosophical description of a subject who is beyond 
being. It should be kept in mind, however, that Heidegger has a very particular 
understanding of ontology, which was very different from any understanding of 
ontology that came before Kant.  ‗Ontology‘, as Heidegger understands it, is the post-
Kantian Diltheyean-hermeneutic study of the way the meaning of the living word of 
‗Being‘ is implicitly understood and expressed, however incompletely, in our human 
everyday experiences and expressions.  For Heidegger, then, approaching the issue of 
the meaning of Being is inseparable from the comprehension of Being that the human 
being harbours.  It is this question, of the meaning of Being in relation to the (finite) 
experiences of the human being, that interests Heidegger, and to which he brought to 
bear an existential-hermeneutic methodology under the influences of Dilthey and 
Kierkegaard.  With Heidegger, then, hermeneutics can be applied to an understanding of 
being and its meaning, by gaining access to Dasein‘s implicit understanding of the 
meaning of being, revealed in Dasein‘s everyday comportment to being-in-the-world. 
As Heidegger writes in Being and Time: 
Entities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, 
the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their 
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nature is ascertained.  But Being ‗is‘ only in the understanding of those entities 
to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs.
178
  
 
Hand, therefore, is correct to say that Levinas distances his philosophical approach from 
that of Heidegger‘s ‗ontology‘, however, as was shown above, the first steps out of 
Heidegger‘s ‗ontology‘ can be seen in Levinas‘s previous work.179  Also, his analysis 
leaves more than just Heidegger behind, as will be shown below.
180
  In a key sentence 
describing the text Hand stresses: ‗Escape now symptomatically replaces freedom‘.181  
Hand says of the text that it effectively dismantles what Levinas had confidently erected 
philosophically up to this point.  Hand believes that the shock Levinas would have felt 
due to the political changes taking place, both on an international and personal level, led 
Levinas to think about his understanding of freedom.  Although the historical context 
and the unfolding events at the time of writing this essay were undoubtedly influential 
on Levinas‘s thinking, and must not be understated, the development of his thought in 
relation to freedom is consistent with his previous work, even if in this essay it takes a 
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more solemn direction.
182
  Levinas himself will come to describe his intellectual 
biography as ‗dominated by [both] the presentiment and the memory of the Nazi 
horror‘.183  When reading the article one cannot help now but to be aware of the future 
yet to come and this lends a particular sombre note to the picture of the human being as 
powerless and impotent to escape from being and its alleged destined meaning.
184
   
Interestingly, Levinas opens the article on the issue of freedom, stating that, 
‗[t]he revolt of traditional philosophy against the idea of being originates in the discord 
between human freedom and the brutal fact of being that assaults this freedom‘.185  On 
this reading, traditional philosophy does not question the freedom of man, and any 
limitations to this freedom are seen as coming from the outside.
186
  The struggle is seen 
as a struggle between ‗the I‘ (le moi) and ‗the non-I‘ (le non-moi), and not a struggle 
within the self.  Levinas terms this view of the ‗I‘ (moi) as ‗self-sufficient‘, this term 
will become synonymous with freedom understood in this way in his later work.  Here 
Levinas aligns this view of freedom as ‗self-sufficient‘ with ‗restless and enterprising 
capitalism‘ and the bourgeois spirit. Through the ever greater accumulation of 
possessions and capital the bourgeois asserts its hold over the present, and even takes 
steps to guarantee their power over the future, and safeguard their security through 
insurance.  The drive for control and their wish to overcome the imposition of the world 
and things even dominates any desire for enjoyment, ‗he prefers the certainty of 
tomorrow to today‘s enjoyment‘.187  Underlying this relationship with the world is a 
particular understanding of being.  Being is sufficient onto itself and offers itself to us.  
The lack in the human being is attributed to a limitation of being in the case of the 
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human, and Levinas describes philosophy‘s sole preoccupation as the drive to transcend 
these limits.  Western philosophy has attempted to overcome these limits by trying to 
secure a harmony between us and the world, or by attempting to perfect our own being.  
Levinas then notes that the modern sensibility, perhaps for the first time in the 
history of philosophy, no longer turns toward transcendence.  It is at this point that 
Levinas introduces the term in the title, ‗escape‘ (l'évasion).  The modern sensibility is 
one of world-weariness.  It is the ‗disorder of our time‘ (mal du siècle).188  Being in all 
its weight, brutality and seriousness, weighs heavily on the modern subject.  Levinas 
uses the analogy of a game to describe life.  Life becomes very real and is no longer 
seen as a game once one realises that they are impotent to say stop, or halt the game 
when it becomes distressing, and no longer plays by our rules.  For it is not suffering 
that reveals the stark reality of being, but our inability to pause the suffering, and 
consequently results in ‗an acute feeling of being held fast (rivé)‘.189  Such an insight 
does not bring with it a new image of our existence, but affirms the inescapability of our 
existence and the permanent quality of our presence.  The recent events of World War I, 
and perhaps even the impending war to come, has stripped life of its innocent youthful 
game-like status, and unlike the history of philosophy and the various attempts to 
overcome the limits placed on man, the need of modern man becomes the need to 
escape.
190
  
The escape that Levinas wishes to depict is not an escape from a particular mode 
of being, nor is it an aspiration to flee this reality and enter into another domain, nor to 
overcome the restrictions that come with a body.  Each of these escapes seek to modify 
being but do not entail the need to escape being as such.  Levinas also includes Bergson 
and his understanding of freedom within this group, as his philosophy does not 
adequately capture this fundamental need to escape and thus stays within the confines of 
ontology.  Bergson‘s life force or creative evolution (devenir créateur) may break with 
the mechanical view of time, but being is replaced with becoming, and fundamentally 
there is still no attempt to escape the weight of being.  
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While it breaks with the rigidity of classical being, the philosophy of the vital 
urge does not free itself from the mystique (préstige) of being, for beyond the 
real it glimpses only the activity that creates it.
191
 
 
In this section we also find a veiled criticism of the spontaneity that is distinctive of 
Bergson‘s depiction of freedom.  The vital urge may be spontaneous and unpredictable, 
and  so, in Bergson‘s estimation, undetermined and free, but Levinas maintains that the 
image of the being it depicts is one of a being that is almost wild and irrational, a being 
‗destined for a race-course (voué à une course). The urge is creative but irresistible‘.192  
Although the reference to Bergson is not explicitly stated, in this section Levinas also 
attributes the ‗fatalism‘, up until now associated with Heidegger‘s freedom, to that of 
Bergson‘s.  As Bergson‘s philosophy does not manage to leave the confines of ontology 
behind, despite all attempts to avoid determinism, without any recourse to beyond 
being, the journey may be unpredictable but the end remains the same. 
The fulfilment of a destiny is the stigma of being: the destination is not wholly 
traced out, but its fulfilment is fatal, inevitable [...].  With the vital urge we are 
going toward the unknown, but we are going somewhere, whereas with escape 
we aspire only to get out (sortir).
193
      
 
The escape that Levinas wishes to describe is not equivalent to creation, or to a renewal 
of being.  Levinas argues that this need to escape (besoin de l‟évasion) from being, 
which is impossible to achieve, is fundamental to the human beings relation to being, 
and yet one that philosophy has overlooked.  Despite the apparent identity within the 
existent, there is an integral duality and tension fundamental to the subject.  This 
duality, however, is not in the traditional sense of the distinction between the material 
and the immaterial; it is, rather, in the dramatic form of the subject‘s relation to its 
self.
194
  The need to escape is not motivated by a want to reform the self, or to overcome 
some lack, but to be rid of the self altogether.  The very identity of the self incorporates 
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the need of being rid of oneself.
195
  The ‗I‘ (moi) is chained to its self, and powerless to 
ever undo the bind.
196
 At the end of this section Levinas states that central to philosophy 
is the problem of being qua being, but for Levinas the need for escape is what leads us 
towards it.      
 Having differentiated the ‗escape‘ in question from any other reflections on 
escape, in the successive sections Levinas moves on to give a detailed 
phenomenological reading of need, pleasure, shame and nausea in order to capture this 
fundamental need to escape that will always elude the subject.  The powerlessness of 
the subject is explored in greater detail.  Levinas does this by turning to examine the 
importance of affective experiences and the crucial significance of sensation and 
sensibility in the life of the embodied self.  The move towards reflecting on affectivity 
will prove crucial for Levinas‘s future work, as it will call into question the primacy of 
intentional consciousness, as it reveals a passivity that comes with being an affective 
sensible self, which is prior to, or beneath the freedom of reflective consciousness.
197
  
First Levinas turns to ‗need‘, in order to clarify just what this need to escape is.  
The need to escape is not as a result of any privation, ‗there is in need something other 
than a lack‘.198  The being of that which is does not admit of degrees, it either is or it is 
not.  It is the very fact of existing that escape wishes to evade, and it is not to be 
confused with any need to change the nature or quality of the existent.  The need to 
escape has no object, similar to the contrast between anxiety and fear in Heidegger, 
which Heidegger himself borrowed from Kierkegaard.
199
  Need here is simply the need 
to get out, irrespective of any subsequent destination.  As John Llewelyn describes it, 
‗[i]t is an inner restlessness that will not be put to rest, unlike needs for which 
satisfaction brings an at least temporary peace‘.200  Need is generally interpreted as 
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resulting from some kind of lack, as need turns us toward something other than 
ourselves, and when the need is met we are returned to a ‗natural plenitude‘.  Levinas, 
however, maintains that this description is too hasty.  Levinas asks what of malaise, or 
discontent, wherein the individual has uneasiness within themselves and they have no 
idea what it is that could release them from this inner disquiet.  
There are needs for which the consciousness of a well-determined object — 
susceptible of satisfying those needs — is lacking.  The needs that we do not 
lightly call ‗intimate‘ remain at the stage of a malaise, which is surmounted in a 
state closer to deliverance than to satisfaction.
201
      
 
The use of the term ‗deliverance‘ to describe the experience of becoming free from a 
state of malaise captures the passivity of the subject.  As we associate the fulfilment of 
needs as coming from outside the self, this further demonstrates our passivity, ‗it places 
our being under the tutelage of what is outside of us‘.202  The suffering of need in the 
form of malaise affirms that need is not to be understood in terms of a lack.  Similarly 
that the satisfaction of a need does not eradicate it also further supports this analysis.  
Needs are never fully satisfied, as they are replaced by another, or the anticipated 
satisfaction does not come, or if perceived as being satisfied disappointment shortly 
follows the satisfaction.  A fundamental aspect of the human condition is this inability 
to satisfy this deepest need.  In order to further elaborate on how this need refers to the 
presence of our being, and not some deficiency, Levinas turns to an on analysis of 
pleasure. 
If need was the desire to fill a lack in being and return to a state of plenitude, 
then in pleasure, which is the satisfaction of a need, one should feel most attached to 
being.  Levinas describes how in fact the opposite is the case.  Rather than rooting us 
firmly in being, pleasure offers us a glimpse of escape and a momentary forgetfulness of 
the weight of being.
203
  Like floating in zero gravity, we can feel weightless, ‗[t]he 
[human] being feels its substance somehow draining from it; it grows lighter, as if 
drunk, and disperses‘.204  However, the weightlessness cannot last and when one returns 
to earth the heavy weight of their being is all the more apparent due to the momentary 
release.  In pleasure, time seems to split and one is held fast in a continuous present.  
When the pleasure breaks and ceases one is returned to the instant.  Although pleasure 
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can provide release from malaise, it should not be seen as the goal of need, as pleasure 
is not an end point at which to aim.  It is not a state but a movement, a process of 
departing from being, but not aimed at any specific destination.  A vital element in 
Levinas‘s description of pleasure is that pleasure is an affective event.  This line of 
thinking will be crucial for his later description of subjectivity as affectivity, as it 
captures the passivity of the self.  As pleasure promises momentary release from the 
malaise that comes from the acute feeling of being held fast (rivé) to being, it cannot be 
a state of being.  If pleasure was an act, then it would fall under the categories of 
being.
205
    
Affectivity, on the contrary, is foreign to notions that apply to that which is, and 
has never been reducible to categories of thought and activity.
206
     
 
Cognition is also an attribute of being.  If pleasure was cognitive it would likewise be 
understood as a property of being.  Pleasure is not an act of being as it is the process 
that attempts to escape from this heavy burden of being.
207
  Try as we might to forget 
this basic relation to being and to transcend our self through the immersion in pleasure, 
which although may bring us momentary self forgetting, it is always doomed to failure.  
Pleasure cannot last, and our attempt to flee will never be accomplished, as we will 
always be returned once again to our self.
208
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Not only is pleasure insufficient in its primary purpose but in some ways we are 
left the worst for this momentary forgetting, as when we return we are left ashamed of 
our being and our basic nakedness that we cannot conceal, not even to ourselves.  
Nakedness does not refer to the physical condition of being unclothed, but to the need to 
excuse one‘s existence.  Shame captures the drama that is the duality of the self.  For in 
shame the self clearly wishes that it could eradicate the self that acted in the manner that 
brought about the shame.  The I can no longer understand its own actions, and is 
sickened by the fact that it cannot hide from what it did, and cannot escape the self that 
did it, as they are one and the same.
209
  However, shame here is not to be thought of as a 
result of acting in an immoral way.  Shame is not as a result of any limitation, or as a 
result of a particular shameful act, but the self‘s incapacity to break with its own self.  
Shame has an ontological significance, as it turns us towards the inescapable fact of 
being there.  It is our presence to ourselves that is shameful.  As revealing as shame is in 
exposing our inability to be free of being, there is one more phenomena that is more 
revealing still, that of nausea.  
More than any other phenomenon, the debilitating feeling of needing to vomit 
reveals the inescapable presence of our self to our self more than any other.  ‗We are 
revolted from the inside; our depths smother beneath ourselves; our innards ―heave‖ 
(nous avons “mal au coeur”).‘210  Nausea has a similar role to that of anxiety in 
                                                 
209
 In the not-so-distant future Jean-Paul Sartre will publish Being and Nothingness (1943), in which he 
also notably discusses shame.  Shame, for Sartre, indicates our basic relatedness to others.  The self feels 
ashamed because the other is watching and has witnessed a shameful act.  For Sartre, the primary 
structure of shame is shame before somebody.  Sartre wrote, shame ‗is a shameful apprehension of 
something and this something is me.  I am ashamed of what I am [...] the Other is the indispensable 
mediator between myself and me.  I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other.‘ Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Being and Nothingness. A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes (USA: 
Washington Square Press, 1956) p. 301.  In distinction, in On Escape Levinas‘s account of shame is 
shame felt for one‘s own inescapable nakedness to oneself.  In Time and the Other Levinas stresses, in 
contrast to Sartre, that what he wishes to capture is the fact that the I is inescapably bound to the self: ‗In 
Sartre‘s philosophy there is some sort of angelical present [...].  In recognizing the whole weight of matter 
in the present itself and in its emerging freedom, we want both to recognize material life and its triumph 
over the anonymity of existing, and the tragic finality to which it is bound by its very freedom.‘ Levinas, 
Time and the Other, p. 62. In 1957 in his article ‗Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity‘ Levinas 
reintroduces ‗shame‘ only at that stage of his work ‗shame‘ begins to take on an ethical significance.  
Through the encounter with the face of the Other the self comes to feel ashamed for its arbitrary freedom.  
‗It is a shame freedom has of itself, discovering itself to be murderous and usurpatory in its very 
exercise‘. Levinas, ‗Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity‘, p. 58.  Although this understanding of shame is 
closer to Sartre, as it comes from an intersubjective encounter, they are fundamentally different.  For 
Levinas the self does not feel ashamed for a particular ‗vulgar act‘, as Sartre puts it, but for its very own 
existence.  This feeling of shame brings with it the possibility of a moral life.  See, Hayat, La liberté 
investie, especially the third portion of this study where the author compares the philosophy of Sartre and 
Levinas in relation to their respective views on freedom. 
210
 Levinas, On Escape, p. 66. 
 77 
Heidegger‘s work, but it is notably different.211  It is not the facticity of Dasein‘s being 
that is revealed in nausea, but the pure weight of being, and our absolute inability to do 
anything about it.  ‗[T]his‘, as Levinas stresses, „is the very experience of pure 
being‘.212  It is nausea, therefore, that awakens us, as it were, to the pure brute fact that 
‗there is being‘ (il y a l‟être).  Nausea is powerlessness, an ‗impower‘ (impuissance) 
beyond the power of the self.
213
  The imposed fatality of finite subjectivity seems even 
more powerless than Heidegger‘s Dasein who is doomed to death.  Anxiety, in 
Heidegger, can be read as redeeming, as it pulls Dasein back from its fallen state and 
reveals freedom, bringing with it the potential for authentic living, through the 
embracing of one‘s inevitable death.214  In On Escape it is not the end of being that 
strikes fear into the subject, but the very weight and imposition of being, chained to the 
subject who is powerless to change it.  
Although the thinking through of these young ideas, and the metaphors used in 
an attempt to describe them, will undergo further change, Levinas‘s depiction of the 
world at this early stage will fundamentally remain the same.  It is in this article that we 
first grasp the sense of urgency in Levinas‘s attempt to think beyond being, but the path 
out of being is yet to be paved.  To do so, Levinas will need to ‗overturn‘ certain 
‗common sense‘ notions, one of which will be our understanding of freedom and 
responsibility.  
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It is a matter of getting out of being by a new path, at the risk of overturning 
certain notions that to common sense and the wisdom of the nations seemed the 
most evident.
215
 
 
Being is not described in any favourable terms in this early article and our fundamental 
relation to being is the impatient urgent and incessant need to escape, irrespective of 
where we might go or how we might get there.  What is of importance is that we leave 
being behind.  In contrast to the picture of the free Western subject presented by 
Idealism, the human being is depicted as utterly powerless to fulfil this incessant need.  
Given the political climate at the time perhaps it is unsurprising that being is depicted in 
suffocating terms.  
Every civilization that accepts being — with the tragic despair it contains and 
the crimes it justifies — merits the name ‗barbarian‘.216 
 
Future works will pay much more attention to the importance of the love of life and the 
enjoyment in living, which bring a momentary release from the burden of life, in 
contrast to Heidegger‘s Dasein who Levinas goes on to describe in Totality and Infinity 
as ‗never hungry‘.217  However, pure undifferentiated neutral being will continue to be 
described in such a negative manner.  Fortunately, for Levinas there is a way out, the 
subject is not left alone and forsaken to being.  Although pleasure as a primarily selfish 
act is on the final assessment insufficient, Levinas will go on in the post-war work to 
describe a transcendent encounter that is never fully consumed by the free subject and 
breaks the totalising structure of being.  The descriptions of the subject as affectivity 
begun here will lead Levinas to alterity.
218
    
 
§1.12 RE-READING HUSSERL 
 
‗The Work of Edmund Husserl‘ (‗L‟Oeuvre d‟Edmond Husserl‘) was published in 
1940, ten years after Levinas‘s dissertation and not long after Husserl‘s death.  It is a 
significant article on which to end this chapter as in this article Levinas returns to his 
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reading of Husserl and discovers latent possibilities in Husserl‘s understanding of 
intentionality not exploited by Husserl himself, and in light of this re-examines freedom 
in Husserl‘s thought.  Levinas is once again preoccupied with the question of freedom 
and it is a central focus of his reading and presentation of Husserl‘s phenomenology.  
This re-reading of Husserl provides Levinas with the methodological tools to later 
develop his own philosophy further, and to build on this potential that lay somewhat 
dormant in Husserl‘s own work, as the ethical significance was unrecognised by Husserl 
himself, by describing how sense can come from the outside.
219
  Levinas now presents a 
re-evaluation of his earlier reading on the very issue of freedom and intellectualism, 
both topics on which he had earlier based his criticism of Husserl.  This revised reading 
reveals how, despite the subject being viewed as the origin of sense, the subject is both 
active and passive in relation to sense.
220
  Levinas finds the possibility of a more 
favourable account of freedom in Husserl‘s description of intentionality, which he 
believes Husserl himself overlooked.  Despite this, Levinas is also subtly critical of 
Husserl‘s own emphasis on consciousness as the sole origin of meaning.  Although 
Levinas‘s re-reading of Husserl will pave the way for Levinas to give a new description 
of freedom, and explore further the question of the origin and justification of freedom, 
this article hints at what Levinas later came to find deficient in the understanding of 
freedom contained in Husserl‘s work.  
The purpose of this long article is to present an overview of the phenomenology 
of Husserl, and to offer an exposition of the main components thereof, ‗to bring out the 
unity of the phenomenological inspiration, its physiognomy, its message‘.221  Given that 
we have summarised Levinas‘s understanding of phenomenology in his first article 
outlined above, we do not need to repeat that summary, rather we will turn our attention 
to those aspects that have undergone a slight revision, and more particularly the 
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importance of this description of phenomenology for freedom.  Were as in his thesis 
Levinas questioned the intellectualism of Husserl here we find that Levinas has 
discovered a way around this earlier criticism, and no longer holds it to be the case.  In 
his thesis, Levinas attributed the intellectualism of Husserl to the privileged position of 
representation in his description of intentionality, claiming that ‗to have a sense‘ does 
not mean the same as ‗to represent‘.222  He has since come to reconsider this position 
motivated by a change in his understanding of the meaning of ‗representation‘.  The role 
of the sense-bestowing function of consciousness (Sinngebung) and self-evidence take 
on a new significance.  With this modified reading of Husserl Levinas has found a 
possible way of describing freedom that does not fall prey to Heidegger‘s determinism, 
nor Bergson‘s irrationalism, and brings Husserl‘s own thought in a direction overlooked 
by Husserl himself.  It provides a way for Levinas to begin to develop an understanding 
of freedom as grounded in a passivity that is prior to meaning giving intentional 
consciousness, and by arguing that the subject is not the sole origin of meaning, 
freedom can be saved from a totalizing unethical description.      
Although Levinas‘s description of phenomenology does not alter that given in 
his very first article on Husserl‘s book of Ideas I, the description given in this article 
pays particular attention to an important dimension that was not stressed before.  He 
describes the purpose of phenomenology as ‗an investigation of their [objects] meaning 
[sense (sens)] based on the self-evidence that constitutes them‘.223  Phenomenology is 
the clarification of sense and does not concern itself with any questions pertaining to the 
existence of the object, but only the sense of the object for consciousness.  
Phenomenology‘s method is to reflect on consciousness, and to examine the self-
evidence awakened by reflection in order to clarify this sense.
224
  This definition of 
phenomenology opens up the question of sense, and in the section ‗Intentionality‘ 
Levinas goes on to outline what intentionality is and how thought should be understood 
as always having a ‗sense‘.  
Levinas‘s description of intentionality begins in the familiar fashion, by 
describing what was novel in Husserl‘s approach and how consciousness is always 
consciousness of something.  Levinas reminds us that intentionality is transcendent as it 
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is a way for thought to contain something other than itself.  He also points out that it is 
not to be understood as a relation between two objects, but unlike his previous 
description in which Levinas stressed that consciousness itself is not an object, here we 
find an emphasis on a dimension of intentionality previously unexplored.  Levinas 
stresses that intentionality is essentially the act of bestowing a sense, Sinngebung.  ‗The 
relation of intentionality is nothing like the relations between real objects.  It is 
essentially the act of bestowing a meaning [sense] (the Sinngebung).‘225  As such the 
object, every object, constitutes a moment of sense.  To think is to think in terms of 
meaning.  One of the important latent possibilities in Husserl‘s phenomenology that 
Levinas seems to have previously overlooked is the notion of ‗sense‘ as broader than 
simply applying to a theoretically contemplated representational or objectified content.  
The turn to the concrete life of the subject, earlier attributed to Heidegger, is now found 
to be already present in the work of Husserl.  Representation is contained within the 
idea of sense, not just in our theoretical engagement with the world, as Levinas 
suspected in his thesis, but all mental life participates in representation.  
To Husserl, the fact of meaning [sense] is characterised by the phenomenon of 
identification, a process in which the object is constituted.  The identity of a 
unity across multiplicity represents the fundamental event of all thought.  For 
Husserl, to think is to identify. 
226
  
 
This ‗identify‘ is the same thing as to have a ‗sense‘, for the identification is that which 
the subject gives the object, and the way through which the object is understood 
simultaneously.  Intentionality seen as Sinngebung is a bestowing of sense, as it is the 
act of synthesising the manifold of experience into a unity, and hence is a 
representation, an objectifying act.  This objectification is a function of intentionality 
and is not confined to theoretical contemplation, ‗for Husserl, representation, in the 
sense we have just specified, is found necessarily at the basis of intention, even non-
theoretical intention‘.227  This is also true of affective intentions.  Representation is a 
corner stone of intentionality, as in synthesising the manifold of experience into a unity 
a sense is given to the object.  This is the case whether or not one takes the step to 
critically reflect on the content of consciousness in a theoretical fashion.  This leads 
Levinas to reconsider his earlier judgement in his thesis were he found Husserl‘s 
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phenomenology to be intellectualist.
228
  The object has a meaning even when there is 
nothing intellectual about it, when the object is immediate, unreflected upon, or ‗even 
when this something is absolutely undetermined, a quasi-absence of object‘.229  
The notion of self-evidence has a crucial role in this revised reading of Husserl, 
and Levinas consistently mentions it throughout the various sections.  It is self-evidence 
that saves intentionality from both the threat of solipsism and the descent into a bad 
infinity in which consciousness reflects on consciousness which reflects on 
consciousness ad infinitum.
230
  With self-evidence this exercise comes to an end.  ‗The 
process of identification can be infinite.  But it is concluded in self-evidence — in the 
presence of the object in person before consciousness.‘231  Before the object becomes an 
object for theoretical reflection it is present ‗in person‘.  What Levinas stresses here is 
the real givenness of alterity, which is in contrast to Husserl, wherein the object ‗in 
person‘ is the real intended object of the act that intends.232  This ‗in person‘ for 
Levinas is a presence to consciousness that is not understood as evidence, and opens the 
way for an understanding of consciousness that is not the sole origin of meaning.
233
  In 
his revised understanding of the meaning of intentionality for Husserl, Levinas crucially 
finds a passivity within consciousness, the significance of which he believes to have 
been overlooked by Husserl himself.   
This ambiguity within intentionality, at the origin of sense, provides the 
philosophical tools that will later enable Levinas to describe an encounter that can have 
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a significance ‗in person‘, which he will come to understand as prior to representational 
consciousness, and as infinite, escapes the theoretical totalising gaze.  It is the foreign 
within us that remains foreign.  Consciousness is paradoxically both active and passive.  
The world is both ‗given‘ to the mind and the mind is the origin of what it receives.234   
[S]elf-evidence is a unique situation: in the case of self-evidence the mind, while 
receiving something foreign, is also the origin of what it receives.  It is always 
active.  The fact that in self-evidence the world is a given, that there is always a 
given for the mind, is not only found to be in agreement with the idea of activity, 
but is presupposed by that activity.  A given world is a world where we can be 
free without this freedom being purely negative (nous pouvons être libre sans 
que cette liberté soit purement negative).  The self-evidence of a given world, 
more than the nonengagement of the mind in things, is the positive 
accomplishment of freedom (est l‟accomplissement positif de la liberté).235 
 
Importantly for Levinas‘s development, not only is the subject an origin of meaning, 
and in this sense is free, but this paradoxical description of the mind as both passive and 
active opens up a way for Levinas to challenge the description of the subject as the sole 
origin of meaning.  Meaning is passively received, as well as actively given.  This 
safeguards the possibility of novelty, along with opening a space for an alterity that 
remains foreign, whilst avoiding the determinism that could be unavoidable if the 
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subject did not also freely partake in the constitution of the world and of history.
236
  
There is a positive account of freedom to be found in the work of Husserl that is no 
longer viewed as purely intellectual.  The subject is concretely immersed in the world 
and yet not overwhelmed by it, because it is also the origin of meaning that whilst 
coming from the subject is also rooted in self-evidence.
237
  This move overcomes the 
determinism of Heidegger‘s thought in which Dasein finds itself always already thrown 
into a world of pre-constituted meaning, finding itself always too late.  As Levinas says 
of Heidegger‘s philosophy, ‗[t]he subject is neither free nor absolute; it is no longer 
entirely answerable for itself.  It is dominated and overwhelmed by history, by its 
origin, about which it can do nothing, since it is thrown into the world and this 
abandonment marks all its projects and powers‘.238  
On Levinas‘s reading of Husserl, the constitution of the world by the Ego is not 
a description of solipsism as the world also partakes in this activity, the world is ‗given‘ 
as well as constituted.  Intentionality is always a relation with a transcendent object and 
yet the action is not reducible to the correct identification of an external object, crucially 
consciousness as intentionality is also the giver of sense.  Self-evidence secures 
consciousness in its relation with the world as both active and passive.  Levinas also 
now sees self-evidence as overcoming the problem of the centrality of theory in 
Husserl‘s approach, as self-evidence is directly accessible to intuitive intention.  ‗The 
very contact with things is their intellection.‘239  Levinas equates self-evidence with 
freedom.
240
  Through self-evidence we are posited as an ‗origin of being‘.241  It is 
through self-evidence that the subject constitutes the world.  This implies that there is a 
world to be constituted.  The act of synthesisation by thought, which is a representation, 
is also to be understood as a process of identification of being and crucially an event of 
sense.  Hence Levinas claims: ‗Consciousness, to Husserl, is the very phenomenon of 
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meaning [sense]‘.242  One way in which Levinas identifies freedom in Husserl‘s work is 
with the sense bestowing function of the Ego.  Husserl himself in describing the 
effectuation of the syntheses says, 
[t]he positing, the positing thereupon, positing antecedently and consequently, 
etc., is its free spontaneity and activity; the Ego does not live in the positings as 
passively dwelling in them; <the positings>  are instead radiations from the 
<pure Ego> as from a primal source of generations.  Every positings begins with 
a point of initiation, with a positional point of origin; so it is with the first 
positing, as with every further one in the concatenation pertaining to the 
synthesis.
243
  
 
Levinas‘s reading of the Urimpression (primary impression), and its relation to 
time, in Husserl‘s phenomenology, elaborates further this understanding of 
intentionality as paradoxically both passive and active.   
The origin of all consciousness is a primary impression, an ‗Urimpression‘.  But 
this original passivity is at the same time an initial spontaneity.  The primary 
intentionality in which it is constituted is the present.  The present is the outflow 
of mind itself, its presence to itself.
244
  
 
With an Urimpression the world is given in a now point that will pass and be replaced 
by a new present, hence it is an ‗original passivity‘, however, as intentionality is to 
bestow sense, the world is also understood and has meaning, ‗at the same time an initial 
spontaneity‘.  Urimpression as the primary impression reveals to us how the concrete is 
pure immediacy.  For Levinas the concrete as immediate lacks intellectual content, 
despite it having a sense and as such being understood.
245
  The immediate ‗now‘ of 
time, the present, is always tied up with retention and protention and retention of 
retention.  The future and the past in some sense converge on the present, in time seen 
as duration when time flows together and is not simply a successive chain of separate 
moments, one is always caught up with what has past and what is about to be, the 
remembered and the anticipated.  Levinas stresses that Husserl‘s understanding of 
phenomenological time captures favourably the freedom of the subject, in an additional 
sense from freedom understood as sense bestowing, in this context it is the freedom of 
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the subject to retain the past through retention and stretch into the future through 
protention.  This is how self-consciousness and thought is possible and allows for what 
Levinas calls a ‗deep subjectivity‘ that is contrasted with a mere stream of 
consciousness. ‗It [time] is truly the secret of subjectivity itself, the condition for a free 
mind. […] [T]ime expresses freedom itself.‘246  Continuity in the form of inwardness of 
mind is safeguarded through this understanding of time and with it the ‗freedom‘ to 
explain history and the freedom of bestowing meaning.  Levinas contrasts this 
‗freedom‘, granted through Husserl‘s understanding of time, with an understanding of 
history that can overwhelm, which is perhaps an implicit reference to Dasein as fated by 
time in Heidegger‘s Being and Time.        
Caygill suggests that the article could be subtitled ‗anti-Heidegger‘, as for 
Caygill it clearly demonstrates that Levinas has re-examined his earlier preference for 
Heidegger, and on reading Husserl anew Levinas has found a strong account of the 
metaphysical essence of freedom.
247
  It is undeniably the case that Levinas often points 
out how some of the originality found in Heidegger has its roots in Husserl, and 
Levinas‘s re-examination of Husserl‘s account of intentionality is more favourable than 
his previous analysis.  However, although this reading of Husserl presents Levinas with 
a way to develop an account of subjectivity that can describe the metaphysical essence 
of freedom, Husserl‘s own account is still deficient in certain respects.  Husserl himself 
does not offer an explanation for the origins of freedom, nor seek to question were 
critical consciousness comes from.  Caygill‘s reading leaves the reader with the overall 
impression that Levinas‘s final analysis of the account of freedom in Husserl is 
positive.
248
  This, I believe, does not account for the other elements of Levinas‘s reading 
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of freedom in Husserl, once we set aside the positive reading given to the description of 
subjectivity as both passive and active at the origin of meaning.  The way in which 
Levinas characterises the further consequences for freedom in Husserl‘s thought is 
consistent with the later development of Levinas‘s thought, and the criticisms of this 
account of freedom that he will come to develop more explicitly.  Although it cannot be 
denied that Levinas‘s re-reading of Husserl uncovers a way to begin to describe 
freedom that avoids the limitations of both Heidegger and Bergson‘s position, Husserl‘s 
approach, detailed in this article, will not escape future criticism, even though it is not 
overtly criticised here.  
Levinas‘s view of freedom in the Western tradition as aligned with the power of 
the ego, unaffected by the outside, is unmistakably present in this early article.
249
  In the 
very first line of the article Levinas places Husserl‘s philosophy firmly within the 
confines of ‗European civilization‘, and goes on to remark on the next page, ‗Husserl 
rejoins the great currents of Western idealism‘.250 Consciousness on Husserl‘s 
assessment cannot be shocked by anything alien or foreign to its own being.  ‗That 
everything is reducible to the subject is not for Husserl, as it is for Berkeley, the simple 
fact that the mind knows only its own state; it is that nothing [knowable] in the world 
could be absolutely foreign to the subject.‘251  As all thinking is to think in terms of 
sense, which is to understand, hence there is nothing foreign to thought.  For Husserl 
consciousness comes first and is primary.  
In its inner recesses, the subject can account for the universe.  Every relation 
with another thing is established in self-evidence, and consequently has its 
origin in the subject.
252
 
 
As Peperzak puts it, ‗intellection is the realization of sovereignty‘.253  In Husserl‘s 
account, the ego is the origin of meaning, through Sinngebung, and through self-
reflection after the reduction consciousness seeks to clarify this original sense.  Levinas 
outlines that this total possession of oneself in the reflection is the other side of 
                                                                                                                                               
not only places the freedom of I into question, but this ethical event makes possible the freedom of 
representation.  
249
 This indictment of the tradition in relation to freedom was first hinted at in L‟ontologie dans le 
temporal in reference to Heidegger, as shown above.  It is first attributed to Husserl in this article.  This 
reading of the article is supported by Peperzak who asserts that ‗[t]he new perspective of ―L‟oeuvre 
d‟Edmond Husserl‖ is the idea of freedom in the typically Western sense of autonomy.‘ Peperzak, 
‗Phenomenology- Ontology- Metaphysics: Levinas‘ Perspective on Husserl and Heidegger‘, p. 119.           
250
 Levinas, ‗The Work of Edmund Husserl‘, pp. 47-48.  
251
 Ibid., p. 69.  
252
 Ibid., p. 82.  
253
 Peperzak, ‗Phenomenology—Ontology—Metaphysics‘, p. 119.  
 88 
freedom.  The reduction is a matter for the mind to be free.  The world revealed after the 
reduction is a world constituted by thought.  Even on this revised reading, Levinas still 
maintains that consciousness remains absolute for Husserl because of Husserl‘s 
apodictic arguments for the relativity of the world that form a critical note of Husserl‘s 
transcendental reduction.
254
  
It is relative to nothing, for it is free.  Its freedom is defined precisely by the 
situation of self-evidence which is positive, which is more and better than simple 
non-involvement. It is free qua consciousness. The adequation of inner 
perception, which is the source of its absolute ‗certainty‘, is in reality founded 
on this absoluteness of consciousness.  The total possession of self in reflection 
is but the other side of freedom.
255
    
 
As the initial act of engagement with the world is one of bestowing a meaning, even if it 
is unreflected upon, when consciousness turns back on itself it is examining this 
experience that was originally freely given a sense by consciousness, hence the other 
side of freedom.  In this section devoted to the phenomenological reduction Levinas 
comments further on the privileged position of the transcendental ego in Husserl‘s 
phenomenology.  Even history presents no limitation to the transcendental ego, leaving 
Levinas to characterise Husserl‘s phenomenology as ahistorical.256  Despite Husserl‘s 
attempts in the genetic phenomenology to discover the ‗sedimentary‘ history of thought, 
Levinas argues that Husserl never frees his approach from the privileged position of the 
transcendental ego, ‗the mind, in Husserl, ultimately appears as foreign to history‘.257  
The consciousness that the reduction brings us back to explore is a consciousness 
disengaged from reality, things and history. 
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Whereas Caygill believes the essay could be renamed ‗anti-Heidegger‘, 
Peperzak is almost opposite in his reading of the text, claiming that Levinas‘s criticism 
of Husserl contained therein is ‗wholly Heideggerian‘.258  Peperzak ends his reading of 
the article by stating that in the end Levinas chooses Heidegger‘s appropriation of 
phenomenology and not that of Husserl, believing Levinas to find Husserl‘s approach 
naïve and not transcendental enough.  This attributes too much to Heidegger, given the 
veiled criticism of Heidegger throughout the article, and also overlooks the revised and 
more positive reading of Husserl since his doctoral thesis.  However, Peperzak is correct 
to point out that contained in the article is a reading of Husserl precisely on the question 
of freedom, that Levinas will be openly critical of in his future work if not markedly 
here.  This is again evident in the section ‗Phenomenology and Knowledge‘.  
Knowledge is primary in Husserl‘s phenomenology and it was the very impetus behind 
his pursuit of this new method.  In a move that will become more and more familiar as 
Levinas‘s work progresses, in section twelve ‗Phenomenology and Knowledge‘, 
Levinas equates knowledge with freedom, ‗knowledge was a way of being free, of 
accepting only the reasonable for rule, that is, of accepting nothing foreign to 
oneself‘.259  In Levinas‘s later work knowledge and freedom will also come to be 
associated with the domination of the Same at the expense of the other, and echoes of 
this voice yet to come can be heard resounding not only in the short passage above but 
throughout this section.  Knowledge is seen as an instrument of liberation, as through 
knowledge man can grant his existence a meaning and value.  Yet at this stage Levinas 
is not yet as disparaging as he will come to be.  He holds out hope that freedom 
understood as self-evidence as meaning can ground knowledge by bringing it back to 
the subjective world, back to the things themselves, and prevent science from becoming 
a force through which man can brutishly declare ‗I am‘.  ‗Phenomenology is the 
manifestation of the dignity of mind, which is freedom.‘260  
Levinas attributes Husserl‘s phenomenology, and his understanding of 
consciousness, to providing the foundation for Heidegger‘s philosophy.  In a subtle 
change from his dissertation, Levinas now argues that Husserl‘s work was always 
interested in ‗concrete humans‘ and ‗concrete reality‘.261  This leads Levinas to claim 
that Heidegger‘s philosophy remains a tributary to Husserlian phenomenology, even 
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though the new direction that Heidegger went in was profoundly different from that of 
Husserl.  A major difference between the two is that of the importance of historicity for 
Heidegger, as opposed to Husserl for whom the phenomenon of meaning has never 
been determined by history.  ‗For Heidegger, on the contrary, meaning is conditioned 
by something that already was.‘262  In this article we are again confronted by Levinas‘s 
reading of Dasein as determined by the past and by the future, and as such never really 
free.  With Husserl‘s description of intentionality, on the other hand, man maintains in 
some respect a distance from the world, and hence is not overwhelmed by the weight of 
the world, while all the while being part of it.
263
  There is a relationship of intellection 
between man and the world, which does not have to be purely theoretical.  Intentionality 
as Sinngebung is always a bestowing of meaning and as such is free.
264
  However, the 
transcendent nature of consciousness and self-evidence rescues this approach from 
solipsistic interpretations, the subject does not inhabit a world closed in on itself but is 
constantly directed outside. Levinas believes that this description of Sinngebung as 
freedom reveals a freedom that is free from the determinism of Heidegger, as the 
subject is not suffocated by an established world but is also the origin of the world.  The 
opposition between irrational intuition linked with spontaneous freedom and rationality 
as opposed to freedom in Bergson is also overcome.  Immediate intuition is both 
spontaneous and at the same time always has a rational sense. This description of 
freedom paves the way towards an understanding of freedom that does not view the 
subject as a lone ego who constitutes the world undisturbed, and as such is unethical, 
and yet also not entirely at the mercy of the structures of the world.  A middle path 
between the two is possible.    
Drabinski argues that in this article we see the beginnings of Levinas‘s break 
with Idealism, and the movement towards what will become in Totality and Infinity an 
articulation of relationality in terms of a sense-bestowal set out from absolute 
difference.
265
 This will involve the movement from idealism to transcendence, to 
materiality, eventually leading to an understanding of sense bestowal from the outside, 
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which precedes and founds the freedom of representation.  Levinas begins to open up 
the potential in Husserl‘s philosophy to the unexplored consequences of the passivity in 
consciousness.  These first steps toward a description of subjectivity as affectivity will 
also place Levinas in a stronger position to put into question the freedom and 
spontaneity of the ego, and show why this understanding of freedom is insufficient and 
unable to account not only for the origins of freedom but for certain elements of human 
life.  This questioning of freedom will not lead Levinas to abandon freedom, far from it, 
Levinas will seek to justify freedom and raise it to worthier heights.  
Levinas concludes by saying that, ‗Husserl‘s phenomenology is, on the final 
analysis, a philosophy of freedom, a freedom that is accomplished as, and defined by, 
consciousness‘.266  Even if on this reading Husserl‘s phenomenology is no longer 
regarded as intellectualist, the freedom of the ego is prioritised and there is no room for 
anything ‗foreign‘ or ‗alien‘, as consciousness is absolute.  Husserl‘s thought still 
harbours idealist tendencies, as consciousness alone constitutes the world.  Even though 
the world beyond the subject is evident through self-evidence, consciousness for 
Husserl is the ultimate source of this self-evidence.  The undeveloped consequences of 
the passivity within intentionality in Husserl‘s work is something that Levinas will 
develop further in line with his own thought, and he will question further the view of 
freedom as an unquestioned total autonomy.  As freedom is here equated with 
intentionality, which is regarded as sense-bestowing, by questioning this view of 
freedom Levinas is questioning the directionality of sense and not the freedom of the 
will. Precisely because this understanding of intentionality sees intentionality essentially 
as bestowing a sense and the total constitution of a transcendent object by the ego, 
Levinas will later move away from this terminology as it is aligned with a view of the 
subject as a self-sufficient freedom who is the origin of the world and is closed off to 
any true alterity. He will further develop the description of the self as affectivity 
materiality and sensibility, which captures a dimension of the powerlessness of the self, 
began in On Escape. In this article we have seen the beginnings of the steps that 
Levinas will take to describe the origins of freedom, and how there is a passivity central 
to subjectivity, which is prior to free activity.  An essential openness to an alterity that 
cannot be fully constituted or known without remainder, a sense from outside that 
places freedom understood as autonomy into question.  
                                                 
266
 Levinas, ‗The Work of Edmund Husserl‘, p. 85 
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§1.13 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Central to Levinas‘s first works in philosophy, even before he began to clearly articulate 
his own unique voice, was the question of freedom.  Levinas brought this interest in 
freedom to his reading of the work of some of the main early influences on his thought, 
namely, Bergson, Husserl and Heidegger.  Although he finds fruitful aspects in all three 
approaches, ultimately, on the question of freedom Levinas found the three different 
approaches to be insufficient.  Bergson‘s approach may well have presented Levinas 
with a way to safeguard novelty and transcendence, but his account of freedom takes us 
beyond the realm of rational reflection and aligns freedom with irrationalism and 
presents us with a picture of a being fit for the ‗racecourse‘.  Husserl‘s phenomenology 
is found to eliminate this opposition between irrational intuition and the rational 
intellect, and hence offers a firmer foundation for freedom.  Levinas, nevertheless, 
initially finds that in Husserl‘s utilization of his own method he prioritises theoretical 
intentionality over the concrete, and does not adequately account for freedom, but takes 
it as a given.  This led Levinas to Heidegger‘s stress in Being and Time wherein the pre-
reflective world of concrete experience is opened up to phenomenological significance, 
calling the primacy of reflective consciousness into question.  Yet despite his consistent 
praise for Heidegger Levinas is perhaps most disappointed with Heidegger‘s description 
of freedom.  Levinas finds that within Heidegger‘s account of Dasein there is no room 
for transcendence, alterity, or novelty.  On Levinas‘s reading, in place of freedom we 
find a being whose future is already fated and determined, destined to die, and free only 
to embrace this inevitable end.  In On Escape we briefly glimpse the direction that 
Levinas will take his own philosophy after the war, were he will further describe the 
important role of sense and materiality, and continue to question not only the how of the 
origins of freedom but also, the why.  We ended this chapter with Levinas‘s 1940 essay 
which saw Levinas return to a reading of Husserl and to a re-evaluation of his earlier 
criticisms made in his doctoral study. This article prepares the way for Levinas‘s 
departure after 1945.  The discovery of latent possibilities in Husserl‘s phenomenology, 
although not exploited by Husserl himself, open the way for Levinas to present a 
description of subjectivity that is actively present in the generation of meaning but also 
passively engaged as a recipient of meaning and sense from the outside.  This, in turn, 
enables Levinas to challenge the modern conception of the subject as the sole and 
primary origin of meaning, and as one who possesses an unrestricted and hence 
 93 
unethical freedom, whilst also avoiding the view of the human being as a fated subject 
who is at the mercy of a history into which one is thrown.  This final article ends on the 
questioning of freedom, and we see the beginnings of the path that Levinas will take to 
revaluate the meaning of freedom, and seek its justification.  
We leave Levinas just a few short months before his internment as a prisoner of 
war for four years (1940-1945).  The classic image that is often used as the antithesis of 
freedom is that of the prisoner, who has his everyday actions dictated by another, and is 
physically bound and restrained.  How could one not reflect on the meaning and value 
of freedom in such a situation?  We will meet Levinas again at the start of our next 
chapter in 1947 with the publication of Existence and Existents.  Levinas will begin to 
describe a non-ontological experience of being and strengthen his critical reading of 
freedom as he sees it as portrayed in the Western Philosophical tradition, bringing him 
ever closer to not only an account of the origins of freedom but also to a justification of 
that freedom.  
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CHAPTER II 
A WAY THROUGH HEIDEGGER‟S PHENOMENOLOGY  
TO THE OTHER (1940s) 
 
Continuing on from his analysis presented in On Escape, in the 1940s Levinas resumes 
his examination of the experience of the present instant as removed from any 
relationship with the past or with the future, and in doing so reveals a fundamental 
passivity within the self.  The description of the subject that first began in On Escape, 
and which revealed the powerlessness (impuissance) of the subject, is further explored 
and developed.  One key idea that carries over into his work of this decade is the 
enchainment of the subject to its self.  Not only does this idea continue to play a pivotal 
role in the work of this period, but it also takes on a new significance in his analysis of 
the subject as a split subjectivity. This will prove crucial for Levinas‟s later position, 
particularly in relation to understanding the argument that responsibility precedes 
freedom.  The „I‟ (le moi) is inescapably chained to its self (le soi), and is therefore 
responsible for a condition that was never chosen and yet can never be rescinded.  One 
is irrevocably tied to Being, so much so that even suicide offers no way out.  Levinas 
turns to a description of certain existential phenomena that acutely reveal the weight of 
the present, such as, for instance; fatigue, effort, indolence and insomnia. An 
examination of these phenomena discloses the subject‟s fundamental inescapable 
enchainment both to Being and to one‟s self.  These descriptions form the basis of 
Levinas‟s challenge to the understanding of freedom whereby the subject, in its self-
sufficiency, is seen as the sole origin of meaning, whether in Husserl‟s version of 
transcendental idealism or in Heidegger‟s version of existentialism and „fundamental 
ontology‟.  Levinas returns to and uncovers a level of existence, that of the sensate 
embodied self, that is prior to and which underlies the intentionality of representational 
consciousness that occupied Husserl‟s attention and the awareness of one‟s own death 
in the mood of Angst that Heidegger cultivated in his existential reduction.
1
    
In many respects, then, Levinas‟s post-war writings of the 1940s documents his 
way through Heidegger to another path in philosophy and phenomenology that 
overturns the primacy of freedom in the phenomenological  philosophies with which he 
                                                 
1
 For Heidegger, „inner brooding‟ over one‟s own death (as opposed to „idle chatter‟ (Gerede) about the 
death of the other, is to be cultivated in the existential analytic. See, Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 306, 
(SZ 261). 
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was fully acquainted and yet explains the justification of freedom characteristic of 
human consciousness and the individual human being itself. Thus in this period of his 
work, the question of the origins of freedom is once again of importance to Levinas, as 
he begins to develop his argument that it is the encounter with the Other that frees the 
self from the present instant, institutes time, novelty, the freedom of representation and 
critical consciousness. As he informs his reader in the Preface to Existence and 
Existents (1947), this work is a preparatory study and one that is part of a wider research 
project „concerning the problem of the Good, time, and the relationship with the Other 
as a movement toward the Good‟.2  The same themes will be further explored in the 
lecture series Time and the Other (1948).  As is evident from his remarks in the Preface 
to Existence and Existents, the ethical dimension to Levinas‟s thought that was all but 
absent from the pre-war work is now beginning to emerge albeit in embryonic fashion
3
  
 
§ 2.1 EXISTENCE AND EXISTENTS (1947) 
 
During the time that has elapsed between his last publication and Existence and 
Existents, stands what is undoubtedly the event that had the biggest impact on Levinas 
both personally and philosophically, the devastation of World War II and the horror that 
was the Shoah.  Levinas was naturalized as a French citizen in 1930, and with the 
outbreak of World War II he was drafted into military service in 1939.  He served as an 
interpreter of Russian and German and was taken prisoner with the French 10
th
 Army at 
Rennes on 16
th
 June 1940.  Though Levinas lost many members of his extended family 
during the war, his own life was spared by virtue of the fact that he was in a French 
uniform, and hence was captured as a military Prisoner of War.
4
  Levinas was kept in a 
forest labour camp, where he and other Jewish soldiers were kept separately from the 
others.  Due to the position of the camp he was protected under the terms of the Geneva 
                                                 
2
 Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. xxvii (first translated into English by Lingis in 1978).  Lingis 
translates the title of this work as „Existence and Existents‟, however, it should be noted that De 
l’existence à l’existant could also be translated as „From Existence to Existents‟ which captures the 
movement of the analysis in the text, from existence to the existent.  Whereas Heidegger wishes to move 
from the existent (das Seiende) to the being of the existent (das Sein des Seienden), Levinas, therefore, 
wishes to go in the opposite direction from generalizing existence to the existence of the particularity of 
the existent and existents.      
3
 I say here „beginning to emerge‟ because although the other appears in Existence and Existents as a way 
in which the existent can escape this suffocating relationship with existence, the other does not yet have 
the radical ethical significance that it will be given in the work of the 1950‟s.  
4
 Levinas‟s wife (Raïssa Levi) and daughter (Simone, born 1935), narrowly evaded death by hiding in a 
religious order in Orléans, organised through the intervention of their friends, one of whom was Maurice 
Blanchot.     
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Conventions.
5
  While in captivity Levinas wrote a portion of what was to become 
Existents and Existence.  Unsurprisingly the section written while in captivity is the 
section that deals with the „il y a‟, „there is‟.  This ominous description of pure 
existence, empty of all existents, seems fitting to the setting in which it was brought to 
light.  In his foreword to a late English edition of the text, Robert Bernasconi remarked 
that:  
When Levinas described the distance between the ego and the self as less like 
liberation than slackening the rope that still binds a prisoner, the metaphor must 
have had a personal resonance for him.  It is unlikely that a book like Existence 
and Existents could have been written in tranquillity.
6
  
 
That the events of the Second World War had a profound effect on Levinas is 
undeniable, however, continuity stills exists between his analysis in On Escape and his 
work written during and after the war.
7
  
In the final sentence of On Escape Levinas remarks, „[i]t is a matter of getting 
out of being by a new path, at the risk of overturning certain notions that to common 
sense and the wisdom of the nations seemed the most evident‟. 8   The work of 
establishing a „new path‟, which will lead out of being, is continued in Existence and 
Existents.  This remark also reveals that Levinas will have to wrestle with „common 
sense‟ language, in a way that is not unfamiliar from the work of Heidegger, to do 
„violence‟ to language in order to retrieve and engender new meanings.9  His work after 
the war could also be viewed as an attempt to address the rhetorical question he himself 
posed at the end of his lecture to the students of Wahl in 1940, that although 
Heidegger‟s ontology has tragic overtones, it is witness to a time and to a world that 
                                                 
5
 See, „Interview with François Poirié‟, p. 40.  Levinas spent the first part of his captivity at Frontstalags 
in Rennes and Laval, then at Vesoul, and from June 1942 until May 1945 at Stalag 11B at Fallingbostel 
near Hannover in Germany. 
6
 Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. xi.  
7
 As Levinas says himself in the Preface, „These studies begun before the war were continued and written 
down for the most part in captivity.‟ Ibid., p. xxvii.  
8
 Levinas, On Escape, p. 73.  
9
 Levinas‟s wrestle with language is something that will increasingly mark his work as it develops.  As 
Levinas‟s philosophy becomes more interested in metaphysics, understood in the uniquely Levinas sense 
as ethical, it becomes increasingly difficult for Levinas to express his position confined by ontological 
language.  Hence, the need to do violence to language will become more and more necessary.  This 
struggle with language is not unlike that of Heidegger‟s, who in Being and Time tells the reader that 
existential analysis has the character of „doing violence‟ (Gewaltsamkeit) to common sense, „whether to 
the claims of the everyday interpretation, or to its complacency and its tranquillized obviousness‟. 
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 359, (SZ 311).  Levinas‟s attempt to grapple with this problem will mark a 
shift from Totality and Infinity to Otherwise than Being. See, Ch. IV, § 4.4.5 
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perhaps will be possible to overcome tomorrow.
10
  This necessary „overcoming‟ of 
Heidegger‟s ontology, announced at the end of that lecture, is reiterated in the 
introduction to Existence and Existents.  Levinas states that although his reflections are 
inspired by Heidegger, „they are also governed by a profound need to leave the climate 
of that philosophy, and by the conviction that we cannot leave it for a philosophy that 
would be pre-Heideggerian‟.11  Thus Levinas cannot avoid Heidegger‟s thinking but 
must go through Heidegger‟s thought to a different place and to a different climate of 
thinking. 
 
§ 2.1.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INSTANT 
 
One of the most important themes that first emerged in On Escape, and that forms the 
central focus of this work, is the idea of the burden of being, expressed in this work as 
the il y a, the „there is‟.12  In the Preface to the second edition, written in 1978, Levinas 
refers to the notion of the il y a as the „le morceau de résistance‟ of the work.13  The 
desire to escape being, as a result of the experience of being as a burden, is now linked 
with the Good.  In the Preface Levinas points out to the reader that the movement 
towards the Good should not be understood as a movement to a higher existence but as 
„a departure from Being‟ an ex-cendence, that does not leave Being behind.  Once he 
has stated the wider goal of his philosophy he points out that the present work is mainly 
concerned with the position in Being, the act through which the existent must take up 
existence in each instant, hence arising in impersonal Being.  The notion of the present, 
the instant, is central and is revealed through a phenomenological reflection on certain 
subjective states in which this predicament is acutely felt, such as fatigue, indolence and 
insomnia.
14
 These states acutely reveal our unavoidable situation, that one is 
inescapably tied to being, and also, inescapably tied to oneself.  As the analysis reveals 
                                                 
10
 „Par là, l‟ontologie de Heidegger rend ses accents les plus tragiques et devient le témoignage d‟une 
époque et d‟un monde qu‟il sera peut-être possible de dépasser demain.‟ Levinas, „L‟ontologie dans le 
temporal‟, p. 128.  
11
 Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 4.  
12
 The section „Existence without Existents‟, which focuses on the il y a was written while in captivity 
(c.f., p. 92, n. 5) and first published as a separate essay in 1946 in Deucalion (Cahiers de Philosophie), I, 
141-54, and was later incorporated into the Introduction and chapter 3 of De l’existence à l’existant.  An 
English translation of the original article is in The Levinas Reader, pp. 29-36.      
13
 Emmanuel Levinas, De l’existence à l’existant (Paris: Vrin, 2013), p. 9. This Preface is not contained in 
the English edition.  
14
 Levinas‟s prioritising of the „present‟ throughout this work confirms the influence of Lavelle, 
particularly his work La presence totale (Total Presence). See, Ch. I, n. 179.    
 98 
an essential passivity of the self, one could say that all of the themes described and 
discussed in this work implicitly touch upon the question of freedom, as they reveal 
further limitations to the view of man as an autonomous, sovereign, and free.  As this is 
the case, in order to understand how Levinas‟s description of the subject develops, and 
to understand how it can be situated prior to the distinction between freedom and non-
freedom, it is essential that we give consideration to the analysis presented in this work 
even if it the relevance for freedom is not directly evident per se in certain sections of 
this work.  Towards the end of the work Levinas discusses freedom explicitly.  A 
crucial element of Levinas‟s descriptions of subjectivity first made and emphasized in 
On Escape, which will become particularly significant for Levinas‟s later work, and for 
his descriptions of freedom, is that the „I‟ (le moi) is chained to its self (le soi).15     
From the outset it is clear that Levinas still has Heidegger‟s philosophy in mind.  
The very first line of the introduction draws on Heidegger‟s ontological difference, the 
distinction between the being of that which is (Sein des Seienden) and that which is 
(Seiende).  Levinas outlines how Being (Sein) is the empty verb that „we seem not to be 
able to say anything about‟, and that as a result our access to Being seems to only come 
through reflection on the existent, „that which exists‟.16  Whereas Heidegger attempted 
to gain access to the question of the meaning of Being by beginning with a particular 
unique being in Being (Dasein), Levinas wishes to begin with Being in general (il y a), 
before addressing how the existent takes up a particular position in being.
17
  Levinas 
                                                 
15
 „Thus, escape is the need to get out of oneself, that is, to break that most radical and unalterably 
binding of chains, the fact that the I (moi) is oneself (soi-même).‟ Levinas, On Escape, p. 55.   
16
 Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 1.   
17
 This is not a simple reversal of Heidegger‟s approach, as will become clearer below.  Heidegger‟s own 
thinking on, and methodology in relation to, the ontological difference, is more complex and nuanced 
than the straight-forward rendering of the ontological difference conveys.  There has been some criticism 
in relation to Levinas‟s apparent reversal of Heidegger‟s ontological difference, most notably from 
Derrida in his Violence and Metaphysics. Derrida argues that a reversal of Heidegger‟s approach, 
beginning with an analysis of Dasein in order to open up the question of the meaning of Being, reveals a 
misunderstanding of Heidegger‟s position, as Being can in no way precede the existent.  As Derrida put 
it, „Being, since it is nothing outside the existent, a theme which Levinas had commented upon so well 
previously, could in no way precede the existent, whether in time, or in dignity, etc.‟ Jacques Derrida, 
„Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas‟, in Writing and Difference, 
trans. by A Bass (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 170.  In Time and the Other Levinas 
further discusses his particular appropriation of Heidegger‟s ontological difference by stressing the 
difference between distinction and separation, whilst acknowledging that to Heidegger his approach 
would seem „absurd‟. Levinas, Time and the Other, pp. 44-45.  Against Derrida‟s criticism, one could say 
that Levinas brings another dimension to the understanding of Being to be found in Heidegger, and in 
doing so deepens this approach, rather than a misunderstanding of Heidegger‟s distinction.  Although it is 
true to say, as noted by Derrida, that for Heidegger Being is always Being as appearing in the 
understanding of Being, Derrida seems to have overlooked what it is that Levinas was trying to explore in 
his analysis, just as Levinas‟s analysis reveals what was overlooked by Heidegger, by beginning with 
Dasein‟s understanding of Being.  De Boer convincingly argues that what Levinas uncovers through his 
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states that the principle theme of the text is the present, the instant in which a being 
takes up a position in being, and in order to analyze the notion of present one must 
begin with the idea of Being in general.
18
  
The burden of being, the fact that I am myself, inescapably so, becomes acutely 
apparent in the instant of certain subjective states, such as fatigue (la fatigue) and 
indolence (la paresse). Lingis translates la paresse as indolence, more generally 
translated from French into English as laziness or sloth.
19
  In the context of Existence 
and Existents it is a difficult word to translate.  Llewelyn believes that indolence is a 
„risky‟ choice of translation, as it is does not capture the force of the French word which 
is a derivative of parare, to prepare.
20
  Llewelyn prefers to translate la paresse as 
dilatoriness, believing it to better capture how the instant is postponed, or delayed.  The 
important point, which Llewelyn notes, is that contained in Levinas‟s descriptions of the 
la paresse is a critique of both the Bergsonian and Heideggerian accounts of 
temporality.  Levinas wishes to capture a sense of the instant, the present, which can 
reveal to us the existents relationship with existence that does not gain its significance 
from the continuity with the unceasing flow of time that is duration, nor from the 
impending future yet to come in Heidegger‟s ecstatic account of temporality.21  
                                                                                                                                               
analysis of indolence, fatigue, insomnia etc. is that „existence‟ (or Being for Heidegger), has the meaning 
of a dimension that precedes the understanding of Being that Heidegger begins with. In arguing that 
Dasein has an understanding of Being, this does not rule out the possibility that there is a level of 
engagement with Being which precedes such an understanding.  „This, it seems to me, presupposes a 
„being‟ which precedes the Being of the understanding of Being; „being‟ here in quotation marks (and 
without the capital B), just like the „being‟ to which Levinas refers by the term il y a — an existence or 
being of which it cannot be said that it is or is not, incomprehensible, beyond grasp and yet necessarily 
presupposed.‟ De Boer, „Ontological Difference (Heidegger) and Ontological Separation (Levinas)‟, in 
The Rationality of Transcendence, pp. 115-32 (p. 119).  William Large argues that the il y a should be 
understood as a „mood‟, and therefore, in no way should it be interpreted as a description of the 
anonymous Being devoid of all beings.  It is similar to Heidegger‟s analysis of „moods‟ but it is 
significantly different.  As Large says, „[w]hat is at issue in these descriptions [boredom and anxiety] is 
Heidegger‟s commitment to a personal expression of being.  It is this personal expression that drops out 
in Blanchot and Levinas‟ conception of the “there is”, even though it is still an existential and not a 
categorical analysis‟. William Large, „Impersonal Existence: a conceptual genealogy of the “there is” 
from Heidegger to Blanchot and Levinas‟, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 7:3 (2002), 
131-42 (p. 132).        
18
 Elisabeth Louise Thomas has rightly noted that despite Levinas initially arguing for why we must begin 
with being in general, Levinas still proceeds to begin his reflections with the existent and certain 
subjective states such as indolence and fatigue, in order to describe the il y a. See, Thomas, Emmanuel 
Levinas. Ethics, Justice and the Human beyond Being, pp. 34-39.    
19
 From dolere and douleur, originating from the Latin indolentia, ‘freedom from pain‟. 
20
 Llewelyn, Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of Ethics, p. 37.      
21
 On this point Sheldon Hanlon notes, „Levinas‟s phenomenology of existence is original in that he is 
concerned with the way that the burden of existence is revealed in the very instant without any reference 
whatsoever to the past or the future.‟ Sheldon Hanlon, „From Existence to Responsibility. Restlessness 
and Subjectivity in the Early and Late Levinas‟, Philosophy Today, 55, 3 (2011), 282-97 (p. 284).   
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In Being and Time Heidegger tells us, „[w]e therefore call the phenomena of the 
future, the character of having been, and the Present, the „ecstases‟ of temporality‟.22 
Heidegger goes on to note that the ordinary understanding of time is to view time as an 
ongoing sequence of „nows‟, but this understanding is a derived form of understanding 
that rests on the more primordial existential meaning of temporality as ecstases.  
Levinas, whilst also providing an existential understanding of time, shows how certain 
primordial experiences do not conform to the Heideggerian understanding of time, nor 
does it match the „ordinary‟ derived understanding that Heidegger refers to. In 
weariness time is indeed felt as an instant, but it is an instant that lags behind the 
present, a weariness to embrace the present, a weariness to embrace being and embrace 
oneself.  In Levinas‟s descriptions of la paresse time is experienced as lagging, the 
instant is experienced as a holding back from beginning, the effort of being is acutely 
felt and one wishes to hold back from being. 
23
  The introduction confirms that this is a 
key element of the arguments presented in Existence and Existent, when Levinas once 
again turns to Heidegger and states that a key element to Heidegger‟s understanding of 
human existence is existence conceived as ecstasy.  What is significant about this point 
and how Levinas differentiates his analysis presented in this text from his reading of 
Being and Time, is that for Heidegger „ecstasy‟ stretches out towards the future. As 
Dasein is ultimately a Being-towards-death then what it is ultimately moving towards is 
the end, towards nothingness. Levinas attributes the tragic element of existence in the 
analysis of Being and Time to finitude.  In contrast, Levinas asks if the only negative in 
Being, the „evil‟ (le mal) in Being, comes from a deficiency in Being, as Heidegger 
would argue, or, is the brute fact that one exists, that one cannot escape being in the 
instant, irrespective of the future, not enough to bring about a „horror of Being‟ 
(l’horreur de l’être) that is just as primal, if not more so, than anxiety over [one‟s own] 
death?  Levinas will propose that Being in pure generality, and not as a result of some 
defect or negation, is evil and produces horror in the existent.
24
  „Existence of itself 
harbours something tragic which is not only there because of its finitude. Something 
that death cannot resolve.‟25     
                                                 
22
 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 377, (SZ 329).  
23
 „The essential laziness and lethargy with which Levinas is here concerned is a precedence essential to 
the accedence to a start.‟ Llewelyn, Emmanuel Levinas: The Genealogy of Ethics, p. 37.      
24
 „Nous allons essayer de mettre en question l‟idée que le mal est défaut.  L‟être ne comporte-t-il pas 
d‟autre vice que sa limitation et que le néant?  N‟a-t-il pas dans sa positivité même quelque mal foncier?‟ 
Levinas, De l’existence à l’existant, p. 19.     
25
 Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 5.  
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§ 2.1.2 EXISTENCE IN THE INSTANT 
 
When our world is ruptured in one sense or another, „turned upside down‟, torn „in 
pieces‟, what we come up against is the anonymous state of being.26  Existence is not 
reliant on a relationship with a world, and comes before such a relationship.  When our 
world is torn apart, due to one event or another, this primordial relationship with being 
prior to a world becomes clear.  Levinas stresses that the term „relationship‟ can only be 
used here analogously. Relationship implies two distinct independent terms. The 
anonymous state of being that we become aware of at world‟s end is not a substance, 
rather it is the bare fact „that there is‟ (le fait qu‟il y a).27  The existent and existence are 
not two independent but related terms.  The existent was never prior to existing.  At 
each moment the event of taking up existence, by virtue of existing, takes place.  „The 
conquest of Being continually recommences‟.28  One is right to think that this event 
implies a contradiction, as how can an existent take over its existence if it does not exist 
prior to existing?  Levinas admits that logically this appears to be the case, however, as 
paradoxical as it may seem, he tells us we should not be „duped by the verbal 
repetition‟.29  This point relates to Levinas‟s idea of the split subject, and that in each 
instant the existent must continuously take up existence.  He then moves towards a 
phenomenological description of certain experiences that he maintains attest to this 
paradoxical event. 
Levinas notes that the development of biological science in the 19
th
 century 
brought with it a new way of understanding the relationship between what exists and its 
existence, placing particular emphasis on the struggle for life.
30
  Just simply being in 
and of itself is overwhelming and suffocating, „[t]here is a pain in Being‟.31  In place of 
the belief that existence was bestowed on an existent by a Deity, or exists as a result of 
its essence, is the view that to be is the very struggle for life.  This approach, however, 
does not go far enough in capturing a fundamental aspect of the relationship between 
existence and an existent that Levinas wishes to describe.  For Levinas, this description 
                                                 
26
 See, Ch. I, § 1.4, for the particular understanding of „world‟ in Heidegger that Levinas was influenced 
by.  „World‟ for Levinas, just as for Heidegger, does not mean the collection of objects.  
27
 Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 8.  
28
 Ibid.  
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Presumably Levinas has the dominant interpretation of the work of Charles Darwin and his 
contemporaries in mind.  Levinas could also be read as alluding to Nietzsche‟s „will-to-power‟. 
31
 Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 9.  
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of the existence of an existent as „the struggle for life‟ is closer to the Heideggerian 
understanding, that care (Sorge) is Dasein‟s most basic state of being as a being whose 
own being is at issue for it.  As Levinas says, „it appears as a struggle for a future, as the 
care that a being takes for its endurance and conservation‟.32  For Heidegger, Dasein‟s 
most basic state of being is care, and temporality is the meaning of authentic care.  As 
care is a concern for one‟s own being, and Dasein‟s own being is to be a Being-
towards-death, care is always directed towards the future.  Thus it is a care for one‟s 
own being in the light of one‟s own most possibility, one‟s own death.  Dasein‟s present 
is always tied up with the past and the future.  Your past in contained in the present you, 
just as you are always ahead of yourself already in being, in relation to your future 
possibilities.  
Only in so far as Dasein is as an „I-am-as-having-been‟, can Dasein come 
towards itself futurally in such a way that it comes back.  As authentically 
futural, Dasein is authentically as „having been‟.33  
 
Far from a care for being that brings about a fundamental experience of time as ecstasis, 
Levinas describes a horror of being, and the existential moments that reveal the 
existents reluctance to be, and yet, its powerlessness to undo its own existing.  
In contrast to temporality understood as ecstases, Levinas asks if the relationship 
between existence and an existent can be understood on an even more fundamental 
level.  Not as a concern for its own being, and as such a projection into the future, but if 
we limit our analysis purely to the instant, and to existential phenomena in which the 
instant is most acutely felt, we gain a more fundamental insight into an existent‟s 
relationship with existence.  Levinas points out that such insight into the relationship an 
existent has with existence can only take place by examining aspects of life that occur 
prior to reflection, and which are not mediated by any reflection on consciousness.   
Thus both Husserlian „reflection‟ of consciousness on itself and Heideggerian 
„reflection‟ on Angst and its significance to Dasein are both ruled out as possible 
avenues to approach this issue. 
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To see the truth of this operation, let us ignore all attitudes toward existence 
which arise from reflection, attitudes by which an already constituted existence 
turns back over itself.
34
  
 
In order to do this, Levinas next turns to phenomena which are „prior to reflection‟, 
choosing to focus on fatigue (la fatigue) and indolence (la paresse).
35
  Ordinarily 
subjective states such as fatigue and indolence are seen as mental contents, or are 
reflected upon for the moral significance they may have, traditionally viewed as 
character vices. Apart from this traditional approach, Levinas claims that these 
experiences have a special phenomenological significance, as through 
phenomenological reflection on these „dramatic events‟ we can gain an insight into the 
existents relationship with existence.
36
  Revealed through both of these prereflective 
phenomena is a refusal, a weariness (lassitude), an „important nonacceptance‟.37  This 
weariness is not in relation to a particular empirical state but with regard to being, to 
existence itself, „the recoil before existence which makes up their existence‟. 38   In 
weariness, as experienced through fatigue and indolence, the existent is forcefully 
reminded of its existence, and how existence was never chosen and cannot be escaped, 
„in weariness (lassitude) existence is like the reminder of a commitment to exist, with 
all the seriousness and harshness of an unrevokable contract‟. 39   Here we see the 
continuity between this work and On Escape.  Just as in On Escape the desire to escape 
is not the desire to be free of a particular predicament in life, nor is there any destination 
to escape to in mind.  Evasion is desired for evasion sake.  In On Escape although the 
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duality of the subject is touched upon, the emphasis is placed on the self‟s inability to 
escape from Being. In Existence and Existents, however, this duality of the subject 
becomes more central to the argument.  Not only can one not escape Being but the „I‟ 
(moi) can also not escape the self (soi). 
Levinas does not want the reader to confuse indolence with indecisiveness, for 
although it is a refusal, it is not the refusal to make up one‟s mind or the wish to avoid 
the exertion of effort.  It is the beginning of action, any action, which is avoided, as it 
reveals the very refusal to be that nonetheless cannot be undone.  Each instant is like a 
birth, a new beginning, and in indolence each instant is heavily felt.  Indolence is like a 
protest in the face of existence, a lagging behind the instant, an unwillingness to take up 
one‟s existence which is affected in each instant.  Like the slow trudge of a physically 
and mentally exhausted person, for whom the effort it takes to execute each little 
movement is intensely apparent.  Using an analogy from On Escape Levinas remarks 
that reality is unlike a game, which can cease at any moment, leaving no trace of the 
game behind.  The freedom of play, the freedom to invent the rules, to begin and end 
when one so wishes, is absent from the reality of existence.  
But beginning is unlike the freedom, simplicity and gratuitousness which these 
images suggest, and which are imitated in play.  In the instant of a beginning, 
there is already something to lose, for something is already possessed, if only the 
instant itself.
40
   
 
Far from being a „game‟ the analogy that Levinas uses is that the beginning in every 
instant of existence is more like a job (besogne); however, it is a job that the existent 
never applied for and now cannot leave.  The task cannot be erased, the beginning 
cannot be undone.  To end the process once started will not undo the beginning, rather it 
will bring the process to a halt, terminate it.  Even if the existent wishes to forfeit, 
unlike a game that vanishes without remainder, the remnants of existence will remain.  
The powerlessness of the subject is once again apparent in Levinas‟s descriptions.  The 
existent lacks the freedom to do anything about the predicament they are in, this is „the 
tragedy of being‟ that indolence reveals.41  In indolence the existent is weary of its own 
self.  
Subjectivity is a relationship.  As Levinas says, one is oneself.  The ego (moi) 
has a self (soi) that lags behind it like a shadow that cannot be out run.
42
  Trapped in a 
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relationship with its self and with existence, even the future offers no respite for the 
solitary subject, for alone each instant will bring more of the same.  Without alterity the 
next instant will not bring with it a new, joyful, „virginal instant‟, but will condemn the 
existent to a perpetual present.  As Levinas will argue, contra Heidegger, and yet in 
agreement with Heidegger as Heidegger admits the alterity of one‟s own death that 
cannot be an objectifiable presence for that being, without alterity there is no future and 
hence no freedom.
43
    
 
§ 2.1.3 FREEDOM, FATIGUE AND THE EFFORT OF LABOUR IN THE PRESENT 
 
In the next section, „Fatigue and the Instant‟, Levinas turns to an analysis of labour and 
the effort and fatigue which accompanies labour, to further explore the existents‟ 
relation to being.
44
  Once again it is difficult to separate Levinas‟s phenomenological 
descriptions of fatigue and the effort of labour from the circumstances in which these 
reflections took place.  While a POW Levinas was forced to undertake hard labour in a 
Forestry Commando Unit.  This experience of hard forced labour in the surrounding 
forest inevitably contributed to Levinas‟s analysis of labour that is far removed from the 
tradition of the Marxist-Hegelian‟s view of the connection between work and freedom, 
and also that of Heidegger‟s view of work as connected to the creation of a world in 
which Dasein can realise its freedom.
45
  When Levinas describes the numbness (un 
engourdissement) that characterises fatigue (la fatigue), and how this numbness is 
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experienced as a lag in being, a distance between being and a current preoccupation that 
seems to slip from your grasp despite your best efforts to hold fast to it, one cannot help 
but think of just how familiar this experience would have been to Levinas in captivity.
46
 
Levinas‟s reflections on effort lead him to ask whether effort is merely the 
ability to freely take up a task, like one would their luggage, and hence the ability to 
suspend the effort at will, or a constraint in effort that is more deeply rooted to our self, 
„the instant of the effort contains something more; it reveals a subjection which 
compromises our freedom‟.47  Levinas critiques the dominant view of labour as being 
directed towards a future goal, and hence linked to freedom.  In such a view labour is 
freely chosen, and one is willing to suspend their freedom momentarily in order to 
achieve the desired future aim.  Levinas, however, questions this view by presenting a 
closer analysis of work in the instant, and reveals the endurance in work that brings 
about fatigue.  Levinas describes how effort also reveals that we are tied to the past, and 
tied to being, tied to a commitment that we never made.  Responsible before we are 
free. 
In the humility of the man who toils bent over his work there is surrender, 
forsakenness.  Despite all its freedom, effort reveals a condemnation; it is 
fatigue and suffering.
48
  
 
And in a further blow against the tradition that deems effort meaningful due to its future 
orientation, Levinas describes how fatigue reveals that for effort the instant is 
inescapable.  „Effort is an effort of the present that lags behind the present.‟49  We do 
not have to look beyond the instant of effort in order to gain an insight into its 
significance.  Independent of the fact that one must toil in order to live, effort or fatigue 
reveals to us that one is condemned to the present.  „There is in the labour most freely 
consented to, in the most spontaneous effort, an irrevocable, unredeemable 
commitment.‟50 
Levinas moves on to further elaborate on this condemnation, and to show how 
effort reveals an irremediable commitment even when the particular task that involves 
our effort is freely chosen.  He contests the view that sees effort as a struggle with 
matter, the view that the free subject has to struggle with its surroundings in order to 
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fashion the world to its will, and believes that philosophers have wrongly taken this 
position as a given.  Such a view attests to Levinas‟s belief that traditionally limitations 
to freedom have been reflected upon, but freedom itself is never placed into question.  
This position came about from reflections on effort from the outside, whereas Levinas 
wishes to describe the instant of effort and „its internal dialectics‟.51  Levinas goes on to 
reflect on human work in order to reveal a phenomenological account of the instant.  In 
contrast with a melody, that when played well forms a single whole, in the effort of 
labour each single moment is minutely felt step by step.
52
  The pain of effort does not 
arise from the physical exertion or from the necessity of labour in order to live, but from 
the fact that labour ties one to the instant, or as Levinas says the pain from being 
condemned to the present.  Against the more optimistic accounts that view labour as 
freeing and joyful, arriving at their position through a retrospective account of labour, or 
perhaps from the position of a spectator and not that of the labourer, Levinas maintains 
that if we restrict our analysis to the instant we can find no such rewards.  
And every labour mystique, which appeals to themes of joy or freedom through 
labour, can appear only above and beyond effort properly so-called, in a 
reflective attitude to effort.  It is never the labour itself that joy resides.  It is fed 
with other considerations — the pleasure of duty fulfilled, the heroism of the 
sacrifice and difficulty involved.
53
   
 
The effort of labour offers insight into the instant because from the perspective of the 
labourer time seems to lag, and drag behind the present, struggling to keep up with the 
moment, „it is like the lag of an existent that is tarrying behind its existing.  And this lag 
constitutes the present‟.54  The significance of this analysis is that in the instant of the 
effort of labour the existent‟s inescapable bond to existence is revealed.  In action one is 
bound to the instant. 
In place of the view of action as affording man the ability to fashion the world to 
man‟s will, and hence as aligned with freedom, by focusing on the event of effort and 
not the result Levinas paints a very different picture.  „Action is then by essence 
subjection and servitude, but also the first manifestation, or the very constitution, of an 
existent, a someone that is.‟55  This break in the instant, this lag in which the existent 
struggles to keep up with the present, opens a distance between the existent and 
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existence in which the relation can form.  A distance is also opened up between an 
existent and its own self, leading Levinas to describe existence as the relationship 
between an existent and itself.  In fatigue this taking up of the instant is visible.  
Levinas‟s description of the instant is paradoxically both active and passive.  The 
instant is defined by this taking up of existence by the existent, and yet the existent is 
irrevocably and inescapably tied to the present.  This leads Levinas to claim that the 
existence of an existent is an act, a movement, even when the existent is said to be 
inactive.  This activity that is the existent, this taking up of the present, „the upsurge of 
an existent into existence‟, is what Levinas terms hypostasis.56  As the taking up of a 
position in existence takes place in a „world‟, in the next chapter Levinas turns to 
explore what the world can mean in the context of his descriptions of the existence of 
the existent.   
 
§ 2.1.4 DESIRE AND LIFE IN THE WORLD 
 
Levinas begins by defining being-in-the-world (être-dans-le-monde) as „to be attached 
to things‟.57  This attachment to things is distinct from taking up the present through 
effort as effort does not have to be related to objects.  In order to further describe this 
attachment to things that characterises being in the world, Levinas goes on to describe 
intentionality, as intentionality best captures this engagement with objects.  In his 
description of intentionality Levinas distances himself from both the Husserlian 
„neutralized and disincarnate‟ and Heideggerian ecstasic „care‟ accounts of 
intentionality and in place of these accounts puts forward an argument for intention 
understood as desire (le désir).
58
  Desire is distinct from care as the desirable is desired 
as an end in itself.  In desire I am absorbed with the desirable, with no further thought to 
the potential outcome or any consequences extended into the future.  In opposition to 
the Heideggerian position, that the fundamental horizon of Dasein‟s Being-in-the-world 
is that of „care‟ (Sorge), Levinas asks if we eat primarily to nurture our bodies in order 
to maintain our existence, or, do we eat because we are hungry, for the pleasure and 
enjoyment of eating?
59
  In line with his argument Levinas also contests the Platonic 
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theory that the need for pleasure arises from some lack or deficiency.  In contrast to the 
dark descriptions of the being in its generality contained in the rest of this work, in this 
section on the world Levinas outlines how there is an inherent joy in the givenness of 
the world.
60
  Irrespective of any purpose one may attribute to the fulfilment of a 
particular desire, the satisfaction of a desire is in itself joyful.  The view that sees desire 
as the counterpart to a lack overlooks both the inherent possibility of pleasure in the 
world, and that even in abundance desire is present for desire sake.  In proposing the 
view that our fundamental relation to the world is desire, Levinas opens up a space that 
will lead to an account of an excessive intentionality, a desire that goes beyond being.
61
  
As we shall see in chapter four, this will prove to be crucial for the analysis in Totality 
and Infinity.   
At this point in the discussion Levinas introduces „the Other‟ (l‟autrui).  This 
term may not yet have the radical ethical significance that it will later come to have, but 
it is significant that on its first appearance it is described as an example of an event „that 
break[s] with the world‟. 62   The encounter with the Other is different from our 
interaction with objects, even though the Other is associated with things, and in certain 
situations the Other can appear like an object.  The Other has a social situation, is 
clothed in a particular fashion, and to some degree is conscious about their physical 
appearance to the world and has formed and shaped their appearance through bathing 
and grooming.  Levinas draws a distinction between the public and the private sphere.  
In the former the other takes on a social role and is to a greater and lesser extent 
objectified, whereas in the latter the alterity of the Other comes to the fore.  
Levinas outlines how the paradigmatic experience in which the alterity of the 
Other is most striking is in the relationship with nudity.  By this relationship with nudity 
Levinas has a particular relationship in mind.  Nudity alone is not a sufficient condition 
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to encounter alterity, as the naked body of a patient to a doctor for example, or to use 
Levinas‟s own example of the recruiting examiner, is somewhat objectified and viewed 
as „human material‟.63  Levinas takes the relationship with nudity in the context of an 
erotic relationship to epitomise „the true experience of the otherness of the Other‟, as it 
is a „relationship that goes beyond the world‟, in contrast to social life which is not 
disturbing in this way.
64
  Although Levinas himself does not consider it, nudity in an 
erotic context similarly does not guarantee an encounter with alterity.  If in the public 
sphere it is the objectification of the Other that prohibits their alterity from being 
encountered, as it is not an encounter with excess, similarly in the context of an erotic 
encounter with nudity, if the Other was to be treated as an object for one‟s sexual 
gratification and pleasure their alterity would likewise stay hidden.
65
  This private-
public sphere distinction is a problematic distinction to make, as it runs the risk of 
confining ethics, as Levinas will come to define it, to the intimacy of the private sphere. 
Levinas will come to reconsider this distinction in his later works.
66
  Also, as Levinas 
will come to argue that the freedom of the subject is grounded in the encounter with the 
alterity of the Other, relegating this excessive intentionality to a private erotic relation 
would raise difficulties for this later position.      
Levinas applauds Heidegger for his descriptions on what Being-in-the-world 
means, and for going beyond the idea that the world is the sum of objects; however, 
Levinas takes his own analysis further.  Levinas criticises Heidegger‟s appeal to an 
ontological finality in his description of the world.  Levinas asks if our relationship with 
things in the world must always be interpreted in relation to a teleological utility, that of 
the care for existing by one‟s own being for that being‟s existence.  Is a house shelter 
from the harsh elements, or is it not primarily a home?  Levinas believes that by 
centring his analysis on „tools‟, and interpreting Dasein‟s relationships with things as 
ends, Heidegger overlooks the lived reality of the „secular‟ nature of being-in-the-world 
and has not accepted the sincerity of intentions.
67
  By looking behind the intentions [qua 
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directly intended object of the act] to find an end outside of the immediacy of the act, 
the truthfulness (and givenness) of that very intention is undermined.  Although food 
provides sustenance, the experience of eating is one of pleasure and satisfaction, and is 
an end in itself, „food makes possible the full realization of its intention.  At some 
moment everything is consummated‟.68  In order to further clarify the way in which our 
intentional relationship with things can be played out in the immediate, with no 
consideration for a beyond that very immediacy, Levinas again turns to desire.
69
  
Through a brief analysis of the desire that is felt between two lovers, Levinas outlines 
how this desire can never be fulfilled as the lover can never possess the beloved.
70
  In 
the immediacy of the desire for the beloved there is no goal beyond that intimate 
moment, and when the embrace ends in satisfaction one finds that they are returned to 
oneself. 
Food serves as a contrast to the example of the lovers as it is a more simple 
pleasure in which one fully consumes the food.  In both examples, however, Levinas 
articulates how the pleasure in and desire for the act of loving and eating is confined to 
the act itself.  Levinas further separates his descriptions of being in the world from 
Heidegger‟s with a simple reflection on the mundane, yet sincere, moments of 
everydayness. 
Nowhere in the phenomenal order does the object of an action refer to the 
concern for existing; it itself makes up our existence.  We breathe for the sake of 
breathing, eat and drink for the sake of eating and drinking, we take shelter for 
the sake of taking shelter, we study to satisfy our curiosity, we take a walk for 
the walk.  All that is not for the sake of living; it is living.  Life is a sincerity.
71
    
 
The place in which our life is lived, for the pure sake of living, is the world.  Although 
this section of the text was not written in captivity, in reading these passages one cannot 
help but imagine Levinas locked in the prison camp, alienated from the world in which 
he wished to live his life, and kept from these very simple pleasures of drinking and 
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eating good food simply for pleasure‟s sake.  When food is reduced to a biological 
necessity, and rationed as such, when the joy and satisfaction of the simple pleasures of 
life are denied, one must gain a different perspective on, and appreciation of, such 
simple pleasures.  As Levinas himself says, to be in the world is to be freed from the 
instinct to exist.  Being in the world consists of simple pleasures for pleasure sake such 
as tending a flower bed for the joy of growing flowers.
72
  Life in the world provides a 
respite from the anonymity of being, a space is created where life can be lived in all it 
simple sincerity.  
 
§ 2.1.5 FREEDOM AS EXCESS AND THE LIGHT OF INTENTIONALITY  
 
In his discussion of the world in terms of intentionality, the correlation between 
intentionality and freedom that was addressed before the war is once again evident.  
Although Levinas criticises some of the nuances involved in Heidegger‟s descriptions 
of being-in-the-world he accepts the basic premise that the ego is embedded in the 
world and not outside of it.  However, there is still an important distance between the 
ego and the world, which affords the ego the opportunity to relate to the world and to 
take up a position with regard to it, through intentionality.  Adding to his description of 
intentionality as desire, Levinas explains intentionality as a movement to take hold of 
something, to grasp it.
73
  This relationship with objects in the world reveals the ego‟s 
distance from the world, despite being in the world.  This crucial distance opens up a 
space for freedom.
74
  „The world as given to intentions leaves the I a freedom with 
                                                 
72
 Underlying this point by Levinas is the „existentialist‟ critique of scientific naturalism, which brings to 
mind „existential phenomenology‟.  De Boer makes the point that French „reflexive philosophy‟, namely 
that of Lavelle and Marcel, influenced Levinas‟s turn to an analysis of „existential‟ phenomena in his 
early work, such as fatigue, indolence and effort.  De Boer, „Difference and Separation‟, in The 
Rationality of Transcendence, pp. 115-32 (p. 120).   
73
 „This possession at a distance, keeping one‟s hands free, is what constitutes the intentionality of 
intentions.‟ Levinas, Existence and Existents, pp. 38-39.  
74
 Levinas‟s point here brings to mind the philosophy of J. G. Fichte, who maintained that your freedom is 
your consciousness and your consciousness is your freedom.  Although Levinas rarely refers to Fichte by 
name, and when he does it is in criticism of his philosophy as belonging to the tradition of German 
Idealism (See, Levinas, Otherwise Than Being: Or, Beyond Essence, trans. by Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne University Press, 1998), p. 101, 125, and 123-24), more recently some 
interesting work has been done on the relationship between the two. In The Cambridge Introduction to 
Emmanuel Levinas Morgan points out that in a certain sense Fichte was a forerunner of some of Levinas‟s 
ideas. See, Michael L Morgan, The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 69, n. 33.  Morgan point out that Fichte, through the idea of 
recognition as put forward in Foundations of Natural Right, argues that in order to have self-
consciousness, and consequently reflective consciousness, I must firstly have the concept of the other.  
For Fichte, I become a self because I am summoned to free action by another.  See, J. G. Fichte, 
 113 
regard to it.‟75  The exteriority of objects in the world further guarantees this distance 
which the ego is free to traverse.  On the other side of this intentional relation with the 
world, through which the ego can move toward the world, is the possibility to withdraw, 
to the inwardness of the I.   
 Similar to his position in the „Work of Edmund Husserl‟ Levinas argues that 
intentionality is the very origin of sense, and his description captures the active sense-
bestowing (Sinngebung) freedom of the I.  „Sense is that by which what is exterior is 
already adjusted to and refers to what is interior.‟76  Levinas disputes the position that 
sense (sens/sinn- meaning) is reducible to a concept and here links sense with sensation.  
Even at this level that is preconceptual, intentionality is seen as bestowing a sense on 
the object.  Levinas turns to the age old philosophical metaphor of „light‟.  The exterior 
world is revealed to us through the medium of light, it is how the world is given and 
hence made known.  Levinas reaffirms his position that intentionality, as meaning 
bestowing, seeks to possess and grasp the object.  „Light makes possible, then, this 
enveloping of the exterior by the inward, which is the very structure of the cogito and of 
sense.‟77   Once again we see how intentionality is not a way through which the I 
passively receives the external world, intentionality, rather, as the giver of sense, 
apprehends the object as though it came from the I.
78
  
[D]ue to the light an object, while coming from without, is already ours in the 
horizon which precedes it; it comes from an exterior already apprehended and 
comes into being as though it came from us, as though commanded by our 
freedom.
79
     
                                                                                                                                               
Foundations of Natural Right, trans. by Michael Baur, ed. by Frederick Neuhouser  (Cambridge: 
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In his work to come Levinas will develop this strange idea of how an object, which 
precedes the subject, and is exterior, appears as though it came from the subject, as 
though commanded by our freedom.
80
  This freedom, understood as the freedom of 
representation, will be given an explanation and justification.     
Levinas continues the analogy of light to draw a familiar comparison between 
light and comprehension.  Quite distinct from the natural-scientific explanation of light, 
Levinas points out that understood phenomenologically light is what enables meaning 
(sens).  The discussion on light and intentionality leads to knowledge, and Levinas 
returns to further explain how a subject, whilst being-in-the-world, is at a distance to the 
world which enables inwardness and a freedom in relation to the world. 
It is a way of relating to events while still being able to not be caught up in them.  
To be a subject is to be a power of unending withdrawal, an ability always to 
find oneself behind what happens to one.
81
 
 
The power of the subject here captures an understanding of freedom as excess.  As the 
subject is at a distance from the world, this separation from being opens a space for the 
subject to take up a position with regard to the world.  This ability to maintain a 
distance from the world, through consciousness and knowledge, is seen as a freedom.  
This freedom is only possible due to representational consciousness, objectifying 
thought.  As Levinas phrases it, „it is already a freedom with regard to all objects, a 
drawing back, an “as for me ...”‟.82  
This „power of the agent to remain free‟, to maintain a distance from the world, 
is extended beyond the ability to maintain a distance from present bonds, and also 
includes the ability to free oneself from the bond of its history.
83
  Levinas goes even 
further, stating that this distance, granted by the light of knowledge and intentionality, 
affords the I the opportunity to not be „compromised‟ by that history, and to „suspend‟ 
that history.  Put otherwise, favourably, this means that the I does not have to be 
determined by history, however, this freedom also presents the I with the possibility of 
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forgetting its responsibility, and to be as if it was the origin of the meaningful world.   
This power to withdraw infinitely, to take up a position in relation to being, is what 
defines the I.  The I is both constantly engaged with being, through intentionality, and 
yet at a distance from it, likewise afforded by intentionality.  „The I is a being that is 
always outside of being and even outside of itself‟.84  
This separation, and the illumination of the world through light, also makes 
desire possible.  This excess gives the subject the sense of being beyond the mechanical 
determinism of the natural world, as the subject can stand back from being.  This 
detachment from being is a necessary pre-condition for the appearing of a meaningful 
world. 
In this world where everything seems to affirm our solidarity with the totality of 
existence, where we are caught up in the gears of a universal mechanism, our 
first feeling, our ineradicable illusion, is a feeling or illusion of freedom (illusion 
de liberté).
85
 
 
What is it about this feeling of freedom that makes it illusionary?  At this point of the 
text Levinas does not linger on this point but he will turn explicitly to the question of 
freedom in the final chapter of this text.  Readers familiar with Levinas‟s later work will 
undoubtedly hear the beginnings of what Levinas will later come to characterise as the 
„Same‟ in the reference above to the „totality of existence‟.  The self, without the 
interruption of the Other, is closed within a totality whereby everything relates back to 
the self, without remainder.  Keeping in mind Levinas‟s argument, presented in our 
previous chapter, that without alterity there can be no „novelty‟, no genuine possibility 
of difference, and hence no freedom, one can begin to make sense of this claim that 
alone in the world the self has only the „illusion‟ of freedom.  
In direct opposition to Heidegger Levinas maintains that our everyday existence 
in the world, consisting of our everyday activities, motivated by desire, is not an 
inauthentic fraud, or a fallen state, but a getting out of the anonymity of being.  Through 
living in the world, consisting of the simplest joys of life, the subject creates an 
„interval‟ in being, a pause from the horror of being in its pure generality, but not an 
escape from being.
86
  The subject concerned only with its self is not yet free, and hence 
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anonymity of being, see, § 2.2.2. 
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has only the illusion of freedom.  Everyday life is a resistance to being, a beyond the 
„elemental‟.  It is to this „elemental‟ that Levinas turns to next. 
 
§ 2.1.6 ART AS ACCESS TO THE IL Y A  
 
The reflection on aesthetics, in particular the nature of art work, which is the focus of 
the first section of chapter III „Exoticism‟, leads the reader into the second section 
which was written while in captivity „Existence without Existents‟.  Beginning with the 
view of aesthetics that deems the „elementary function‟ of art to be mimesis, Levinas 
describes how through art we encounter an alterity that remains exterior and resists 
assimilation and possession, even in works of art that focus on representation.  Through 
representation in art objects stand out from the world, they are removed from any 
horizon and any context in which we have grown familiar with is disturbed.  „The 
painting, the statue, the book are objects of our world, but through them the things 
represented are extracted from our world.‟87  When art breaks up our world it confronts 
us with the „impersonality of elements‟.  In its nakedness the work of art almost floats 
above the world, in a state of limbo, belonging to a worldless reality.  Taken out of any 
context belonging to our world, the pure materiality of the object strikes us, and turns us 
to the il y a, to the pure fact of being, that there is.  
 
§ 2.1.7 THE „THERE IS‟  
 
We now turn to the portion of the work that Levinas wrote while in captivity and which 
he later came to regard as the most important part of the work.  
As to Existence and Existents, what is important in that book is the description 
of being in its anonymity, a description very close to the themes of Blanchot.  A 
convergence, a parallelism, what I call the il y a (there is).  Whatever be my 
projects, my movements, my rest, there is being.  Il y a is anonymous, “il y a” 
like “il pleut” (“it” is raining).  There is not only something that is but there is, 
above and through these somethings, an anonymous process of being.  Without a 
bearer, without a subject.  As in insomnia, it doesn‟t stop being — there is.88     
 
In the Preface to the second edition of the work Levinas points out that the il y a was 
never meant to convey the generosity and abundance that the German term es gibt 
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conjures up.
89
  When reading the suffocating way in which being is described, it is hard 
to imagine that these reflections, written whilst in captivity, could have been written in 
jovial times.  
In Levinas‟s attempt to describe being in general he begins with a customary 
philosophical method of asking the reader to accompany him in conducting a thought 
experiment, in which we try to imagine „all beings, things and persons, reverting to 
nothingness‟.90  In contrast to the imagery of „light‟ used to describe the world and 
knowledge in the preceding chapter, in order to describe the il y a Levinas now turns to 
the „night‟.91  If the world is an illuminated space in which the existent can escape from 
the anonymity of being, when the world and all beings are removed the undifferentiated 
being that remains is dark, ominous, and harrowing in its silence.
92
  The nothingness 
that remains is still a something, a happening, if only the happening of a dark and empty 
silent night.
93
  As Leask phrases it, „this il y a is nothing exact and yet it is not exactly 
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nothing.‟94  Levinas uses the impersonal third person pronoun to capture a sense of the 
there is.  „There is is an impersonal form, like in it rains, or it is warm. Its anonymity is 
essential.‟95  The absence is itself felt like a presence.  „But this universal absence is in 
its turn a presence, an absolutely unavoidable presence.‟96  The il y a transcends all 
distinctions between the interior and exterior, between subject and object, as it invades 
all and leaves no space between, in order to distinguish between them.  Like the night 
that envelopes everything in its darkness, leaving no reference point from which to 
obtain one‟s bearings.  In the sheer blackness, in the absence of all light, even the 
boundaries of the self become blurred and the distinction between the self and the 
surroundings dissolve.
97
     
What we call the I is itself submerged by the night, invaded, depersonalised, 
stifled by it.  The disappearance of all things and of the I leaves what cannot 
disappear, the sheer fact of being in which one participates, whether one wants 
to or not, without having taken the initiative, anonymously.
98
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The one thing that cannot be hidden, even in the darkest night, is the sheer fact 
that there is.  The emptiness is filled with „the nothingness of everything.‟ 99   In 
complete darkness there is no need to hide as one is already cloaked in darkness, and yet 
despite the absence of any light one feels most exposed, insecure and vulnerable.  
„Before this obscure invasion it is impossible to take shelter in oneself, to withdraw into 
one‟s shell. One is exposed.‟100  The very horror of the il y a, felt in the night when the 
darkness seems to intrude on the self, penetrating its interiority, is the horror of the 
depersonalization that accompanies it.  Consciousness offers us a way to rise above the 
il y a and to appear to momentarily escape the horror, as through consciousness an 
individual subject separates its self from the generality and ambiguity of being.  Before 
the il y a it is not death that causes anxiety, but the horror of the condemnation to exist 
with „no exit‟ (sans issue) from being, for even death is impossible before the il y a.101  
Levinas draws on Shakespeare, as just one of his many literary references, to help him 
to depict this eerie experience after a murder the world is as it appeared to be before.  
„Horror is the event of being which returns in the heart of this negation, as though 
nothing had happened. “And that,” says Macbeth, “is more strange than the crime 
itself”.‟102  Despite your world having been turned upside down the fabric of the world 
remains the same.  There is no silhouette shaped hole of the person who is gone. 
Existence is as it was before.  
 
§ 2.1.8 INSOMNIA AND THE PASSIVITY OF THE SELF 
 
By sketching a materialist account of subjectivity, understood as the ego‟s inescapable 
bond to the self, Levinas places the view of the free autonomous sovereign subject into 
question, by simply describing situations that lead us to reflect on autonomy.
103
  
Levinas‟s description of insomnia demonstrates both the passivity of the existent, and 
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also, in reflecting on insomnia the weight of the il y a is revealed.  We are once again 
confronted with a different take on an ordinary event that leads us to revaluate our 
previous thoughts on the matter, if any, and the consequences thereof.  In insomnia, the 
subject cannot even choose to go asleep, „one is held by being, held to be‟.104  To „fall 
asleep‟, the term used in English to describe the event of passing from wakefulness into 
sleep, captures the passivity and powerlessness of this event.  One does not will sleep, 
sleep comes, or as is the case with insomnia, it does not.  As Levinas says, with 
insomnia „sleep evades our appeal‟. 105   Sleep is described as the possibility of 
suspending consciousness, „to withdraw from being‟.106  
In contrast to attention, Levinas describes the wakefulness (la veille) that 
accompanies insomnia as vigilance.
107
  Attention is directed towards an object whereas 
with vigilance there is no object, just a heavy presence.  In fact, in the night, it is as 
though the night itself is watching.
108
  Even the subject begins to fade away.
 109 
 In the 
vigilance of insomnia the I is not awake and attentive, rather „it‟ watches.  This 
experience of the dissolution of the subject is one of horror and oppression.  It is as 
though the subject is absorbed by the night, as the boundary between the interior and the 
exterior seem to dissolve.
110
  Levinas tells us that the anonymous vigilance revealed 
through an analysis of insomnia, strictly speaking, cannot be termed phenomena as this 
would presuppose an ego.  Almost like a state of limbo, insomnia is in between 
consciousness as attention and sleep as the suspension of consciousness.  Levinas 
returns to his phenomenological analysis of insomnia in Time and the Other where it 
has a more prominent place in the discussion.
111
  As insomnia is the extinction of the 
subject, this leads Levinas to ask what then accounts for the advent of the subject.  In 
the next section Levinas discusses the opposition of consciousness and 
unconsciousness, which leads to a discussion on hypostasis, and the advent of a subject 
in the instant.    
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§ 2.1.9 CONSCIOUSNESS, THE BODY, AND POSITION 
 
Consciousness is marked by its ability to retreat, to sleep.  The continuous flow of 
consciousness does not come to an end in sleep, and nor does one begin anew when one 
wakes.  Rather it is a „participation in life by non-participation‟, a switching off, a 
pause, a rest.
112
  A condition that is necessary in order for one to sleep is that of a 
„place‟.  To sleep one must find a place in which to take refuge, lie down, and take up a 
position, „to abandon ourselves to a place‟ and „summon sleep‟.113  Again the passivity 
of the existent is captured by the way in which Levinas describes sleep.  Sleep is not 
described as an activity that one can master and command, rather the existent must give 
him/her self over to sleep and to a place.  There is vulnerability in sleep, as one is 
abandoned to sleep and to the place of rest.  Not only is a place a condition for rest and 
sleep, but consciousness itself comes out of a position.  „Position is not added to 
consciousness like an act that it decides on; it is out of position, out of an immobility, 
that consciousness comes to itself.‟114  The advent of consciousness is within a position, 
and one that consciousness could not will or control.  Consciousness has a place and in 
order to have a place it must first be posited.  Levinas claims that if one was to imagine 
consciousness without a position it would not be a consciousness that is free of all 
restraints, but the very annihilation of consciousness.  Consciousness can only arise in a 
position in being.  
Against the Bergsonian view of place as geometric space, and the Heideggerian 
concrete world, Levinas puts forward the idea of place as fundamentally a base, as a 
taking up of a position.  This is inextricably linked to an understanding of the body as 
„the irruption in anonymous being of localization itself‟.115  The body is not an object 
belonging to the existent, however, nor is it completely correct to say that „I am my 
body‟, such as I am my pain, or I am organs, as in this description the body is still 
described as a being, a substance.
116
  Through his phenomenological analysis Levinas 
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wants to claim that the body is the event of the positing of the existent in being, „the 
way a man engages in existence‟.117  In an attempt to convey further to the reader how 
the body is this event, Levinas refers to Rodin‟s sculptures.  With Rodin‟s sculptures the 
figures are not positioned on top of a pedestal, rather the base forms part of the 
structure.  The base is an integral part of the structure, as it appears as though the figures 
are emerging out of the base.  With some of Rodin‟s pieces one finds it hard to tell 
where the base ends and the figure begins, they are almost amalgamated into one.  This 
image captures how consciousness presupposes a position in being, and the body as a 
necessary condition for the possibility of any inwardness.  Consciousness is not free 
floating and detached.  The body is integral to this positioning.  Consciousness, just like 
Rodin‟s sculptures, cannot choose this position as this would require pre-existing the 
position.           
 
§ 2.1.10 HYPOSTASIS 
 
In order to further describe what he means by hypostasis Levinas goes on to discuss 
hypostasis in relation to time, and returns to the earlier discussed theme of the instant.  
The understanding of position as the taking up of a place leads Levinas to reflect on the 
instant as a present. Levinas claims that the present has generally gained its significance 
in philosophy due to its relationship with time, with the future and the past.  Although, 
Levinas claims, that this has been the case since the time of ancient philosophy, he 
believes it to be particularly evident in modern philosophy.
118
  Despite their differences, 
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Levinas places both the Bergsonian and Heideggerian understandings of time firmly in 
this tradition, as both see the instant as caught up with the remembered past and the 
anticipated future, as duration and ecstasis.
119
  Levinas separates himself from both by 
reflecting on the significance of the instant understood as the present, irrespective of its 
relationship with time past and yet to come.  On this classical conception of time the 
instant is viewed as evanescence, a fading away in order to make room for the next 
instant, and as such it loses its significance.  This view also has consequences for the 
view of existence, which is seen as persistence through time.  By focusing on the 
instance Levinas shows how each instant „imitates eternity‟.120  
Levinas cites Malebranche as an exception to this tradition, as Malebranche 
„catches sight of the drama inherent in an instant itself‟, by focusing on the instant 
removed from its relationship with the past and the future the event of the instant comes 
to the fore, as does the relationship with existence that it reveals.
121
  For Levinas each 
instant is the accomplishment of existence, „a beginning, a birth‟.122  Hypostasis is a 
continuous event whereby existence is taken up by the existent in the present.
123
  It is a 
paradoxical relationship whereby what previously did not exist somehow gives birth to  
its own self, in each instant.  Each instant is understood as a beginning, as it is removed 
from time, and so, there was no before and there will be no future.
124
  The advent of the 
existent is understood as a constant folding back on itself, a repli en soi.
125
  
 
§ 2.1.11 FREEDOM AND THE PRESENT  
 
In this section Levinas turns explicitly to how this description of existence, as revealed 
through an analysis of the instant, relates to freedom.  Though Levinas argued above 
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that the instant is to be understood as absolute, he does not want the reader to infer from 
this that the instant should therefore be regarded as a complete freedom. 
The description of this absolute can then not be put in terms of sovereignty 
(souveraineté) and blissful freedom (liberté bienheureuse), with which the 
notion of the absolute is characterized in the philosophical tradition.
126
   
 
This passage does not rule out the possibility that hypostasis brings a degree of freedom, 
just that the instant as absolute is not to be understood as „sovereignty and blissful 
freedom‟, as it is not free of all restraints.  In Time and the Other it will become clear 
that this freedom gained through hypostasis is a minimal freedom understood as a 
beginning, and a mastery over being, that comes with simply taking up being in the 
present.  It is not to be thought of as freedom of the will, the freedom of representation, 
or as freedom from the basic materiality of the self.  The event that Levinas is seeking to 
describe rests on the materiality of the self and is an event prior to reflective 
consciousness and intentional engagement with the world.  
Hypostasis reveals the paradoxical relationship between existence and the 
existent.  On the one hand, the existent gains mastery over existence by rising up from 
the anonymity of the il y a and taking up a position, and in that sense is said to be free, 
and yet, on the other hand, the existent is chained to itself, chained to existence, and 
cannot escape the present.  
What is absolute in the relationship between existence and an existent, in an 
instant, consists in the mastery the existent exercises on existence, but also in the 
weight of existence on the existent.
127
   
 
We are left with two different sides to this understanding of freedom.  Merely by 
existing the existent is said to have mastery over being, and yet alone it cannot escape 
the present instant, nor escape the immediate weight of enchainment of the ego to the 
self.  In Time and the Other Levinas will develop this idea of freedom understood as a 
mastery over being, gained purely by existing, in more detail.  Below, we will see that 
this distinction between two slightly different meanings of freedom becomes more 
apparent in Time and the Other.  In Existence and Existent this distinction is not so 
clearly stated and as such can be easily overlooked.  This „mastery‟ over being is not yet 
clearly described as a freedom.  In Existence and Existents the focus is primarily on the 
weight of existence on the existent and how alone the subject cannot escape the present 
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and cannot escape the enchainment of the ego to the self, and so in that sense is not yet 
free. 
The present does not gain its significance from being a moment in a linear time 
sequence, preceded by the past and giving way to the future, but from its absolute 
engagement with being.  The instant is always present.  Even when one reflects on time 
past, or harbours hope for time to come, the instant can never be escaped, „the present in 
its inevitable return upon itself does not allow for its annihilation‟. 128   Even the 
evanescence of the present cannot destroy the infinity that is the presence of the present.     
The present is subjected to being, bonded to it.  The ego (le moi) returns 
ineluctably to itself (à soi); it can forget itself in sleep, but there will be a 
reawakening.  In the tension and fatigue of beginning one feels the cold sweat of 
the irremissibility of existence.  The being that is taken up is a burden.
129
    
 
Although the present refers only to itself, which should imply freedom from restraints, it 
cannot escape the restraint that comes from this self identification.  Despite the fact that 
the instant is not weighed down by the events of the past, the unremitting beginning in 
the instant is itself a weight and a burden.  The commitment to exist, which is taken up 
simply by existing, entails a responsibility to existence that one did not choose, and yet 
one cannot choose to undo it.  
The freedom of the present finds a limit in the responsibility for which it is the 
condition. This is the most profound paradox in the concept of freedom: its 
synthetic bond with its own negation.  A free being alone is responsible, that is, 
already not free (déjà non libre).  A being capable of beginning in the present is 
alone encumbered with itself.
130
 
 
When one thinks of freedom in the work of Levinas the predominate correlation that is 
made is between the paradoxical freedom of the I and the infinite responsibility one has 
for the Other.  It is interesting to note that at this early stage when Levinas first connects 
freedom and responsibility it is in relation to the existent alone.  The responsibility that 
the existent has for its own existing cannot be separated from its freedom; rather, it is 
the very condition of that freedom.  
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With hypostasis the existent finds itself singularized in existence before being 
free.  The singularization of the existent was never willed nor chosen by the subject, it is 
prior to any cognitive initiative or intention, and nevertheless, it is an event that the 
existent cannot undo.  The weight of responsibility for the existent‟s own existence 
holds it back.  The passage above indicates that the responsibility that comes with 
existing is simultaneous with the advent of freedom, „[a] free being alone is responsible, 
that is, already not free (déjà non libre)‟.  The existent is simultaneously free and 
limited by the responsibility that encumbers that freedom.
131
  Consequently, one is not 
free and therefore responsible, one is, rather, responsible and therefore free.  It is 
important to remember that freedom is here used in a minimal sense, and is not the 
freedom of the will.  Responsibility, therefore, precedes freedom understood as freedom 
of the will, and the freedom associated with „light‟, theoretical consciousness and 
knowledge, as through hypostasis the existent is responsible for existing prior to this 
level of engagement with the world.   
 We are again reminded that what Levinas is seeking to describe is an event that 
precedes theoretical and reflective thought.
132
  The use of the term „existent‟, in place of 
subject, further demonstrates that Levinas wishes to reveal a relationship with existence 
that prefigures the intentional relationship with the world, and therefore prefigures 
representational consciousness.  This is also affirmed by his unwillingness to describe 
the event as an experience.
133
  Levinas turns to Descartes and points out how Descartes‟ 
cogito rests on this prior event of hypostasis.  Far from needing to rest his argument, 
ultimately, on an ontological argument for the existence of God, Levinas argues that the 
certainty of the cogito rests on the certainty of the present.
134
  
In the next section „The Present and Position‟, Levinas goes on to further argue 
that the event that he is describing is prior to reflective consciousness, and not to be 
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thought of as an act of the will.
135
  The effort by which the existent perpetually takes up 
a position in the instant is distinct from effort understood as effort arising from an act 
taken up a subject.  The effort to be is not a free initiative of a subject, but the very 
being of an existent.  
A subject does not exist before the event of its position.  The act of taking a 
position does not unfold in some dimension from which it could take its origin; 
it arises at the very point at which it acts.  Its action does not consist in willing, 
but in being.
136
 
 
Levinas points out that action taken by the subject transcends itself, as it is directed at 
the world, whereas the taking up of a position in being does not transcend the existent.  
The hypostasis of an existent is a „folding back on itself‟ (repli en soi), and so, is a 
complete self contained event that has no opening unto alterity.
137
  In contrast to 
Heidegger‟s position, for whom, Levinas claims, temporality understood as „ecstasy‟ is 
already a being outside of oneself and always already embedded in the world, Levinas 
questions whether the original relationship between an existent and being involves an 
opening to the outside.  Levinas does not take time, or a relationship with a beyond the 
existent, as a given.   
In starting with position, we question whether ecstasy is in fact the original 
mode of existence, whether the relationship currently called a relationship 
between the ego and being is a movement toward an outside, whether the ex is 
the principle root of the verb to exist.
138
 
 
Levinas is here playing on the etymological root of the prefix ex, in „ecstasy‟ and 
„existence‟, meaning out (of), from, beyond.139  On Levinas‟s analysis the existent is 
alone in being and trapped in a self-contained relationship that can only be breached 
from the outside, through an event that is not initiated by the subject, and so, not 
reducible to the freedom and the power of the I.  Only through an encounter with 
alterity can the existent be freed from this perpetual present and given the possibility of 
freedom, and not just fate. 
The return of the present to itself is the affirmation of the I already riveted to 
itself, already doubled up with a self.  The tragic does not come from a conflict 
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between freedom and destiny, but from the turning of freedom into destiny, from 
responsibility.
140
  
 
§ 2.1.12 FREEDOM AND HYPOSTASIS 
 
In this section Levinas clearly states that hypostasis is not yet freedom.  „If an existent 
arises through consciousness, subjectivity, which is a preeminence of the subject over 
being, is not yet freedom‟.141  Given that in Time and the Other Levinas will come to 
deploy the word freedom in a different sense, it is of importance, therefore, to be clear 
on the meaning of freedom in this section.  As with the majority of this text, freedom is 
here used as the freedom from the immediate materiality of the subject, a freedom that 
eludes the solitary existent.  Even though the intentional ego can seem to escape the il y 
a through an intentional relationship of desire with the world, a relationship of „mastery, 
power or virility‟, the il y a is never far away.  „It is forever bound to the existence 
which it has taken up‟.142  Even the freedom that seems to come with consciousness and 
cognition, cannot free the self completely.  Consciousness may separate the self from 
the world, placing the world at a distance (through reflection), but the definitive mark of 
existence of the existent, that of solitude, is not ruptured.  Drawing on his interpretation 
of intentionality in Husserl‟s phenomenology, presented in the „Work of Edmund 
Husserl‟, in which it was argued that intentionality bestows a sense, and hence nothing 
in the world could be absolutely foreign to the subject,  Levinas here continues that line 
of thought by arguing that intentionality keeps the self locked in its own solitude.  
Illuminated by light, they [given objects] have meaning [sense (sens)], and thus 
are as though they came from me.  In the understood universe I am alone, that is, 
closed up in an existence that is definitively one (définitivement une).
143
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Levinas is again using light here as an analogy for knowledge and understanding.  In the 
passage above it is important to note that Levinas states that in the universe as 
„understood‟ I am alone.  Thus, at the level of the intentional ego (le moi) the „I‟ is 
condemned to a solitary existence.  
It is at this point of the argument that Levinas again introduces the Other 
(autrui), as the Other breaks up the categories of the ego, and hence can free the ego 
from this solitary existence in which all of the given objects of the world are subsumed 
by the ego, given a sense, and hence as „mine‟ are part of that solitude.  
It is [reaching the other (autrui)], on the ontological level, the event of the most 
radical breakup of the very categories of the ego (du moi), for it is for me to be 
somewhere else than my self; it is to be pardoned, to not be a definitive 
existence.
144
  
 
Therefore, „my understanding of the meaning of being‟ can be, and is, called into 
question through the existence of the Other.  Without the existence of the Other there 
can be no critical distance in self-understanding.  In his work to come Levinas will 
stress this point further, arguing that without the Other the self would never call its self 
into question, and consequently without the Other critical consciousness would never 
arise.  Within this work, the Other is described as pardoning the self from a life 
condemned to solitary confinement, by breaking up the categories of the ego and 
introducing an alterity that cannot be assimilated by the ego.  A danger with the way in 
which the Other is discussed in Existence and Existents is that the Other could be seen 
to be reduced to the functionary role of „pardoning‟ the self from a life that would be 
otherwise condemned to solitude.
145
  This is something that Levinas himself becomes 
aware of and in his later work he will further develop his thinking on subjectivity in 
relation to the Other, and in doing so move towards avoiding this criticism.  
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Levinas continues the light analogy and explains that it is not possible to „grasp 
the alterity of the other‟ through any relationship characterised by light. 146  
Phenomenology, on Levinas‟s interpretation, is limited when it comes to philosophising 
about the other as it represents a philosophy of light par excellence.  Phenomenology 
proceeds through a reflection on conscious experience, and as such Levinas maintains 
„cannot leave the sphere of light‟.147   Every object that is reflected on is an object that is 
known and constituted by the ego, and more importantly for Levinas, intentionality is 
essentially the act of bestowing a sense (Sinngebung).  As such, on his reading of 
phenomenology, following Husserl (and Heidegger), there is no room for an encounter 
that resists and shatters those categories, an encounter that occurs prior to the subject‟s 
intentional engagement with the world understood as „light‟.    
Qua phenomenology it remains within the world of light, the world of the 
solitary ego which has no relationship with the other qua other, for whom the 
other is another me, an alter ego known by sympathy, that is, by a return to 
oneself.
148
       
 
For Levinas, the understanding of intentional presented in the work of both Husserl and 
Heidegger are not significantly different.  For Husserl, objects cannot be encountered 
(begegnen) in their meaning and existence precisely because their meaningful existence 
is constituted by the activity of human intentional consciousness.  Heidegger‟s 
argument that the meaningful existence of the „hammer‟ is not constituted through the 
harmony of intentional-perceptual experiences but constituted through the activity of 
Dasein in using the hammer, therefore, is not a rejection but a modification of Husserl‟s 
transcendental-phenomenological approach and position.  Rather than consciousness 
being named and acknowledged as the bestower of meaning of things in the world, the 
individual human being in Dasein as actor in the world is.  Though Heidegger says that 
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the „understanding of Being‟ that I have of the world (in Dasein) extends to and 
includes not only myself, the world but also the existence of one‟s fellow human being, 
there is scant treatment or acknowledgement of the existence of the otherness of one‟s 
fellow human being in Heidegger‟s actual text or philosophical position.  Likewise with 
Husserl‟s approach to inter-subjectivity where the other is reduced to the sameness as 
the self in the constitution of the meaning of the „other‟, the very otherness of the 
existence of the „other‟ is not a feature of his phenomenological analyses and 
investigations.  
 
§ 2.1.13 ALONE AND TRAPPED IN THE INSTANT 
 
Throughout the latter sections of the text, when Levinas explicitly addresses freedom, it 
is freedom understood as aligned with knowledge and light, and as such is seen as 
operating on the level of intentional consciousness, the level of the ego (le moi) and not 
that of the self (le soi).  Earlier in the text when describing events that are prior to 
reflection such as weariness and fatigue, events that capture the passivity of the self, 
Levinas uses the term „existent‟ to capture this sense of passivity.  In this section, when 
Levinas turns to the subject‟s conscious engagement with the world, in place of 
„existent‟, Levinas uses terms such as „subject‟, „cognition‟, „ego‟, and „I‟.149  This 
reveals that freedom understood in the sense of the freedom of representation, the 
freedom of bestowing a meaning on the world through intentionality, takes place at this 
level of conscious engagement with the world.
150
  Before consciousness arises the 
existent has emerged in being, and as such is responsible for its own being, prior to this 
freedom understood as the freedom of representation and knowledge.
151
  
Knowledge, which is attained through the existent‟s intentional relation with the 
world, is described as „the secret of its freedom‟.152  Throughout his work to come this 
juxtaposition of knowledge and freedom will occur more frequently.  In order to grasp 
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 Levinas, Existence and Existents, pp. 88-89. 
150
 In Time and the Other Levinas continues this line of argument, and uses the term subjectivity when 
describing engagement with the world at the level of intentional consciousness.  „Subjectivity is itself the 
objectivity of light. Every object can be spoken of in terms of consciousness — that is, can be brought to 
light.‟ Levinas, Time and the Other, p. 66. 
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 The conclusion further affirms that what Levinas is seeking to describe is an event, through which an 
existent arises in being, which is prior to the world, „behind the cogito‟, „arises before the scission of 
being into an inside and an outside‟, and is antecedent/anterior/prior (antérieur) to the presupposed world 
of light.  Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 105. 
152
 „Knowledge is the secret of its freedom with respect to all that which happens to it.‟ Ibid., p. 88. 
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why Levinas aligns these two together, and hence why this sense of freedom pertains to 
the ego, one needs to grasp the duality within the self.  Contained in this distinction 
between the existent and the ego is an important distinction between two different 
meanings of freedom. In the next section we will discuss this important distinction, but 
firstly we need to grasp this equally important distinction between the ego and the self.   
Helpfully, it is in the very next section of the text, „The Ego as an Identification and as a 
Bond with Oneself‟, that Levinas articulates further the duality within the self.  This 
distinction between the self and the conscious ego will prove to be a vital distinction to 
grasp in order for us to come to understand why Levinas claims that responsibility 
precedes freedom, both in relation to the self in the early work and in relation to the 
Other in his later work.  To borrow an apt summary from Critchley: 
The whole Levinasian analysis of the subject proceeds from a rigorous 
distinction between the subject and consciousness or between the le Soi (the 
self) and le Moi (the ego). Levinas‟s work, and this is something far too little 
recognized in much of the unduly edifying or fetishizing secondary literature on 
Levinas, proceeds from the rigorous distinction between consciousness and 
subjectivity.
153
    
 
In that particular article Critchley centres his reading of Levinas on the 1968 version of 
„Substitution‟, later redrafted by Levinas to form the pivotal chapter IV of Otherwise 
than Being, however, this claim about the importance of the duality of the self in 
Levinas‟s philosophy is just as true for works as early as On Escape and Existence and 
Existents.  Granted it is not until Otherwise than Being that Levinas will give his most 
detailed account of the moral sensibility of subjectivity, and notwithstanding the 
changes and development that take place, it is of importance to bear in mind that this 
fundamental and crucial distinction, albeit not fully argued for, is nonetheless present as 
early as On Escape.
154
  
Despite the fact that throughout this work the duality of the self is a central 
element of Levinas‟s whole philosophical approach and argument, the significance of it 
can be easily overlooked.  This fundamental element of Levinas‟s account of 
subjectivity is crucial in coming to terms with his description of freedom.  The more 
one understands this important point the less paradoxical and counterintuitive Levinas‟s 
                                                 
153Simon Critchley, „The Original Traumatism. Levinas and psychoanalysis‟, in Questioning Ethics: 
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, ed. by Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 230-42 (pp. 232-33).  
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 „Thus, escape is the need to get out of oneself, that is, to break that most radical and unalterably 
binding of chains, the fact that the I (moi) is oneself (soi-même).‟ Levinas, On Escape, p. 55.  
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claim that responsibility precedes freedom will seem, both initially in relation to the self 
and in his later work in relation to the Other.  In this section, which deals specifically 
with the duality of the subject, Levinas seeks to get across to the reader the originality 
of this position.  He stresses that this duality in the subject is not akin with other 
dualities within the self that we have previously met in the history of philosophy, such 
as the distinction between will and passion, and reason or feeling. The crucial 
distinction that Levinas wishes to stress is that whereas these dualities remain at the 
level of the ego, Levinas wants to show that there is an older and more primary divide 
in the subject, the self is before the ego.
155
  Even with the „freedom‟ that the ego appears 
to bring, through knowledge and an intentional relation with the world understood as 
desire, the ego cannot be free of the self.  The responsibility of being tied to existence 
precedes the freedom of intentional consciousness.  The way in which Levinas describes 
the bond between the self and the ego, using terms such as „weight and a responsibility‟ 
(une pesanteur et une responsabilitié), „fatality‟ (la fatalité), „enchainment‟ 
(enchaînement), „destiny‟ (destin), „impossibility of getting rid of oneself‟ 
(l’impossibilité de se défaire de soi-même), all capture the powerlessness of the subject 
to escape this condition of existing.
156
  This „fatality‟ precedes and conditions the 
freedom of the ego.
157
  
In describing this condition of subjectivity as „enchainment‟ and a „burden‟, 
Levinas is well aware that the reader may suggest that the implication of this description 
is that the subject must, in at least a minimal sense, be free.  For surely only a free being 
can be enchained and burdened?  In answer to this potential rebuttal Levinas argues that 
it is not freedom that can be derived from this experience, but only the thought or hope 
of freedom.  Levinas uses the example of servitude to support his point.  „One cannot 
derive out of the experience of servitude the proof of its contrary, but the thought of 
freedom would suffice to account for it‟.158  Levinas stresses his point that this „concept 
of freedom‟ is illusionary,   
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 „Each of those faculties contains the ego completely.‟ Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 89.  
156
 Ibid. 
157
 As Thomas succinctly describes this predicament of the subject: „The way this freedom is interpreted 
is crucial to an understanding of subjectivity and is tied up with hope and a new conception of time. 
However, to introduce a notion of freedom in the midst of enchainment will sound paradoxical unless we 
recognise from the start that this freedom is not a power of the subject to leave, negate or overcome being 
but merely to bear it‟. Thomas, Emmanuel Levinas. Ethics, Justice, and the Human beyond Being, p. 47. 
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 Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 90. 
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[a]nd this is the concept of freedom, which is only a thought: a recourse to sleep, 
to unconsciousness, and not an escape, the illusory divorce of the ego from its 
self which will end in a resumption of existence in common.
159
 
 
Freedom for the solitary ego remains an illusory freedom, as the ego is still chained to 
the self.
160
  The subject condemned to the solitude of the present can only hold onto the 
hope that the future will bring consolation, and an escape.  However, alone the subject 
will never escape the present, „it cannot endow itself with this alterity‟.161  Freedom and 
salvation can only come from elsewhere.  Our life in the world, described earlier as the 
sincerity of intentions, may enable us to forget and to numb the pain of the instant, but 
our engagement with the world is not an escape from this fundamental condition of the 
inescapable attachment of the ego to the self.  Where, then, can the realisation of this 
hope come from?  One can detect the presence of Hegel in the text when Levinas rules 
out the possibility of any dialectical movement.  The opposition of freedom and the 
thought of freedom will not bring forth time.
162
  „The impossibility of constituting time 
dialectically is the impossibility of saving oneself by oneself and of saving oneself 
alone.‟163  No activity taken by the subject can bring forth its salvation from its self and 
from the present instant.  This hope can only be realised in the future, but as the subject 
is trapped in the instant, alone, it can only bring about more of the same, the future can 
only come from an outside the subject. „It can only come from elsewhere, while 
everything in the subject is here.‟164   
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 Ibid. 
160
 Levinas uses the example of boredom to further describe this duality of the self.  This example is 
particularly appropriate in French as the verb to be bored (s'ennuyer) is a reflexive verb.  The English „I 
am bored‟ (expressed as a state of being) translates into French as „je m’ennuie‟.     
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 Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 95, my emphasis.        
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 „The distinction we have set up between liberation and the mere thought of liberation excludes any sort 
of dialectical deduction of time starting with the present [...].  There is no dialectical exorcism contained 
in the fact that the “I” conceives of a freedom.  It is not enough to conceive of hope to unleash a future.‟ 
Ibid., p. 91.  
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 Ibid., p. 95. 
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 Ibid., p. 96, my emphasis. Herein lies the origins of Levinas‟s „immanent critique‟ of the respective 
phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger and their accounts of the origins of time-consciousness.  
Although both Husserl and Heidegger differ in their respective accounts of the phenomenological origins 
of time-consciousness, both prioritise the subjects experience of time, be that the remembered past and 
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constantly projects itself, for Heidegger.  As Joseph Cohen says of Levinas, he shifts „once again the 
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Joseph Cohen, „Levinas and the Problem of Phenomenology‟, in International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies, 20:3 (2012), pp. 363-74 (pp. 371-72). 
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§ 2.1.14 TWO DISTINCT MEANINGS OF FREEDOM  
 
Within the midst of this argument explicating the enchainment of the ego to the self, 
and the absence of freedom understood as a freedom from the immediacy of the 
material condition, Levinas complicates matters slightly by switching between two 
slightly different understandings of freedom.  In order to make sense of what can appear 
on first reading as, at best, an ambiguity, if not an inconsistency, I suggest that there are 
two slightly different uses of the term freedom in the text.  Whilst maintaining that the 
enchainment of the ego to the self is a burden that results in the illusion of freedom, and 
„not freedom itself‟, the existent is simultaneously described as a freedom.  „While 
being a freedom and a beginning, a subject is the bearer of a destiny (d’un destin) which 
already dominates (domine) this very freedom (liberté même).‟165  The „destiny‟ of the 
being is the inescapable now of the materiality of the self, the „hope‟ of being free of 
this condition is the closest to the freedom from this burden that alone the subject will 
achieve.  However, merely through existing the existent has a minimal sense of 
freedom, a freedom understood as a beginning, a freedom to be.
166
  For although the self 
is described as „free‟, meaning the very minimal sense of having a beginning, the self is 
responsible for this unchosen existence.  This freedom as a beginning is not yet freedom 
from the present, nor the freedom of light and knowledge, which is aligned with the 
ego, and nor is it freedom from this perpetual self-referential relationship with its self. It 
is simply a mastery over being achieved purely through being an existent.  
As a self-reference in a present, the identical subject is to be sure free with 
regard to the past and the future, but remains tributary of itself.  The freedom of 
the present is not light like grace, but is a weight and a responsibility.  It is 
articulated in a positive enchainment to one‟s self; the ego is irremissibly itself 
(le moi est irrémissiblement soi).
167
 
 
§ 2.1.15 THE FREEDOM OF TIME AND THE OTHER (L’AUTRE)  
 
As Levinas has argued that the subject is condemned to the instant, how then can we 
account for time?  Once again the position of both Heidegger and Bergson, alongside 
classical philosophy, are criticised for positing time in the solitary subject, and 
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 Levinas, Existence and Existents, pp. 89-90.  
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 This distinction between freedom understood as intentional consciousness, which belongs to the ego, 
and the minimal freedom of merely being a beginning, which is said of the self, will be repeated in 
Totality and Infinity. See, Ch. IV, §4.3.2.   
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 Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 89.  
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underestimating the importance of the Other (autrui) who „frees us‟ (autrui nous 
délivre).
168
  The solitary subject as „definitively himself‟ cannot account for the 
„absolute alterity of another instant‟. 169   If the future is what comes out of the 
possibilities contained in the actualities of the present, it cannot be transcendent and 
foreign, but fated, and as such offers nothing truly new.  Only an alterity, not contained 
within the present or in the subject, can bring forth the future.
170
  „This alterity (altérité) 
comes to me only from the other (autrui).‟171  With time comes hope, as who knows 
what tomorrow may bring.  The Other (autrui) also brings freedom and redemption for 
the subject, as one is released from the overbearing weight of the instant in which the 
subject is tied to being and cannot escape its self.  In his 1986 interview, when asked 
about Existence and Existents, Levinas remarked: „Nevertheless, at the end of the book, 
the essential idea that the true bearer of being, the true exit from the there is is in 
obligation, in the “for-the-other”, which introduces a meaning into the nonsense of the 
there is. The I subordinated to the other‟.172  Levinas‟s remark here, that the „true exit 
from the there is‟ comes in the obligation for the Other, affirms his comment above, that 
the freedom gained through hypostasis is an illusionary freedom, as the ego is still tied 
to the self. 
As time itself comes from the relation with the Other person (autrui), what then 
is this relation?
173
  Levinas goes on to further distinguish his position from that of 
Heidegger‟s, by outlining how the alterity of the Other that he wishes to capture is 
overlooked in Heidegger‟s Miteinandersein.  Being-with-others in the world is mediated 
by our engagement with things.  Our interaction with one another is mediated through 
our interaction with a third term.  In Heidegger‟s approach and analysis, we stand side-
by-side facing something, not as partners in a dialogue.  Levinas is interested in an 
earlier disruption that can only come when I am faced by the stark alterity of the Other.  
Before the side-by-side relation there is the face-to-face encounter.  Levinas is insistent 
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 „Interview with François Poirié‟ (1986), in Is it Righteous to Be?, pp. 45-46. 
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 Although at this early stage Levinas is content to describe the encounter with the other in terms of a 
„social relation‟, he will later move away from describing this event in terms such as relation and 
experience.  
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that it is an „encounter‟, not a „constitution‟ of the other in self-consciousness or in any 
experience of mitDasein.  At this very early stage of his work we see the beginnings of 
terms that have come to be so readily associated with Levinas‟s philosophy.  Although 
they will come to have greater ethical significance and will undergo much development, 
Levinas here describes the Other as „the widow and the orphan‟ („la veuve et 
l’orphelin‟), „alterity‟ (altérité), „face-to-face situation‟ (le face-à-face), „asymmetrical‟ 
(asymétrique), „neighbour‟ (le prochain).174  Even at this early stage we can glimpse 
that it is not the plastic face of the other constituted through our intentional perceptual 
experiences (Husserl) or the other in that being‟s alongsideness of Dasein (Heidegger), 
nor the empirical other as „an example of genus humanum‟, but, as De Boer notes, the 
„qualified other‟, „the biblical other‟, „the orphan and the widow‟, the marginalized, the 
other who has been othered in society about whom the prophets speak.
175
  In our 
everyday interaction with the world this alterity of the Other is forgotten.  Within this 
early text, Levinas goes on to argue that it is Eros that brings us back to this 
unbridgeable distance that separates us from the alterity of the Other.
176
  Levinas, 
however, reserves his descriptions of this phenomenon for his next work.
177
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§ 2.2 TIME AND THE OTHER (1947) 
 
Before we make some concluding remarks on Levinas‟s position on the freedom of the 
subject contained in Existence and Existents let us firstly turn to another work from 
1947, Time and the Other.
 178
  In what will become a common style in Levinas‟s work, 
in this next text he retraces the steps covered in the previous text, on this occasion 
Existence and Existents, adding some notable modifications, deepening the analysis, 
and including some additions.  Levinas‟s approach in Time and the Other follows the 
same overall structure of Existence and Existents, beginning with existence without 
existents, followed by the emergence in the present of the existent in existence, moving 
on to a description of the materiality of the solitary subject in the world, and 
culminating with the encounter of the Other in Eros.  As we have summarised the main 
movements in this argument above, we will confine our readings to the subtle 
differences, in relation to the freedom of the subject, contained therein.  
 
§ 2.2.1 HYPOSTASIS AS FREEDOM 
 
Our attempt to understand and present Levinas‟s thinking through of the freedom of the 
subject in his work from 1947 is complicated by the ambiguity surrounding the 
presentation of his position on this matter, even in this very narrow time period.  Even 
though Existence and Existents, and the lectures which make up Time and the Other, are 
contemporaneous with one another, and on first reading appear to repeat and deepen his 
analysis, a closer reading of these two works around the question of freedom reveals 
certain ambiguities that require closer inspection.  In order to clarify the place of 
freedom in Levinas‟s thinking and to track the development of that thinking, it is 
necessary to try to clearly determine just what his position in his early work is.  With 
this in mind we will contrast his position on the freedom of the existent in Existence and 
Existent with Time and the Other.  We will now turn to the question of whether the 
existent that emerges through hypostasis, prior to the encounter of the Other, can be said 
to be free, as not only is this question of central importance for our reading of Levinas‟s 
later work, but it is around this central question that the ambiguities lie. 
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 Time and the Other is a collection of essays delivered by Levinas in December 1946 and January 1947 
in the Philosophical College in Paris, and was first published in this format in 1948.  In 1979 it was 
published as a book with a new Preface. 
 139 
In both works the present is described as the event of hypostasis, the act of the 
emergence of the existent in which the existent is continually a folding back on its self 
(un repli en soi).
179
  As we have seen above, in Existence and Existents, Levinas argues 
that the freedom obtained through hypostasis is not freedom at all, but „only a thought‟, 
„recourse to sleep‟, the „illusion‟ of freedom, and a „conception of freedom‟ that is not 
freedom itself.
 180
  When we turn to Time and the Other, Levinas, on a number of 
occasions, argues that the solitary existent in the instant is a freedom, be that in a very 
minimal sense.  Through hypostasis, the emergence of the existent in existence is 
described as a mastery over being, a beginning.  Although the existent is trapped in the 
present, and enchained to its self, „the appearance of an existent is the very constitution 
of a mastery (maîtrise), of a freedom in an existing that by itself would remain 
fundamentally anonymous‟.181  Merely by existing, by having existence as an attribute, 
the existent is said to be a freedom.  The ego‟s mastery over the anonymity of the il y a 
is characterised by Levinas as freedom.  Throughout the text Levinas interchangeably 
refers to this freedom as a „first freedom‟, „existent freedom‟, and the „freedom of 
beginning‟.182  Levinas stresses that this „first freedom‟ is the freedom of beginning and 
not yet that of the freedom of a will.  
As present and „I,‟ hypostasis is freedom.  The existent is master of existing.  It 
exerts on its existence the virile power of the subject.  It has something in its 
power.  It is a first freedom (Première liberté) — not yet the freedom of free will 
(libre arbitre), but the freedom of beginning (la liberté du commencement).  It is 
by starting out from something now that there is existence.  Freedom is included 
in every subject, in the very fact that there is a subject, that there is a being. It is 
the freedom of the existent in its very grip on existing.
183
  
 
In the section „Solitude and Hypostasis‟ Levinas again tells us: 
A solitude is necessary in order for there to be a freedom of beginning (liberté 
du commencement), the existent‟s mastery over existing — that is, in brief, in 
order for there to be an existent.  Solitude is thus not only a despair and an 
abandonment, but also a virility, a pride and a sovereignty (une souveraineté).
184
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 „To the notion of existence, where the emphasis is put on the first syllable, we are opposing the notion 
of a being whose very advent is a folding back upon itself‟. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 81.  „In 
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184
 Ibid., p. 55, my emphasis. 
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Simply by overcoming the bleak anonymous neutrality of the il y a, and continually 
emerging in the present as an existent, the existent is said to be „free‟, „virile‟ and 
sovereign.  This is a freedom the existent shares with all beings, simply by virtue of the 
fact that every being has a position in being.  However, this freedom does not yet 
include the freedom of the will or representational consciousness.  The existent is alone 
in existence and without time. 
On first reading these two positions seem to render the possibility of deciphering 
a unified position on the question of freedom within the works of 1940‟s difficult.  The 
lack of clarity on the matter can be partially attributed to the difficulties that accompany 
all attempts to discuss freedom, as the concept itself is ambiguous and open to different 
meanings depending on the context.  A closer reading of the context, and the particular 
use of freedom in these two texts, opens up a reading that can further explain what can 
appear to be an inconsistency.  As was argued above, although it is a nuanced difference 
between the two uses of freedom within both of these texts, it is an important difference 
to highlight in order to makes sense of Levinas‟s position within these two texts.  
In the passages in Existence and Existents, referred to above, whereby the 
existent is not yet said to be free, but has the illusion of freedom, freedom here is in 
relation to a particular context, that of the subject‟s inability to escape the heavy burden 
of materiality in the present.  By „materiality‟ Levinas does not simply mean a 
biological condition, but a relationship with existence, the existent cannot detach itself 
from itself.
185
  The solitude of „its being mired in itself‟.186  When Levinas argues in 
Existence and Existents that through hypostasis, and through its engagement with the 
world, the existent only has the hope and illusion of freedom, but not yet freedom, it is 
the freedom from the immediacy of the material condition that has not been achieved.  
This absence of, what we have termed, the „freedom from‟ the self, and this 
fundamental condition of being tied to oneself, does not contradict the minimal freedom 
understood as a beginning, a mastery over being.
187
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 „This manner of being occupied with itself is the subject‟s materiality.  Identity is not an inoffensive 
relationship with itself, but an enchainment to itself; it is the necessity of being occupied with itself.‟ Ibid. 
186
 Ibid., p. 67.  
187
 Our use of the term „freedom from‟ brings to mind the traditional distinction between freedom 
understood in a „positive‟ and „negative‟ sense, „freedom from‟, understood as the absence of external 
restraint, and „freedom to do‟, understood as the ability to act.  This distinction most notably calls to mind 
the work of Isaiah Berlin.  See, Isaiah Berlin, „Two Concepts of Liberty‟, in Liberty, ed. by Henry Hardy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 166-217.  However, in this instance it is important to keep 
in mind that we are not using „freedom from‟ in that sense.  We do not wish to claim that Levinas is 
 141 
 In Time and the Other when the existent is said to be a freedom, it is the 
freedom of a beginning, a minimal freedom that Levinas believes is an attribute of 
„every subject, in the very fact that there is a subject, that there is a being‟.188  It is 
freedom understood as what comes simply from being an existent, the ability to exercise 
mastery and control, even if that is within such limitations.  The two positions, that of 
the lack of the freedom from the self in Existence and Existence, and that of the 
presence of a minimum freedom understood as a beginning in Time and the Other, are 
not mutually exclusive.  However, in light of Levinas‟s criticisms of freedom in the 
work of Bergson, Heidegger and Husserl examined in the previous chapter, to be 
consistent with these criticisms, one could ask if freedom understood purely as a 
mastery over being should be regarded by Levinas as freedom at all.  We need firstly 
turn to a more detailed account of freedom in Time and the Other before turning to this 
question.  
The existent is said to be free in a minimal sense of freedom, simply meaning 
that by its very existence it exercises a mastery over being, which it shares with all 
beings.  However, as the existent is enchained to its self and alone is trapped in the 
present, any notion of a freedom beyond that of a freedom understood as beginning is 
an illusion.  Although only on a few occasions in Existence and Existents does Levinas 
refers to hypostasis in terms of this freedom understood as beginning, we can still see 
the continuity between the two texts.  This minimal freedom as a beginning can be read 
back into his description of hypostasis, even though it is rarely described as liberté.  
[T]o be means to take up being, the existence of an existent is by essence an 
activity. An existent must be in act, even when it is inactive [...] the upsurge of 
an existent into existence, a hypostasis.
189
  
 
This reading is also evident in the following passage: 
What is absolute in the relationship between existence and an existent, in an 
instant, consists in the mastery the existent exercises on existence, but also in the 
weight of existence on the existent.
190
  
 
Just as in Time and the Other what is „absolute‟ about this relation is that the existent is 
absolved of any relation outside of itself and hence it has an „absolute‟ existence.191  
                                                                                                                                               
describing external barriers to freedom.  Rather, this term is used to capture the material condition of the 
subject, the internal enchainment of the ego to the self.    
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In the section „Solitude and Hypostasis‟, in Time and the Other, Levinas makes 
it clear that this freedom as a beginning is prior to any encounter with the Other.  
Levinas clarifies that the solitude of the existent is not as a result of the absence of the 
Other, it is not derived from the negation of a social relationship, but is as a result of 
hypostasis.
192
  Alone in existence, and without time, prior to any encounter with the 
Other, the solitary existent is said to have this minimal freedom of beginning.
193
  
Levinas goes to say that despite this sovereignty the existent is still identical to itself, 
and therefore, alone and absolute, devoid of any relation to alterity and anything new.  
The position argued in Existence and Existents is reiterated, the materiality of the 
subject means that this absolute beginning is nonetheless not without limitations, 
existing comes with the responsibility of existing.  
Its freedom is immediately limited by its responsibility.  This is its great 
paradox: a free being is already no longer free (un être libre n’est déjà plus 
libre), because it is responsible for itself.
194
  
 
Being is felt as a heaviness and a burden.  Responsibility accompanies the existent‟s 
freedom from the start.  Once again, in Time and the Other, the responsibility for being 
is due to the split subjectivity, the ego must carry around the self.  Referencing the 
writings of Blanchot once again, Levinas tells us:  
The relationship with itself is, as in Blanchot‟s novel Aminadab, the relationship 
with a double chained to the ego, a viscous, heavy, stupid double, but one the 
ego (le moi) is with precisely because it is me (moi).
195
  
 
It is not the fact that one has a body that one feels weighed down and held back.  
Materiality does not consist in being embodied, but in the inescapable bond between the 
ego and the self, freedom and responsibility.  Levinas ends this section by reminding us 
that even at the stage of a first freedom, the existent is a solitary existence, locked in its 
own identity, and without the Other is also without time. 
 
§ 2.2.2 THE AUTHENTICITY OF WORLDLY EXISTENCE 
 
Consistent with his position in Existents and Existence, Levinas goes on to explain how 
everyday life in the world loosens the bond between the ego and the self by providing 
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an interval. The existents engagement with the world is an attempt to break the unhappy 
solitude that comes through hypostasis.  Levinas uses the term „salvation‟ („du salut‟), 
which has notable theological connotations, to describe the existent‟s engagement with 
the world as an attempt to break its solitary existence.
196
  Although the existent‟s 
engagement with the world is seen as an attempt to escape its solitary existence, Levinas 
does not regard this everyday occupation with things as inauthentic.  If one was to 
remain constantly preoccupied by the predicament of being this would surely lead to 
madness, and, Levinas remarks, „No one would recommend madness as a way of 
salvation‟.197  Levinas takes seriously the everyday needs of the masses.  The genuine 
need of hunger is not an inauthentic fallen state, and it is an elitist and privileged 
position to regard the majority who may well be preoccupied with such concerns as 
„fallen‟ or inauthentic.198  
There is something other than naivety in the flat denial the masses oppose to the 
elites when they are worried more about bread then about anxiety.  From this 
comes the accent of greatness that stirs in a humanism springing from the 
economic problem; from this comes the very power that the demands of the 
working class possess to be elevated into a humanism.
199
     
 
To judge such behaviour as an inauthentic fallen state is to fail to take heed of the 
sincerity of such needs, and the morality which can arise out of such a collective cry.  
This approach confirms Levinas‟s adherence to the phenomenological starting point, as 
he aims to accept experience as it is without any aprioristic or constructivistic 
considerations.
200
  Once again, behind these reflections, one cannot help but think of 
Levinas‟s experience of hunger and cold in a prison camp, no doubt bringing him to an 
acute awareness of the authenticity of such basic needs that may well have been 
occasionally denied him.  Perhaps the easiest way to overlook the truth of such needs, 
and to see them as base or even animalistic, is to have had them always met.  Levinas, 
however, does not want the reader to take from this some kind of advocacy for a 
metaphysical liberation that firstly finds its roots in an empirical economic liberation.  If 
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one was to see the struggle for economic liberation as a stepping stone to a deeper 
liberation, one would be missing his point, that the drive for the satisfaction of the basic 
needs of life is authentic in and of itself.  For Levinas, it rests on the reality of the 
weight of matter in the present.  
Against Heidegger, Levinas once again argues that our primary relation with the 
world is an „ensemble of nourishments‟, rather than a system of tools.  „To stroll is to 
enjoy the fresh air, not for the health but for the fresh air.‟201  The subject‟s relationship 
with the world is one of enjoyment (jouissance).  Not only does enjoyment signify the 
immediacy of our relationship with things in the world, in contrast to Heidegger‟s 
ecstatic care for existence, but it also reveals the subject‟s first respite from materiality.  
Levinas argues that enjoyment is a sensation and is therefore light and knowledge.  The 
illumination of the object indicates a distance between the subject and the object, and 
hence an interval in the subject‟s return to its self.  It is the first „salvation‟ from 
materiality, and it brings a forgetfulness of self. „The morality of “earthly 
nourishments” is the first morality, the first abnegation.  It is not the last, but one must 
pass through it.‟202  
Although the return to the self is postponed through enjoyment, it is not done 
away with.  Not only does light indicate a distance between the subject and the world, 
but, as knowledge, it is a complete return to the self.  Through light the world is 
constituted by the subject, and as we have seen in the last chapter, this, for Levinas, is 
an act of bestowing meaning by the subject and is a total assimilation of the known 
object.  „Light is that through which something is other than myself, but already as if it 
came from me.‟203  In a footnote to this remark Levinas points out that he believes that 
Husserl‟s notion of vision simultaneous implies intelligibility.  „To see is already to 
render the encountered objects one‟s own, as drawn from one‟s own ground.‟204  The 
world and objects known through „light‟ lack any fundamental strangeness, and 
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therefore, the ego remains chained to the self.  Engagement with the world as light and 
knowledge is not foreign enough, in fact not foreign at all, and so, it cannot shatter the 
solitary existence of the existent.  Therefore, alone the existent may enjoy the world, but 
it is still not free of its materiality.  „By themselves reason and light consummate the 
solitude of a being as a being, and accomplish its destiny to be the sole and unique point 
of reference for everything.‟205  There is no space outside of reason‟s light.  The world 
encounter through reason will never really surprise the existent, nor offer anything truly 
new.   
The intentionality of consciousness allows one to distinguish the ego from 
things, but it does not make solipsism disappear: its element — light — renders 
us master of the exterior world but is incapable of discovering a peer for us 
there.
206
   
 
Even though the world transcends consciousness, through reason understood as light, 
consciousness is a complete return to the self without remainder.  Nothing foreign is 
ever encountered, as all objects are assimilated into the self.  In order for the subject to 
be released from this solitary prison it would have to encounter something truly foreign 
that remained foreign, and did not result in a return to the self.   
Life could only become the path of redemption if, in its struggle with matter, it 
encounters an event that stops its everyday transcendence from falling back 
upon a point that is always the same.
207
     
  
If this encounter was initiated by the subject it would not resist the structures of 
intentional consciousness, and could not, therefore, resist complete assimilation.  If the 
encounter was an act of the free subject how could it be an encounter that was outside of 
the structures of intentional consciousness?  In order for the encounter to remain foreign 
and new it would have to take the subject by surprise, and be outside of the powers of 
the free, sovereign and absolute subject.     
 
§ 2.2.3 FREEDOM AND DEATH  
 
Another area of importance to the question of freedom, only touched upon in Existence 
and Existents, that Levinas analyses further in Time and the Other, is death and suicide.  
It is near to the beginning of the text, when trying to emphasise that there is no way out 
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of the il y a, that Levinas briefly mentions suicide.  In stressing that his descriptions of 
being in its pure generality does not permit of a nothingness beyond to escape to, 
Levinas explains that even suicide which „appears as the final recourse against the 
absurd‟, does not offer a way out.208  Citing Shakespeare once again, Levinas points out 
how often in tragedy suicide is depicted as the last great act that the subject can perform 
to affirm their mastery over being.  If one cannot control the circumstances of life, they 
can at the very least master being through choosing their own death, as Juliette 
demonstrates in the third act of Romeo and Juliette, „I keep the power to die‟.209  For 
Levinas, there is no possibility of nothingness beyond being, „[a]nd this impossibility of 
nothingness deprives suicide, which is the final mastery one can have over being, of its 
function of mastery‟.210  By choosing death one does not achieve the mastery over 
being, for one is no longer.
211
  Being permits of no exit, there is no way out.  One 
cannot escape being as escape presupposes that one is free of a particular scenario and 
free to be beyond that reality.  Death, however, cannot be thought of as bringing an 
escape from life, we know nothing of death, as it is a mystery (le mystère).
212
  Levinas 
will once again make this point in Totality and Infinity, pointing out, in contrast to 
Heidegger, that death is a mystery that cannot be understood.
213
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Further on in the third section of the text Levinas returns to examine death in 
more detail.  Levinas takes up his analysis of work begun in Existence and Existents and 
introduces an aspect of work previously unexplored, physical suffering and pain.  
Physical pain is distinct from moral pain as physical pain belongs to the instant, which 
one is bonded to.  Moral pain offers a respite within the distance between the self and 
the pain, in which one can freely take up an attitude with regards to the moral pain.  
While in moral pain one can preserve an attitude of dignity and compunction, 
and consequently already be free; physical suffering in all its degrees entails the 
impossibility of detaching oneself from the instant of existence.
214
  
 
Physical pain offers no such respite, as with physical pain the subject deeply feels the 
bondage to the instant, and the inescapable weight of existence.  „In suffering there is an 
absence of all refuge‟.215  There is no hope of retreat as there is nowhere to run to.  
Death too is announced in suffering, as in the instant of suffering death draws 
nearer.  One of the main characteristics of death in Time and the Other is that it is a 
mystery.  It is not that death is unknown but that it is essentially unknowable.  
Continuing the light analogy from Existence and Existents, Levinas argues that death is 
„outside all light‟, and hence „an experience of the passivity of the subject‟, as it is 
outside of the subject‟s powers to know and to understand.216  Death as other (autre) 
evades assimilation and the power of the subject.  Levinas clarifies that the term 
„experience‟ here is „only a way of speaking‟, as experience for Levinas implies 
intentionality, which as we have seen earlier, Levinas interprets as meaning-giving 
(Sinngebung), and hence the complete assimilation of the object by the subject, leaving 
no space for difference.  This is not possible with death, as death is an experience of 
other (autre) that cannot be contained within the subject.
217
  
As was pointed out in the preceding chapter, for Heidegger, an awareness of 
one‟s own Being-toward-death, in the affective disposition of anxiety, reveals to Dasein 
its most fundamental possibility, and in doing so brings Dasein back to its possibilities 
and the potential for authentic living.  For Levinas, death reveals to Dasein its 
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freedom.
218
  By contrasting his analysis of death with that of Heidegger‟s, Levinas 
argues that far from revealing our freedom, suffering and death reaffirm our inescapable 
bond to being.  Once again his descriptions of suffering, pain and death capture an 
essential passivity in the subject. 
Being toward death, in Heidegger‟s authentic existence, is a supreme lucidity 
and hence a supreme virility. [...] it makes possible activity and freedom.  Death 
in Heidegger is an event of freedom, whereas for me the subject seems to reach 
the limit of the possible in suffering.  It finds itself enchained, overwhelmed, and 
in some way passive.
219
  
 
In authentically Being-towards-death Dasein, on Levinas‟s reading, is described as 
„supreme virility‟ and „supreme lucidity‟, whereas for Levinas, death as the 
impossibility of dying reveals a subject that is „overwhelmed‟, „enchained‟ and 
„passive‟.  We are left with a fundamentally different conception of freedom.220  Death 
is not a possibility that one can take hold of in the present, as death is eternally in the 
future, „[d]eath is never now‟.221  In suffering, through which we grasp the nearness of 
our own death, there is a „reversal of the subject‟s activity into passivity‟. 222   In 
Heidegger‟s descriptions of authentically Being-towards-death, Dasein resolutely 
accepts death and almost embraces death.
223
  Levinas describes a different side to 
suffering and the vulnerability of life, when in the „purity‟ of suffering, when one has no 
choice but to almost surrender and give in to the suffering that takes hold, one is 
reduced to the helpless state of infancy and overcome by „infantile shaking of 
sobbing‟.224 
 Levinas goes on to argue that death introduces plurality into being and breaks 
the solitary existence of the existent.  As death remains a mystery, beyond the light, 
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hence beyond the powers of the subject to consume and assimilate, death is a relation 
with something absolutely other (autre).
225
  Having established, through his analysis of 
death, that the subject can have a relation with an event that remains outside and other 
(autre) to the subject, Levinas then turns to social life and the concrete situation of the 
erotic encounter.  Alongside death the erotic relationship is another example that reveals 
the plurality of existence.  However, in this event the personal Other (autrui) is 
encounter and not simply otherness in general (autre).  In turning to examine this event 
in which the subject has an encounter with an Other, and yet does not assume it, 
Levinas asks how can the ego survive such an event and preserve its „mastery‟ over the 
il y a?  Levinas frames his question specifically in terms of freedom, and preserving the 
minimal freedom that the subject has acquired through hypostasis.  
The problem does not consist in rescuing an eternity from the jaws of death, but 
in allowing it to be welcomed, keeping for the ego — in the midst of an 
existence where an event happens to it — the freedom acquired by hypostasis.226  
 
This passage further reveals that in Time and the Other Levinas argues that the solitary 
existent, merely through its hypostasis in the instant, is already free.  However, as was 
shown above, „free‟ here is used in the minimal sense of a beginning, merely having a 
position in Being.  
 
§ 2.2.4 TIME AND THE PASSIVITY OF THE SELF 
 
Levinas‟s analysis of time further expands on his description of subjectivity as 
passivity, as he argues that time cannot come about in a solitary subject, but must be 
given from the outside.  Death may open up otherness to the existent, who alone is a 
universe unto itself, but death cannot account for time, which releases the subject who is 
trapped in its solitary state.  For Levinas, time itself cannot occur in a solitary subject, 
even in a subject who dies, and as such could be said to have a future, even if merely 
that of moving towards death.  Death as mystery is so far removed from the subject that 
it cannot enter into a relationship with the present, bringing with it time, it will always 
remain at an infinite distance.  Death is never now.  How then can the future become a 
presence in the present?  This is only possible through the face-to-face encounter. 
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The situation of the face-to-face would be the very accomplishment of time; the 
encroachment of the present on the future is not the feat of the subject alone, but 
the intersubjective relationship.
227
 
 
The future brings with it the power of the self to be beyond itself, a power that the self 
alone does not wield, only a difference that can remain other will bring this possibility, 
and consequently release the subject from a present in which it is trapped within itself. 
Against the vision of time in Plato‟s Timaeus, wherein time is said to be a 
moving image of eternity, Levinas asserts that the future must be „absolutely other 
(autre) and new‟ if it is to break the solitary existence of the self in the present.228  
Levinas cites Bergson as conceiving of a conception of freedom and time that goes 
some way towards this same end; however, it does not go far enough, as „it preserves 
for the present a power over the future‟.229  Levinas argues that duration is creation, and 
for creation to be properly understood as the possibility of bringing about something 
new, it must presuppose an opening onto mystery.
230
  Creation for a subject who alone 
is trapped within its self would lead to more of the same, and would be better 
understood as replication, or perhaps alteration, but not genuine novelty.  Time, for 
Levinas, is a „new birth‟, which brings with it the possibility of creation and so must be 
open to an alterity that remains outside the subject.
231
  The future as death cannot bring 
the possibility of initiative to the existent, as in the face of death the ego is without 
initiative.  It is the intersubjective relationship with the human Other that brings the 
possibility of a future, novelty and time.  
§ 2.3 ART 
 
Art also provides another example through which the radical passivity of the self is 
revealed.  Levinas describes an aspect of our existence that is irreducible to the 
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structures of intentional consciousness, outside of the categories of knowledge and 
concepts, and cannot be accurately described as conscious free action.
232
   
 
§ 2.3.1 ART AND THE PASSIVITY OF THE SELF   
 
Although Levinas‟s 1948 article „Reality and Its Shadow‟ („La réalité et son ombre‟) is 
a reflection on the nature of art, in this short article we can see just how wide the range 
of reflection on freedom within Levinas‟s work stretches.233  In this article, once again, 
Levinas associates freedom with knowledge and the cognitive powers of the subject.  
Art cannot be understood in terms of our freedom precisely because it cannot be 
reduced to a concept, nor can it be intellectually grasped by the subject, as it is prior to 
an engagement with the world understood from within such categories.   
Levinas begins the article by stating that it is generally understood that art is 
expression, and as expression it therefore rests on cognition.  The artist is viewed as 
possessing „knowledge of the absolute‟ and the hope is that this is transmitted via their 
work.
234
  When art is understood in this way, criticism and the role of the critic appear 
as „parasitic‟, as the critic preys on the work of the artist.235  Levinas wonders if one can 
regard the activity of art criticism only in negative terms, or, does the fact that the public 
feels the need to speak when confronted by art, not point to a different and overlooked 
understanding of both art and the dialogue that comes about in the form of criticism in 
response to the work of art.        
If art originally were neither language nor knowledge, if it were therefore 
situated outside of „being in the world‟ which is coextensive with truth, criticism 
would be rehabilitated.
236
 
 
Levinas then spends the remainder of the article arguing for this alternative description.  
If art is to be seen as an activity that detaches the artist from the world, then criticism, 
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and speaking about the art work, is what brings art back in touch with the world and in 
touch with others.   
Art is described as irreducible to the categories of cognition and cannot be 
described through the use of concepts. „Art does not know a particular type of reality; it 
contrasts with knowledge.  It is the very event of obscuring, a descent of the night, an 
invasion of shadow‟. 237   For Levinas, in contrast to a concept, art is described as 
capturing an image of reality, its „shadow‟, and as such is always somewhat obscure.238  
Carrying on the „night‟ analogy from Existence and Existents, art is said to belong to the 
night, and is another example of an event that is beyond the powers of the subject and 
their attempt to completely assimilate the object and possess it through knowledge.  Art, 
as belonging to the shadows and to the „night‟, is outside of the „light‟, and hence 
refractory to the categories of cognition and knowledge. 
Levinas takes issue with the use of the adjective „disinterestedness‟ to describe 
the artist vision, as interestedness implies freedom its counterpart likewise implies 
freedom, be that the freedom from any interest.  He also disregards the description of 
artistic vision in terms of bondage, for the same reason, bondage implies the restriction 
of freedom and so freedom is presupposed.  The effect that an image has cannot be 
understood in terms of freedom or enslavement, as it is a fundamental passivity that is 
prior to freedom and not a suppression or suspension of freedom.  Our interaction with 
an image differs from our interaction with an object as with an object we intellectually 
„grasp‟ and „conceive‟ the concept.  In the case of an artistic image, it is not a matter of 
intellectually grasping a concept, or of any Heideggerian „letting be‟ (Sein-lassen), as it 
is an event that is not reducible to the freedom and power of the subject.
239
  Whether 
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that subject be viewed as the constituting subject of consciousness in Husserl‟s 
reduction or the openness of „Dasein‟ and that being‟s understanding of Being, that lets 
the meaning of the Being of beings appear, art cannot be thematized in this manner. „An 
image marks a hold over us rather than our initiative, a fundamental passivity.‟240  From 
the perspective of an artist the passivity is demonstrated through the description of the 
artistic process, whereby, the artist is described as „possessed‟ (possédé) and „inspired‟ 
(inspiré).
241
  Levinas goes on to describe the affect that art has on the participant, both 
the artist him/herself and the spectator, in his descriptions the passivity of the subject 
comes to the fore.  The poetic order imposes itself on us.  However, it is an imposition 
that evades assimilation by the participant.  „But they impose themselves on us without 
our assuming (les assumions) them‟.242  The image is not a concept that can be grasped 
by the power and the freedom of the subject, there is a more than which cannot be 
assimilated by the subject.  
Levinas goes on to clarify that the artistic event should be seen more as a mutual 
participation, rather than assimilation.  Levinas chooses to focus on the example of 
music, as the affect of rhythm on the subject is particularly visible and can be 
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overpowering.  Levinas‟s descriptions of how rhythm almost takes over a person who 
succumbs to the melody and the movement, further captures the passivity of the subject.  
„Rhythm represents a unique situation where we cannot speak of consent, assumption, 
initiative or freedom, because the subject is caught up and carried away by it.‟243  On 
reading his reflections the term „captivate‟ is given a new sense of significance, which 
will come to have crucial ethical significance in Levinas‟s much later work.  To say that 
one is captivated by a particular rhythm, or a work of art, can imply that one is captured 
and almost held fast against their will.  However, in line with Levinas‟s analysis, it is 
more correct to say that the subject is swept up in such a manner that occurs prior to an 
engagement with the world at the level of the will, and so cannot be understood as a 
restriction to freedom.  Even though to be aesthetically captivated is generally 
understood as a favourable and pleasurable experience it, nevertheless, reveals the 
passivity of the subject who is captivated.  The overtaking of the subject by rhythm 
cannot be described as a despite oneself as it is not an overtaking of a conscious self that 
resists, but nor can it be described in terms of consciousness, for in rhythm the self 
fades away into anonymity.  As Levinas argues,  
[i]t is a mode of being to which applies neither the form of consciousness, since 
the I is there stripped of its prerogative to assume, its power, nor the form of 
unconsciousness, since the whole situation and all its articulations are in a dark 
light, present.
244
  
 
The experience can neither be described as conscious nor unconscious, and instead 
Levinas describes it as like a waking dream.  When the subject is taken in by the rhythm 
and succumbs to dancing and rhythmic movement, it is as though one‟s freedom is 
paralyzed, and the subject‟s way of being is one of an all-embracing play. 
The particular automatic character of a walk or a dance to music is a mode of 
being where nothing is unconscious, but where consciousness, paralyzed in its 
freedom, plays, totally absorbed in this playing.
245
   
 
Our engagement with art is not a conscious cognitive act that is mediated through 
concepts, but one that comes to us through a sensation that is not reducible to concepts 
and therefore eludes introspection.  This is also a view of „consciousness‟ that is neither 
susceptible to, nor presentable via inner reflection of the self upon the self, and 
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challenges the view of freedom associated with such a description of consciousness.  
Levinas shows us that such a view of consciousness does not exhaust the subject‟s 
engagement with the world.  
What is today called being-in-the-world is an existence with concepts.  
Sensibility takes place as a distinct ontological event, but is realized only by the 
imagination.
246
 
 
 
§ 2.3.2 ART AS IMMORAL 
 
When Levinas addresses freedom again in this article it is not the loss or absence of 
freedom, but the abundance of freedom that art can grant both the artist and the 
participant, which is raised.  In the article in one sense art is viewed as „immoral‟ 
because it removes the artist from the world and from his or her responsibilities and 
duties.
247
  Art removes the artist from their engagement with the world.  In contrast to 
speaking, which is an unfinished activity that solicits a response from an other, Levinas 
describes the work of an artist as a completed and closed event.  „It does not give itself 
out as the beginning of a dialogue‟.248  Understood in this way art is then described by 
Levinas as freeing, precisely because it brings freedom from responsibility, „it 
especially brings the irresponsibility that charms as a lightness and grace. It frees‟.249  
The release from the everyday world of worries that art can bring, and the peace that 
can accompany the passive consumption of the work of art, is seen by Levinas in 
negative terms, as fleeing the world is also fleeing from responsibility.  „This is not the 
disinterestedness of contemplation but of irresponsibility‟. 250   Both the activities of 
producing and indulging in art can be extremely personal and isolated acts, and as such 
has little room for an intersubjective relationship, and any responsibility towards the 
Other.  Levinas even goes as far as to say that one can feel ashamed of this self 
indulgence.  „There is something wicked and egoist and cowardly in artistic enjoyment.  
There are times when one can be ashamed of it, as of feasting during a plague‟.251  The 
way that art can find its way back to the world, and most importantly for Levinas to an 
engagement with others, is through criticism, as criticism „integrates the inhuman work 
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of the artist into the human world‟.252  Criticism releases art from an otherwise egoist 
existence.  
This analysis is carried over to another article that deals with aesthetics that was 
published just one year later in 1949, „The Transcendence of Words‟.  In this article, 
however, alongside the necessity of critique an emphasis is placed on the necessity and 
role of speech.
253
  Levinas argues that all art creates silence, even those that create 
sound.  The self-sufficient silent world of both the artist and the vision of the spectator 
are interrupted by the word of the other, through critique.  Vision lends itself 
particularly well to the apparent full assimilation of the object by the subject as form is 
wedded to content, whereas sound can more often have an incomplete element and 
hence „break with the self-complete world of vision and art‟.254  As sound surpasses 
what is given, the experience of hearing a sound contains more than can be assimilated 
by the subject, and in this sense sound heralds transcendence.  However, it is the sound 
of a human other made through speech that can truly shatter this self-sufficient world.  
A world that is empty of human others may well be filled with many natural sounds but 
despite this clatter it is a world of echoing silence.
255
  „The sounds and noises of nature 
are failed words. To really hear a sound, we need to hear a word.‟256  Words break the 
world of self-sufficiency and reveal a beyond that cannot be fully taken in by the 
subject.  Levinas privileges hearing and not vision, as the way through which we 
encounter the transcendence of the Other.
257
  It is the event of hearing the Other, and not 
that of seeing the Other nor of being present with the Other, that points to the depths of 
the otherness of the Other and the „transcendent origin‟ of the word.258  
In this early article one can see the beginnings of some important themes yet to 
be developed by Levinas, such as the crucial importance of language and speech as first 
and foremost an address from and to the Other and not firstly as a way to verbalise and 
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communicate thought.
259
  Speech reveals a fundamental element of expression that is 
overlooked in a tradition that views expression as subordinate to thought.  Primarily 
speech is how we can transcend ourselves and reach toward the Other.  It is openness to 
dialogue and not a vehicle for thought.  The very act of speaking further places into 
question the notion of the free and self-sufficient subject, or as Levinas phrases it,  
[t]he act of expression makes it impossible to remain within oneself (en soi) or 
keep one‟s thought for oneself (pour soi) and so reveals the inadequacy of the 
subject‟s position in which the ego has a given world at its disposal.  To speak is 
to interrupt my existence as a subject and a master.
260
 
 
In this article Levinas clearly argues that speech reveals to us that the subject is 
primarily situated in relation to the Other (Autre) and not primarily in relation to its own 
self or to the world.  
This privilege of the Other (Autre) ceases to be incomprehensible once we admit 
that the first fact of existence is neither being in-itself (en soi) nor being for-
itself (pour soi) but being for the other (pour l’autre).261 
 
This article provides us with insight into Levinas‟s developing description of 
subjectivity, or, what one might call his view on „the human condition‟, even though the 
precise ethical significance that he will later add to this description is absent.  The very 
phenomenon of language attests to the subject‟s fundamental openness to alterity.  
When the subject is viewed primarily as self-sufficient and the origin of meaning, how 
are we to make sense of language?  Levinas argues that speech illustrates that the „the 
first fact of existence‟ is that the self is being for the other (l’autre).  Speaking is not a 
closed and fulfilled activity but is only the beginning of a dialogue and as such an event 
that is at least partially beyond one‟s control.  Through speaking one opens one‟s self up 
and becomes vulnerable, potentially placing their view of the world into question and 
opening up the possibility of a meaning from the outside.  
 The influence of the dialogical tradition on the work of Levinas is clear within 
this article.  In his article „An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy‟ De Boer identifies the 
influence of both transcendental philosophy and the dialogical tradition on the work of 
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Levinas.
262
  He identifies one of the key differences between these two approaches as 
the central question of the most basic nature of man. 
 The issue at stake in the controversy between the phenomenological 
 (transcendental) and dialogical philosophies of intersubjectivity is none other 
 than the question of the true condition of the predicament of man.  Is the human 
 being primarily present to himself (pour soi) and only secondarily directed 
 toward the other (mediated by the world) or is he face-to-face with the other 
 from the very outset (in discourse, hospitality, desire) and only in the second 
 place a self-consciousness (by abstraction)?
263
        
 
De Boer characterises the dialogical approach as viewing the relation with the Other as 
a face-to-face relation.  The relation with the Other is not mediated by an intentional 
relation with the world.  We meet the Other face on, address him, speak to him.   
Phenomenology, in both Husserl and Heidegger‟s accounts, on the other hand, sees the 
relation with the Other as mediated.  The Other is directed towards the world alongside 
me.  We are facing the world, not facing each other.  „He is a fellow knower and a 
fellow worker, but not a partner.‟264  Although Levinas will take aspects of both of 
these traditions on board for his own thinking, he also views them both as deficient.  
Levinas will radicalise this relation with the Other, as De Boer puts it, with Levinas the 
other becomes the Other.  „The Other is not only someone I meet; he calls me to 
responsibility and accuses me.‟265   Throughout the next chapter to come Levinas‟s 
position on what De Boer calls „the true condition of the predicament of man‟ will 
continue to unfold.  Levinas will argue that the subject is not primarily free in-itself and 
for itself but is put into question from the outside and through this event becomes free.  
Even then, this freedom is a difficult freedom, an ethical freedom, a freedom for the 
other and not for the self.  
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§ 2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
If, as Levinas will say in his later work, freedom is founded through the encounter of 
the Other, an important question that we could ask of this stage of his work, is, is the 
subject understood to be „free‟ prior to the encounter of the Other?  The answer to this 
question can help us to reflect on the development of his thinking in relation to freedom.  
From our analysis of Existence and Existents and Time and the Other, initially, it would 
seem that one would have to conclude that in one very minimal sense, yes, the existent 
can be said to be „free‟, and yet, also, no, trapped in a solitary present, where everything 
comes from and returns to the subject, without the possibility of a difference that 
remains foreign the subject cannot escape its material destiny.  In Existence and 
Existents Levinas stresses the inescapable enchainment of the ego to the self, and the 
burden of Being.  The existent cannot escape the responsibility that comes with existing, 
even though it is a responsibility that was never chosen and is prior to the freedom of 
the will and intentional consciousness.  Without the Other the subject will remain 
trapped in a perpetual present.  
In Time and the Other, though the text mainly repeats the analysis from the 
previous text, there is a new emphasis on the issue of whether the existent can be said to 
be free, or not, through hypostasis.  Although this position is hinted at in Existence and 
Existents, in Time and the Other Levinas makes it explicitly clear that prior to the 
encounter with the Other the existent has a minimal freedom, the freedom of beginning, 
a first freedom, which comes from simply being.  This, however, would seem to be an 
attribute of any being, simply by existing it is a beginning and can be said to have the 
freedom of a mastery over Being.  Also, if we consider Levinas‟s criticisms of the 
Heideggerian, Bergsonian and Husserlian understandings of freedom examined in our 
previous chapter, in order for Levinas to be consistent with his own criticisms of these 
positions, freedom without novelty is no human freedom at all.  Without the possibility 
of newness, which to be truly „new‟ must remain other and beyond the self, a freedom 
as „beginning‟ would indeed seem to be an „illusion‟.  At the level of the instant the 
existent is still trapped in a self referential circle, and so, is not free.  Only the Other, 
who introduces genuine novelty, can rupture this instant and bring the possibility of 
genuine freedom, not just freedom understood as merely existing.  
The analysis presented in the work examined in this chapter reveals that 
intentional consciousness is not the sole way in which the subject engages with Being, 
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in fact it is a derived mode that is founded on a more immediate and passive 
engagement as a sensible embodied self.  The subject‟s freedom to create meaning is 
not unrestricted or unbound precisely because the subject is bound by responsibility.  In 
his work to come Levinas will not only show that our responsibility to the Other 
precedes such meaning giving powers, but he will also argue that this event gives rise to 
such a possibility.  Representational consciousness does not exhaust the subject‟s 
engagement with Being, nor is it the „first fact of existence‟.  We have seen how 
Levinas‟s descriptions of the self uncover a latent passivity, which contests the view of 
subjectivity that begins with the power and the freedom of the conscious subject.  When 
we move to his work of the 1950‟s, in the next chapter, we will see that not only does 
Levinas develop this description of subjectivity further, but he also begins to more 
clearly articulate a question which arises as a consequence of such descriptions.  If the 
self is fundamentally a sensible embodied self who, prior to bestowing meaning, 
passively receives meaning from the outside, then what gives rise to the unnatural 
freedom of representation and, further still, to critical reflective consciousness?  It takes 
the specifically Levinasian ethical development of his thinking to lead to his answer that 
only a radical Other, irreducible to the powers of the self, who places such powers into 
question, can account for this freedom of the subject.  
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CHAPTER III 
A WAY THROUGH HUSSERL‘S PHENOMENOLOGY TO  
THE OTHER (1950s) 
 
In this chapter we turn to an examination of freedom in Levinas‘s work from the 1950‘s 
prior to his magnum opus Totality and Infinity (1961). Throughout this period  Levinas 
continues to question the modern view of subjectivity that begins with an already 
constituted ego, presupposing the freedom of intentional consciousness, the will, and 
the subject‘s ability to reflect on its self.  In contrast to this description of subjectivity, 
Levinas moves on to emphasise the importance of the body, kinaesthetics and the 
overlooked horizon of sensibility that conditions the subject‘s conscious engagement 
with Being.  In developing these dimensions of human subjectivity, Levinas returns to 
the work of Husserl, specifically to the dormant possibilities identified by Levinas 
before the war.  In doing so, Levinas opens a way to philosophically describe aspects of 
human existence that resist representation and objectification, and escape the totalizing 
gaze of objectifying intentionality, yet remain meaningful. Hence a hermeneutical 
retrieval of their sense is required within Husserlian phenomenology and modern 
philosophy.  
This chapter examines Levinas‘s writings from this period with particular 
reference to Levinas‘s understanding of freedom as it becomes increasingly thematized 
by him in relation to the cognitive conceptual powers of the subject.  Since such powers 
are operative at the level of the conscious ego and not at the fundamental level of the 
pre-reflective sensible body, thus, we begin to understand why it is that Levinas 
maintains that the Other precedes and invests such an understanding of cognitive 
conscious freedom.  Even though these horizons are outside of the subject‘s conscious 
engagement with, and constitution of being, Levinas maintains that there still is 
meaning contained therein, even if consciousness is blind to such meaning, as it arrives 
too late to see it.  As Levinas himself phrases it at the end of this decade, ‗The senses 
make sense‘ (Les sens ont un sens).1  This meaning does not originate in the self but 
originates in the other, in exteriority.  Levinas continues to push below the freedom of 
intentional consciousness to reveal elements of human life that are outside of the 
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categories of freedom and non-freedom, and which condition and give rise to the 
freedom of critical consciousness.  We will follow Levinas‘s way through both 
Husserl‘s and Heidegger‘s prioritizing of ‗the understanding of Being‘ in their 
philosophies by dealing, firstly, with ‗Is Ontology Fundamental‘ (1951) and ‗Ethics and 
Spirit‘ (1952) (section one).  Then we will address ‗Freedom and Command‘ (1953) and 
‗The Ego and the Totality‘ (1954) (section two), his major essay ‗Philosophy and the 
Idea of Infinity‘ (1957) (section three), and finally ‗The Ruin of Representation‘ and  
‗Intentionality and Metaphysics‘, both published in 1959 (section four). 
 
§ 3.1. ‗IS ONTOLOGY FUNDAMENTAL?‘ (1951) AND ‗ETHICS AND SPIRIT‘ (1952) 
 
The very title of Levinas‘s 1951 article ‗Is Ontology Fundamental?‘ is an obvious 
allusion to Heidegger, and a question raised against Heidegger‘s prioritising of 
ontology in philosophy and phenomenology.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
this is by no means the beginning of Levinas‘s critique of Heidegger‘s work. In this 
article, however, his criticisms take a notable ethical shift.  Levinas explicitly designates 
Heidegger‘s philosophy as firmly rooted within the overall framework of the western 
philosophical tradition.  By criticising Heidegger, therefore, Levinas also criticises this 
tradition.   
 
§ 3.1.1 ‗IS ONTOLOGY FUNDAMENTAL?‘  
 
For Levinas, the tradition has always prioritised ontology over ethics, which, for him, is 
to prioritise the Same over and against the Other.  Levinas views ontology as striving 
for comprehension and understanding, and as such favours knowledge above all else.
2
  
Levinas carries on his association of the freedom of the subject with comprehension and 
understanding, and so by questioning whether or not comprehension and understanding 
are fundamental Levinas is also questioning the fundamentality of freedom and the 
priority of the subject, be that conceived in terms of ‗self consciousness‘ or ‗Dasein‘.  
By asking if there is no higher value than knowledge, Levinas is also asking if freedom 
should be praised above all else and for its own sake.  When philosophy holds the 
                                                 
2
 In his introduction to The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, Critchley makes a similar claim: 
‗Ontology is Levinas‘s general term for any relation to otherness that is reducible to comprehension or 
understanding.‘ The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, ed. by Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi 
(Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 11.   
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fundamental question to be the meaning of Being in general, and by doing so overlooks 
the unique significance of the concrete particular event in which another human being 
addresses me, philosophy has placed ontology before ethics.  Freedom is already 
assumed and posited, and so, the source of freedom goes unquestioned, meaning the 
very event that brings freedom about is consequently overlooked.  
At the opening of the article Levinas declares that ontology holds the primary 
place among the branches of philosophy.  As all other areas of philosophy reflect on 
knowledge related to a particular aspect of being, it stands to reason that the broader 
question of the understanding of being in general, that underpins those particularities, is 
the fundamental question.  It is this fundamental position of ontology that Levinas 
moves on to question.  Since the publication of Sein und Zeit one could not mention the 
contemporary place of ontology without at least alluding to Heidegger, and as expected, 
Heidegger is implicitly present throughout the article.  When Levinas clarifies what he 
means by ‗understand‘, as he has defined ontology in terms of an understanding of 
Being, the reference to Heidegger is apparent.  ‗To understand being as being is to exist 
in this world‘.3   Levinas makes it clear that in light of Heidegger‘s philosophy to 
‗understand‘ should not imply theoretical contemplation.4  ‗To think is no longer to 
contemplate, but to be engaged, merged with what we think, launched — the dramatic 
event of being-in-the-world.‘5  The fullness of everyday concrete existence is given a 
new significance.
6
  Our everyday immediate and unreflected-upon activity in the world 
reveals an implicit forgotten understanding of Being.  
Despite Levinas‘s praise for this element of Heidegger‘s work, that 
‗understanding‘ cannot be reduced to thoughts and that consciousness does not ‗exhaust 
our relationship with reality‘, ultimately Levinas believes that Heidegger‘s philosophy 
still belongs firmly within this description of the tradition because understanding, albeit 
understood in a non-theoretical sense, is still seen as Dasein‘s fundamental way of 
                                                 
3
 Emmanuel Levinas, ‗Is Ontology Fundamental?‘, in Entre Nous. On Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. by 
Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (Columbia University Press: New York, 1998), pp. 1-11 (p. 2).  
4
 ‗Henceforth, the understanding of being implies not just a theoretical attitude, but the whole of human 
behaviour. The whole man is ontology.‘ Ibid. 
5
 Ibid., p. 3. 
6
 On this point Levinas makes an interesting reflection in relation to freedom.  He notes that our every 
gesture and movement has ripples far beyond those we intended or willed.  By simply being in the world 
we leave traces and residue beyond our control, ‗In doing what I willed to do, I did a thousand and one 
things I hadn‘t willed to do. The act was not pure; I left traces. Wiping away these traces, I left others.‘ 
This is an unavoidable consequence of being.  By being we do more then we intend to do.  Whatever the 
inadvertent outcome might be, we are responsible.  It is interesting to note that in this passage although 
Levinas is not yet addressing intersubjective action he points out that ‗we are responsible beyond our 
intentions‘.  Responsibility is not directly linked to free conscious action. Ibid. 
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being-in-the-world.
7
  In one respect Heidegger‘s philosophy could be said to take the 
tradition further along the same trajectory, as under this revised definition 
understanding pervades all levels of activity and life.  Drawing on an analogy from 
Existence and Existence, Levinas argues that Heidegger‘s philosophy is a philosophy of 
‗light‘, a philosophy of knowledge.  The particular is always understood in relation to 
the universal, and within the wider backdrop of the horizon of Being.
8
  ‗To understand 
is to relate to the particular, which alone exists, through knowledge, which is always 
knowledge of the universal.‘9  On Levinas‘s reading, Heidegger‘s philosophy, therefore, 
belongs within Levinas‘s broad characterisation of the wider western philosophical 
tradition as prioritising the Same over and against the other.
10
  Unique particularity is 
overlooked in favour of knowledge, which is always in relation to the universal.            
  
§ 3.1.2 BEYOND ONTOLOGY 
 
Levinas begins this next section by reflecting on whether or not there is a relation that is 
irreducible to understanding and comprehension, and would hence break with ontology.  
For Levinas, there is only one such relation that ‗exceeds the confines of 
                                                 
7
 Ibid., p. 4. 
8
 Levinas‘s conflating of Heidegger‘s philosophy with a general all-encompassing reading of the Western 
philosophical tradition has been questioned by commentators.  François Raffoul, for example, questions 
whether it is correct of Levinas to characterise Heidegger‘s philosophy as an Ontology of the Same. ‗We 
must indeed admit that a number of the analyses offered by Levinas are not devoid of a certain 
interpretative violence, and perhaps don‘t do complete justice to the philosophical advances that one can 
find in Heidegger, in particular his thinking of the other, of responsibility, and of selfhood‘. See, François 
Raffoul, ‗Being and the Other: Ethics and Ontology in Levinas and Heidegger‘, p. 144. Robert 
Bernasconi makes a similar point in relation to Levinas‘s characterisation of Heidegger, ‗[t]he decisive 
point is that Levinas ultimately does not treat Heidegger on his own terms, but as the most recent 
representative of a tradition of thought that extends far beyond Heidegger, back past Hobbes and Spinoza, 
who are also frequently the targets of Levinas‘s polemic, to Heraclitus‘. Robert Bernasconi, ‗Levinas and 
the Struggle for Existence‘, p. 176. 
9
 Ibid., p. 5. 
10
 In a further reference to Heidegger‘s philosophy, Levinas makes a number of references to ‗letting be‘ 
and raises similar criticisms to those addressed in ‗Reality and Its Shadow‘.  Letting a being be implies 
that the active subject has firstly understood the being in question, and has therefore assimilated the 
being, even if the subject then lets the being be.  The power of the subject is posited first and remains 
unquestioned.  Levinas wishes to disturb the paradigms of knowledge and ontology, which overlook the 
unique particularity of the Other.  ‗It does not consist in conceiving of him as a being, an act in which the 
being is already assimilated — even if that assimilation ends in releasing him as a being — in letting him 
be.‘ Ibid., p. 8.  Alongside Heidegger‘s philosophy, Levinas also broadly views the history of Western 
philosophical thought in general as guilty of this.  This sweeping reading of the tradition is often made by 
Levinas in order to support his point that the main tendency in the tradition has been towards knowledge 
and the assimilation of the other at the expense of unique particularity. This reading, however, overlooks 
moments in the tradition that are an exception to this characterisation, such as, among others, the work of 
Kierkegaard for example.           
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understanding‘, the relation with the human Other (autrui).11  In our interaction with 
everyday objects our understanding of them is revealed.  The object is known, and 
hence fully assimilated by the subject. To use Levinas‘s own terminology, this 
understanding is a ‗possession‘ and ‗consumption‘ of the object. 12  The concrete 
encounter with the Other is a unique relation that is beyond any comparison to the 
subject‘s engagement with objects.  The Other is not known but greeted.  The unique 
particularity of the individual in front of me is irreducible to knowledge, as their 
particularity escapes any universal categories, and the wider horizon of Being.  In a very 
straightforward sense, when I find myself engaged with the Other who is standing in 
front of me, speaking to me, I am not reflecting on our activity, but I am engrossed in 
the event.  As Critchley phrases it, ‗I am not contemplating, I am conversing‘.13  In 
further contrast with the subject‘s coming to know an object, in which the subject is in a 
sense master over the passive object, when I meet the Other I cannot shield the fact that 
through my every gesture, no matter how subtle, the Other is aware of the meeting.          
In every attitude toward the human being there is a greeting — even if it is the 
refusal of a greeting.  Here perception is not projected toward the horizon (the 
field of my freedom, my power, my property) in order to grasp the individual 
against this familiar background: it refers to the pure individual, to a being as 
such.
14
          
 
In the encounter with a concrete human Other their particularity strikes me, breaking 
with any familiar ‗horizon‘, and hence they are outside of my freedom and power.    
The crucial importance of speech and language, addressed in ‗The 
Transcendence of Words‘, is carried over into this article, wherein Levinas poses the 
question of whether language can be said to precede reason and understanding.  In 
contrast to the description of ontology as ‗light‘ and vision, given above, the 
interruption of Being that is irreducible to a concept or theme comes to the subject via 
sound.  The interruption of the Other takes place through the concrete situation of 
speech. In dialogue, both I and the Other are firstly addressed and invoked rather than 
understood.  
Speech delineates an original relation.  The point is to see the function of 
language not as subordinate to the consciousness we have of the presence of the 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., p. 5. 
12
 Ibid., p. 6. 
13
 Critchley, The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, p. 12.  
14
 Levinas, ‗Is Ontology Fundamental?‘, p. 7. 
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other (autrui), or of proximity, or of our community with him, but as a condition 
[emphasis added] of that conscious realization.
15
 
 
The very fact that language is shared indicates that we were firstly spoken to before we 
were given the words to speak back.  We were addressed, and likewise strived to 
communicate with the Other, prior to any conscious realization of their presence.  
Speaking is interpreted widely by Levinas as expression, for even if I chose not to 
verbally greet the Other, my expression operates as a kind of speech.  This ‗speech‘ is 
prior to understanding, and its primordial function is not to communicate understanding, 
but to institute sociality.  It is at this point of the text that it becomes clear that Levinas 
is criticising ontology from an ethical perspective.  Levinas declares that ‗The relation 
to the other is therefore not ontology‘, and instead describes it as ‗invocation‘, 
‗sociality‘, ‗prayer‘, and even ‗religion‘.16  Levinas clarifies that his use of the word 
religion is not intended to invoke images of God or any particular religion, but is used to 
indicate that the relation to the Other is not reducible to understanding and is therefore 
‗distanced from the exercise of power‘.17  
Levinas maintains that the bond with a person is in no way comparable to the 
relation with a thing.  When an object is named it is assimilated and possessed by the 
subject, when another human person is named they are simultaneously called and 
invoked.
18
  Understanding is equated with domination, power over the object, and 
violence.  However, although Levinas contrasts understanding of things with the 
encounter of the human Other, he does not want to reduce the question to a simple 
dichotomy between, on the one hand, a static passive object that can be assimilated into 
the subject and, on the other hand, an encounter with an active free and dynamic Other.  
This is a similar question to one that Levinas raised at the very end of his 1949 article 
‗De la description à l’existence‘, when he asked if man can only be explained in terms 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., p. 6. 
16
 Ibid., p. 7. Levinas‘s use of the term ‗religion‘ here does not have to be exclusively understood in a 
theological sense.  The Latin root of the term is re-ligare, meaning to bind back together, can be read as 
referring to how language is what binds together prior to any reflective consciousness of one‘s self or of 
the other in dialogue.  Also, the French term prière, translated as ‗prayer‘, is an ambiguous term that is 
not conveyed in the English translation.  From the Latin precāria, to obtain by entreaty, or to insistently 
ask, does not have to be understood in an exclusive religious sense.   
17
 Ibid., p. 8. 
18
 On this point Levinas adds that ‗human faces joins the Infinite‘.  Levinas‘s particular appropriation of 
the term infinite will be explored when we address his 1957 paper ‗Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity‘ 
below.  
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of ‗activity and passivity‘, as ‗power over him or slavery‘.19  The question of what it 
means to encounter another human person, and consequently what it means to be 
human, is more complex and varied.  From Levinas‘s perspective, if he was to approach 
the question by presupposing that two separate and free individuals come face to face, it 
would then be difficult to avoid a Hegelian clash of freedoms, whereby one of the 
subjects will inevitable become master.
20
 
The concern of contemporary philosophy to free man from categories adapted 
solely to things, therefore, must not be content with the opposition between the 
static, inert, and determined nature of things, on one hand, and dynamism, 
durée, transcendence or freedom as the essence of man on the other.  It is not so 
much a matter of opposing one essence to another, or saying what human nature 
is.  It is primarily a matter of our finding a vantage point from which man ceases 
to concern us in terms of the horizion of being, i.e., ceases to offer himself to our 
powers.
21
   
 
The way in which Levinas‘s writings reflect on the freedom of the human person cannot 
be reduced to a simple either/ or, that of either determination or freedom.  Levinas‘s 
concern is not to define the nature of man, if one can speak of such a thing, but to move 
outside of the categories of understanding, knowledge, and ontology and open up a 
discourse on a primordial event that is beyond those categories, and prior to freedom 
and non-freedom.
22
  
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 ‗L‘homme en tant que créature ou en tant qu‘être sexué n‘entretient-il pas avec l‘être une autre relation 
que celle de la puissance sur lui ou de l‘esclavage, d‘activité ou de passivité ?‘ Emmanuel Levinas, ‗De la 
description à l‘existence‘, in En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger, pp. 129-51 (p. 151).   
20
 One could raise the objection that this is not the only possibility and cite Kant‘s moral philosophy as 
one possible way of supporting this objection. However, as was pointed out in our introduction, although 
Levinas commends Kant for arguing for morality understood as the self-limitation of one‘s autonomous 
freedom, Kant does not account for why the autonomous subject would place its self into question in the 
first place. Kant takes the free transcendental ego as a given and does not seek for it a justification. 
Levinas asks where the impetus for the autonomous subject to place its self into question comes from. For 
Levinas, in order for Kant‘s moral philosophy to even be a possibility the self would have to have been 
initially placed into question from the outside. For Levinas, only the Other, who disturbs the self at the 
level of the affective self, which underlies the conscious ego, can place the self into question and in doing 
so stimulate the subject to question the justification of its own existence. For Levinas, without such a 
disturbance the self would live a self-referential life seeking to consume the other, be that literally or 
assimilation through knowledge.       
21
 Levinas, ‗Is Ontology Fundamental?‘, pp. 8-9. 
22
 It is striking that often, alongside his broad reading of the tradition, Levinas gives sparse to no 
consideration to the emerging theories of intersubjectivity from that time period, although, given their 
brief mention in other works, it is reasonable to assume that he would have been familiar with them. This 
is especially true of thinkers within the phenomenological tradition, for example, Max Scheler, Edith 
Stein and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  
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§ 3.1.3 THE FACE AND THE ETHICAL MEANING OF THE OTHER 
 
In this section Levinas once again equates understanding with violence and negation, as 
through understanding a being is constituted without remainder, and as such is taken in 
by the powers of the subject, becoming a possession.  ‗The partial negation which is 
violence denies the independence of beings: they are mine.‘23  The encounter with the 
Other eludes such domination and possession.  ‗He does not enter entirely into the 
opening of being in which I already stand as in the field of my freedom.‘24  A crucial 
point to clarify, not only in relation to this text, but also of importance for any 
understanding of Levinas‘s work, is that the encounter with the Other is an ethical, and 
hence from within his understanding of ethics, a ‗metaphysical‘ encounter, not an 
ontological one.  There is always a more than that the escapes the powers of the subject.  
What is encountered is beyond the realm of appearance and cannot be ‗known‘, as it is 
an excessive exteriority.  This passive resistance of the Other to the attempt at 
assimilation can also produce a violent response in the self.  As the Other is the only 
being that resists the power of the subject, Levinas argues, the Other is the only being 
that the subject can desire to fully negate, which would be to murder.  Paradoxically, 
however, although this is the case, when one has truly seen the face of the Other their 
power to kill is stripped away.   
At the very moment when my power to kill is realized, the other (autrui) has 
escaped.  In killing, I can certainly attain a goal, I can kill the way I hunt, or cut 
down trees, or slaughter animals — but then I have grasped the other in the 
opening of being in general, as an element of the world in which I stand.  I have 
seen him on the horizon.  I have not looked straight at him.  I have not 
encountered (rencontré) his face.
25
 
 
This point indicates that what Levinas is trying to describe is something that goes 
beyond the purely empirical physical meeting between two people.  Of course it is 
physically possible to take the life of another being, including a human being, but 
Levinas maintains that if one truly looks the Other in the face, murder becomes 
impossible.
26
  One cannot annihilate the Other, even if they do end their biological 
life.
27
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 Levinas, ‗Is Ontology Fundamental?‘, p. 9. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid., trans. mod., pp. 9-10; 21. 
26
 ‗To be in relation with the other face to face — is to be unable to kill‘. Ibid., p. 10.  In an interview 
from 1986 Levinas confirms this reading, when he describes the face, ‗It is also the commandment to take 
the other upon oneself, not to let him alone; you hear the word of God.  If you conceive of the face as the 
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The precise ethical significance that Levinas gives to a concept that has become 
synonymous with his work, that of the face [le visage], begins here in this article.  
Despite the implication of using the term face, which automatically conjures up images 
of physical form, for Levinas the face is not the perception I have when I look at 
someone‘s facial appearance or expression, for the face breaks through the physical 
form.  From Levinas‘s descriptions of the face, therefore, it would be more precise to 
think of the face-to-face encounter as a linguistic stimulation and not a plastic-visual 
one.
28
  In this article Levinas explicitly refers to the face as ‗speech‘, stating that the 
vision of the face is hearing and speech.
29
  In the next article, and his work to follow, 
Levinas will come to describe the face in terms of the command ‗Thou shall not kill‘.  
When asked about the face in an interview from 1986 Levinas replied: 
The face is not of the order of the seen, it is not an object, but it is he whose 
appearing preserves an exteriority which is also an appeal or an imperative given 
to your responsibility: to encounter a face is straightaway to hear a demand and 
an order.  I define the face precisely by these traits beyond vision or confusion 
with the vision of the face.
30
 
 
What is of importance in Levinas‘s descriptions of the face is that the face signifies an 
otherwise than being and outside of the totality of understanding beings in their being.  
The face is irreducible to knowledge, interrupts being and gives it an ethical 
significance.  
By his own admission Levinas accepts that as of yet his argument remains to be 
fully demonstrated, and the events that he has just begun to describe are ‗barely 
suspected‘.31  The article may raise more questions than it answers, but it marks the 
beginning of Levinas‘s work in which ontology is explicitly criticised and, in its place, 
ethics will be declared as first philosophy.  As Levinas says in his preface to Entre 
Nous, ‗[i]t is as if the emergence of the human in the economy of being upset the 
                                                                                                                                               
object of a photographer, of course you are dealing with an object like any other object.  But if you 
encounter the face, responsibility arises in the strangeness of the other and in his misery.‘ Levinas, 
‗Interview with François Poirié‘, in Is it Righteous to Be?, p. 48. 
27
 In Totality and Infinity Levinas repeats the point that even if one ends the life of the Other, encountered 
in the face is the impossibility to annihilate the Other.  Referencing the biblical narrative of Cain and 
Abel, Levinas writes that even though Cain killed his brother Abel, he will be haunted by Abel‘s eyes, 
that ‗in the tomb shall look at Cain‘.  Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 233.     
28
 This is further supported by Levinas‘s comments in both this article and ‗The Transcendence of 
Words‘, that vision is a sense which allows more easily for a full assimilation of an object. Sound is more 
allusive.     
29
 Levinas, ‗Is Ontology Fundamental?‘, pp. 10-11. 
30
 Levinas, ‗Interview with François Poirié‘, in Is it Righteous to Be?, p. 48. 
31
 Levinas, ‗Is Ontology Fundamental?‘, p. 10. 
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meaning and plot and philosophical rank of ontology‘.32  Not only is the tradition of 
ontology ‗upset‘ by Levinas‘s reflections on an everyday overlooked mundane 
occurrence, when the Other speaks to the Same, but his opening up of the ethical 
significance of this encounter consequently calls into question the view that prioritises 
the sovereignty of the free subject in any ethical account of human existence.      
 
§ 3.1.4 ‗ETHICS AND SPIRIT‘ (1952)33 
 
Even though Levinas‘s short article ‗Ethics and Spirit‘ belongs, strictly speaking, to a 
substantial body of work wherein he concentrates on his Jewish heritage and Judaism, 
much of his philosophical interests, and development from within this period, are 
nonetheless evident within his religious writings.  The importance of language and 
speech discussed in ‗The Transcendence of Words‘ and ‗Is Ontology Fundamental?‘ is 
emphasised further in ‗Ethics and Spirit‘, wherein it is argued that speech prefigures 
consciousness.  The recently introduced ethical significance of the Face is also carried 
over into this article, and further elaborated on. In relation to our particular interest, 
freedom does not figure prominently in this article, however, by turning to Levinas‘s 
descriptions of knowledge we will be in a position to clarify further why Levinas began 
to increasingly align freedom with knowledge and violence.  We will then be able to 
understand why, for Levinas, the encounter with the human face is irreducible to, 
beyond and prior to any such powers of the subject, and hence outside of the categories 
of freedom.  
After a brief reflection on Christian morality, Jewish morality in the nineteenth 
century, and an undeveloped comparison between Christianity and Judaism, Levinas‘s 
next section of the article is titled ‗Spirit and Violence‘.  Having ended the previous 
section by identifying Judaism as a religion of the spirit, Levinas begins this section by 
                                                 
32
 Levinas, Entre Nous, p. xiii. Levinas‘s questioning of the view that ontology holds the highest ‗rank‘, 
and therefore also questioning the view that the question of the meaning of Being is of the highest 
importance, is another implicit reference to the work of Heidegger.  In his, Introduction to Metaphysics 
(the published version of a lecture course Heidegger gave in the summer of 1935 at the University of 
Freiburg), Heidegger refers to ‗rank‘ on a number of occasions.  One such occasion is in relation to the 
fundamental importance of ontology, particularly in relation to his view that the question of the meaning 
of Being is of the highest importance.  Stating, at the beginning of his lecture course, ‗But it [Why are 
there beings at all instead of nothing?] is the first question in another sense — namely, in rank.  This can 
be clarified in three ways.  The question "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?" is first in rank 
for us as the broadest, as the deepest, and finally as the most originary question‘. Martin Heidegger, 
Introduction to Metaphysics trans. by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2000), p. 2.   
33
 ‗Ethique et esprit‘ was first published in the journal Evidences 27, (1952).   
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suggesting that a way in which the spiritual life could be further defined could be to 
exclude the spiritual life from any relation to violence.  This, in turn, raises the further 
question of what ‗violence‘ means precisely. A definition of violence then follows: 
Violence is to found in any action in which one acts as if one were alone to act: 
as if the rest of the universe were there only to receive the action; violence is 
consequently also any action which we endure without at every point 
collaborating in it.
34
    
 
We commit violence whenever we act with no regard for the external world, and merely 
consider our own needs and desires, as if the whole world consisted only of us and was 
there to administer to our own needs and desires.  Likewise, violence is carried out 
when an action is done to us without our participation, that is to say, without one being 
a partner in the event whose otherness in that relationship is never reducible to the same, 
or when we allow someone to speak through us.  Levinas is well aware of the breadth of 
this definition of violence, and in the next sentence adds that when violence is 
understood in this way almost every causality is therefore deemed violent, along with 
the ‗satisfaction of a need‘, and crucially ‗the desire and even the knowledge of an 
object‘.35  
What, then, can be regarded as a cause but which is not within the order of 
violence?  It is in answering this question that Levinas turns once again to language and 
conversation.  ‗The banal fact of conversation, in one sense, quits the order of violence. 
This banal fact is the marvel of marvels.‘36  Through the act of speaking one addresses 
the Other, greets him/her and opens oneself up to the otherness of the other and hence to 
the Other.  
The Other (Autrui) is not only known, he is greeted (salué). He is not only 
named, but also invoked. [...]. I not only think of what he is for me, but also and 
simultaneously, and even before, I am for him (je suis pour lui).
37
  
 
Addressing the Other escapes the classification of violence defined above, as it is 
recognition that one is not alone, it is to enter into a dialogue that one cannot control, 
and in a sense is the beginning of collaboration.  Rather than an attempt to dominate, in 
speech one must patiently await the response of the Other.  
                                                 
34
 Emmanuel Levinas, ‗Ethics and Spirit‘, in Difficult Freedom. Essays on Judaism, pp. 3-10 (p. 6).     
35
 Ibid., p. 6.  
36
 Ibid., p. 7. 
37
 Ibid. This is later expressed by Levinas as the way in which the Other takes the me (le moi) in me 
hostage. See, Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, p. 59, 123, 126-27, 141.  
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The agent, at the very moment of its action, has renounced all claims to 
domination or sovereignty, and is already exposed to the action of the Other in 
the way it waits for a response.
38
 
 
Prior to being an object of knowledge, and prior to any universal classification you 
might predicate of the Other, the Other is one who is greeted and invoked, an 
interlocutor hence I become a subject for the other.  This exposure in terms of the 
ethical description of the face introduced in ‗Is Ontology Fundamental?‘ is expanded on 
in this article.  In contrast to a faceless ‗thing‘ which is an object of knowledge, 
understood within Levinas‘s description to be violently seized and totalised, the face 
occupies a ‗depth‘ dimension and an ‗opening‘ that presents itself in a personal way.39     
 
§ 3.1.5 KNOWLEDGE UNDERSTOOD AS VIOLENCE 
 
In the next section speech as a non-violent action is contrasted with knowledge.  As 
knowledge is a naming and a classification, from within the perspective of Levinas‘s 
thought knowledge is thus seen as an attempt at possession and totalisation.
40
  The face, 
however, is irreducible to knowledge.  The face offers ‗an absolute resistance to 
possession‘.41  The resistance offered by the face is not to be understood in terms of 
violence.  Levinas‘s description of the face is paradoxical, for although the face is 
absolute vulnerability, naked and open without protection, it is simultaneously an 
absolute resistance to all attempts at possession and domination.
42
  It has a power 
stemming from its powerlessness.  The resistance inscribed in the face is a resistance 
against the absolute annihilation of the face, which is murder.  One may well desire to 
murder the Other in response to the Other‘s absolute resistance to all attempts at 
possession, in fact Levinas tells us that the Other is the only other being that one can be 
tempted to kill, to see the face is the temptation to murder and to hear the command 
                                                 
38
 Levinas, ‗Ethics and Spirit‘, p. 8, my emphasis. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 ‗To know is to perceive, to seize an object‘. Ibid., p. 9.  Levinas does not fully argue out this point 
within this article.  In chapter two we presented a more detailed account, based on Levinas‘s earliest 
works, as to why Levinas aligns consciousness with freedom.  Consciousness is perceptually constructive, 
as it creates and recreates the world.  Through the constitution of the object by consciousness, 
consciousness bestows a sense onto the object, in doing so comes to know and possess the object without 
remainder, leaving no room for anything foreign, anything beyond the powers of theoretical 
consciousness.   
41
 Ibid., p. 8. 
42
 ‗The face, for its part, is inviolable; those eyes, which are absolutely without protection, the most naked 
part of the human body, none the less offer an absolute resistance to possession, an absolute resistance in 
which the temptation to murder is inscribed: the temptation of absolute negation.‘ Ibid. 
 173 
‗thou shall not kill‘.43  For although the use of term ‗face‘ (visage) invokes images of 
physical expression and visual stimuli, as we seen in the preceding section, the face is 
not of the order of the seen.  ‗To see a face is already to hear (entendre) ‗You shall not 
kill‘‘.44  
For Levinas, this commandment is not arrived at through theoretical deliberation 
over how we ought to live together; it is, rather, inscribed at a pre-theoretical level, at 
the most basic level of human interaction, that of discourse and the face-to-face relation.  
It is this fundamental opening onto an otherness that is not reducible to knowledge, and 
cannot be possessed by the same, that Levinas begins to discuss in terms of ‗morality‘.  
As this event occurs prior to theoretical reflection, and escapes the totalising gaze of 
consciousness.  If this is the case, then, Levinas wonders if it is not, therefore, correct to 
say that the encounter with the Other precedes consciousness.
45
  ‗Speech belongs to the 
order of morality before belonging to that of theory.  Is it not therefore the condition for 
conscious thought?‘ 46   Levinas goes on to answer his question in the affirmative. 
Speech, understood primarily as a reaching out to the Other and not as a means of 
verbalising thought, breaches the solipsistic sovereign life of the self and brings with it 
consciousness (the latter not to be understood in the Cartesian-Lockean sense of 
consciousness reflecting on itself).    
This self, viewed face-on, is consciousness, existing by virtue of the fact that a 
sovereign self, invading the world naively — like ‗a moving force‘, to use 
Victor Hugo‘s expression — perceives a face and the impossibility of killing. 
Consciousness is the impossibility of invading reality like a wild vegetation that 
absorbs or breaks or pushes back everything around it. The turning back on 
oneself of consciousness is the equivalent not of [Cartesian-Husserlian-
Heideggerian] self-contemplation but of the fact of not existing violently and 
naturally, of speaking to the Other.
47
 
 
The resistance of the face to, what Levinas views as the natural disposition of the 
subject to mindlessly seek to possess and absorb the environment around them, 
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stimulates a turning back on oneself, and hence consciousness.
48
  It is the impossibility 
of taking the Other into the Same, into the self, that brings about conscious action and 
self reflection.  As, for Levinas, freedom is aligned with consciousness, this stance 
contributes further to our attempt to understand why Levinas comes to claim that the 
Other precedes and conditions the freedom of the subject.  Before the Other is named, 
understood, or grasped through the intentional structures of consciousness, he/she 
affects me.  The ability to understand one another, and to understand one‘s own self, 
rests on this primordial experience of speech as an address to and from the Other.  The 
resistance of the Other, the ‗no, thou shall not kill‘ that is inscribed in the face, brings an 
awareness to the self that the world is not there to be mindlessly consumed and 
devoured.  Hence, consciousness exists by virtue of the fact that the ‗naive‘ self 
encounters the face of the Other.  Or, as Levinas phrased it above, ‗Consciousness is the 
impossibility of invading reality like a wild vegetation that absorbs or breaks or pushes 
back everything around it.‘ 
 
§ 3.1.6 THE BIRTH OF CRITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
On a similar point, although not in relation to this particular text, one of the ways in 
which De Boer looks at freedom in the work of Levinas is in relation to cognition and 
the founding of the subject‘s critical consciousness.  De Boer argues that for Levinas 
without the interruption of the Other the self would lack any critical awareness and 
consequently objectivity.  If human freedom is seen as uninhabited and coming to know 
is exercising one‘s freedom, what is there to stop the self from seeing the world entirely 
on the self‘s own terms, without ever questioning what the self has determined the 
world to be.  Rather than accepting critical consciousness as an a priori facet of the 
human being, Levinas delves deeper, and argues that the birth of critical consciousness 
comes with the interruption of the world of the self by the gaze of the Other.  De Boer 
argues,  
[a]ccording to Levinas, there would be no objectivity if the Other were not 
watching; it is he who interferes with our spontaneous naiveté and prompts 
critical awareness.  This breach in natural dogmatism would be impossible 
                                                 
48
 As Levinas‘s work progresses he will expand on this idea that being is of itself negative, aligning the 
violence of the Same, and the attempt to dominate and consume, with ‗nature‘.  It is the encounter with 
the Face of the Other that disturbs this natural tendency, introduces transcendence and the Good Beyond 
Being.  Without this encounter the ‗natural‘ world remains fundamentally evil (mal). For a critical reading 
of  Levinas‘s  negative view of Being, see, Leask, Being Reconfigured.    
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without the presence of the Other‘s face, before whom arbitrariness shies back 
and is ashamed.
49
           
 
 
By questioning the origin of knowledge as within the self, De Boer points out 
that Levinas is questioning the entire tradition of autonomy of thought.  By way of an 
example from the tradition, De Boer selects a philosopher that had a central influence 
on Levinas, Husserl, and shows how for Husserl the self does not need exteriority in 
order to gain this critical capacity.  The freedom of the self is not placed into question.   
‗In the egological world, where the Other has not yet appeared (Husserl‘s position ex 
hypothesi), it would never occur to me to criticize my natural understanding of 
reality.‘50  ‗Ethics and Spirit‘ lends further support to De Boer‘s reading of Levinas as 
questioning the entire tradition of autonomy of thought, as in the article Levinas 
specifically addresses the entire tradition of Western Philosophy.  Levinas implies that 
all of the tradition is guilty of unquestioningly accepting, and prioritising, the self‘s 
ability to come to know the world, which ultimately rests on knowledge of the self.
51
  
‗If ―know thyself‖ has become the fundamental precept of all Western philosophy, this 
is because ultimately the West discovers the universe within itself.‘52   This maxim 
stretching as far back as the Temple of Apollo at Delphi prioritises both knowledge and 
the self, and by criticizing this maxim Levinas calls into question a value that he 
believes is representative of the entire tradition.
53
   
Returning to the final paragraphs of ‗Ethics and Spirit‘, Levinas argues that not 
only does the encounter with the Other bring about consciousness, and introduce 
morality into being, but it is also the basis for society.  Society is defined as ‗the miracle 
of moving out of oneself‘ and is contrasted with the violent man who strives only to 
possess.
54
  Violence is aligned with ‗knowledge‘, ‗sovereignty‘, ‗possession‘, and 
‗experience‘.  Experience, for Levinas, implies the self conscious ‗I‘, the ego, which for 
Levinas cannot be separated from the subject‘s intentional engagement with the world, 
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and as such is still within the categories of the Same.  Therefore, in an attempt to 
distance himself from ontological language Levinas uses the terms ‗encounter‘ and 
‗event‘ to describe this contact with the Other.55  ‗Experience‘ implies that the event is 
as a result of a free initiation on the part of the subject, fully constituted, and can be 
fully absorbed by the subject.  ‗Every experience of the world is at the same time an 
experience of self. [...].  Reality‘s resistance to our acts itself turns into the experience of 
this resistance; as such, it is already absorbed by knowledge and leaves us alone with 
ourselves.‘56  When the subject has an ‗experience‘, through the intentional structures of 
consciousness, the object is absorbed into the same and the subject remains alone, there 
is no remainder, no alterity irreducible to the same, and so there is no encounter with the 
Other.  
This article attests to the point made in the article discussed above, that the 
encounter which Levinas is describing is an ethical encounter.  Although it is a concrete 
event with a living human being, it is beyond the categories of perception and the realm 
of appearance.
57
  For although on a purely empirical level one human person can take 
the life of another, to truly encounter the face of the Other is to hear the command thou 
shall not kill, which will render murder impossible.     
For in reality, murder is possible, but it is possible only when one has not looked 
the Other in the face.  The impossibility of killing is not real, but moral. The fact 
that the vision of the face is not an experience, but a moving out of oneself, a 
contact with another being and not simply a sensation of self, is attested to by 
the ‗purely moral‘ character of this impossibility.  A moral view (regard) 
measures, in the face, the uncrossable infinite in which all murderous intent is 
immersed and submerged. This is precisely why it leads us away from any 
experience or view (regard).  The infinite is given only to the moral view 
(regard): it is not known, but is in society with us.
58
 
 
To encounter the face of the Other is to glimpse the infinite, which by definition is 
beyond any definition, and irreducible to any thought of it, ‗it is not known, but is in 
society with us‘.  Knowledge understood as an assimilation of the object leaves no room 
for otherness or novelty, as all otherness is overlooked when the object is constituted 
and assimilated into the same.  Knowledge understood as freedom gives rise to two 
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separate explanations as to why the encounter with the Other must presuppose freedom, 
from Levinas‘s philosophical standpoint.  As freedom is aligned with knowledge for 
Levinas, and as the face is outside of the paradigms of knowledge, and prior to all 
understanding and naming, the encounter with the face is also outside of the categories 
of freedom.  Secondly, as knowledge leaves the subject alone and within the confines of 
the same, with no room for novelty or genuine alterity, hence there is no room for a 
genuine free action that will result in something new.
59
  The face opens the solitary 
world of the subject to a beyond that they cannot contain, and hence brings the 
possibility of freedom.   
 
§ 3.2 ‗FREEDOM AND COMMAND‘ (1953) AND ‗THE EGO AND THE TOTALITY‘ (1954) 
 
As we have seen in the article above, from 1952 onwards Levinas begins to describe the 
face as the command ‗Thou shall not kill‘.  The obvious question, for freedom, that 
arises from such a description is what implications are there for the self who is 
confronted and hence, commanded by the face.  Can a command be enacted by a free 
subject only, and if this is the case, is the self that is confronted by the face, therefore, 
understood as free prior to the encounter?  Can a command be understood otherwise 
than as tyranny, violence and domination?  In ‗Freedom and Command‘ Levinas 
explores the meaning of command in relation to freedom and reflects on whether a 
command can be seen as an imperative to act that is given only to a free subject, or not, 
or whether we can understand command in a sense that is prior to freedom and outside 
of those associated categories.
60
  By drawing on his reading of Plato, mainly his 
Republic, Levinas argues that command does not have to imply tyranny and that the 
face-to-face encounter reveals a passive force that commands by virtue of its 
vulnerability and pacificity.  Most importantly for our study, in this article Levinas 
contends that the face is ‗an opposition prior to my freedom, which puts my freedom 
into action‘. 61   He also explicitly argues that the face-to-face encounter cannot be 
understood by reference to the philosophical approaches of either Husserl or Heidegger, 
as it is prior to any meaningful representation that comes from the sense-bestowing 
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power of the intentional subject (Sinngebung), and is also contrary to the Heideggerian 
notion of throwness (Geworfenheit) into ‗existence‘ (in Heidegger‘s sense) without 
one‘s choosing of such a situation or constitution.  The face-to-face encounter, the 
relationship with exteriority, is said to be prior to the freedom of the commanded self, 
and ‗makes freedom possible‘.62 
 
§ 3.2.1  ACTION AND COMMAND 
 
Levinas begins the article with the declaration that ‗To command is to act on a will‘, 
and as a will offers the greatest resistance, if one can order others to act, then to 
command must be seen as the highest form of action.
63
  The term ‗action‘ implies that 
the agent is free.  This understanding of command and action, consequently, leads to a 
contradiction.  Only a free agent can be said to act, and only a free agent can therefore 
be commanded to act, but if one is commanded to act by a foreign will, is the agent then 
free?  The dilemma that Levinas is reflecting upon alludes to Kant‘s well-known 
argument that moral obligation implies freedom, that is to say, to maintain that x ought 
to do y, x has to be able to do y.  The potentiality to do y implies, likewise, that x is free 
to do or not to do y; and so, moral obligation for one‘s self implies individual freedom.  
Hence Kant‘s famous exhortation that the moral law is self-imposed on the free subject 
by the free subject.
64
  The problem, which Levinas is considering, emerges when one 
talks about acting on the basis of the will of another.  If to command is to act on a 
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foreign free will, how is it possible that one can be said to command an agent to act?  
As Levinas puts it, ‗How can one move an unmoved mover?‘65  
One way that the tradition has dealt with this inconsistency is to argue that the 
command must coincide with the will of the agent, that is to say, one must be 
commanded to behave in way that is consistent with how the agent would have acted in 
anyway.
66
  ‗A will can accept the order of another will only because it finds that order in 
itself.‘67  If this was not the case the foreign will would resist, even if resistance, and 
maintaining one‘s freedom, entailed going as far as accepting one‘s death as a 
consequence of refusing the command.  Levinas goes on to argue that freedom of 
thought in itself can be seen as a tyranny, and turns once again to Plato‘s Republic to 
further explain his point.  Plato was constantly aware of the ‗threat‘ that our ‗animality‘ 
posed to reason, and that the appetite and spirited aspects of the person had to be 
controlled by reason.
68
  Levinas notes that this inner struggle ‗makes a mockery of 
autonomy‘.69 
 
§ 3.2.2 TYRANNY 
 
From this Levinas moves on to a more general discussion on tyranny.  When reading 
the article one must be mindful of the historic backdrop, and remember that in 1953 the 
events of the Second World War were very fresh in people‘s psyche, particularly the 
Jewish community and individuals like Levinas who were so cruelly and personally 
affected by a very real experience of tyranny.  In his more politically minded work of 
the fifties, such as this present article, Levinas also has Stalinism and the Soviet Union 
in mind, as well as the ongoing events of the Cold War.  Caygill convincingly argues 
that Levinas expands his general critique of Western metaphysics to the political 
structures raised upon them.
70
  Levinas was undoubtedly thinking of the Nazi regime, 
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and such unjust political structures, when he mentions the vast possibilities and 
unlimited resources that a tyrannical regime can exploit, ‗those of love and wealth, 
torture and hunger, silence and rhetoric‘.71  Tyranny can be so insidious and cunning 
that even the servile soul may be unaware that they are in fact under the control of a 
tyrannical power.  Rather than identifying a command as an external command, to the 
servile soul it is felt as though they were acting upon their own inclination.  
The supreme violence is in that supreme gentleness.  To have a servile soul is to 
be incapable of being jarred, incapable of being ordered.  The love for the master 
fills the soul to such an extent that the soul no longer takes its distances.  Fear 
fills the soul to such an extent that one no longer sees it, but sees from its 
perspective.
72
               
 
This very real possibility, one that Levinas knew all too well, reveals just how malleable 
human freedom can be.  Levinas also describes command from the perspective of the 
tyrant, pointing out that the tyrant preys on others as if they were mere physical objects, 
manipulating and contorting them to suit his/her own will.  The alterity of other human 
beings are overlooked, and therefore, the tyrant is alone in the world in that others are 
merely there for his/ her own use and manipulation, ‗there is no one in front of him‘.73  
 
§ 3.2.3 THE STATE 
 
Due to the vulnerable nature of human freedom, and the real threat of tyranny, Levinas 
moves on to argue for what he believes to be a political condition for the possibility of 
freedom, the just State.  ‗Freedom, in its fear of tyranny, leads to institutions, to a 
commitment of freedom in the very name of freedom, to a State.‘ 74   In order to 
safeguard freedom, freedom is externalised into institutions and a ‗written text‘ in the 
form of law and perhaps a constitution.  Levinas argues that the formation of a just 
State, which is ‗armed with force‘, is ‗the only way to preserve freedom from 
tyranny‘.75  In comparing his approach to that of Kant‘s, Levinas remarks that he too 
believes that we must impose commands on ourselves.  However, in contrast to Kant, he 
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believes that an internal rational law does not go far enough, as it is no defence against 
tyranny.  Only an exterior command that is armed against the threat of tyranny can 
preserve freedom.
76
  
 Even though the formation of a just State is seen as the only protection from 
freedom, over time a problem arises.  The original command made by the will to curtail 
freedom in order to protect freedom, becomes increasingly distant and alien to the will.  
Eventually freedom can no longer recognise itself in the institutions of the State, and in 
turn comes to view the State and the limitations to freedom, as tyranny.
77
  ‗The will 
experiences the guarantees that it has provided against its own degradation as another 
tyranny.‘78  Levinas moves on to challenge the position he has just set out, which bears 
a strong resemblance to the social contract tradition, putting his own position forward in 
contrast, arguing that meaning is not only derived from the will but can also come from 
elsewhere.  Levinas argues that the face-to-face relation is a command that is not to be 
understood as tyrannical as it is the ‗reason prior to reason‘ that led the will to sacrifice 
freedom in the name of freedom.
79
  The will did not form social institutions in order to 
protect its own freedom, but in order to safeguard the freedom of others.  Hence, 
Levinas offers an explanation for why the will can submit itself to an exterior 
impersonal will, because it has already encountered a meaningful command prior to 
action.  The State, and the social and political institutions it founds, requires politics, 
and politics requires discourse.  As we have seen earlier, Levinas argues that discourse 
presupposes the face-to-face encounter.    
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§ 3.2.4 WAR, WORK AND FREEDOM 
 
Having loosely sketched the political conditions of freedom, Levinas now takes a step 
further back, to examine what personal event prefigures the impersonal law and gives 
rise to that possibility.  In order to do so, Levinas once again takes up his analysis of 
violence and contrasts the domination of things with the pacific opposition of the face.  
Levinas repeats the definition of violence given in ‗Ethics and Spirit‘, and introduces 
two new examples of violence, that of work and war.
80
  
Levinas‘s reflections on work take on an added dimension not considered in his 
work of the 1940‘s, that of violence, however, the contrast between work and freedom 
is still clear.  Work is seen as the drive to dominate things, manipulating and distorting 
them for one‘s own end.  From the perspective of work the individuality of the object is 
overlooked and the worker only thinks of how the object can be dominated.  ‗Work 
neither finds nor seeks in the object anything strictly individual.‘81  War too overlooks 
the particularity of the individual in front and never looks the enemy in the face, but 
seeks to take them by surprise from behind.  ‗I do not face the freedom with which I 
struggle, but throw myself against it blindly‘.82  Both war and work share a common 
attitude towards that which they seek to control, both view the object and the enemy as 
‗a mass‘ to be dominated.83  One can see in Levinas‘s descriptions of work and war why 
Caygill maintains that this section of the article serves as not only a critique of the 
Hegelian-Marxist position on the liberatory power of work but also a critique of the 
Hegelian master/slave dialectic, which views war and work as a mode of recognition.
84
  
For Levinas, both war and work are far from modes of recognition, as both are blind to 
the externality of the object in front of them, and both seek domination and control. 
 
§ 3.2.5 RESISTANCE OF THE FACE 
 
Like the object of war and work, the face is also described as an opposition.  However, 
it is not an opposition that resists the subjects force when a subject‘s force acts upon it, 
like stone under a chisel or the barrel of an opposing gun, for it is an opposition that 
                                                 
80
 ‗Violent action does not consist in being in a relationship with the other; it is in fact an action where 
one is as though one were alone.‘ Ibid. 
81
 Ibid., p. 19. 
82
 Ibid.  
83
 Ibid. 
84
 Caygill, ‗Levinas and the Political‘, p. 74.  
 183 
takes the subject by surprise.  The face does not stand in the way of the subject‘s freely 
undertaken action, but confronts the subject prior to action.     
It is what resists me by its opposition and not what is opposed to me by its 
resistance.  This means that this opposition is not revealed by its coming up 
against my freedom; it is an opposition prior to my freedom (antérieure à ma 
liberté), which puts my freedom into action.  It is not that to which I oppose 
myself, but what is opposed to me.
85
 
 
The encounter with the Other does not come about through the free initiation of the 
subject, for the encounter is not a free act under taken by the ego.  ‗It does not at all 
follow my intervention; it opposes itself to me insofar as it turns to me.‘86  While the 
face is described as an opposition it is not to be understood as a hostile or aggressive 
force.  It is a pacific opposition.  The face does not take up an opposing position in 
opposition to a particular action on the part of the subject, but to be a face is to be a no 
to a violent subject, who would otherwise behave as if they were alone in the world to 
act.
87
  When one can behave violently towards the other it is precisely because they 
have not looked the Other in the face.  ‗Violence is a way of acting on every being and 
every freedom by approaching it from an indirect angle.‘88  It thus follows for Levinas 
that to never see the face of an other is to be alone in the world.        
 In keeping with his position presented in ‗Is Ontology Fundamental?‘, Levinas 
argues that as knowledge aims to grasp and take hold of a thing through a concept, 
‗starting with generality, the universal, ideas and law‘, violence is then committed, as 
the unique particularity of that concrete thing is missed.
89
  The object has no meaning 
out of itself, but only in relation to the category to which it belongs, and in relation to 
the wider whole.
90
  The face, however, breaks through all forms and all categories, and 
is truly naked.  Although in this article the face is described as expression, leading the 
reader to possibly think of the face as a visual stimulation, met through the look, one 
should not take from this that the face is therefore reducible to the physical form and 
concrete facial expressions.  Levinas describes the face in terms of expression in order 
to draw out the point that through expression one is invited to speak and converse, and 
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not to impartially stand back and weigh up the other as an object of the subjects 
perceptual or usable world.  Expression captures the immediacy of the encounter, and it 
prefigures any theoretical or contemplative attitude.  Through expression one is struck 
by the Other and has a responsibility to respond.  Expression ‗does not invoke an 
attitude in addition to knowledge; expression invites one to speak to someone [about 
something]‘.91  Towards the end of the article Levinas returns to the description given in 
earlier articles whereby one is said to enter into a relationship with the Other through 
speech.
92
 
 
§ 3.2.6 ASYMMETRY OF THE FACE-TO-FACE 
 
From the perspective of a removed impartial observer, when one person approaches 
another person and engages them in dialogue, this event can easily appear purely as a 
meeting of two equal human beings.  However, from Levinas‘s ethical perspective this 
event is loaded with a wider meaning that goes beyond a simple multiplicity of beings.  
The formal structure of the presence of one to another cannot be put as a simple 
multiplicity; it is subordination, an appeal from one to the other.  The being that 
is present dominates, or breaks through its own apparition; it is an interlocutor.
93
  
 
The individual who is confronted by the face of the Other is in a sense ‗subordinated‘ to 
the Other, as they are disturbed and called to respond.  Beyond the mere appearance 
from an outside perspective, from the perspective of the one who is interrupted, they 
cannot escape the summons and cannot undo the interruption.  ‗Beings which present 
themselves to one another subordinate themselves to one another.‘94  It is in this way 
that the face can be said by Levinas to be the first command, a command prior to 
institutions, and a command that is not a tyranny.  ‗This subordination constitutes the 
first occurrence of a transitive relation between freedoms and, in this very formal sense, 
of command.‘ 95   The transitive relation of command by the other in a dialogic 
experience frees up, as it were, both to freely respond.  It is the command, nonetheless, 
that is prior to the freedom that is ‗between‘ the beings in a dialogue and that renders 
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each of the interlocutors free to respond, hence Levinas‘s use of the plural ‗freedoms‘ 
that become hypostatic after and in the transitive event of (genuine) dialogue and so 
irreducible to each other as the ‗same‘ freedom/s.  
Levinas makes it clear that this fundamental dimension of human life that he 
wishes to bring to light is a metaphysical, and therefore from his perspective, an ethical 
relationship.  ‗The metaphysical relationship, the relationship with the exterior, is only 
possible as an ethical relationship.‘96  It is a relationship with exteriority that can never 
be reduced to the categories of the same.  The meaning and rationality of the face does 
not find its source in the freedom of the subject, but comes from outside. It is a 
signification that pre-exists the subject.  
Expression is just this way of breaking loose, of coming toward us, yet without 
deriving its meaning from us, without being a work of our freedom.
97
  
 
Through the idea of the face Levinas distances himself further from the philosophical 
approaches of both Heidegger and Husserl, and the account of meaning in their 
respective approaches, as he argues that the face cannot be accommodated within either 
of their phenomenological perspectives.  The face does not derive its meaning from the 
intentional structures of the Ego‘s consciousness or individual actor in the world.98  
With the face the origin of the directionality of meaning and sense is profoundly 
different. Meaning comes from outside the subject.  Thus in direct reference to Husserl, 
Levinas argues that this meaning ‗is prior to all Sinngebung‘.99  
This primordial encounter with the otherness of meaning, Levinas claims, 
provides a coherent reason for understanding why it is not irrational for the personal 
will to submit itself to the impersonal will in the form of intuitions and laws, that have a 
meaning prior to the freedom of the subject.  Through the face the subject is already 
confronted with a meaning prior to the subject‘s freedom.  Levinas believes that this 
point undermines the Heideggerian approach, stating that it indicates that the world is 
not waiting on the subject to provide it with rational meaning, as ‗intelligibility precedes 
me‘. Levinas maintains that this idea is ‗just the contrary of the notion of 
Geworfenheit‘. 100   In this article Levinas does not offer a more detailed argument 
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against the idea of freedom in the work of both Husserl and Heidegger, however, from 
our readings of his earlier work we can see that he has maintained a consistent position 
in aligning the work of freedom with the meaning giving powers of the subject.  As the 
face is a meaning that comes to the self from the outside, it is ‗prior to all constitution‘ 
and precedes the meaning giving powers of the intentional ego.  Levinas, therefore, 
describes the encounter as prior to the freedom of the subject.  In support of this, 
Levinas emphasises that the face is a signification that is never actually ‗present‘ to 
consciousness, ‗one has already denied that every exteriority must first have been 
immanent, that every past must have been present, that every command is an autonomy, 
and every teaching a reminiscence‘.101   
In an indirect reference to Hegel, Levinas insists that the face-to-face encounter 
is not the clash of two freedoms, ‗like forces which affirm one another in negating one 
another‘.102  Levinas returns to his analysis of tyranny and stresses that the command 
which comes to the subject through the face is not tyranny, and not violence, but 
creation.  As Levinas views the face-to-face encounter as outside of a totality, the 
encounter does not have to result in the supremacy of one or the other, something 
absolutely new is possible.  His use of the term ‗creation‘ once again captures this 
possibility of genuine novelty.
103
  Agreeing with the analysis presented by Socrates in 
Plato‘s Republic Levinas repeats that the tyrant is neither free, nor happy, and takes this 
further by asserting that tyranny is neither action nor freedom.
104
  The subordination of 
the will to the impersonal law of the just State is considered justified as it is based on 
the prior concrete discourse of the face-to-face, ‗as the encounter of man with man‘.105  
Levinas explicitly states that this encounter with the face of the Other is prior to 
freedom and makes freedom possible.  ‗We have sought to set forth exteriority, the 
other, as that which is nowise tyrannical and makes freedom possible.‘106  
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Within this article Levinas may briefly outline why it is that the Other precedes 
my freedom, but he does not fully argue just how it is that the Other ‗makes freedom 
possible‘.  It is also somewhat unclear just what this freedom in the quote above refers 
to. Freedom was used in two different contexts in the article, one to describe the social 
and political liberties that are seen to rest upon the institutions and laws within, and 
protected by a just State, and secondly, in relation to consciousness and the meaning 
giving power of the subject (Sinngebung).  By concluding that the Other makes freedom 
possible, within the context of the article, it would seem that this is referring to both 
freedom in the form of civil liberties, which are claimed to come by living in a just 
State, and the freedom of consciousness understood as Sinngebung and rationality.  The 
former is seen to rest upon the latter, and so, the validity of the argument can be said to 
come down to the demonstration of the latter.  The article demonstrates how it is that 
the subject can accept the State‘s limitations to the personal will, as it rests upon the 
prior command that is the face of the Other.  The limitation to freedom by the State was 
seen as justified by arguing that it is based on the prior command of the face of the 
Other which is also prior to the freedom of consciousness.  However, in order to fully 
justify this position Levinas will need to show further how the prior command that is the 
face of the Other makes freedom of representational consciousness possible.  Within 
this article this important premise is not fully argued, and so it remains to be seen.  
 
§ 3.2.7 ‗THE EGO AND THE TOTALITY‘ (1954)107 
 
In his article from 1954, ‗The Ego and Totality‘, Levinas carries over some of the 
themes addressed in ‗Freedom and Command‘, such as society, work and economic 
relations.  The analysis of such phenomena once again reveals limitations to the 
freedom of the subject.  The main focus of this article, however, is the question of how 
can a being be simultaneously in a position within the totality and also separated from 
it?  In order for exteriority to be present to me, and yet always a more than that if it is to 
remain exterior, it must overflow the terms of consciousness without destroying 
consciousness.
108
  The article also presents a sustained critique of love, as an exclusive 
relationship between two, and consequently excluding ‗the third man‘ and the 
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possibility of justice.  Although freedom figures loosely in every section of the article, it 
is in establishing the central problem at the beginning of the article that we gain an 
additional insight into Levinas‘s view of freedom.  It also helps us to understand why it 
is the qualified Other, the widow, the poor and the orphan, that disturbs the totality of 
the Same, and why the other we choose to love is not other enough.  
 
§ 3.2.8 THE ORIGINS OF THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT  
 
The first section of the article centres on the contrast between an unthinking being that 
lives violently as if it were a totality and a thinking being that is aware of itself as a 
particularity in relation to a totality.  This distinction is not new to Levinas writings so 
far; what is new, however, is the definite link that Levinas makes between biological 
consciousness and violent selfish living on the one hand, and thinking self conscious 
life defined by its openness to exteriority and metaphysical meaning.
109
  Biological 
consciousness is seen as a being that lives purely from and for itself, as a totality, totally 
unaware of, and therefore not concerned with, exteriority.  ‗A simply living being is 
thus in ignorance of the exterior world.‘110  As this being considers nothing outside of 
itself, confusing their particularity with the totality, they are therefore said to live a 
violent life.
111
  Their experience of the world is of mere sensations, for the senses bring 
them nothing of the exteriority.  This self-centred biological consciousness, described as 
closer to ‗instinct‘ than consciousness, lives a life trapped in the same.  Hence not yet 
free but determined by its biological drives.  
There is nothing mysterious in the identity of a living being throughout its 
history: it is essentially the same, the same determining every other, without the 
other ever determining it.
112
    
 
The living being exists purely for itself, there are no other options, and as such the 
living being has two possibilities, freedom or death.  Levinas describes the purely 
biological being as freedom, aligned with the same and violent action.  However, the 
quote above rules out the possibility of genuine choice for the living being trapped in 
the same, as the living being lacks exteriority it also lacks options.  It would seem, 
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therefore, that despite Levinas describing the living biological being as ‗free‘ this 
freedom is used in a very minimal sense as the ability to perform thoughtless self 
referential instinctual actions.  
Biological thoughtless being is separated from a thinking self-conscious being 
by an awareness of the exteriority that ‗lies beyond its nature‘, and its particularity in 
relation to it.
113
  If a purely biological being is said to have a consciousness free of 
problems, an awareness of exteriority complicates matters.  To be conscious of the 
exteriority means that the being becomes ‗metaphysical‘, it has a relationship with an 
exteriority that is not assumed.
114
  For biological consciousness instinct crashes up 
against the exteriority, it is merely an object in its way. Levinas cites Bergson‘s 
Creative Evolution agreeing with the thinker‘s description of ‗instinct illuminated by 
intellect‘, which captures how self-consciousness transforms biological 
consciousness.
115
  This transformation makes labour, society, and economics possible.  
Thinking being can relate to the totality without being reducible to it, or absorbed into 
it.  Levinas then introduces the question of how can a being be simultaneously in a 
position within the totality and also separated from it?  Levinas describes this problem 
as the problem of innocence, stating that it cannot be solved by stating that free beings 
are separated but coexistent. Levinas believes this breaking up of biological 
consciousness, and the introduction of metaphysics to the natural living being, to be 
nothing less than a miracle.  Exteriority breaks up the totality of the same, bringing with 
it not only thought but also possibilities beyond the same.  ‗Thought then is not simply 
reminiscence, but always cognition of the new.‘116  As biological consciousness exists 
within a totality it cannot give itself this required novelty.  It must come from outside of 
the totality, and not be reducible to it.  
This in turn raises the question of how we can account for the beginning of 
thought.  The answer to the question will lead Levinas to the now familiar face-to-face 
encounter.  ‗Thought begins with the possibility of conceiving a freedom external to my 
own‘.117  Arguing that conscience is a necessary condition of thought, Levinas claims 
that we must, therefore, discover the moral conditions for thought.  The path that 
Levinas takes to arrive at that conclusion examines many new themes along the way, 
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such as why love is an inadequate answer to both the question of the origin of thought 
and the question of justice.  Levinas also reflects on society, the third man, labour, the 
products of work, money, finally coming around to economic justice, which, he argues, 
is the realisation of the moral condition for thought.  
 
§ 3.2.9 THE LIMITATIONS OF LOVE 
 
Levinas opens his critique of love through a brief discussion on guilt and innocence.  
Guilt and innocence imply that a free being can both injure another free being and be 
injured, and as such the being is both a totality unto itself and within a totality.
118
  
Levinas believes that an implication of such a position is that although the being must 
be thought of as free in order to be guilty, the fact that they can be wronged and injured 
reveals a vulnerability and limitation to that freedom.  Levinas argues that the tradition 
of the revealed religions have sought to deal with his contradiction, and safeguard the 
free beings sovereignty, through recourse to a transcendent God.  The free being is only 
deficient in relation to God, whom alone can pardon the free being, and maintain the 
free being‘s sovereignty and status as a totality.  Man is a totality in relation to a 
transcendent God who is outside of the totality.
119
  Levinas goes on to argue that this 
solution is no longer sufficient for modern man, who feels guilt in a different way, in a 
way that cannot be pardoned by piety.  This, then, opens up the question of pardon.  
Forgiveness can only come from the one wronged, and consequently, Levinas argues, 
the very possibility of pardon implies an intimate society.  The wronged party can 
choose to forgive the wrong done.  Such an intimate society implies that both parties 
have chosen one another, and therefore, this intimate society supports the totality of the 
ego rather than places it into question.  ‗Such a truly intimate society is in its autarchy 
quite like the false totality of the ego.‘ 120   It is within this context that Levinas 
formulates his critique of love. 
 As love is between two it is a closed society of two that is shut off from any 
third parties.  Within this closed society any wrong done is an offence against the lover, 
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and hence, the lover can grant complete absolution.  Such a relation allows the ego to 
recovery ‗its solitary sovereignty‘.121     
The ego, capable of forgetting its past and renewing itself, but which by its 
action creates the irreparable, would through the pardon be liberated from this 
last shackle to freedom, since the only victim of its act would or could consent 
to forget it.  Absolved, the ego would become again absolute.
122
   
 
As such, an intimate relationship can free the ego of its apparent wrong, removed from 
our true situation in the world, and maintains the false idea of the ego‘s sovereignty.  In 
‗true society‘, as Levinas terms it, which extends beyond such an immediate bond, the 
consequences of our actions likewise extend beyond the immediate intentions or 
obvious results.  One cannot hide behind the excuses and explanations offered to a 
beloved.  Likewise, as the consequences of our actions escape us and reach far beyond 
what we can imagine, so too does the right to pardon disperse out into a wider 
immeasurable context.  Only the other, then, who is outside of the loving dual 
relationship of two, who is exterior to this totality, can alert me to my true wrong doing.  
Only the unimpeachable and severe witness inserting himself ‗between us‘, and 
by his speech making public our private clandestinity, an exacting mediator 
between man and man, faces, and is you.
123
          
  
Religious piety cannot undo and pardon my wrong doing in society.  It is not a wrong 
done against God, but a wrong done against the other man.  Such wrong cannot be 
commensurate with pardon, as from whom would the pardon come?  One is responsible 
for their action, responsible for their very existence, and every consequence that follows 
on from that.  Regardless of whether or not the consequences stretch beyond those 
willed, one is guilty.  To plead ignorance is no defence. ‗The intention cannot 
accompany the action to its last prolongations, which the ego nonetheless knows that it 
is responsible for.‘124  
 Levinas then introduces the political sphere, and the concept of social justice.  
Although religion and love are deemed inadequate to deal with such fault and wrong 
doing, this should not imply that we must, therefore, abandon all hope of pardon and 
resign ourselves to the fact that our very existence will inevitable bring harm to others.  
As society is more complex then the intimacy of two lovers, this calls for justice and a 
universal law.  One cannot rely on the subject alone to come to the realisation that they 
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are guilty, for how can one repent for harm which one is unaware of causing.  The 
accusation must come from the outside.  This line of argument, pursued by Levinas, 
opens up an important implication, namely, that true consciousness of oneself comes 
from the outside, and does not find its source from within the self.  ‗The impasse of 
liberalism is in this exteriority of my consciousness to itself.‘125  At this point of his 
argument Levinas again introduces what he believes to be the primordial function of 
language, in defence of his position, language ‗links us with the outside‘.126       
 
§ 3.2.10 ECONOMY, THE VULNERABILITY OF THE BODY, AND THE OTHER 
 
In section four of the article ‗The Status of the Third Party, and Economy‘, Levinas 
addresses the question of injustice in relation to the third party, believing that real 
injustice, unpardonable injustice, is with respect to a third party only.  Levinas defines 
injustice as the violation of one free being by another.  This, however, presents a 
paradox for this understanding of freedom.  Injustice can only be in relation to a free 
being, and yet, as a free being this being should be impermeable to violence. What then 
can freedom mean?  In one respect freedom implies that a will is impervious to 
influence.  This point raises a similar paradox dealt with in ‗Freedom and Command‘, 
how can a free being be commanded to act against its will.  In this article Levinas deals 
with this issue by arguing that the meaning of the action is not determined by the will 
that acts, and in this way a free being can suffer an injustice.  ‗Though it [the will] be 
the free subject of this willing, it exists as the plaything of a fate which transcends it‘.127  
Levinas does not want the reader to think that fate implies that the will could not have 
acted otherwise, as he is not defending a form of determinism, rather, he is outlining 
that the meaning given to one‘s actions does not come from the subject, as that is 
beyond the subject‘s control.128  ‗As a will productive of works, freedom, without being 
limited in its willing, enters into a history of which it is a plaything.‘129  In acting one 
submits themselves and their work to the judgment of others.  The limitation to the will 
does not come from within the subject, as the subject can act in an infinite number of 
ways, but from the situation beyond which the subject has little or no power over.  ‗In 
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this situation in which a freedom, without in any way abdicating, nonetheless receives a 
meaning which remains alien to it, we recognize a created being.‘130  Such a being is not 
the birth of the universe, meaning precedes and transcends them.               
 This leads Levinas to reflect on the ways in which a will can be deprived of its 
work in economic relations.  Unlike expression, that immediately presents the subject, 
work points towards the subject but marks the subject‘s absence.  In economic relations 
money, be that in the form of steel or gold or paper, gives individuals who have it power 
over those who do not.  One can acquire the work which is the product of the other‘s 
labour.  ‗The will productive of works is a freedom that betrays itself.‘131  In both sense 
of ‗betrays‘, as in shows the freedom of the will and contradicts it.  Although work is 
produced by a free being, it can also be a source of injustice against that free being.  
Levinas asserts that it is this possibility, that others can take hold of the work of the will, 
which makes society possible.  Levinas goes as far as to claim that this shows that the 
ego‘s relationship with a totality is essentially economic. 132   The will is both in 
possession of itself and exterior to itself in the form of its work, and consequently 
reliant on others.  Injustice is possible due to the concrete situation of the human person, 
not as a reflective consciousness or a pondering mind, but as a flesh and blood 
individual who can not only accomplish tasks but who hungers and thirsts, ‗the 
ontological structure of the third party takes shape as a body‘.133  Levinas explores this 
point further by turning to the vulnerability of the body. 
 Levinas‘s comments on the vulnerability of the body once again call into 
question the complete autonomy of the individual.  His simple, yet astute observations 
bring us to reflect on the extent to which any individual can be said to be truly self-
reliant.  Sickness serves as an example to illuminate the self‘s reliance on things and 
others outside of the self.  When an individual is suffering from an illness they are 
forced to seek help and treatment from external sources.  ‗The physician‘s practice, 
already from the time of the first meditations of the Greek sages, gives lie to the 
autarchy of the will.‘134  In line with the stance taken in ‗Freedom and Command‘, 
Levinas concludes this section by stating that it is only through the creation of a world 
that the will can be freed of some of the threats to its freedom, by establishing 
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institutions outside of itself.  However, society itself is no guarantee against oppression.  
In fact society can give rise to many more advanced and long-lasting forms of 
oppression and violence, not open to the world of nature.  Whereas in the natural world 
the domination of a will comes in the form of brute physical violence, the violence of 
society can take many additional forms made possible by society and social institutions 
such as money and unjust economic relations.  Society must also seek to be just, and not 
only in words but in the form of a universal law and the implementation of that law.  
‗Without yet having recourse to justice, the way of peacetime violence, exploitation or 
slow death is substituted for the passion of war.‘135      
  In order to explain where the inclination towards justice and the efforts to 
achieve a just society stem from, Levinas presents his now familiar argument that rests 
on the face of the Other and its disturbance of the Same.  Injustice is not always aware 
of its crime.  The perpetrator may well be blind to how their actions affect others, blind 
to the fact that there are others, and merely naively act in the world alone.  Although 
one may acquire and even feed off the free work of others, Levinas argues, that alone is 
not enough to alert me to my injustice and to ‗catch sight of the possibility of justice‘.136  
A more fundamental and concrete encounter is needed, one that shocks me and calls me 
to account for my very existence.  Language is once again affirmed as a necessary 
element of this encounter, as through language one is addressed, spoken to, and as such 
one finds one‘s self in the position of having a responsibility to respond to the one who 
addresses them, ‗the other does not weigh on the same, but only places it under an 
obligation, makes it responsible, that is, makes it speak‘.137  Language does not link 
thought with an object, it is not between two concepts, but between two persons.  
Levinas affirms his belief in the primal function and origin of language, as human 
sociability, and not founded in propositional discourse or analysis of terms outside of 
that sociability.  When one speaks to another, they are addressed and invoked, not 
known and totalised.  Language, however, does not guarantee the encounter with a face.  
One can disengage from the unique status of the Other and instead speak to them in an 
almost objectified manner.  If one wishes to manipulate another person, and bend them 
to their will, they may use language as a tool to do so.  In such cases, which are 
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common everyday occurrences, one speaks to a ‗disfigured face‘ and the speech is a 
‗form of violence‘.138  
When one is encountered by the face of the Other it breaks through such a social 
totality.  In this article Levinas describes the encounter with the face as ‗transcendence‘, 
and the ‗desensibilization‘ and ‗dematerialization‘ of sense data.139  The encounter with 
the face rises above and beyond the totality.  Although in the face of the Other the self is 
confronted by the command, ‗you shall not murder‘, and consequently the power to 
negate the Other is nullified, this command is not an affront to the self‘s freedom.  
‗Speech is thus a relationship between freedoms which neither limit nor negate, but 
affirm, one another. They are transcendent with respect to each other.‘140   Levinas 
describes the relation between the two as between equals, and returns to his contrast 
with love, which is an inequality.  This face-to-face relation is the primordial encounter 
that is the condition for ethics, society, and justice.  Although the foundation of justice 
is to be found outside of the totality, justice itself belongs to the totality, and so can only 
be strived for and maintained within the totality.  This, however, should not provide 
society with a justification for injustice.  When society fails to make economic relations 
just, it is a weak and invalid excuse to hide behind the fact that the multiplicity of 
society is based on the concrete intimate relation of the face-to-face encounter, and 
therefore, to hold justice as unachievable outside of that intimate relation.
141
  
Levinas goes on to argue that one‘s value as a particular unique person is not 
reducible to the way in which one can economically contribute to the totality.  Yet, 
despite this, money and economic transactions bring with them the means for one 
freedom to have a hold over another freedom.  Money has the power to ‗corrupt the 
will‘, and yet it also brings with it the ability for individuals to maintain relations in 
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their absence.
142
  It enables people to delay gratification, to postpone needs and desires, 
and to develop trust and build a society.  Mere survival is no longer the immediate 
concern, and time takes on a different significance.  People can live beyond the 
immediate moment.  Money can grant us time.  Although money is used to quantify 
man, and would therefore seem to be an affront to justice, Levinas argues that 
nonetheless money is an essential condition for justice.  Without money human violence 
could only be repaired through vengeance or pardon, which never brings reparation but 
extends that violence into the future.  Although it is the economy that totalises people, 
and brings with it injustice, it also brings money, which, Levinas maintains, provides 
the category for the common measure between men. 
 
§ 3.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REFLECTION ON FREEDOM IN ‗PHILOSOPHY AND THE  
IDEA OF INFINITY‘ (1957)143 
 
In Levinas‘s 1957 essay ‗Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity‘, the excessive character of 
exteriority comes to the fore through Levinas‘s appropriation of the Cartesian idea of 
infinity.
144
 Although this article marks the beginning of some important new 
developments, there is also continuity with Levinas‘s earlier thought, shown through a 
re-emergence of his criticism of paganism, earlier linked with Nationalism Socialism, 
and now tied directly to Heidegger‘s philosophy.  The sheer ambition of Levinas‘s 
philosophy, and the wide range of work spanning the whole of the Western 
philosophical tradition that is called into question by his approach and criticised by him 
that was only hinted at by him before, becomes explicitly evident in this article.  One 
such fundamental, almost sacred principle of the tradition, called to justify itself and 
account for its meaning, is freedom.  One could justifiably argue that this pivotal article 
is as much about philosophy and the idea of freedom as it is about infinity.  The central 
and honoured place that freedom has occupied within the tradition supports Levinas‘s 
claim that the dominating tendency within the intellectual history of the West has been 
to prioritise the same and seek to dominate and possess all otherness.  Levinas‘s 
investigations ask us to consider if this propensity has provided us with an accurate 
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portrayal of what it means to be a human person, and if it captures the full range of our 
‗experience‘ of being a human.145  Or, has philosophers reflections begun too late, by 
taking autonomy and freedom as the starting point, and in doing so overlooked a more 
primordial fundamental event that not only founds that freedom but justifies it?  This 
article follows an almost identical line of argument to that which is developed and 
presented in more detail in Totality and Infinity.
146
   
 
§ 3.3.1 FREEDOM UNDERSTOOD AS AUTONOMY  
 
Levinas opens the article by stating that every philosophy seeks truth, and then goes on 
to identify and argue for a division within philosophy based on two differing 
inclinations in relation to the search for truth.
147
  On the one hand is the search for truth 
that is marked by a journey away from what is familiar and towards the ‗absolutely 
other‘, toward a transcendent exteriority. 148   This search for truth through an 
engagement with difference, and the beyond, Levinas refers to as heteronomy.  On the 
other hand is the spirit of philosophy that Levinas names autonomy and aligns with 
freedom.  In opposition to heteronomy, which seeks truth in difference, autonomy finds 
truth within the same, and in doing so seeks to know and posses all otherness, reducing 
it to the primacy of the same.
149
  
Perceived in this way, philosophy would be engaged in reducing to the same all 
that is opposed to it as other.  It would be moving toward auto-nomy, a stage in 
which nothing irreducible would limit thought any longer, in which, 
consequently, thought, non-limited, would be free.  Philosophy would thus be 
tantamount to the conquest of being by man over the course of history.
150
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Levinas plays on the etymology of autonomy (αὐτόνομος), emphasising that in 
philosophy understood in this way, the same is only answerable to itself, governed by 
self law.  There is no limitation to the self‘s freedom and no outside laws restricting the 
power of the ego.
151
  In his short, three paragraphs description, of the spirit of 
philosophy defined as autonomy, Levinas uses the words free (libre) and freedom 
(liberté) seven times.  In the one paragraph description of philosophy marked by 
heteronomy freedom in never mentioned.  Throughout the article, autonomy and 
freedom are used almost interchangeably: ‗Freedom, autonomy, the reduction of the 
other to the same, lead to this formula: the conquest of being by man over the course of 
history‘.152  In philosophy understood in this way freedom is seen as the highest value.  
Levinas‘s description presents a strong and striking critique of the Western 
Philosophical tradition.  Although he has distinguished between two general 
approaches, he goes on to argue that the dominant spirit has been autonomy.  ‗The 
choice of Western philosophy has most often been on the side of freedom and the 
same‘.153  Even though there have been some notable exceptions to this general rule, 
they are few are far between.
154
  From the Pre-Socratics to the present day the goal of 
Philosophy has been the acquisition of wisdom.  In seeking to know philosophy has 
sought to contain and to possess.  The Western traditions unwillingness to allow room 
for difference and their inability to think of particulars without any reference to the 
universal, has led to the privileging of the ‗same‘ over the other.  
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Western thought very often seemed to exclude the transcendent, envelop every 
other in the same, and proclaim the philosophical birthright of autonomy.
155
  
 
§ 3.3.2 PHILOSOPHY AND KNOWLEDGE AS APPROPRIATION AND POWER 
 
Levinas moves on to further explain this previously identified dominant propensity 
within the history of western philosophical thought by adding ‗narcissism‘ to the set of 
characteristics that best describe this tendency.  Just like Narcissus, who was transfixed 
in his own self adoration, the philosophy of the same takes freedom as ‗a sure right‘ and 
seeks no further justification for this right.
156
  When such a freedom encounters 
anything foreign, instead of questioning this revered freedom in the face of such 
difference, it regards the foreign being as an obstacle to be overcome and integrated into 
the life of the Same.
157
  One such way of possessing the object is through knowledge. 
The original difference and foreignness is subdued through understanding.  ‗The search 
for truth becomes the very respiration of a free being, exposed to exterior realities that 
shelter, but also threaten, its freedom.‘ 158   Levinas refers to Plato‘s description of 
philosophy as a dialogue that the soul has with itself (Sophist 263e4 and 264a9), and his 
view that knowledge is a recollection (anamnēsis), as epitomizing this view of 
philosophy, ‗every lesson introduced into the soul was already in it‘. 159   Hence, 
philosophy is best described as an egology, the soul discussing with itself is monologue, 
not dialogue.  
 When exteriority has been confronted, within the tradition, it is reduced to a 
concept and a knowable object.  The way it is known is in and through its generality.  
Philosophy is not alone in its endeavor to preserve freedom in this way.  The intellectual 
history of the West gave rise to science, whose very methodology rests on overlooking 
particular differences in favor of general laws and principles that can be derived from 
such observations.  The drive to know, possess, and contain all foreignness may have 
begun as an intellectual endeavor, but it did not exhaust or contain its reach.  ‗In a 
civilization which the philosophy of the same reflects, freedom is realized as a wealth.  
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Reason, which reduces the other, is appropriation and power.‘ 160   Levinas‘s 
characterization of philosophy as dominated by freedom and autonomy is not meant as a 
benign ‗innocent‘ reflection on philosophy, nor is it restricted to the intellectual history 
of the West.  Levinas believes that this propensity within the tradition, from the pre-
Socratics on, has seeped into the social and political development of the West, and 
given rise to imperialism and colonization, evident not only in thought but also in 
deeds.
161
   This has given rise to war, which may display the clash of freedoms, but the 
clash of freedoms does not guarantee the putting into question of freedom.   
 
§ 3.3.3 HEIDEGGER AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SAME 
 
Throughout his career, Levinas may have continually praised Heidegger for his 
intellectual thoroughness and ingenuity, but this does not save him from this particular 
criticism.  Not only is Heidegger included within this negative assessment of 
philosophy, in some respects Levinas believes him to be the pinnacle of such a tradition, 
‗he is not destroying, but summing up a whole current of Western philosophy‘.162  
Levinas sees it as no coincidence that the author of Being and Time had early 
sympathies with National Socialism.  In an interview that took place in 1992 Levinas 
was asked if he believed there was a connection between Heidegger‘s philosophy and 
his political engagement, Levinas responded:  
The absence of concern for the other in Heidegger and his personal political 
adventure are bound up together.  And despite all my admiration for the 
grandeur of his thought, I could never share this double aspect of his 
positions.
163
      
 
Heidegger may be radically different from the tradition in some crucial aspects, 
however, Levinas believes that within his philosophy the unique particularity and 
singularity of beings is still overlooked.  Though Heidegger‘s descriptions of Dasein 
questions the priority of consciousness, and replaces the ego, Dasein is still a being for 
whom its own being is an issue for it, above all else.  ‗The Dasein Heidegger puts in 
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place of the soul, consciousness, or the ego, retains the structure of the same.‘164  The 
question of the meaning of Being takes precedence over the question of the meaning of 
the human being.  Dasein remains utterly self-centred.  Concerned with its own being 
and its own death.  
 As Levinas has described the tradition as prioritising freedom above all else, he 
wonders whether or not Heidegger‘s philosophy could be said to be different from the 
tradition in that respect, as even Dasein‘s freedom ultimately depends on the ‗light of 
Being‘.165  Peperzak believes that Levinas is referring here to Heidegger‘s principle of 
Entschlossenheit (resoluteness).
166
  Despite Dasein‘s being as Being-unto-death, Dasein 
can still live as an authentic being by resolutely accepting its own most possibility, and 
in that sense be free.
167
  However, Levinas decides that it is still not that different from 
the tradition, as within the tradition, especially within modern philosophy, free will is 
seen as a low form of freedom, whereas true free is often depicted as the aligning of 
one‘s will with a greater universal reason.168  On this point in this article Peperzak 
notes, 
[b]y will and freedom, neither Descartes nor Kant nor Hegel nor Levinas mean 
the power to choose freely among different possibilities. Classical philosophy 
has always insisted on the difference between freedom of choice (or, as Kant 
puts it, Willkür) and the true freedom that obeys reason and reasonable laws.
169
 
 
Within this tradition freedom is still within the confines of the Same, as particular 
differences are subordinated to a greater universal law and universal reason.  What is 
also interesting to note about this point, in addition to Peperzak‘s reading, is that within 
this tradition freedom is even further aligned with reason and knowledge, as the 
supreme principle.  By placing freedom into question, and asking if it is an 
unquestionable fundamental principle, one is also questioning both the priority of and 
grounding for reason and critical consciousness.  By positing a moment older than and 
prior to freedom, Levinas is positing a more fundamental and primordial event that is 
older than the ego and that instigates freedom.  Although Heidegger does not prioritise 
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reason, and describes Dasein‘s more fundamental engagement with the world, in 
Heidegger too, freedom is obedient to a higher principle, and is never questioned or 
judged as unethical.  Further, Levinas argues that within Heidegger‘s philosophy there 
is no transcendent principle such as a Deity, infinity, or the Good.  Nothing outside of 
the Same that can put the Same into question.     
In a further blow to Heidegger, Levinas‘s link between paganism and National 
Socialism presented in his 1934 article, ‗Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism‘, is 
carried over into this article, only now in 1957 the philosophy of Heidegger is explicitly 
connected to both.  The similarity that is drawn between the three is the emphasis on 
‗nature‘ and man‘s ‗enrootedness‘ to the earth.170  Although the later Heidegger is very 
critical of technology, Levinas believes that this does not lead to a criticism of an older 
unethical power structure that is viewed as natural and hence goes unquestioned.
171
  The 
earth is taken as neutral, and any behaviour that can be seen as natural is therefore 
‗ethically indifferent‘ and justified, ‗foreign to all guilt with regard to the other‘.172  
Such an existence, that takes its self and its actions to be natural, could never question 
its place in the sun and is therefore ethically indifferent, ‗a heroic freedom‘.173  Taking 
this point further, Levinas argues that this ‗earth-maternity‘ gave rise to further unjust 
power structures and exploitation, such as ‗property, exploitation, political tyranny, and 
war‘.174  On this reading Heidegger‘s work is seen to affirm freedom over justice, which 
to Levinas‘s mind is both a dangerous and unethical position to maintain.  By remaining 
within this unethical paradigm, unjust social structures can go unchallenged. By 
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privileging the Same over and against the other we privilege strong individualism, 
domination, totalitarianism and power over rather than power with or power for the 
‗other‘.  By taking the free subject as the unquestioned starting point, any threat to that 
freedom from the outside is seen as an obstacle to be overcome, and not as someone to 
be welcomed.  How, then, is the freedom of the Same put into question? 
 
§ 3.3.4 SURPASSING THE POWERS OF THE SUBJECT 
 
Despite the dominance of the philosophy of the Same within the tradition, it is not the 
only spirit of philosophy, there are also other sources that Levinas can call upon.  
Levinas returns now to his first description of philosophy, described as ‗heteronomy‘ in 
the opening section of the article. Although Levinas wishes to argue from a 
philosophical perspective, this new approach that Levinas wishes to open up is, to some 
extent, informed by his religious tradition.  Levinas‘s attempt to take the wisdom of the 
biblical tradition, and translate it into philosophical argument, is summed up by this 
now familiar phrase among Levinas commentators, he sought to translate Hebrew into 
Greek.
175
  Despite this influence, on many occasions Levinas emphasizes that one does 
not need to look beyond the philosophical tradition to find examples of thinkers that did 
not favor ‗right in might‘, or did not reduce every other to the same.176  One very 
important way that he manages to think both within and outside of the tradition, and to 
strike a balance between speaking to the tradition and forging a new path, is to 
appropriate a well-known philosophical category, and deploy it in a very new and 
radical way.  This concept is the Cartesian concept of infinity, as presented in 
Descartes‘ Meditations on First Philosophy.  
At first glance one may well be skeptical of Levinas‘s use of Descartes‘ thought 
to move outside of the tradition within which, Levinas claims, the Same dominated.  
Anyone in anyway familiar with Descartes is well aware of his cogito, his famous 
affirmation and bedrock of certainty of all knowledge-claims, ‗I think therefore I am‘, 
and so would be justified in their initial unease upon discovering that Levinas was 
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attracted to Cartesian thought.  Where is the ‗other‘ in the Cartesian cogito?  Initially the 
only thing that Descartes can be sure of is the existence of his own mind, he cannot 
even be sure that his own body exists, let alone entertain the existence of others.  It 
would seem that Cartesian thought fits very well into the dominant characterization of 
Western Philosophy given by Levinas, a tradition dominated by egoism, emphasizing 
the individual and the dominance of the Same over and against the other.  Levinas 
paradoxically sees a potential in the concept that Descartes used to ontologically prove 
the existence of God, only Levinas takes the formal design of the structure of the 
concept of infinity and uses it for a different purpose.  
Descartes reasons, quite rightly according to Levinas, that he himself could not 
possibly be the source of the concept of infinity.  The two crucial points that Levinas 
takes from this idea, firstly, is that the subject is affected from the outside, and cannot 
be said to be the origin of the idea, and secondly, the idea is greater than that which the 
self can contain.  The ‗I‘ thinking the concept of infinity can in no way contain infinity 
nor exhaust the content of the thought, as the ideatum surpasses the idea.  The ‗I‘ ‗thinks 
more than it thinks‘. 177  This more than in the Same cannot be deduced from the 
consciousness of the thinking subject, ‗[i]t has been put into us. It is not 
reminiscence‘.178  This is a crucial point for Levinas, and it helps to philosophically 
support his argument that the encounter with the Other occurs prior to the freedom of 
the subject, and is not derived from the power and the freedom of the ego.  It is a 
moment of excessive exteriority. ‗The infinite is the radically, absolutely, other‘.179 This 
structure of thinking, however, can be seen to cause a problem for consciousness and 
freedom.  How can a finite subject encounter infinity, and yet not be consumed through 
this encounter?  Infinity, in order to be infinity, must overflow the terms of 
consciousness and yet not be fatal to it.  Levinas may well question the origins and 
meaning of freedom, but he does not want to undermine the freedom of the subject.  If 
the encounter with the infinite does not leave the subject intact, and the separation 
between the subject and infinity is not maintained, the philosophy of the Same will 
prove to be valid.    
 
 
                                                 
177
 Ibid., p. 55. 
178
 Ibid., p. 54, my emphasis. 
179
 Ibid., p. 55. 
 205 
§ 3.3.5 THE IDEA OF INFINITY AND THE OTHER  
 
Levinas moves to explicitly link the idea of infinity to the Other (Autrui), a link that he 
will maintain in his later work.  Through the encounter with the face of the Other the 
self encounters the infinite, an absolute exteriority that can never be contained by the 
self.  It is a moment of ethical meaning that comes to the self from the outside and 
places the self into question.  By linking the notion of infinity to the epiphany of the 
face, Levinas argues that the absolute exteriority of the Other is guaranteed, as the finite 
‗I‘ could not be the source of this idea.  To make this point clear Levinas contrasts this 
encounter with the subject-object relation, wherein through knowledge the object is 
fully integrated into the Same.
180
  In contrast with an object, the Other is beyond the I‘s 
power of appropriation.  This ‗no‘ that the Other opposes to the subject‘s attempt to 
consume and contain the Other is again described by Levinas as the command ―You 
shall not kill‖.181  Confronted by the defenseless Other, and the realization that the 
Other escapes the power of the I, the egotistical self-centered life of the subject comes 
to an end.  Only with this encounter is the self truly introduced to exteriority for the first 
time.  If the face of the Other remains unseen the subject continues to live alone in the 
world, violently consuming every foreign object, be that physically or through 
conscious cognition.       
The solipsist disquietude of consciousness, seeing itself, in all its adventures, a 
captive of itself, comes to an end here: true exteriority is in the gaze which 
forbids me my conquest.
182
 
 
Given that the Other is said to precede and give rise to critical consciousness, if we were 
to read this argument as a linear or logically chronological argument, then the argument 
would quickly descend into circularity.  Levinas would be accused of presupposing that 
which the Other is said to bring, namely, consciousness.  As we shall see in our next 
chapter, this particular problem arises from such a straight forward linear reading of 
Levinas‘s descriptions, which is in fact unhelpful.  We must keep in mind that the 
interruption of the Other occurs at the level of the sensate passive self, which is ‗prior‘ 
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to consciousness, and departs before consciousness arrives.  Levinas will describe this 
strange logic in more detail in Totality and Infinity.       
Though it is only touched upon, this section of the article seems to imply that the 
encounter with the face of the Other brings with it an ethical reversal of the self‘s 
priorities, ‗the structure of my freedom is […] completely reversed‘.183  Infinity puts a 
stop to the imperialism of the Same.  The resistance to murder that is inscribed in the 
face of the Other, and is revealed to the self when the Other speaks, is not real but 
ethical. Levinas argues that if the resistance was a ‗real‘ resistance it would be 
encountered as a force opposed to the subject‘s will, and hence an obstacle to the 
subject‘s freedom that could be consumed by the subject.  However, as it is an ethical 
resistance, the self encounters true exteriority, which means that it is beyond any 
attempt to possess it.  In this encounter the freedom of self is judged to be not only 
arbitrary but also unjust.  This position seems to imply that Levinas regards the subject 
who is confronted by the face as ‗free‘ prior to the encounter, as their freedom is called 
into question and judged to be arbitrary and unjust.  
At the end of this section of the article Levinas describes the Other as closer to 
God than the subject, as in order to put the subject‘s egoism into question the Other 
must be higher than the subject, ‗his gaze must come to me from a dimension of the 
ideal‘.184  It is the subject who is called into question, confronted and judged, and 
consequently found to be unethical.  The subject must respond to the Other and it is in 
this sense that the subject is understood to be lower than the Other.  The Other is 
privileged above the self, whose self-centeredness is reversed as a result of the 
encounter. Levinas calls this event ‗the first given of moral consciousness‘, and points 
out that it is not an invention of a philosopher.
185
  Levinas is not setting out a normative 
ethical approach but describing the conditions that render morality possible at all.  The 
encounter with the Other is not a basis for a universal ethics, as this would overlook the 
fact that it is ‗me‘ who is confronted and must respond, and not a universalisable subject 
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or transcendental I.
186
  The face does not appeal to reason, nor does it offer the subject 
arguments which the subject can deliberate over and finally arrive at a choice.  The face 
is prior to such reasoning and affects the self at the level of embodied sensibility.    
Levinas moves on to show how the ethical relation is a primary and foundational 
relation and not ‗grafted on‘ to an earlier cognitive engagement with the world, ‗it is a 
foundation and not a superstructure‘.187  In saying this, however, Levinas does not want 
the reader to deduce from this the conclusion that this ethical meaning, which comes 
from outside, is therefore a subjective sentiment or feeling.  If this was the case it would 
be interiority and would not break the confines of the Same.  The ethical experience of 
the face of the Other is an experience with exteriority, that has a structure different from 
contemplation.
188
  
 
§ 3.3.6 FREEDOM OF SPONTANEITY CALLED INTO QUESTION  
 
In the final section of the article Levinas turns to a question that is of most importance 
for our purposes, it is the question of how the face is outside of the powers of the will, 
and therefore beyond the freedom of the subject.  Levinas asks, ‗[i]s not knowing a face 
acquiring a consciousness of it, and is not to acquire consciousness to adhere freely?‘189  
If the experience of the Other is not reducible to, nor containable within, the 
consciousness of the subject, how then are we to make sense of it, and what does it 
mean for the freedom of the subject?  Levinas notes that the view that individual choice 
and free will is on the final analysis arbitrary is not new to philosophy, and is a position 
held by many philosophers.
190
 However, even within this tradition the ‗elementary 
stage‘ of freedom of choice is seen as subordinate to the power of the subject to submit 
one‘s will to a universal reason.191  Freedom remains as the primary principle, therefore, 
freedom as such is never placed into question, hence freedom and the Same still 
dominate.  
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The very spontaneity of freedom is not put into question — such seems to be the 
dominant tradition of Western philosophy.  Only the limitation of freedom 
would be tragic or scandalous.
192
          
 
It is not the freedom of choice and freedom of the will, which Levinas seeks a 
justification for, rather he is questioning the meaning and justification of the existence 
of the spontaneous free subject, that can either live entirely for itself, which is to live 
unethically, or, miraculously, can also live for the Other.  In this section a subtle 
question that runs underneath the explicit narrative is the question of how moral 
conscience is possible at all.  The presence of moral conscience in itself calls into 
question the priority given to freedom and sovereignty as first principles. How do we 
account for conscience and shame we feel before the face of another in need? 
Levinas refers to the social contract tradition, Hobbes in particular, to 
demonstrate the pride of place freedom is given in modern political theories, as this 
approach bases the advent of social order on the ‗incontestable right‘ and freedom of the 
subject.  In the Hobbesian tradition the individual is viewed as first and foremost free, 
and concerned primarily with its own survival.  As the autonomous individual exists in 
a world populated with other autonomous individuals, who are caught up in their own 
struggle for survival, inevitably clashes will occur between these individuals.  In order 
to safeguard survival, and generally improve the quality of life, individuals decide to 
surrender some of their freedoms in the name of freedom.  The limitation of freedom is 
seen as justified only in as far as it is done in the interest of freedom for self-
preservation.  What Levinas highlights is that freedom is only limited, but freedom as 
such is never questioned.  In contrast to this, Levinas‘s social philosophy ultimately 
rests on the face-to-face encounter, which is the putting into question the arbitrary and 
egoist freedom of the self.  For Levinas, society did not emerge as an attempt to 
preserve self-interest and the safety of the self, but to create institutions and conditions 
that could preserve and safeguard the safety of the multiple Others whom one individual 
could not attend to all at once.  Hence it is a ‗social conscience‘ and not a personal self-
interested consciousness that is the legitimate basis of a ‗society as such‘ for Levinas.  
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§ 3.3.7 SHAME  
 
Through the encounter with the Other the self comes to realise just how arbitrary, unjust 
and shameful its existence is.
193
  In the face of the Other the self is measured against 
infinity, and comes up wanting.
194
  In this article Levinas introduces ‗shame‘ (honte) 
into his description of the response that the self has to the encounter with infinity, the 
encounter with the Other.  ‗Shame‘ almost acts as an indicator as to whether or not the 
face of the Other has been ‗seen‘.  One knows that they have seen the face of the Other 
when they are left feeling shameful for their very existence.  Simply by living, one is 
using resources and taking up space that cannot, therefore, be used by another.  ‗It is a 
shame (honte) freedom has of itself, discovering itself to be murderous and usurpatory 
(usurpatrice) in its very exercise.‘195  The self‘s spontaneous self-centred existence is 
almost mirrored for them in the face of the Other, and seeing themselves in this light for 
the first time, they feel ashamed.  In this passage Levinas clearly implies that the 
individual who is confronted by the Other is a ‗freedom‘ who becomes ashamed of such 
freedom because they come to realise that this freedom is ‗murderous and usurpatory‘.  
Given that through the encounter the self comes to be ashamed of its freedom, this 
would seem to imply that the self was free prior to the encounter.  However, the use of 
term ‗usurpatory‘ (usurpatrice) implies that this freedom has been wrongfully taken, 
seized and snatched.  There is no justification or value in the self-centred egoistic life 
that the self has been living.  The self has been living as if they were alone in the world, 
free from any genuine exteriority, as anything foreign is grasped by the self.  The fact 
that this freedom is described as ‗usurpatory‘ this still leaves open the question of the 
justification of this freedom that was wrongfully taken, it also leaves open the question 
of the origins of this freedom.  
Despite stating that through the encounter with the Other freedom comes to 
know itself as unjust, in the very next passage Levinas moves on to argue that freedom 
is invested from the outside.  Utilising a story about a second century exegete, Levinas 
argues that spontaneity, synonymous with freedom for Levinas, cannot be justified 
through recourse to itself.  In order for freedom to be justified, the justification must 
come from the outside.  If one was to take freedom as a given, without questioning the 
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origins or meaning of freedom, it could only be murderous and usurpatory, as this 
freedom could only be for the self and for the fulfilment of the self‘s needs through 
consuming the exterior and taking it fully into the self.  However, when freedom is 
understood as given by the Other, and through ‗seeing‘ the Other the self can live for 
the Other, freedom is justified and can be seen as good.  The exterior can remain 
inconsumable, foreign, and other.   
Existence is not condemned to freedom, but judged and invested as a freedom 
(mais jugée et investie comme liberté).  Freedom could not present itself all 
naked.  This investiture of freedom (investiture de la liberté) constitutes moral 
life itself, which is through and through a heteronomy.
196
  
 
The use of the term ‗investiture of freedom‘ implies that freedom comes to the self 
through a shameful encounter with exteriority, with the Other.  ‗Investiture‘, from the 
Latin term investire, directly translated as to robe or to dress, is formally used to 
describe the act of bestowing a position.  As Levinas uses this term in this context we 
can take from this that the Other bestows freedom on the self.  
As it seems to be the case that Levinas is arguing that freedom is bestowed on 
the self from the outside, how are we to understand Levinas‘s simultaneous position that 
through the encounter the self comes to see its freedom as unjust, a freedom that 
without the investiture of the other would be arbitrary and egoistical.  Although the 
above passage implies that the self only becomes free when the Other invests the self as 
a freedom, Levinas describes freedom as becoming good through the encounter and this 
can seem to complicate any attempt to understand whether or not the self is said to be 
free prior to the encounter.  How can freedom, which is only invested through the 
encounter, become good in that very encounter, if it did not exist before hand?  
Helpfully, Levinas moves on to explain that freedom putting itself into question is an 
‗infinite‘ movement, which is never complete.  It is not a once off occurrence that 
transforms unethical egoistic freedom into ethical freedom.  
The structure of the free will becoming goodness is not like the glorious and 
self-sufficient spontaneity of the I and of happiness, which would be the ultimate 
movement of being; it is, as it were, its converse.  The life of freedom 
discovering itself to be unjust, the life of freedom in heteronomy, consists in an 
infinite movement of freedom putting itself ever more into question.  This is how 
the very depth of inwardness is hollowed out.
197
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Moral life is a continual movement whereby the self constantly questions 
whether or not they are good enough.  In Levinas‘s later writings it becomes clear that 
for Levinas ones responsibility towards the Other is never fulfilled.  The most moral 
among us will always feel as though they have failed the Other, no matter what they do.  
They will always know that more could have been done for the Other, and so, they will 
never measure up against their own judgment.  One can never be rid of their shame as 
they can never fulfil their responsibility.  Hence, to sum up this position, Levinas will 
often reference Dostoyevsky‘s Brothers Karamazov, ‗[e]ach of us is guilty [responsible] 
before everyone for everyone, and I more [responsible] than the others‘.198  The seeds of 
this later position are evident in this article, ‗infinite movement of freedom putting itself 
ever more into question‘.  The putting into question the naive right of my freedom is 
never a completed task.  This is a continual movement.  This passage also helps us to 
further understand Levinas‘s claim that the encounter with the Other both invests the 
self with freedom and places this freedom into question, and by doing so makes the 
structure of the free will good.  Coming to be ashamed of one‘s freedom does not have 
to imply that one was free before encountering the Other.  One will always be ashamed 
of their freedom and their failure towards the Other.  The self comes to know that their 
spontaneous existence is arbitrary, if it is not for the Other.  
 
§ 3.3.8 CONSCIENCE PRECEDES FREEDOM 
 
In an attempt to further illustrate how moral conscience can never be satisfied, and 
one‘s responsibility towards the Other can never be fulfilled, Levinas returns to his term 
desire.  Although Levinas discussed desire and need in Existence and Existents, the 
developed understanding of desire used in his later work begins to emerge here.  Desire 
is linked with infinity and contrasted with ‗need‘, as the hallmark of a desire is that it 
can never be satisfied.  The relationship with the Other has such a structure.  This also 
further explains one aspect of why Levinas describes the Other as higher than the self.  
The Other is a desire that will remain beyond the self.  The Other opens up a dimension 
of height, and a goodness that eludes the grasp of the self.  A lack that can never be 
filled is introduced to the self-reliant subject.  Not only does desire convey the infinite 
depths of moral conscience, but it also demonstrates that it is a relationship more 
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fundamental than knowledge, and cannot be described through theory and concepts.  
This ever increasing demand that is placed on the self and can never be fulfilled opens 
up a space within the self, an inwardness, ‗the systole of consciousness as such‘.199  
Levinas is not describing a reorientation of consciousness, or a particular variation of 
consciousness that is produced as a result of the encounter with the Other.  Rather, he is 
describing an event more primal and more fundamental than even consciousness itself.  
The encounter with the Other occurs prior to freedom and prior to the subject‘s ability 
to conceptualise experiences and be reflective and critical. 
Ethical consciousness itself is not invoked in this exposition as a ‗particularly 
recommendable‘ variety of consciousness, but as the concrete form of a 
movement more fundamental than freedom, the idea of infinity.  It is the 
concrete form of what precedes freedom, but does not lead us back to violence, 
the confusion of what is separated, necessity, or fatality.
200
  
 
This movement more fundamental than freedom, which opens up the self to an 
excessive exteriority and an excess of meaning that cannot be contained, is ethics.  As 
Peperzak succinctly puts it,  
[t]hus ethics cannot be understood as a secondary discipline based on a 
theoretical philosophy, an ontology, or epistemology that would precede any 
command or normativity.  The ethical relation is not a ‗superstructure‘ but rather 
the foundation of all knowledge, and the analysis of this relation constitutes a 
‗first philosophy‘.201   
 
The solitary free ego is, in some respects, an intellectual abstraction.  The very 
beginning of one‘s existence occurs inside the other.  To a greater or lesser extent one‘s 
life is always dependent on others.  The intellectual history of the West has perhaps 
forgotten and overlooked that primal fact.
202
  It is this fundamental foundational aspect 
of what it is to be human that Levinas is examining.  One is not alone.  
This reading is further affirmed in the next paragraph where Levinas argues that 
what he is describing is outside of the sphere of ‗proof‘ precisely because it is prior to 
freedom and critical consciousness.  ‗[T]he situation in which the free will is invested 
precedes proof‘.203  Proof can only be demonstrated to a free will who can understand 
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that proof, and hence takes place at the level of a critical free consciousness.  The Other, 
however, precedes this level of consciousness.  The individual does not make a 
controlled decision to move out of their solipsistic world and toward the Other in an 
approach of their making and choosing.  For this would be an instance of the freedom of 
the ‗I‘, the dominating ego, striving to control and possess the Other by seeing it as an 
object that the I can know and possess.  It is the Other who shocks the self prior to 
cognition, which for Levinas is linked to freedom and the subject‘s ability to know, and 
hence the Other disturbs the self prior to freedom. Interruption of the same by the Other 
is outside of the paradigms of both knowledge and proof as it occurs prior to this 
weighing up, prior to reflective consciousness.  It can never be a question of proof, as 
Levinas phrases it,  
proof already presupposes the movement and adherence of a free will, a 
certainty.  Thus the situation in which the free will is invested precedes proof. 
For every certainty is the work of a solitary freedom.
204
  
 
 
If autonomy is deemed to be prior to the encounter with the Other, the Other can 
only ever be a moment of the life of the Same.  If the ego is said to constitute the Other, 
then the Same can never be taken by surprise and judged by an exteriority that remains 
exterior.  If the autonomous subject is said to come first then freedom could only ever 
be murderous and usurpatory, freedom could never be justified, never be ‗good‘.  
Levinas avoids this problem by making sure to stress that the Other is not a 
phenomenon that the self encounters, constitutes and bestows a meaning on.  The Other 
is a moment of excessive exteriority that brings meaning from the outside. 
No movement of freedom could appropriate a face to itself or seem to 
‗constitute‘ it.  The face has already been there when it was anticipated or 
constituted; it collaborated in that work, it spoke.
205
      
 
The Other is outside of all concepts and beyond comprehension.  This, however, does 
not have to result in a negative analysis, whereby the ego is said to fail in its attempts to 
comprehend.  This deficiency is seen as positive, as the lack creates a space for 
conscience and desire.
206
  Conscience precedes freedom and is inaugurated from the 
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outside.  It is a primordial mode of the self prior to what has been traditional considered 
to be most fundamental, freedom.  
Then if the essence of philosophy consists in going back from all certainties 
toward a principle, if it lives from critique, the face of the other would be the 
starting point of philosophy.
207
  
 
Consciousness, as the presence of the self to the self, could be said to be explained 
without recourse to anything else.  The depths of conscience, however, felt as shame for 
one‘s existence in the face of the Other, can only stem from the encounter with the 
Other.  
 Levinas is not describing a symmetrical meeting of equals, who freely choose to 
converse with one another.  Morality is more rigorous and more demanding than that.  
One is responsible for the Other and guilty before them, but one has no right to expect 
the Other to be equally responsible for them.  It is an asymmetrical relationship whereby 
the self‘s freedom is placed into question and judged by the Other, leaving the self 
ashamed.  In the last sentence of the article Levinas describes the Other as having a 
position of height in relation to the self.  ‗Height‘ is used to convey to the reader that 
this encounter is a metaphysical ethical encounter, and not an empirical fact whereby 
two human beings stand in front of one another.  The ethical meaning transcends the 
ontological fact.  The Other is said to be higher than the self, for, exposed to the infinite 
through the face of the Other, the self comes to glimpse ‗the ideal‘ and is judged against 
it.
208
  It is the self who is taken by surprise and has no choice in responding to the Other, 
even if the response is to ignore their gaze.  No one can take the place of the ‗I‘, who 
alone is called to respond.
209
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§ 3.3.9 DISSYMMETRY
210
  
 
Despite the significant influence of the dialogical tradition on Levinas, most notably 
Buber, the lack of symmetry in Levinas‘s description of the encounter with the Other is 
an obvious point of departure between them.
211
  Levinas emphasizes this very point in 
his article, ‗Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge‘, written shortly after 
‗Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity‘. 212   After a mostly endorsing description of 
Buber‘s philosophy, through which one can see many similarities between the two 
thinkers, in the final section of the article Levinas raises a few objections.  Levinas‘s 
main objection rests on this issue of asymmetry.  Levinas believes that the reciprocity 
maintained within Buber‘s description dilutes the ethical meaning of the interhuman 
encounter. ‗Doesn‘t the ethical begin when the I perceives the Thou as higher than 
itself?‘213  
Levinas goes to explain why it is that he maintains that the description of the 
interhuman relation between two should not be described as reciprocal.  He argues that 
Buber‘s account of the encounter is formalistic and, overlooks the unique responsibility 
of the ‗I‘ confronted by the ‗Thou‘, and the crucial perspective of that of the ‗I‘ 
confronted and spoken to. From an observed third person perspective, the two 
individuals standing face to face are seen as interchangeable, as from the outside each 
appears to be equal to the other.  However, the originality of Buber‘s position comes 
from the fact that the ‗I-Thou‘ cannot be known from the outside but must be lived by 
the particular individuals.  When this approach is truly honored, and one describes the 
phenomena from the perspective of the ‗I‘, Levinas maintains that it is then that this 
formalism breaks down, and the dissymmetry is revealed.  In the very moment when the 
I is spoken to by the Thou the I is uniquely singular and irreplaceable, and placed in a 
position of responsibility.  Levinas acknowledges that this dimension of ‗responsibility‘ 
is present in Buber‘s description, as dialogue rests on this responsibility, ‗only a being 
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responsible for another can be in dialogue with that other‘.214  Levinas here refers to the 
etymological roots of the term, that one is answerable to another and that in dialogue 
one cannot but respond to the address of the Thou.  Responsibility is not as a result of 
some tragic fate that befalls the I; it is, rather, the simple fact that the I addressed by a 
Thou must respond.
215
  What Levinas believes to be absent in Buber‘s account is the 
dimension of ‗height‘ which, for Levinas, captures the ethical significance of the 
encounter. 
In the ethics in which the other is at once higher and poorer than I, the I is 
distinguished from the Thou, not by any sort of ‗attributes‘, but by the dimension 
of height, which breaks with Buber‘s formalism.  The primacy of the other, and 
his nakedness and destitution, do not qualify the purely formal relation with its 
otherness: they already qualify this otherness itself.
216
   
 
For Levinas, the Other is both paradoxically poorer, destitute and in need, and 
simultaneously higher than the ‗I‘.  This is not an attempt by Levinas to deduce a 
universal norm for behavior, nor a value statement about individuals.  Rather, he sees 
himself as being true to the description of an encounter from the first person perspective 
of the one who is disrupted.  The ‗I‘ who is disturbed must answer for themselves 
before the Other who‘s very otherness puts their right to be into question and asks the 
‗I‘ to justify itself.  This disruption, for Levinas, occurs in a concrete real world 
situation that elicits a response of care for the Other, and it is not a description of a 
closed mutual society of two in the form of friendship.  Levinas argues that for Buber 
the relation culminates in a ‗spiritual friendship‘.217    
 In the article Levinas calls on Heidegger‘s notion of Fürsorge (care given to 
others) to support his criticism of what he terms the ‗spiritual friendship‘ that 
characterises, for Levinas, Buber‘s description of the I-Thou relation.  Levinas 
maintains that fürsorge does more justice to the dimension of height in the relation, and 
to addressing of the real needs of the Other such as food and shelter, than Buber‘s 
spiritual friendship.
218
  A separate criticism that Levinas raises against Buber‘s account 
has added significance for our current purposes. Levinas is in agreement with Buber that 
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the I- Thou relation brings a between (Zwischen) that separates the self from the world, 
and gives rise to intentional consciousness by creating a space for critical reflection and 
therefore for the ego.  However, Levinas questions whether Buber‘s description is 
radical enough to account for the separation and independence of the I.           
Though it is not said here, one can see how this point relates back to Levinas‘s 
position that the encounter with the Other precedes the freedom of the ‗I‘.  The 
encounter ruptures the solipsistic world of the self, introducing a separateness between 
the ego and the world, and by subjecting the self the Other inaugurates the subjectivity 
of the ‗I‘.  This is the very birth of philosophy, the beginning of the subject‘s 
independence, and the birth of critical consciousness.  ‗Perhaps philosophy is defined 
by a break with participation in totality; and that is why it is theory, i.e. critique.‘219  The 
origins of which, Levinas maintains, Buber‘s position cannot quite account for.    
Buber, who articulated with such penetration the Relation and the distancing that 
makes it [theoretical knowledge] possible, did not take separation seriously.  
Man is not just the category of distance and meeting, he is also a separate being.  
He accomplishes that isolation in a process of subjectification that is not just the 
recoil from the word Thou.  Buber does not give expression to the movement, 
distinct from distancing and the relation, in which the I emerges from the self.  It 
is impossible for man to forget his metamorphosis of subjectivity.
220
  
 
The above passage also sheds additional light on our search for clarification around the 
question of freedom in Levinas‘s work, as it supports our interpretation of Levinas‘s 
early work, relating specifically to the split subjectivity of the self.  The final sentence 
states that it is through this relation that the ‗I emerges from the self‘.  When the Other 
interrupts the self-centered narcissistic world of the self, the self is confronted by an 
otherness that cannot be contained by the self.  This separateness creates a between, a 
vital distance from within which the ‗I‘ can emerge from the self.  With the emergence 
of critical consciousness comes freedom, hence the Other precedes the freedom of the 
‗I‘.  
Returning now to the final lines of ‗Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity‘, we see 
that for Levinas the encounter not only ruptures the narcissistic world of the self but it 
also places the self into question and through its very otherness asks the self to justify 
itself.  Levinas adds an important extra dimension to Buber‘s general position, as not 
only does the encounter with the Other give rise to the subject, critical consciousness, 
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and hence philosophy, but this only occurs because it is an ethical metaphysical 
encounter that introduces goodness.  In order for the self to be truly shaken from the 
Same it must be judged by the infinite that is higher than the self, and brought to feel 
ashamed.  For Levinas, the very existence of moral conscience is testament of this 
dimension to the encounter that is absent in Buber‘s description.  Describing the event 
as an equal and reciprocal dialogue does not convey the gravity of the encounter and the 
moral significance.  
Is not moral conscience the critique of and the principle of the presence of self to 
self? Then if the essence of philosophy consists in going back from all 
certainties toward a principle, if it lives from critique, the face of the other would 
be the starting point of philosophy.
221
 
 
Through this encounter not only is the freedom of ‗critique‘ invested, but it is 
simultaneously given a purpose and made good. As Peperzak notes: ‗It [the 
subordination of freedom to the law of the Other] does not violate free will but rather 
gives it direction in giving it a task and a meaning‘.222  Levinas‘s position is even more 
radical than this quote from Peperzak suggests.  This event is the very beginning of 
philosophy for Levinas, as without it the self would never call itself into question and 
therefore, would lack critical consciousness.  Therefore, Levinas could be said to 
present a post-Kantian critique of Kant‘s critique.   
 
§ 3.4 ‗THE RUIN OF REPRESENTATION‘ (1959)223 AND ‗INTENTIONALITY AND  
 METAPHYSICS‘ (1959) 
 
‗The Ruin of Representation‘ is an important article for the development of Levinas‘s 
thinking in this period, particularly on the issue of his relationship to the work of 
Husserl.
224
  Levinas returns to the latent potential in Husserl‘s phenomenology, not 
exploited by Husserl, for opening up the unexplored consequences of the passive 
dimension to intentional consciousness, first identified by Levinas in his ‗The Work of 
Edmund Husserl‘.  As we saw in chapter one, this opens the way for Levinas to present 
a description of subjectivity whereby the subject, prior to actively bestowing meaning, 
passively receives meaning from the outside.  Crucially, Levinas will show that this 
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sense bestowal from the outside, through sensibility, is prior to the subject‘s active 
constitution of the world.  Husserl‘s description of the structures of consciousness 
reveals that intentionality is embedded in an earlier transcendental horizon of sense that 
conditions intentionality.
225
  This article, therefore, is an important step in Levinas‘s 
thinking on freedom through Husserl, as his reading of Husserl enables him to 
philosophically defend, through phenomenological description, an excessive moment of 
meaning at the foundation of subjectivity.  Therefore, it is a crucial step in Levinas‘s 
attempt to show that freedom is not foundational and unquestionable, but rests on a 
prior moment, on an essential openness to an alterity that cannot be fully constituted or 
known without remainder.  At the end of the article Levinas comes to call this an ethical 
Sinngebung.  This understanding of subjectivity presents a challenge to the 
philosophical tradition that prioritises the same at the expense of the other.  This article 
marks a crucial step on Levinas‘s philosophical journey, but, as his use of the term 
Sinngebung demonstrates, at this stage of his work Levinas is still maintaining ties that 
he will later come to sever. It is nonetheless an immanent critique of Husserl‘s 
philosophical starting-point. 
 
§ 3.4.1 LIFE‘S PRESENT IS AN UNSUSPECTED ABSTRACTION 
 
In order to place his own introduction to phenomenology into historical context, 
Levinas introduces ‗The Ruin of Representation‘ by briefly comparing his personal 
experiences of both Husserl and Heidegger, and the extent to which he found them to 
embody their respective philosophies.  Levinas then moves on to the standard 
description of phenomenology as theory of intentionality, and begins by unpacking 
what exactly this statement means.  Obviously intentionality rules out sensationalism, 
however, Levinas points out, that the sensible plays an important role in 
phenomenology because ‗intentionality rehabilitates the sensible‘.226   Likewise, it is 
undeniable that the description of phenomenology as intentionality indicates a necessary 
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correlation between the subject and object.  However, this is by no means unique to 
phenomenology and this revelation alone would not have set his idea of phenomenology 
apart from certain other philosophies that have come before.  If it was simply the case 
that through representation the subject ‗snatched‘ permanent essences from every 
horizon, and by doing so could be called self-sufficient, then we would be left with an 
abstract theory of knowledge.  Within the natural attitude, life‘s present does indeed 
seem to afford the subject such a complete representation; this, however, is by no means 
the full picture.  
Life‘s present is precisely an unsuspected but primordial form of abstraction, in 
which beings behave as if this were their beginning.  Re-presentation deals with 
beings as if they were entirely self-supporting, as if they were substances.
227
 
 
Levinas‘s use of ‗as if‘ indicates to the reader that this is not an accurate account of the 
way that the human being exists in relation to the world and to each other, even though 
it appears that way to consciousness.  Representation gives the impression that the 
subject is the origin of meaning.  Through representation the initial passive moment of 
sense, which conditions representation, is not ‗known‘ or ‗experienced‘ by the subject 
and hence is left out of the representation.
228
  A positive, if unethical (in Levinas‘s 
sense), attribute of representation is that the subject is not bombarded with potentially 
infinite stimulation, and ‗triumphs over the vertigo of the infinite‘.229  However, certain 
implicit content goes overlooked, leaving only representation and so beings behave as if 
this were their beginning.  
 Levinas reiterates this point in another article published in the same year, 
‗Reflections on the Phenomenological Technique‘.230  In that article, Levinas turns to 
Husserl‘s Urimpression to further describe the activity and passivity of consciousness 
and to explain how representation, and the constitution of an object, can be seen to be an 
abstraction of life‘s present.  ‗To intend the object, to represent it to oneself, is already 
to forget the being of its truth.‘231  Levinas tells the reader that the Urimpression [primal 
impression] ‗is the here and now par excellence‘, in which the ‗body subject‘ as 
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primarily a sensate subject is both passive and active.
232
  Levinas stresses the 
importance of sensibility and describes it as a kind of ‗intentionality‘, explaining that 
sensibility has a signification and wisdom.  ‗The senses make sense‘.233  Representation 
can overlook this indispensible place of the body, demonstrated by the marginal place 
that the body has occupied in not only the history of philosophical thought but also in 
Husserl‘s own phenomenology.  
Returning to the ‗The Ruin of Representation‘, one of the most favourable 
aspects of phenomenology, for Levinas, is precisely the possibility to look beyond the 
‗immediate‘, what for consciousness appears to be as if that is all there is.  These 
overlooked horizons, such as the crucial place of sensibility, can be revisited.  The 
phenomenological study of such areas, previously unexplored by philosophy, can prove 
to be more objective than the ‗immediate‘ that is constituted by consciousness.       
It is as if the fundamental ontological event, already lost in a grasped or reflected 
object, were more objective than objectivity — a transcendental movement. The 
renewal of the very concept of the transcendental that recourse to the term 
‗constitution‘ may obfuscate, appears to us to be an essential contribution of 
phenomenology.
234
  
 
The term ‗constitution‘ can give the false impression that when the subject grasps the 
object they therefore come to know it in its entirety and without remainder.  Levinas 
views the renewal of the concept of the transcendental as a pivotal contribution to 
philosophy by phenomenology, as it opens up the possibility of critiquing the 
dominance of the same, and equips philosophy with the way out of Idealism.  
Constitution can be said to obscure this important point as with constitution the 
emphasis is on the meaning bestowing powers of the subject.  Whereas, with the 
concept of the transcendental, one is reminded that the fundamental ontological event 
does not occur at the level of the ego, the sphere of the same.  The subject‘s intentional 
relationship with the object is situated in and conditioned by an exteriority that escapes 
the totalizing gaze.  Hence Levinas will go on to claim, with reference to Husserl‘s own 
work, that sensibility is the primary horizon.  This description of the structures of 
consciousness challenges philosophy understood as the ‗absorption of every ―Other‖ by 
the ―Same‖‘.235  
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§ 3.4.2 CONSCIOUSNESS SEES WITHOUT SEEING  
 
Levinas goes on to argue that despite the tendency towards transcendental idealism in 
Husserl‘s philosophy, transcendence is the great theme of Husserl‘s work.  The claim 
that an object can be represented in itself to consciousness could be problematic, as it 
seems to support solipsism.  However, the intentionality of consciousness overcomes 
the threat of solipsism as intentionality is understood as a relation with what is exterior, 
‗the presence of the subject to transcendent things is the very definition of 
consciousness‘.236 Although intentionality reveals a subject object correlation, and so 
points to the subject‘s presence to things, Husserl‘s description of intentionality goes 
further, as intentionality also gives a ‗new meaning‘ to this presence.237  The immediate 
thought, however, does not grasp every content within the horizon of sensation, and 
gives meaning to only that which thought intentionally grasps, hence, an abstraction, 
and as such, only a misunderstanding.  Intentionality focuses in on a particular 
phenomenon and by doing so overlooks the many other implicit contents. 
[I]t is because the intention in its ‗bursting forth toward the object‘ is also an 
ignorance and a failure to recognize the meaning of that object, since it is a 
forgetting of everything that intention only contains implicitly and that 
consciousness sees without seeing.
238
 
 
Through intentional analysis we can seek to recover elements of the implicit content 
that is not thought in the subject‘s immediate presence to things but nonetheless there 
(given).  
In support of his point Levinas refers to §20 of Husserl‘s Cartesian Meditations 
‗The peculiar intentional analysis‘, 
everywhere its [intentional analysis] peculiar attainment (as ‗intentional‘) is an 
uncovering of the potentialities ‘implicit’ in actualities of consciousness — an 
uncovering that brings about, on the noematic side, an ‗explication‘ or 
‗unfolding‘, a ‗becoming distinct‘ and perhaps a ‗clearing‘ of what is 
consciously meant (the objective sense).
239
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Levinas takes from this that these implicit potentialities contained within the explicit 
relation to the object are derived from other horizons and contain implicit meaning.  It is 
not the case that these implicit meanings were explicit in the subject‘s immediate 
relation to the object, and were then forgotten, as ‗forgotten‘ implies that they were 
initially ‗known‘.  This implicit content remains hidden in the immediate relation. 
Consciousness arrived after the event and so cannot be expected to ‗remember‘ that for 
which it was not present for.  The natural attitude will never discover these other 
horizons no matter how scrupulously one looks.
240
  
Presence to things implies another presence that is unaware of itself, other 
horizons correlative to these implicit intentions, which the most attentive and 
scrupulous consideration of the given object in the naive attitude could not 
discover.
241
  
 
Returning to Husserl, Levinas points out that in paragraph §20 Husserl goes on to argue 
that not only is every cogito a meaning of the thing it intends, but there is always a more 
than to the meaning that is explicitly meant. 
As a consciousness, every cogito is indeed (in the broadest sense) a meaning of 
its meant (Meinung seines Gemeinten), but that, at any moment, this something 
meant (dieses Vermeinte) is more than what is meant at that moment ‗explicitly‘ 
[...]. This intending-beyond-itself [exceeding of the intention in the intention 
itself], which is implicit in any consciousness, must be considered an essential 
moment of it. 
242
   
 
There is an excess of meaning contained in the immediate explicit thought, and so in the 
immediate the subject only partially grasps the meaning and overlooks many other 
potential meanings implicitly contained in the thought.   
In Levinas‘s reading of Husserl, the subject is thought to be present to 
transcendent things, and, as transcendent, these things are situated within wider 
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horizons, horizons that intentionality is not explicitly aware of.  Levinas characterises 
what he terms ‗[t]he classical conception‘ of the relationship between subject and object 
as ‗entirely conscious‘, believing that within this tradition the object is understood to be 
exactly what the subject thinks it to be in that present moment.
243
  Levinas‘s point here 
is that, in contrast to his reading of Husserl‘s phenomenology whereby intentionality 
thinks infinitely more than that which it is aware of, in his understanding of the 
‗classical conception‘ of the subject-object relation there is nothing left unthought, no 
excess of meaning that is implicitly hidden to immediate consciousness.  In describing 
intentionality as having ‗innumerable horizons‘ that do not form part of the object that 
is thought, but are nevertheless present implicitly in thought, this ‗classical‘ 
epistemological approach is challenged.    
By contrast [to this tradition], intentionality bears within itself the innumerable 
horizons of its implications and thinks of infinitely more ‗things‘ than of the 
object upon which it is fixed [...].  Thus thought is no longer either a pure 
present or a pure representation. 
244
 
 
Thought is no longer conceived as a pure present or a pure representation, as there is 
always a more than what is explicitly meant in that moment, thought thinks more than it 
can think.  Levinas acknowledges that this can be seen as either a monstrosity or a 
marvel, as this description questions the power of the subject to know the object 
completely.  Unsurprisingly, Levinas‘s position is that it is a marvel, as through 
intentional analysis we can study these ‗forgotten landscapes‘, and most importantly, 
question the autonomy and complete sovereignty of the self, and philosophically justify 
meaning from the outside.  The freedom of representation can come to be justified. 
Levinas compares this identification of the presence of innumerable horizons to the 
psychological insight into the unconscious.  However, in contrast to this, the 
phenomenological insight does not lead to a new psychology but to a new ontology.  ‗A 
new ontology begins: being is posited not only as correlative to a thought, but as already 
founding the very thought that nonetheless constitutes it.‘245  Being is shown to come 
before thought.  With the psychological insight into the unconscious, unknown depths 
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within the Same are revealed, but the dominance of the Same is left intact.
246
  Levinas 
reveals the primary transcendence that conditions the ‗I‘ and thus reveals the false 
abstraction that is the idea of the primacy of the Same.  
The article sheds additional light on why Levinas returned to the work of 
Husserl in favour of that of Heidegger.  Despite the profound influence of Heidegger, it 
is Husserl whom Levinas credits in the preface to Totality and Infinity as making the 
work possible.
247
  In what could only be read as an allusion to Heidegger, in ‗The Ruin 
of Representation‘, Levinas states that Husserl‘s‘ approach compromises ‗the 
sovereignty of representation‘ more radically than the ‗[Heideggerian] affirmation of an 
active engagement in the world prior to contemplation‘.248  Husserl‘s approach puts into 
question the sovereignty of representation by examining the very ‗structures of pure 
logic‘, independent of any feeling or the will.  Hence, representation is unsettled not by 
an irrationalism, but through a description of the structures of consciousness itself. 
Husserl reveals that there are implicit implications to thought that are operative in and 
on thought itself, even though immediate thought overlooks these implications and is 
blind to them prior to reflection.  By carrying out the phenomenological reduction, and 
intentional analyses, we can return to the sources of representation, transcendental 
sensual horizons.  What Levinas has discovered in Husserl‘s description of 
intentionality provides him with a vital philosophical component of his argument 
against the primacy of the Same and the unquestioned sovereignty of the self, and a way 
to put the freedom of representation and critical consciousness into question.   
The idea of a necessary implication that is absolutely imperceptible to the 
subject directed on the object, only discovered after the fact (qu'après coup) 
upon reflection, thus not produced in the present, that is, produced unbeknownst 
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to me, puts an end to the ideal of representation and the subject‘s sovereignty, as 
well as to the idealism according to which nothing could enter into me 
surreptitiously (subrepticement).
249
   
 
Although not dealt with by Levinas in this article, one can see how this reading of 
Husserl opens the way for Levinas to philosophically justify his position that the 
encounter with the Other occurs prior to the freedom of the subject, is not reducible to 
the powers of the subject, and takes the subject by surprise.  It is a meaning from the 
outside that enters the subject ‗surreptitiously‘.  Levinas believes that this description of 
consciousness, the full implications of which seemed to be lost to Husserl, place the 
idea of the subject‘s sovereignty into question.  As the pure ego is transcendence in 
immanence, it is said to be both constituted and constituting.  
 
§ 3.4.3 THE ‗FORGOTTEN‘ HORIZON OF SENSIBILITY 
 
In pointing out that on his reading of Husserl the subject is described as thinking more 
than one thinks, Levinas is not interpreting Husserl as claiming that there is a deficiency 
in intentionality itself.  If this was the case, this would not challenge thought as 
beginning within the Same, and would only identify a lack in the subject‘s ability to 
think the whole of the world all at once.  Such an analysis would result in a limitation of 
the Same, and an identification of the extent of the powers of the Same, but the ‗I‘ 
would still be primary.  As Levinas says, such a reading would show ‗the banality of 
degrees of consciousness‘.250  The implication that Levinas notices is more radical than 
this.  For Levinas, Husserl‘s description of consciousness, as containing these 
overlooked horizons, show that the thought that goes towards an object is embedded in 
the wider context of sensible horizon, and as such is only a partial part of the picture.  
What is most radical about this position is not that these horizons are overlooked, but 
that that these horizons support and condition the subject‘s conscious movement toward 
the object.   
What Husserl illustrates through his concrete analyses is that the thought that 
goes toward its object envelopes thoughts that open onto neomatic horizons, 
which already support the subject in its movement toward the object.  
Consequently, they bolster it in its work as a subject; they play a transcendental 
role.  Sensibility and sensible qualities are not the stuff of which the categorial 
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form or ideal essence is made, but the situation in which the subject already 
places itself in order to accomplish a categorial intention.
251
         
 
What is most significant for Levinas, and will become even more significant as his work 
develops further, is that these forgotten horizons of sensibility underpin the subject‘s 
intentional relation with the world.  The ego is conditioned by these unthought horizons. 
The self is embedded in transcendental meaning prior to the subject‘s movement 
towards the object.  
These forgotten conditions of sensibility, what Levinas terms the situation of the 
subject, breaks open the potential areas of study and reflection for philosophy as 
hermeneutic existential phenomenology, evident through the work of thinkers such as 
Heidegger. Philosophies of existence are given a new firmer footing.  The philosophy of 
the lived body is also given a new significance, as intentionality is rooted in this 
incarnate existence, which is overlooked and excluded in objective representation.  
Incarnate existence draws its being from those horizons, which, nonetheless, in a 
certain sense, it constitutes (since it becomes conscious of them) — as if here 
constituted being conditioned its own constitution.
252
  
 
Herein lies a paradox, that Heidegger made great use of, that the subject both constitutes 
being and is constituted by it.  ‗The world is not only constituted but also 
constituting.‘253  For Levinas, the praise for bringing about the possibility of such wide 
and divergent philosophies goes to Husserl.  The subject finds itself both situated in a 
world and also free to constitute the world and give it meaning.  This tension in the 
work of Husserl, between transcendental idealism on the one hand and engagement in 
the world on the other, which Levinas reminds us Husserl was often criticised for, is 
regarded by Levinas as one of Husserl‘s most important contributions.  ‗Objects are 
uprooted from their dull fixity to sparkle in the play of rays that come and go between 
the giver and the given.  In this coming and going man constitutes the world to which he 
already belongs.‘254  Hence, in order to carry out phenomenological analyses one must 
step outside of the natural attitude and place the question of the existence or 
nonexistence of objects and the world into parenthesis, or, perhaps more accurately 
speaking, put into parenthesis the interpretation of the world that absolutizes the mode 
of being of the world and reifies intentional consciousness.  By doing so this ‗play‘ of 
                                                 
251
 Ibid. 
252
 Ibid., pp. 117-18. 
253
 Ibid., p. 118. 
254
 Ibid., pp. 118-19. 
 228 
intentionality is respected.  The idea of a fixed object is set aside, as the external object 
is both constituted and gives rise to the consciousness that constitutes it.  
Levinas argues that the privileging of sensuous experience in phenomenology is 
testament to this ambiguity of constitution.  As with sensuous experience the lines 
between the noesis and noema are blurred.  The same is both clearly true of cultural 
phenomenon, which is both constituted by thought but is also operative in constituting 
that very thought.  Meaning comes to the self from the outside and conditions the very 
way that the self then engages with the world.  The constituting subject and that which 
is constituted are in some sense mutually (inter)dependent.  However, Levinas stresses 
that they do not complete one another ‗like the pieces of a puzzle‘ but ‗condition one 
another transcendentally‘.255   The straight forward separation between idealism and 
realism is left behind, as the relationship between the thinking subject and the world is 
revealed to be more complicated and interdependent, ‗being is neither inside nor outside 
thought, but thought itself is outside itself‘.256  Immediate self-evidence is no guarantee 
of truth (whatever of certainty).  One must phenomenologically reflect back on the 
experience, as it was experienced, to discover these ‗hidden horizons‘, that most 
crucially for Levinas‘s interest, are the ‗transcendental givers of its [the object] 
meaning‘.257  The particular situation also forms a pivotal part of the experience and can 
change the meaning of that which is constituted.  All of these dimensions come together 
to form the meaning of a given phenomenon, and the phenomenological approach 
reveals this interconnectedness and the way in which being and knowledge are 
conditioned.  Without the awareness of such conditions thought can fall prey to 
‗abstractions, equivocations, and gaps‘.258  
 
§ 3.4.4 TOWARDS AN ETHICAL SINNGEBUNG 
 
In the final section of the article Levinas explicitly outlines just how radical he believes 
the potential implications of this new approach to be.  Levinas maintains that if this 
latent possibility, implicitly contained in the work of Husserl, was developed along a 
particular trajectory, it could perhaps herald the end of an entire philosophical 
orientation.  Contained within Husserlian phenomenology is the seed to overturn the 
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primacy of the philosophy of the Same, which Levinas argues, has dominated 
philosophy since the very beginning.  ‗Philosophy arose in opposition to opinion, and 
led to wisdom as the moment of full self-possession in which nothing foreign or other 
any longer comes to limit the glorious identification of the Same in thought.‘259  
Only in the remaining two paragraphs of the article does Levinas briefly turn 
towards the particular way in which these dormant possibilities, in Husserl‘s description 
of the structures of consciousness, can be developed and explored.  Unsurprisingly, it is 
here that Levinas mentions that this analysis reveals that it is ethics that is at the heart of 
consciousness, and at the foundation of the meaning bestowing thinking subject.
260
  
‗The condition of truth may be sought in ethics.‘261   Though, for Levinas, Husserl 
himself seemed blind to this discovery made by him, and implicitly revealed in and 
through his work, that does not prevent Levinas from appropriating and developing it in 
that direction.  The relation between the subject and that which is other no longer has to 
be thought as ‗an intolerable limitation‘ of the thinker, nor as ‗absorption of this other‘ 
into an ego, but as an ethical Sinngebung.
262
  For Husserl, Sinngebung comes forth from 
a constituting ego that bestows meaning on the object that is absorbed into the Same.  
Levinas terms this event an ethical Sinngebung as it is an event of meaning, yet it is not 
complete, there is always a more than that escapes the grasp of the thinking subject, and 
as such leaves this uncontainable otherness intact.  Levinas will come to show that the 
meaning of the event comes from outside.  Intentionality is conditioned by sensibility, 
conditioned by exteriority, by an alterity that escapes complete representation.  It is in 
Levinas‘s first major work Totality and Infinity that we will fully see how this analysis 
makes ethics, as it is understood by Levinas, possible.   
 
§ 3.4.5 ‗INTENTIONALITY AND METAPHYSICS‘263  (1959) 
 
Levinas‘s article ‗Intentionality and Metaphysics‘, also published in 1959, sheds 
additional light on Levinas‘s reading of Husserl, affirms just how radical Levinas 
believes this new approach to be, and reveals some of the possibilities for developing 
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phenomenology thanks to Husserl‘s description of intentionality.  Continuing on from 
‗The Ruin of Representation‘, Levinas questions the primacy of objectifying 
intentionality and, drawing on Husserl‘s work on kinaesthetic sensations, presents a 
reading of Husserl that further supports his claim that transcendental intentionality is 
prior to and founds objectifying intentionality.  This self‘s immediate engagement with 
exteriority is not that of a thinking subject who encounters exteriority through concepts 
and representation, even if constitution and representation give this impression.  The 
self‘s immediate engagement with existence can only ever occur as a sensual body, 
whose very way of being is conditioned in and by this body.  This point alone 
undermines the primacy of subjectivity understood as self rule through rationality and 
the will, at the very least, it reveals that the passivity and vulnerability of the position of 
the embodied self precedes and conditions that subject‘s conscious engagement with the 
world.    
 
§ 3.4.6 HUSSERL AND KANT 
 
Returning to his reading of Husserl in ‗The Ruin of Representation‘, Levinas tells us 
that apart from the movement of consciousness towards an object, there is an earlier 
movement that is non-objectifying, and founds objectifying intentionality.
264
  This, 
Levinas argues, accounts for the possibility of ‗infinite‘ phenomenological 
investigations, as one can seek to recapture overlooked aspects of this earlier movement, 
and it also accounts for Husserl‘s ‗untiring distrust‘ of the naïve attitude that takes the 
object to be that which is encountered.
265
  This other movement cannot be termed 
subjective as it is does not remain within the sphere of the subject.  In slight contrast to 
the discussion in ‗The Ruin of Representation‘, here Levinas takes issue with the use of 
the term horizon to explain this earlier movement.  The term horizon or background 
implies that this non-objectifying intentionality is subordinate to, and merely the 
transcendental condition for, objectifying intentionality.  The use of such terminology 
undermines the importance of this discovery by Husserl, and overlooks the original and 
ultimate relation that is transcendental intentionality.  
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In fact, the transcendental movement Husserl discovers in intentionality, 
concealed by the naïve vision of the object, accomplishes metaphysical, 
ontologically irreducible, original or ultimate relations.
266
     
 
These original relations cannot be understood in the same manner as one understands 
the relation between the subject and the object, nor are they subject to the same logic, 
however, that does not mean that they are not ‗true‘ or meaningful.  They ‗belong to the 
metaphysics of the transcendent‘.267  
 In order to further explain the importance of the transcendental movement of 
intentionality, and how it breaks up the simple subject-object correlation, Levinas 
moves on to compare Husserl and Kant on how their respective positions differ in 
relation to objectifying intentionality.  Levinas notes that it was Husserl, and not 
Heidegger, who first broke with Kantianism by demonstrating that there is an 
intentional concrete life behind objectifying intentionality.  Although both approaches 
have their similarities, an important aspect on which they part ways is that Kant puts 
forward his idea of synthesis to account for objectivity, and in place of this Husserl 
posits simple intuition, which is itself founded on a sensible intuition.  On this point 
Levinas seems to favour Husserl, as sensible intuition is immediate.  Transcendental 
intentionality is maintained in both approaches, and a favourable aspect of Kant‘s 
philosophy is that it gives us an ‗exteriority that is not objective‘.268  This movement by 
consciousness does constitute an outside, an other, but it is not constituted like an 
object, as it is not an act whereby the subject grasps the other in a complete self-
sufficient movement.  The other than me that is constituted partakes in that movement, 
‗the Other (l’Autre) guides the transcendental movement without presenting itself to 
vision […].  The transcendental movement henceforth receives a structure entirely 
different from the subject-object polarization‘.269  This movement beyond the subject-
object polarization is one of the features of Husserl‘s phenomenology that Levinas finds 
particularly favourable.  However, he finds Husserl not entirely consistent on this 
matter, as the exteriority is polarised into objects.  
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§ 3.4.7 THE TRANSCENDENTAL FUNCTION OF SENSIBILITY 
 
This is not to say that one must abandon Husserl‘s work on the matter, for, as was 
shown above, his work harbours a crucial element which calls representation into 
question.  In this section Levinas returns to the intentional movement that is prior to 
objectifying intentionality, which is an all-important component of his own thinking on 
freedom.  What Levinas emphasises in the reminder of the article is that prior to 
objectifying intentionality is a more fluid, nonrepresentational, transcendental 
engagement with exteriority.  As thinking renders the immediate sensual data into an 
object, it commits a violence of sorts, as objective intentionality ‗conserves a sort of 
immobility‘ on the hyletic datum.  The sensible is immediate, and prior to thinking or 
perceiving objects the self is immersed in the sensible.  In the next section, drawing on a 
tiny selection of pages from Husserl‘s unpublished work, Levinas demonstrates this 
immersion through a discussion on the experience of a lived body by that body itself.  
 
§ 3.4.8 KINAESTHETIC SENSIBILITY 
 
Sensing cannot be removed from the sensing of the sensed.  Sensation is the very 
movement of the sense organs, and the entire body.  It is not a function that is added on 
to man, but the way that man is in the world.  ‗The movement of a sense organ 
constitutes the intentionality of sensing‘.270  Sensation is prior to all acts of perception 
of objects, as it is prior to representation.  It is kinaestheses, the body‘s sensations of the 
body‘s own movements, that situates the body in space and constitutes space, hence 
enabling the perception and constitution of objects.  Consciousness is incarnate, and as 
such is situated in a space, a here, a zero point of orientation. It is as corporeal that the 
subject is in existence.  What this point about the incarnation of consciousness reveals is 
a different intentionality from that of objectifying intentionality.  Walking, dancing, 
talking, touching, tactile feeling and its many shades, comporting one‘s body for a 
necessary manoeuvre, all demonstrate non-representational and non-objectifying 
intentionality.
271
  ‗This phenomenology of kinaesthetic sensibility brings out intentions 
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that are not at all objectifying, and reference points that do not function as objects‘.272  
Such intentionality also captures aspects of human experience that are not mediated by 
thinking or knowledge, and often are reactions and movements that we perform without 
deliberation or conscious choice.  Levinas points out that such everyday non-
objectifying intentional relations put an end to the immobile idealist subject, or ‗pure‘ 
transcendental consciousness as such, as they occur prior to representation and describe 
a subject that is immersed in sensual stimulation.  Levinas‘s description of the subject as 
‗drawn into situations‘ captures the passivity of sensation and incarnation, in contrast to 
the idealist subject who seems to be detached from the world that they present to 
themselves through representation.
273
  In truth, the ego does not stand back from the 
situation and bring together various elements of sensation to form an object, sensing is a 
constant moving out of oneself, transcending itself.  ‗The ego does not remain in itself, 
absorbing every other in representation; it truly transcends itself.‘274  All other acts rest 
upon this most basic intentionality, that of corporeal movement.          
 
§ 3.4.9 INTENTIONALITY OF INCARNATION 
 
In this section Levinas begins by stating that ‗kinaesthetic transitivity‘ can take us 
beyond the traditional epistemological distinction between realism and idealism.  
Levinas argues that realism, by identifying being and the object, eventually collapses 
into idealism, as the constitution of the object as an object comes from the subject.  As 
Levinas phrases it, ‗representation, is always in proportion to consciousness.  It is the 
adequation between ego and non-ego, Same and Other‘.275  Neither approach leaves 
room for a difference that is not, on the final assessment, reducible to consciousness. In 
both approaches, therefore, as representation remains unquestioned, consciousness 
remains the source of meaning.  ‗Hence idealism imposes itself like a tautology […]. 
What exceeds the limits of consciousness is absolutely nothing for that 
consciousness.‘276   
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 Levinas believes that transcendental intentionality, which fundamentally is the 
horizon of sense and incarnation, challenges this long history that prioritises the ego and 
the Same, and brings an end to idealism.  He describes intentionality as an act of 
transitivity.  It is an embodied engagement with exteriority, a constant moving out of 
oneself, that takes place continuously in our most basic activities such as praxis, 
emotion and valuation.  It is this that Levinas regards as ‗the newness of 
phenomenology‘, and what demarcates phenomenology and idealism, as 
phenomenology moves beyond objectifying intentionality.
277
  Although Levinas 
believes phenomenology of kinaestheses and the body to be intentionality par 
excellence, the significance of this radical novelty contained in phenomenology is 
something that Levinas believes Husserl himself overlooked.  
 In his own work Husserl gives priority to the pure ego of the reduction, and in 
doing so overlooks incarnate intentionality.  Levinas maintains that by describing the 
incarnate ego as the pure ego‘s perception of itself as in a relationship with the body, 
Husserl implies that there is a distance between the pure ego and incarnate 
intentionality.  Levinas wonders how Husserl can account for this distance that allows 
the pure ego to grasp its self, as if it was a ‗theoretical act of a disincarnate being‘.278  
Levinas maintains that this methodological move by Husserl, to return to the pure ego 
of the reduction, undermines the radical significance of his own description of 
intentionality, for,     
 in the obsession of the Reduction, in this unsurmountable temptation to seek the 
 intention of a pure ego behind the intentionality of incarnation, I think what is at 
 stake is a positive possibility, constitutive of kinaesthesis, of the memory of its 
 origin in interiority.
279
 
 
Levinas maintains that Husserl‘s ‗obsession‘ with the reduction blinds him to a 
potentially positive possibility that consequently remains dormant in his own work, and 
in doing so Husserl compromises the novelty of phenomenology and returns to 
idealism.  As the pure ego must seek oneself ‗after the fact‘ objectifying intentionality is 
what is emphasized, to the detriment of the earlier moment of transcendent 
intentionality of sensibility.
280
  In relation to this point, Levinas makes an interesting 
comment which he does not elaborate on, ‗Man wholly masters his destiny only in 
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memory, in the remembrance of things past‘.281  It would seem that man‘s sense of self-
sufficiency is supported through reflective theoretical thinking that can be quite 
selective, whereby one can overlook the immediacy of the self‘s incarnate intentional 
engagement with existence, and all the limitation and powerlessness that it involves.  By 
prioritising the pure ego and reflective consciousness the profound insight, given to us 
by Husserlian phenomenology, into the transcendence of intentionality realized by 
sensibility, remains unexploited.   
 At the end of the article Levinas emphasises the importance of incarnate 
intentionality, the fact that as embodied consciousness exceeds its interiority and 
connects with the exteriority.
282
  The body is not an exterior object that one can stand 
back from and study like the biologist would study an external objectified body.  
Consciousness is itself embodied.  The body is lived from the inside and all experiences 
are experienced through the very body that is having the experience.  What is most 
significant, for Levinas, about this new way of understanding the body, as a system of 
kinesthesis, is that it undermines the position that views consciousness as primarily 
objectifying.  Importantly for Levinas, it opens the way for alternative descriptions of 
existence that are not reducible to ‗the logic of objects‘. 283   It presents a way to 
overcome representation and the tendency towards totalization of objects that occurs 
through objectifying intentionality.  Transcendence towards being can be expressed 
otherwise.  Through the phenomenological study of incarnate intentionality philosophy 
can be brought back to the ‗land of men‘.284  By opening a way beyond objectifying 
intentionality the very real everyday lived experience of men and women can be taken 
seriously and reflected upon philosophically, without being totalized and crushed.  In a 
footnote Levinas states that without the movement beyond objectifying intentionality 
we could never make sense of certain human experiences such as art and theology.  
Transcendental intentionality makes an array of aspects of human life intelligible and 
meaningful whilst resisting totalization, such as beauty, art and spirituality. Levinas 
finishes the article by telling us that,  
 the alleged sovereignty of objectifying thought, which in fact imprisons the 
 thinker within himself and his categories and, placing him beneath the 
 jurisdiction of objectivity and nature, mocks the metaphysical adventures of 
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 saints, prophets, poets, and quite simply, living men and women, as mere 
 childish.
285
 
 
Far from giving man power over the world through knowledge and concepts, 
objectifying thought restricts the potential of human thought, and closes it off to many 
aspects of experience that defy such conventions and logical norms.   
 
§ 3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Although in the last article discussed above Levinas has nothing to say about the 
significance of ethics in his interpretation of Husserl‘s account of consciousness, one 
can see the pieces of his argument coming together.  The excess, that is to say, the more 
than that consciousness cannot contain, will become the moral moment for Levinas at 
the basis of consciousness.  It is the placing of the self into question from the outside 
that will give rise to consciousness.  For Levinas, it is not the activity of knowing that 
defines consciousness, rather it is the self‘s engagement with the outside, the exterior, 
the other than the self.  If the exterior always submitted to the will of the Same and was 
entirely consumable and containable by the Same, then there would be no exterior of 
which to speak.  There would only be the Same.  If consciousness is the engagement 
with an outside that remains outside, there needs to be an otherness that remains 
different at the basis of consciousness.  Levinas will come to argue that only the face of 
the human other is profoundly different enough, and other enough, to shock the self into 
the realisation that there is an outside that will remain outside, and hence inaugurate 
consciousness at its most fundamental, as transcendental intentionality.  This moment 
will be described as a moment of sensibility that brings meaning from the outside, a 
meaning not containable and consumable by consciousness, an encounter with an 
excessive exteriority.  
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CHAPTER IV 
FREEDOM RESTING ON TRUTH IN TOTALITY AND INFINITY 
 
In stating his conclusions in the final pages of Totality and Infinity, Levinas clearly sets 
out the place of freedom for that whole text.  Under the heading ‗Freedom Invested‘ he 
explains that one of the major consequences of endeavouring to write an essay on 
metaphysical exteriority is that freedom is not taken as an unquestioned starting point in 
that endeavour. In other words, Levinas‘s approach to this issue calls for a justification 
of freedom, not its dismissal, for, as he argues: 
If, in contradistinction to the tradition of the primacy of freedom, taken as the 
measure of being, we contest vision its primacy in being, and contest the 
pretension of human emprise to gain access to the rank of logos, we take leave 
neither of rationalism, nor of the ideal of freedom.  One is not an irrationalist nor 
a mystic nor a pragmatist for questioning the identification of power and logos.  
One is not against freedom if one seeks for it a justification.  Reason and 
freedom seem to us to be founded on prior structures of being whose first 
articulations are delineated by the metaphysical movement, or respect, or justice 
— identical to truth.  The terms of the conception making truth rest on freedom 
must be inverted.
1
     
 
It is these ‗prior structures of being‘, upon which our theoretical and practical 
engagement with the world rests, that concern Levinas in Totality and Infinity.  By not 
taking intentional consciousness as the most fundamental aspect of human life Levinas 
asks what founds the freedom of representation and rationality.  This is why Levinas 
insists in the passage from his conclusion cited above that ‗[o]ne [he] is not against 
freedom if one seeks for it a justification‘.  Levinas accepts that human life involves the 
capacity of freedom, demonstrated through critical consciousness, self-reflection, and 
the subject‘s ability to make choices aligned with reason.  As this is the case, it raises 
the question, how is it that this crucial capacity came about?  
Levinas seeks to ground subjectivity elsewhere than in the cogito, and in doing 
so he has set himself a very difficult task, one that stretches the limitations of language 
and the boundaries of historical linear time.  As he puts it himself,  
[w]e have sought outside of consciousness and power for a notion of being 
founding transcendence.  The acuity of the problem lies in the necessity of 
maintaining the I in the transcendence with which it hitherto seemed 
incompatible.  Is the subject only a subject of knowings and powers?  Does it 
not present itself as a subject in another sense?
2
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As the text is a defence of subjectivity, Levinas wishes to preserve the I in 
transcendence, but an I that is not reducible to freedom.  Transcendence cannot be 
founded in freedom, as freedom would leave no room for the other.  Levinas puts 
forward the reverse.  Freedom must be founded in transcendence. In Totality and 
Infinity Levinas does this by firstly sketching a view of selfhood that is understood as 
separated by sensible corporeality, is at home in the world and relates to exteriority in 
terms of enjoyment.  By describing the separated self in such terms Levinas opens a 
way in which a profound exteriority can breach the life of the separated self, who is 
already in a relation with exteriority, importantly understood as Desire and not as Need. 
Such originality, which breaks with a long and venerable tradition, is not 
without its problems.  His attempt to think through the self‘s primordial engagement 
with the world, and to explain the self‘s immersion in the world ‗before‘ the emergence 
of the conscious subject, is problematical.  The main question that this approach raises 
for freedom is the question of whether or not the self is said to be free before the 
encounter with the Other, which brings about an orientation in the self towards what 
Visker calls ‗ethical freedom‘, or is the self only made free through the encounter?3 As 
noted by a number of commentators, Levinas employs both transcendental and 
empirical language and this causes some confusion too, not least of which relates to our 
particular concern.
4
  This tension has led to two broadly competing readings of Totality 
and Infinity, both of which have consequences for understanding the description of 
freedom given in the text.  One reading argues that the encounter with the Other is a 
transcendental condition for the possibility of subjectivity as we know it, including 
freedom, language, and society.  Here freedom is viewed as invested by the Other.  The 
other reading, interprets the encounter with the Other as an historical empirical event 
that re-orientates subjectivity from a self-centred egotistical free being, to an ethically 
free being that is for the Other.
 5
  This view regards the subject as initially arbitrarily 
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free and for itself, later to be re-oriented by the Other, who invests freedom as morally 
good and for the Other.  Both of these readings are firmly rooted in the text, and so, in 
order to clarify the description of freedom given, the question of which is more accurate, 
and why this confusion exists, needs to be addressed first in this final chapter of our 
study.  
 
§ 4.1 THE MEANING OF FREEDOM IN TOTALITY AND INFINITY: AN ESSAY ON EXTERIORITY 
 
One crucial, yet overlooked factor which has contributed to the two different readings of 
Totality and Infinity indicated above, is the two senses in which ‗freedom‘ is used by 
Levinas in relation to his description of the self.  One is in his description of the 
separated self prior to the encounter with the Other, and the second, is  used to describe 
that which is invested through the encounter with the Other.  In this chapter it will be 
argued that this distinction, although ambiguous, is essential in understanding how 
Levinas can maintain that the separated self prior to the encounter is ‗free‘, and yet, also 
argue that the self is only made free through that very encounter.  Within the empirical 
reading this double sense of the term freedom is most often interpreted as the 
introduction of the good; the self is initially egotistical, self-centred and ‗free‘, and in 
the empirical encounter is made ethically ‗free‘.  Levinas‘s wider understanding of 
freedom as representation, knowledge and critical consciousness, however, is often 
overlooked.  Given that throughout the text Levinas argues that without the Other the 
self would be lacking in language, time, self-consciousness, exteriority, sociality and the 
freedom of objectivity and reflective consciousness, in a purely empirical reading, the 
self prior to the encounter would be a very strange empirical self indeed. As Levinas 
himself says, more of an animal existence, a stomach without ears.
6
  Thus Levinas‘s use 
of both transcendental and empirical language is not only due to a limitation of 
language; it is also due to the complex nature of his analysis and description.  It will be 
argued that the encounter is both a transcendental condition for the possibility of 
subjectivity as we experience it, and also, crucially, a very real reoccurring empirical 
encounter that constantly leads the subject to place themselves into question.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
meaning [il y a ], subjectivity, and objectivity is that of the psychism or conatus essendi, the self which 
places itself at the centre and makes everything else a means to its own ends.  But there is another exit, 
subsequent developmentally but more fundamental ontologically, and in this sense more truly first.  It is 
the emergence of the responsible self, decentred by the proximity of the Other.‘ Westphal, ‗The welcome 
wound: emerging from the il y a otherwise‘, p. 211.   
6
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 134. 
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Given the ambiguity that exists in the text, one would have to say that this 
disagreement among commentators is at least partially owing to a lack of clarity in the 
author‘s expression.  However, given the limitation of language and the ongoing 
development of Levinas‘s thinking, perhaps this was the only way through to the other 
side of this problem.  The final expression of this difficult description of subjectivity 
will have to wait until Otherwise than Being.
7
  A crucial aspect of the text that helps us 
to begin to understand how the encounter is both an on-going transcendental condition 
and an historical empirical event is Levinas‘s description of time in terms of both 
historical time and the time of eschatology, which will be examined below.  We must 
remember that Totality and Infinity is by no means the end of Levinas‘s oeuvre, but the 
first of his major works, and in that respect only the beginning.  In Levinas‘s later work 
it becomes clear that any talk of a ‗before‘ the encounter illustrates a limitation of 
language, and that there really is no before of which to speak.  Though our study ends 
with this text, our attempt to shed some light on the status of the question of freedom in 
the text can also be seen as a contribution to the wider question around the development 
and consistency in Levinas‘s philosophy as a whole.  
 
§ 4.1.1 PREFACE: WAR AND MORALITY 
 
Levinas famously opens Totality and Infinity, echoing Plato‘s question in the Republic, 
by stating, ‗[e]veryone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know 
whether we are not duped by morality‘.8  For Levinas, if in seeking to describe and 
explain the phenomenon of goodness we begin with an autonomous free and 
independent subject, the explanation that we will be left with will always relegate 
morality to the service of ontology, leaving us with such explanations as a clash of 
freedoms resulting in a master-slave relation, or a war of all against all that is curtailed 
through a social contract, or, in more naturalistic language, an evolutionary socially 
advantageous trait that has contributed to ensuring the survival of our species.  In 
contrast to such an approach Levinas does not simply accept freedom as a given, rather, 
through his analysis he pushes back before freedom and in doing so provides an account 
                                                          
7
 Levinas will later reassess this necessity. Beginning with the publication of ‗La substitution‘ in (1968), 
Levinas begins to work through a description of subjectivity that does away with the interior exterior 
distinction, and develops a description of subjectivity as ‗hostage‘, ‗persecution‘, ‗trauma‘ and 
‗substitution‘. A reworked version of ‗La substitution‘ becomes a central section in Otherwise than Being.    
8
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 21.     
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for freedom as invested from the outside.  By describing morality as the basis of 
subjectivity, and as prior to freedom, Levinas not only provides a justification of 
morality but also a justification of freedom.  
Initially the Preface to Totality and Infinity can seem a little disjointed from the 
subtitle of the text, An Essay on Exteriority, as the Preface concentrates on the question 
of war and peace.
9
  On closer reading, however, one can see just how intrinsically 
connected this question is to the main focus of the text, a treatise on metaphysical 
exteriority that challenges the philosophy of the Same, which Levinas believes to 
dominate the entire tradition of Western philosophy.  Levinas opens the text by 
opposing the phenomenon of war to morality, and this opposition reflects the distinction 
in the title of the text, between totality and infinity.
10
  In the Preface Levinas groups 
together war, totality, ontology and the philosophy of the Same.  Although these themes 
are by no means identical, what binds them together is that, for Levinas, each of them is 
an all embracing system that leaves no room for any alterity.  ‗The visage of being that 
shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality, which dominates Western 
philosophy.‘ 11  In such a totalizing system unique individuality is overlooked, 
individuals are objectified and gain significance through their relationship to the whole.  
So too is true of the unicity of the present, which is ‗sacrificed‘ for a future end goal.12  
War is described as the pure experience of pure being, and therefore morality, as war‘s 
opposite, must bring us beyond being.  
Levinas believes that the dominant approach to philosophy throughout the 
tradition, as favouring a totalizing and complete thought structure, far from benign, has 
                                                          
9
 The importance of the question of war‘s challenge to morality is often overlooked in the secondary 
scholarship.  There are some notable exceptions to this, see, Caygill, Levinas and the Political, see, also, 
Robert Bernasconi, ‗Different styles of Eschatology: Derrida‘s Take on Levinas‘ Political Messianism‘, 
Research in Phenomenology, 28 (1998), 3-19.   
10
 We should keep in mind that the terms of the title ‗totality‘ and ‗infinity‘ should not be read as one term 
versus the other, as is indicated by the conjunction ‗and‘ in the title.  As we shall see as this chapter 
develops, Hegelian dialectical logic is one of the main antagonists to Levinas‘s thought, as is the 
understanding of Being as One that can be traced as far back as Parmenides.  If Levinas was to simply 
oppose totality to infinity this would result in a Hegelian dialectic.  In the text Levinas seeks to describe 
human existence as simultaneously with being whilst desiring the infinite.  As Levinas says, ‗Between a 
philosophy of transcendence that situates elsewhere the true life to which man, escaping from here, would 
gain access in the privileged moments of liturgical, mystical elevation, or in dying — and a philosophy of 
immanence in which we would truly come into possession of being when every ―other‖ (cause of war), 
encompassed by the same, would vanish at the end of history — we propose to describe, within the 
unfolding of terrestrial existence, of economic existence [...] a relationship with the other that does not 
result in a divine or human totality, that is not a totalization of history but the idea of infinity. Such a 
relationship is metaphysics itself.‘  Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 52. On this point, see, Bernasconi, 
‗Rereading Totality and Infinity‘, p. 24. See, also, Peperzak, To the Other, p. 120.          
11
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 21.     
12
 ‗For the ultimate meaning alone counts; the last act alone changes beings into themselves.‘ Ibid., p. 22.     
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indirectly influenced all areas of Western culture.  The impact that this totalizing system 
has had on political and social institutions is evident in the prevalence of war.  A 
thought structure that seeks total concepts and absolute certainty can lead to a similar 
political drive for hegemony, favouring uniformity over diversity.
13
  The only way in 
which to combat totalitarian systems is through its opposite, that of morality.  If the 
Same is characterised by the drive for complete certainty and absolute knowledge, 
achieved by the absolute assimilation of the known into the same, then its opposite, 
morality, is a moment of excessive exteriority that not only resists any attempts of 
assimilation into the Same but through its very resistance places the Same into question.  
For Levinas, then, couched in the discussion about war and peace is not only the central 
question of the text but also this particular question highlights just how much is at stake, 
the very humanity of man.  Hence, Levinas begins with this opening line, ‗[e]veryone 
will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are duped by 
morality‘.14  Do individual acts of kindness towards one another, no matter how few, 
speak to a genuine dimension to the human being, or is morality merely a social 
contract, a limitation of humanity‘s predatory nature?      
In order for morality to prevail over war, and to disturb the dominance of the 
ontological order of things, Levinas tells us that the ‗eschatology of messianic peace‘ 
must ‗superpose itself‘ upon the ontology of war.15  In contrast to a time that gains its 
significance by reference to the totality Levinas introduces eschatological time, which 
he says, is beyond the totality and beyond history, but not beyond the past or the 
                                                          
13
 For Levinas, this is one such way of understanding how a nation that brought the world many of the 
high points in philosophy, literature and music could also be responsible for the devastation of the Shoah.  
The atrocities of The Third Reich were never far from Levinas‘s mind, and this is partially illustrated in 
the use of the term ‗totality‘, which binds together the philosophy of the Same and the metaphysical 
position that underlies war.  As pointed out by Caygill, the use of the term ‗totality‘ within the modern 
philosophical tradition, initially taken from the work of Kant, (for whom ‗totality‘, ‗unity‘ and ‗infinity‘ 
as transcendental ideals, a priori structures of the human understanding, are regulative and not 
constitutive principles), become constitutive in the post-Kantian idealists of such thinkers as Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel.  ‗Totality‘ was also a prominent component of the lexicon of the Third Reich.  
―Totality‘ was at once the specific term identified by Victor Klemperer, the philologist of the language of 
the Third Reich, as ‗one of the keystones‘ of ‗everyday Nazi discourse‘ as well as, and perhaps not 
coincidentally, one of the central concepts of modern philosophy‘. Caygill, Levinas and the Political, p. 
94.  On the possible link between the drive for certainty and hegemony and the atrocities committed by 
Nazi Germany see Simon Critchley‘s Blog post ‗The Dangers of Certainty: A Lesson From Auschwitz‘, 
The New York Times Opinionator, February 2, 2014 
<http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/02/the-dangers-of-certainty/> [accessed on 4 February 
2014]       
14
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 21.     
15
 Ibid., p. 22.        
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present.
16
  By introducing this double description of time as historical ontological time 
and the time of messianic peace, which is central to any understanding of the text, 
Levinas is attempting to displace the centrality of the philosophy of history within 
modern philosophy.  Although the term ‗eschatological time‘ has obvious teleological 
implications, generally associated with the end, or last time, this is not the meaning that 
Levinas wishes to convey.  The intended meaning is closer to the Greek etymological 
roots of the terms, captured by the prefix ‗ex‘, which denotes ‗out of‘, ‗from‘, or 
‗beyond‘, and in this sense one can see the use of the term by Levinas to capture a time 
that is both outside of historical time and yet reflected within human experience.
17
  As 
                                                          
16
 Levinas (in similar fashion to Kierkegaard) explicitly mentions Hegel as an example of such a system 
that overlooks the unique significance of the now, and the unique significance of each individual, in 
favour of a judgement of history in its totality. Ibid., p. 23. De Boer reminds us that Levinas‘s 
understanding of ‗totality‘ can contain history, even though history is still unfolding, as for Levinas 
totality is not a closed whole, but, what De Boer terms, a horizontal infinity.  De Boer argues this view of 
totality as a horizontal infinite process was influenced by Husserl‘s Ideen I.  In contrast to this horizontal 
view of history as a totality Levinas ‗opposes‘, what De Boer terms, the ‗vertical concept of Infinity‘.  De 
Boer, ‗An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy‘, p. 9.  Although the time of the infinite is ‗opposed‘ to the 
determination of historical time, Levinas is not suggesting that historical time can be done away with.  
Rather, the time of eschatology brings the possibility of the good, and the judgement of ‗politics in 
history‘ at each moment. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 22. The superimposition of the time of 
eschatology onto historical time is a complex idea to represent.  In his 1963 article ‗The Trace of the 
Other‘ Levinas makes it clear that the breach of historical time brought about by the Face of the Other 
should not be thought of as the meeting point between two distinct times, rather, it is an ‗incision‘ in 
historical time.  ‗Nor is it an instantaneous cross-section of the world in which time would cross with 
eternity. It is an incision made in time that does not bleed.‘ Levinas, ‗The Trace of the Other‘, p. 354.  In 
the same article Levinas qualifies his use of the term beyond, and explains that ‗beyond‘ is an attempt to 
capture that the ‗beyond‘ is beyond all disclosure and outside of what can be known, but that is not to say 
that what cannot be known or experienced cannot be operative within experience.  ‗The beyond is 
precisely beyond the ―world‖, that is, beyond every discourse — like the One of the first hypothesis of the 
Parmenides, which transcends all cognition, be it symbolic or signified.‘ Levinas, ‗The Trace of the 
Other‘, p. 354.      
17
 ‗The eschatological, as the ―beyond‖ of history, draws beings out of the jurisdiction of history and the 
future; it arouses them in and calls them forth to their full responsibility.‘  Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 
23. In his later work Levinas reassess his use of this term and moves away from it.  When asked by 
Kearney about eschatology, Levinas emphasised that we do not have to think of eschatology in terms of 
eternity, rather we should think of a perpetual movement towards God, a constant striving towards that is 
never fulfilled.  Bernasconi points out that Levinas‘s reappraisal may be due to the perhaps unwarranted 
criticisms of Levinas‘s use of the term eschatology raised by Derrida in his ‗Violence and Metaphysics‘. 
Derrida‘s criticisms could be said to be unwarranted, as, despite the theological implications, one does not 
have to interpret eschatology exclusively as an event that will occur in the future, and indeed, very often 
amongst Christian biblical scholars this is not the case.  Rudolf Bultmann and Alexander Schmemann, for 
example, both interpret ‗eschatology‘ to mean that the Kingdom of God is both at hand and also yet to 
come. See, Hilarion Alfeyev, ‗Eschatology‘, in The Cambridge Companion To Orthodox Christian 
Theology, ed. by Mary B. Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), pp. 107-20.  Whatever motivated this change, Levinas makes it clear that he is reluctant to 
use the term due to the teleological baggage and implications. ‗‗Eschatology‘ (eschaton) implies ‗that 
there might exist a finality, an end (fin) to the historical relation of difference between man and the 
absolutely other, a reduction of the gap that safeguards the alterity of the transcendent, to a totality of 
sameness.‘  This would of course be too close to a Hegelian synthesis, which Levinas here characterises 
as ‗a radical denial of the rupture between the ontological and the ethical‘. Levinas and Kearney, 
‗Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas‘, p. 30. See, Robert Bernasconi, ‗Different Styles of Eschatology: 
Derrida‘s Take on Levinas‘s Political Messianism‘, Research in Phenomenology, 28 (1998), 3-19.  
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Bernasconi phrases it ‗[t]he beyond of history is, rather, that which interrupts history.  It 
is that which history cannot recoup.  Eschatology in Levinas is not a question of the 
future, but a disturbance or interruption of the present‘.18  
To say that eschatological time goes beyond history, and therefore beyond a 
teleological system within a totality that withholds judgement until the culmination of 
acts, is not to promote a view of ‗subjectivity free as the wind‘.19  In fact, Levinas 
argues that by removing the focus from a linear historical time, each instant is given its 
full significance, and responsibility in the now can come to the fore.  Each individual is 
answerable for their actions, or lack thereof, and cannot hide behind the anonymity of 
history.
20
  Levinas links this conception of time to his idea of infinity introduced in his 
work of the 1950‘s, as eschatological time is a relationship ‗with a surplus always 
exterior to the totality‘.21  It is beyond the totality and beyond history, yet, crucially, is 
reflected within human experience and breaks through ontological historical time.  What 
eschatology brings, by breaching the totality, is the possibility ‗of a signification 
without a context‘.22  Levinas informs the reader that it is this relation that Totality and 
Infinity seeks to describe.  
The rest of the Preface clarifies for the reader what this relation is and how 
Levinas will go about describing such a relation.  In doing so, the reader gains a sense 
of just how innovative Levinas‘s approach is, and also how it breaks with any 
methodology that has come before.  The relation that Levinas strives to describe is 
outside of both representation and objectivity, and resists an understanding of truth 
based on evidence and knowledge.  This being the case, Levinas assures the reader that 
this does not mean that one is left with the opposite, that of opinion an illusion.  By 
pushing back before all relations with being that are characterised by representation, 
objectivity and knowledge, one also pushes back before the antithesis, reaching back 
before the totality itself.  What Levinas seeks to describe is ‗a situation that conditions 
the totality itself‘, that of the encounter with transcendence in the face of the Other.23  
                                                          
18
 Bernasconi, ‗Different styles of eschatology: Derrida‘s take on Levinas‘s political messianism‘, p. 7. 
19
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 22.     
20
 This emphasis on the present, and how the judgement of acts should not be postponed until the 
culmination of history, is a development of Levinas‘s argument presented in a very early essay 
‗Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism‘, wherein Levinas argues that the forgiveness of God and 
redemption could break with a view of time as purely historical and deterministic. See, Ch. I, §1.10 Later 
in this text Levinas will develop this idea alongside his critique of Heidegger‘s understanding of time, by 
examining interiority and pardon. See, § 4.2.7. 
21
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 22.     
22
 Ibid.     
23
 Ibid., p. 24.     
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Levinas is aware that he cannot philosophically demonstrate ‗eschatological ―truths‖‘, 
and so he proposes to begin with the experience of totality and push back ‗to a situation 
where totality breaks up‘.24  The attempt to do this will bring Levinas to the very limits 
of philosophical thinking and language, and beyond the boundaries of historical linear 
time.  It will also accompany Levinas beyond the confines of the text, and into his later 
work, which in some regards can be said to be marked by this very problem of 
attempting to articulate that which is beyond articulation.
25
    
 
§ 4.1.2 TRANSCENDENTAL READING 
 
As Levinas is seeking to describe a relation that accounts for our experiences as we 
experience them, he compares his approach to Kant‘s transcendental method.26  It is 
important to emphasis here that Levinas qualifies this comparison by pointing out that 
his method ‗resembles‘ the transcendental method, and so despite the similarities there 
are differences between them.
27
 De Boer is the most notable defender of the 
transcendental reading of Totality and Infinity, presented in his article ‗An Ethical 
Transcendental Philosophy‘.  In his article, De Boer argues that Levinas attempts to 
found ontology through metaphysics, by integrating aspects of phenomenology, 
transcendental philosophy and dialogical philosophy.  De Boer maintains that for 
Levinas dialogue with the Other is the transcendental framework for the subject‘s 
intentional relation to the world.  De Boer compares Levinas‘s method with that of 
                                                          
24
 Ibid.     
25
 As Cohen astutely phrases it, ‗Levinas‘ writings, then, are paradoxical.  As philosophy they must 
justify themselves, but their justification lies beyond the text, not in a reference, a signified, but in what is 
essentially elusive: goodness, sincerity. [...] This is precisely the trouble with knowledge, in a double 
sense: by essence it cannot know the good, but it is disturbed by the good, by the ethical plenitude that 
encompasses and escapes it. [...] His writings are signs of lost traces.  Levinas admits this paradox [...].  
Yet it is by raising this paradox, by invoking its nonmeasurable movement, that his writings make sense 
in transgressing sense.‘  Cohen, ‗Introduction‘, in Face to Face with Levinas, pp. 1-10 (p. 9).    
26
 Levinas, ‗Signature‘, pp. 292-93. See, De Boer‘s important article ‗An Ethical Transcendental 
Philosophy‘.   
27
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 25.  Peperzak rightly warns of the drawbacks of the term, suggesting 
that the term ‗transcendental method‘ is unsuitable given the philosophical baggage that comes with the 
term, most notably the connection to a transcendental and foundational consciousness ‗in search for an 
ultimate ground of all beings‘.  Peperzak favours the less problematic ‗intentional analysis‘. See, 
Peperzak, To The Other, p. 232. In support of his unease with the term Peperzak references Levinas, who, 
in an interview conducted in 1975, he himself acknowledged such draw backs.  Peperzak admits that 
Levinas does not reject the term absolutely.  In fact, far from simply not absolutely rejecting the term, 
Levinas clarified that he had no difficulty with the term provided that ‗―transcendental‖ signifies a certain 
priority: except that ethics is before ontology‘. Despite the philosophical baggage, Levinas went on to 
describe his work as ‗a transcendentalism that begins with ethics‘. Emmanuel Levinas, ‗Questions and 
Answers‘, in Of God Who Comes to Mind, trans. by Bettina Bergo ed. by Werner Hamacher and David E. 
Wellbery (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 79-99 (p. 90).    
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Kant‘s transcendental reduction in the Critique of Pure Reason.  By transcendental Kant 
means conditions that make experience and knowledge possible.  Just as our experience, 
for Kant, justifies the claims he made, so too does our experience of being part of a 
community, language, objectifying consciousness, knowledge, and our ability to be self-
critical, justify the face of the Other as a transcendental condition for experience as we 
experience it.  It is what makes such central aspects of human life possible.
28
  As De 
Boer states, 
[s]imilarly, human egoism, together with the facts of (self-) critical knowledge 
and community (as situations in which the totality breaks), are indications 
pointing to the epiphany of the Other‘s face.29  
 
Through his novel application, and interpretation of Husserl‘s phenomenology, Levinas 
uncovers a wider horizon that is forgotten in ordinary immediate consciousness, which 
nevertheless conditions consciousness.  
De Boer refers to Levinas‘s ‗Signature‘ to further support his convincing reading.  
In that article Levinas argues that the strictly cognitive relation has ‗transcendental 
conditions‘ such as language, history, culture and the body.  ‗To hold out one‘s hands, 
to turn one‘s head, to speak a language, to be the ―sedimentation‖ of a history — all this 
transcendentally conditions contemplation and the contemplated.‘ 30   Further on in 
‗Signature‘ Levinas goes on to affirm that the fundamental experience par excellence, 
which is the foundation of all experience, is the encounter with the face of the Other.  
‗The fundamental experience which objective experience itself presupposes is the 
experience of the Other.  It is experience par excellence [...].  Moral consciousness is 
thus not a modality of psychological consciousness, but its condition.‘31   Although 
Levinas himself uses the term ‗experience‘ here, in his more philosophical work he 
often expresses increasing reservations about the term, as for Levinas, experience 
prioritises intentional consciousness.  In the Preface to Totality and Infinity Levinas 
qualifies his use of the term experience, ‗[t]he relation with infinity cannot, to be sure, 
                                                          
28
 In his Foundations of a Critical Psychology De Boer further explains his thinking behind his belief that 
Levinas‘s philosophy is an ethical transcendental philosophy and what uniquely distinguishes it from 
other forms of transcendental thinking.  ‗It is not making explicit universal principles that lie at the basis 
of our experience [...].  It can be named a transcendental philosophy because it is an investigation of the 
conditions for the Good Life and of the sources of Utopia.  Here the transcendental foundation is not an 
abstract principle but a concretissimum, the critical confrontation with the countenance of the Other.‘ 
Theodore de Boer, Foundations of a Critical Psychology, trans. by Theodore Plantinga (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1983), p. 177. 
29
 De Boer, ‗An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy‘, p. 29, my emphasis. 
30
 Levinas, ‗Signature‘, p. 292.   
31
 Ibid., p. 293. 
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be stated in terms of [intentional] experience, for infinity overflows the thought that 
thinks it‘.32  
Levinas‘s method is said to ‗resemble‘ the transcendental approach as in his 
work he is exploring previously unthought of horizons that condition experience, 
underpin subjectivity, and give rise to objectifying consciousness.  However, in 
distinction from Kant‘s approach, beside from the obvious difference being that Levinas 
is putting the transcendental ego into question, he will also argue that although the 
transcendental relationship with the infinite that is he seeking to describe makes 
experience as we experience it possible, this ‗transcendental condition‘ is an event that 
can be detected within historical experience, time and time again, even though it is 
outside of experience and not reducible to it.  As the event eludes representation, 
although the infinite is encountered in the world through an empirical event, it 
transcends the event as it defies representation and knowledge.
33
 As De Boer rightly 
points out, ‗The condition for experience is not itself experienced‘.34   
Levinas goes on to affirm the resemblance to the transcendental method by 
stating that the idea of infinity, encountered in the face of the Other, ‗is the condition for 
every opinion as also for every objective truth‘.35  Going further still, on the next page, 
Levinas argues that this encounter with infinity founds subjectivity, and has 
‗philosophical primacy‘, hence the comparison to Kant‘s transcendental method.36  If 
freedom is a property of subjectivity, then the idea of infinity likewise founds freedom.  
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 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 25.     
33
 It is this event that Levinas will continue to struggle to describe in his later work, requiring him to push 
the boundaries of philosophy and continue to commit violence to language.  In an article that is to follow 
shortly after Totality and Infinity, ‗The Trace of the Other‘ (1963), Levinas will introduce the term ‗the 
trace‘ in an attempt to capture the sense that consciousness cannot capture the presence of the Other, as 
objectifying consciousness arrives too late.  ‗Its [the face] wonder is due to the elsewhere from which it 
comes and into which it already withdraws. [...]. A face is in the trace of the utterly bygone, utterly passed 
absent [...].  For a face is the unique openness in which the signifyingness of the transcendent does not 
nullify the transcendence and make it enter into an immanent order; here on the contrary transcendence 
refuses immanence precisely as the ever bygone transcendence of the transcendent.‘  Levinas, ‗The Trace 
of the Other‘, p. 355.       
34
 De Boer, ‗An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy‘, p. 26. 
35
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 25.     
36
 ‗This book then does present itself as a defence of subjectivity, but it will apprehend the subjectivity 
not at the level of its purely egoist protestation against totality, nor in its anguish before death, but as 
founded (fondée) [based/grounded] in the idea of infinity.  It will proceed to distinguish between the idea 
of totality and the idea of infinity, and affirm the philosophical primacy of the idea of infinity.‘ Ibid., p. 
26. Later on in the text when Levinas describes sensibility as fundamentally a mode of enjoyment, 
prioritising the affective content over any secondary representational function, he once again uses 
language that resonates with Kant‘s transcendental method, although his position is very different from 
Kant‘s. ‗Rather than taking sensations to be contents destined to fill a priori forms of objectivity, a 
transcendental function sui generis must be recognised in them [...] a prior formal structures of the non-I 
are not necessarily structures of objectivity.‘ Ibid., p. 188.    
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In pushing back prior to subjectivity, prior to freedom, Levinas is consequently 
challenging the view that intentionality defines consciousness.  ‗All knowing qua 
intentionality already presupposes the idea of infinity, which is pre-eminently non-
adequation.‘37 
In his article ‗Rereading Totality and Infinity‘, Bernasconi, gives a critical 
reading of De Boer‘s transcendental reading of Totality and Infinity and shows how 
elements of the text make an exclusive transcendental reading problematic.  Most 
notably, in Section II of the text ‗Interiority and Economy‘, Levinas himself uses both 
transcendental and empirical language to describe the life of the self prior to the 
encounter with the infinite.  Bernasconi is correct to highlight the aspects of the text that 
could be said to complicate De Boer‘s reading, however, his criticisms do not point to a 
deficiency in De Boer‘s thinking, as much as to Levinas‘s somewhat unclear 
descriptions.  Pointing out, ‗[t]he puzzle is that Levinas himself seems unable to decide 
between these rival interpretations‘.38   Both readings are rooted in the text, though 
usually drawing on different sections of the text, and so it would seem that part of the 
problem must lie in Levinas‘s description.  I suggest that the lack of clarity in the text 
relating to this very question reflects, perhaps, not so much Levinas‘s indecisiveness but 
perhaps an unavoidable failed attempt on his behalf to as of yet express in language a 
dimension of life that resists expression and representation.  Levinas‘s later work will 
be marked with a persistent struggle to move away from ontological language and seek 
new ways to ‗say‘ that which can never be ‗said‘.  The tension between the empirical 
and transcendental readings of the text reveal this difficulty, which Levinas had not yet 
found a way around, as he was still unavoidably working his way through the problem.  
We will return to the problem of the paradox of language at the end of this chapter.   
Levinas‘s dual description of time in terms of historical time and the time of 
eschatology is not only crucial in understanding his novel description of human life, and 
is testament to the continuous presence of the two strands of thought that are 
simultaneously operative in his work, that of his Jewish religious heritage and the 
heritage of Greek philosophy, it also helps us to understand how his description of the 
encounter with infinity has been interpreted as both a transcendental condition and an 
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 Ibid., p. 25.     
38
 Bernasconi, ‗Rereading Totality and Infinity‘, p. 23. 
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empirical event.
39
  The encounter with the infinite, through the face of the Other, is a 
moment when eschatological time breaks through the totalizing ontological time of 
history.  Human life takes place within this juxtaposition of historical linear time and 
eschatological time.  The tension within the text between empirical and transcendental 
language manifests in this understanding of time, as on the one hand, the encounter with 
the Other is an historical empirical event, and yet, is outside of human experience and 
not reducible to it.  In his interview with Kearney Levinas remarked: 
The interhuman relationship emerges with our history, with our being-in-the-
world, as intelligibility and presence.  The interhuman realm can thus be 
construed as a part of the disclosure of the world as presence.  But it can also be 
considered from another perspective — the ethical or biblical perspective that 
transcends the Greek language of intelligibility — as a theme of justice and 
concern for the other as other, as a theme of love and desire, which carries us 
beyond the infinite being of the world as presence.  The interhuman is thus an 
interface: a double axis where what is ‗of the world‘ qua phenomenological 
intelligibility is juxtaposed with what is ‗not of the world‘ qua ethical 
responsibility.
40
    
 
The question of the empirical and transcendental reading of the text has important 
ramifications for understanding Levinas‘s description of the origins of freedom.  Firstly, 
this issue centres on whether or not the self is initially free and for itself and is then re-
orientated and made ethically free through a historical empirical encounter.  Or, 
secondly, it raises the question regarding whether the Other is the transcendental 
condition that makes subjectivity possible by investing freedom.  For Levinas, the time 
of the infinite is juxtaposed on the historical ontological time. It is not so much an 
either/or as a both/and.  Hence Levinas says:  
This ‗beyond‘ the totality and objective experience is, however, not to be 
described in a purely negative fashion.  It is reflected within the totality and 
history, within experience.  The eschatological, as the ‗beyond‘ of history, draws 
beings out of the jurisdiction of history and the future; it arouses them in and 
calls them forth to their full responsibility.
41
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 In one of his overtly religious writings Levinas further clarifies his use of the term ‗eschatology‘ and 
the influence of the Jewish scriptures in this regard.  ‗However, eschatology possesses a number of styles 
and genres, and it was the Jewish Bible which probably discovered the one which consists in feeling 
responsible in the face of the future one hopes for others.  Yet ever since the creation, it was to be found 
in the humanity of man.  It cannot be the cause of wars.‘ Emmanuel Levinas, Beyond the Verse. Talmudic 
Readings and Lectures, trans. by Gary D. Mole (London and New York: Continuum, 2007), p. xviii         
40
 Levinas and Kearney, ‗Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas‘, p. 20. 
41
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 23.  At this stage of his writing Levinas is yet to abandon the term 
‗experience‘, however, he qualifies his use of the term, in an attempt to distance himself from an 
interpretation of experience that implies a direct correlation between the noesis and noema which 
prioritises the meaning giving intentional consciousness that, for Levinas, represents the same. ‗The 
relation with infinity cannot, to be sure, be stated in terms of experience, for infinity overflows the 
thought that thinks it [...] but if experience precisely means a relation with the absolutely other, that is, 
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Levinas‘s thinking on time helps to show how this relation with infinity that is both 
outside of experience and makes experience possible, also constantly penetrates 
experience and points to the beyond.  The separated self can forget the infinite, once 
again live a purely egotistical life, and it takes an historical encounter with the Other to 
re-orientate the self once more.  
Consistent with his criticisms of intentionality raised in his earlier work, Levinas 
repeats that as intentionality remains an adequation with the object, it stays within the 
totality of the Same.  As Levinas is attempting to describe subjectivity as both within a 
totality and also breached by infinity, then intentionality, which consumes the object 
totally, cannot ‗define consciousness at its fundamental level‘.42  There must be a prior 
moment whereby the same is placed into question from the outside.  For Levinas, this 
prior moment is the welcoming of the Other, ‗in it the idea of infinity is 
consummated‘.43  In a move that once again resembles Kant‘s transcendental method, 
Levinas plainly describes incarnate consciousness, and then argues that only a 
description of consciousness that is founded by the idea of infinity, an idea that 
overflows the thought that thinks it, can account for such a description of consciousness. 
The incarnation of consciousness is therefore comprehensible only if, over and 
beyond adequation, the overflowing of the idea by its ideatum, that is, the idea 
of infinity, moves consciousness.
44
  
 
Intentional thought alone could not be thought of as breaching the immanence of the 
Same, for although it is a reaching out beyond the I, it involves a complete return again, 
thought remains closed in on itself.
45
  Action, however, that is rendered possible by the 
incarnation of consciousness, breaks forth from the immanence of the Same and is 
therefore regarded by Levinas as a form of violence.  By breaking with the immanence 
of the Same action brings something new into being, something that cannot be 
contained by thought alone.  With action a ‗surplus of being‘ breaks forth ‗over the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
with what always overflows thought, the relation with infinity accomplishes experience in the fullest 
sense of the word.‘ Ibid., p. 25.         
42
 Ibid., p. 27.     
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 The extent to which intentionality can be said to breach immanence will depend on the particular 
understanding of intentionality. In Husserl‘s famous reduction, for example, because the transcendence of 
the physical thing is uncovered as constituted through the harmony of one‘s own actual experiences, this 
transcendence, for Husserl, is a transcendence within radical immanence.  Thus there are several versions 
of the intentionality of consciousness, not all of them presuppose or imply radical otherness in the way 
that Levinas argues.   
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thought that claims to contain it‘.46  This fundamental engagement with infinity in turn 
‗sustains activity‘ and is the source of both ‗activity and theory‘.47  Levinas contrasts 
this view of consciousness as founded in the idea of infinity with the Heideggerian 
conception of disclosure.  For it is not a question of disclosing these hidden, ‗noctural 
events‘ [the welcoming of the face], as this would presuppose that the events are 
contained in the Same, and would overlook the newness of the events.  Although 
philosophy can be said to dis-cover (in the original sense of make known or reveal) the 
significance of these fundamental events, they are not reducible to knowledge.  
 It is this hidden event that conditions and founds subjectivity, that occurs prior 
to the subject‘s reflective engagement with the world, and is outside of the noesis- 
noema structure of consciousness, that Levinas wishes to shed light on.  Levinas aims to 
uncover this forgotten experience out of which objectifying thought lives, and he credits 
the possibility of such an endeavour to the work of Husserl.  
Intentional analysis is the search for the concrete.  Notions held under the direct 
gaze of the thought that defines them are nevertheless, unbeknown to this naïve 
thought, revealed to be implanted in horizons unsuspected by this thought; these 
horizons endow them with a meaning — such is the essential teaching of 
Husserl.
48
 
 
It is these ‗unsuspected‘ horizons that are ‗unbeknown‘ to thought, and yet condition 
thought, that Levinas wishes to describe.  
 
§ 4.2 ‗THE SAME AND THE OTHER‘ 
 
Confirmed through Levinas‘s own admission, Section I should be read as a preparatory 
section that introduces the reader, unfamiliar with Levinas‘s writings, to his distinctive 
way of thinking about and approaching philosophy, his novel interpretation of the 
history of philosophy, his own terminology and the broad strokes of the argument to 
follow.
49
 Levinas begins the main text with a reflection on metaphysics and 
transcendence. 
50
  As he situates his approach to philosophy, and the particular subject 
                                                          
46
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 27.     
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 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid. In relation to this point Levinas refers the reader to his article ‗The Ruin of Representation‘. See, 
Ch. III, § 3.4      
49
 ‗We should like at least to invite him [the reader] not to be rebuffed by the aridity of certain pathways, 
by the labour of the first section, whose preparatory character is to be emphasized, but in which the 
horizon of this whole research takes form.‘ Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 29.      
50
 In describing the structure of metaphysical desire as transcendence Levinas explicitly references Jean 
Wahl‘s Existence humaine et transcendance.  Wahl was an important influence of the development of 
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area of the text, as belonging within this area of first philosophy he begins by outlining 
to the reader the basic structure of metaphysics as he understands it.  
 
§ 4.2.1 METAPHYSICS AND TRANSCENDENCE  
 
Metaphysics is defined by Levinas as a movement towards the ‗elsewhere‘, the ‗other‘, 
that disturbs one‘s state of otherwise being ‗at home‘ (chez soi) with oneself.51  This 
movement is then further characterised as Desire, a desire for the other (autre).  This 
desire is a constant movement out of one self and towards the other that is never 
fulfilled, as the other remains other, and as such remains outside of the self, outside of 
the same.  By way of further explaining metaphysical desire, Levinas contrasts this 
desire with the attempt by the existent to possess and consume other objects that 
through consummation can become mine.  This is the case for both a literal consuming 
through the act of eating and drinking, or the assimilation of the other through 
possession, knowledge and concepts.  ‗Their alterity is thereby reabsorbed into my own 
identity as a thinker or a possessor.‘52  In contrast to this, the other of metaphysical 
desire is the ‗absolutely other‘, which escapes all attempts at assimilation and remains 
exterior with its alterity intact.  ‗The metaphysical desire tends towards something else 
entirely, toward the absolutely other.‘53  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Levinas thinking, particularly in relation to how Levinas thinks transcendence and desire.  Wahl‘s 
understanding of transcendence as a ‗doubling back‘, a double movement that not only brings the self out 
of the immanence of the Same and towards an alterity that is both prior to, and also not reducible to, 
knowledge and concepts, but also hollows out a space within the self that makes room for interiority, is an 
obvious influence on Levinas.  Levinas described this understanding of transcendence in a paper from 
1976, ‗Jean Wahl: Neither Having nor Being‘, ‗[t]hus transcendence is perhaps the essential element of 
Wahl‘s teachings — but a transcendence indifferent to hierarchy.  A bursting toward the heights or a 
descent towards the depths of the sensible world; trans-ascendance and trans-descendence are purely, and 
pure, transcendencies. [...] There is in this transcendent movement an accomplishing of oneself that is at 
once a destruction of oneself, a failure that is triumph. [...]  Before belonging to the empire of Nature or to 
the self-awareness of Spirit, it is in breaking through the border of being that the logically unjustifiable 
uniqueness of the human person is identified.‘ Emmanuel Levinas, ‗Jean Wahl: Neither Having nor 
Being‘, in Outside the Subject (London and New York: Continuum, 2008), pp. 51-64 (p. 62).  Wahl was 
also a forerunner to Levinas in relation to the emphasis he placed on the sensible life of the self and the 
importance of affectivity and the self‘s immersion in immediate sensible lived life in the world that is 
outside of objectifying knowledge and concepts.  Levinas argues that sensible life is a necessity for both 
consciousness and morality. See, Emmanuel Levinas, ‗Jean Wahl and Feeling‘, trans. by Michael B. 
Smith, in Proper Names, pp. 110- 18.  
51
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 33. The translator, Lingis, informs the reader that ‗chez soi‘ is a 
reference to Hegelian bei sich, which Levinas will refer to when he later describes the concrete manner in 
which an existent exists for itself.  
52
 Ibid. 
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253 
Levinas elaborates further on what is distinctive about metaphysical desire by 
contrasting desire with ‗need‘.54  Need is generally understood as arising as a result of a 
lack or deficiency, and when the need is fulfilled the existent returns to a state of 
equilibrium.  On this understanding ‗need‘ never really disturbs the existent‘s state of 
being at home with oneself.  Desire, however, is not based on any such lack and is a 
movement toward the other that can never result in a complete return to oneself, as it is 
a desire that can never be satisfied.
55
  The separation that exists between the absolutely 
other and the existent who desires it can never be dissolved, the distance between the 
two will always remain.
56
  Levinas explicitly names this absolutely other (autre) as the 
human Other (d‟Autrui) and the Most-High (Très-Haut).57  
In the final paragraph of this section Levinas brings up freedom for the first time 
in the text and links freedom with consciousness, metaphysical desire and goodness.  
Levinas argues that when the human being is understood as primarily motivated by need, 
and need is seen to explain society and history, certain aspects of humanity, arguably 
those aspects that set us apart as human, are left unaccounted for.  Levinas accepts that 
the events of the twentieth century seem to support this view, ‗that hunger and fear can 
prevail over every human resistance and every freedom!‘, and given the horrendous 
deeds committed by human beings against one another, one could not doubt the reality 
of the dominion of ‗things and the wicked‘ over man.58  If this alone was an accurate 
portrayal of the human being it would seem that any defence or explanation of freedom 
                                                          
54
 This is not a new distinction in Levinas‘s thinking.  As we have seen, as early as On Escape Levinas 
wrote about the desire to escape being, irrespective of any particular destination.  Levinas also discussed 
desire as an end in itself in Existence and Existents.  The term does undergo development however. As we 
seen in the last chapter, Levinas first began to describe the metaphysical relation in terms of desire in 
‗Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity‘. See, Ch. III, § 3.3. 
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 ‗The metaphysical desire does not long to return, for it is desire for a land not of our birth, for a land 
foreign to every nature, which has not been our fatherland and to which we shall never betake ourselves.‘ 
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, pp. 33-34.  
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 Levinas describes this distance in terms of ‗height‘, which he first introduced in ‗Philosophy and the 
Idea of Infinity‘. See, Ch. III, § 3.3. In contrast to the Hegelian bei sich Levinas retrieves the more ancient 
Platonic understanding of desire and ‗height‘.  Within the text itself Levinas directly makes reference to 
Plato‘s Republic, but in contrast to Plato Levinas argues that although this distance is to be understood as 
‗height‘ the absolutely other is no longer in the heavens but is invisible.  Peperzak points out that this 
section contains allusions to Plato‘s Symposium, Phaedrus and Philebus.  When Levinas returns to this 
distinction between ‗need‘ and ‗desire‘ in subsection D ‗Separation and The Absolute‘, of Section I, p. 
103, he once again makes use of Plato‘s own analysis of Desire and the importance of ‗height‘ in the 
relation between the Good and Being. See, Peperzak, To The Other, p. 132.        
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 Despite equating the absolutely other with the Most-High, which is reasonable to read as a reference to 
God, Levinas does not further explore this assertion in any detail in the present text.  In his post Totality 
and Infinity work Levinas will return to explicitly develop the way in which the absolutely other can be 
understood as God. See, Levinas, ‗The Trace of the Other‘ (1963), and ‗God and Philosophy‘ (1975), in 
Of God Who Comes to Mind, pp. 55-78.        
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 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 35. 
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would be futile.  However, what separates humanity from such ‗animality‘ is that 
human beings have the ability to reflect on this element of the human condition and can 
take steps, wherever possible, to hinder the domination of need.  We are free to try and 
safeguard freedom.  Human beings are not only corporeal beings with material needs, 
but we are also conscious agents.
59
 
Freedom consists in knowing that freedom is in peril.  But to know or to be 
conscious is to have time to avoid and forestall the instant of inhumanity.  It is 
this perpetual postponing of the hour of treason — infinitesimal difference 
between man and non-man — that implies the disinterestedness of goodness, the 
desire of the absolutely other or nobility, the dimension of metaphysics 
[ethics].
60
 
 
Despite our physical condition and needs, despite our absolute reliance on exteriority 
for food and shelter, because we are conscious, human beings can take steps to ensure 
that these basic needs are met in advance and in turn ‗free‘ ourselves from this 
dependency.  As conscious beings who can postpone this hour of need, we exist, for the 
most part, in this space where need is postponed and is prevented from arising in the 
first place.  Levinas will argue that metaphysical desire alone can account for the advent 
of consciousness.  Metaphysical desire alone can justify and invest freedom. 
 
§ 4.2.2 METAPHYSICS PRECEDES ONTOLOGY 
 
In line with his work of the 1950‘s Levinas equates cognition, knowledge and theory 
with the freedom of the subject, as concepts enable the subject to assimilate the alterity 
of the other and remain unquestioned and dominant.  In doing so preserve a false view 
of existence in which the Same dominates.  Levinas then goes on to argue that ontology 
as a philosophical approach seeks to do just that, as seeking to comprehend being is also 
a drive for domination and control.   
To theory as comprehension of beings the general title of ontology is appropriate.  
Ontology, which reduces the other to the same, promotes freedom — the 
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 In subsection D, ‗The Dwelling‘, of Section II ‗Interiority and Economy‘, Levinas returns to this point 
and elaborates on the relationship between corporeality, consciousness and freedom. Levinas describes 
consciousness as a postponing of the corporeality of the body, to be conscious is to be given time.  This 
time in turn affords the existent the opportunity to create social, political and economic institutions that 
bring with them the freedom to engage in the world beyond mere toil for survival.  Levinas argues that 
both self consciousness and time are given through the encounter with the Other.  Hence Levinas says, 
‗[t]o be free is to build a world in which one could be free‘. Ibid., p. 165, my emphasis.  
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 Ibid., p. 35. 
  
255 
freedom that is the identification of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated 
by the other.
61
  
 
This particular mode of philosophy ‗renounces‘ the metaphysical desire described 
earlier by Levinas, as it favours the domination of the Same at the expense of the 
‗marvel of exteriority‘.62  Ontology, however, runs into a problem when it deploys a 
theoretical device that cannot be accounted for within the ontological approach.  
Ontology is also concerned with critique.  The calling into question of its own 
dogmatism cannot be explained via ontology as ontology is the domination of the Same.  
Levinas explains that as freedom is the bases of the ontological approach, situating the 
source of criticism within freedom itself would lead to infinite regress.
63
  From where 
then does the propensity to question its own dogmatism come from?  It is here that 
Levinas declares one of his main premises:  
A calling into question of the same — which cannot occur within the egoist 
spontaneity of the same — is brought about by the other.  We name this calling 
into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics.
64
 
 
This ‗ethics‘ or ‗metaphysics‘ as Levinas also names its, as the calling into question of 
the Same by the other founds, as in makes possible, critical consciousness.  Levinas has 
already established that metaphysics is characterised by the desire for the absolutely 
other, and on those grounds Levinas claims that Metaphysics therefore precedes 
Ontology.  Only the encounter with the Other can breach the Same, and place the self 
into question, and in doing so bring objectivity and critical consciousness.  This has 
implications for understanding both the place and role of ‗freedom‘ in human 
subjectivity. 
 Firstly, as Levinas has equated the domination of the same through theory and 
knowledge with freedom, then by calling into question the supposedly self generation of 
the critical faculty, he is also calling into question the view that freedom is sovereign 
and likewise requires no explanation or grounding.  Secondly, Levinas traces the view 
that aligns freedom with sovereignty and self-mastery as far back as Socrates, whose 
theory of anamnesis serves as a perfect example of ‗the primacy of the same‘.65  
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That reason in the last analysis would be the manifestation of a freedom, 
neutralising the other and encompassing him, can come as no surprise once it 
was laid down that sovereign reason knows only itself, that nothing other limits 
it.
66
 
 
Freedom par excellence is seen as the exercise of one‘s reason and cognitive 
capabilities unhindered by the outside.  By arguing that the same could not possibly be 
the origin of the capacity of the subject to be critical, and that this ability must have its 
origin outside of the subject, Levinas not only calls into question the limitations of 
freedom, but he also questions freedom‘s origin.  By doing so he calls into question the 
view within the history of philosophy that sees freedom as sovereign.
67
  Again we see 
that in challenging this view Levinas‘s approach takes him back beyond the starting 
point that has been taken for granted by so many that have come before him, the rational 
free subject, and he attempts to describe a more fundamental element of human life that 
is overlooked in such a starting point.  
In prioritising the free rational subject philosophy has not only made a 
epistemological error, by overlooking a more fundamental moment that grounds the 
subject, but centrally for Levinas, this approach is also unethical, or, perhaps, it is more 
accurate to call this starting point aethical.  Comprehension of being, knowledge and 
conceptualization, is understood by Levinas as removing alterity from the being of what 
one seeks to understand, and in doing so a violence is committed against the other that 
is understood.  Just as he has done in his work of the 1950‘s Levinas argues that 
phenomenology is no exception to this characterisation of philosophy and the drive for 
knowledge. Levinas does not deny the originality and ingenuity of Husserl‘s 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the outside; hence Levinas regards it as a prime example of the primacy of the same at the expense of 
alterity.  There is no dialogue, only monologue in this recollection. In his interesting article, ‗Anamnesis 
as Alterity?‘, which explores this very topic, moving beyond Levinas‘s well-known critical position on 
anamnesis, Leask convincingly suggests that Levinas‘s treatment, despite himself, ‗might even take us to 
the threshold of a ―positive‖ phenomenology of anamnesis‘, when anamnesis is understood in a similar 
sense to the interpretation given by Jean-Louis Chrétien. See, Ian Leask, ‗Anamnesis as Alterity?‘, in 
Transcendence and Phenomenology, pp. 421-33.  
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phenomenology but he does not view it as a break from this overriding tendency in the 
history of philosophy to violate alterity by apprehending an individual being through a 
categorisation or general conceptualization.  
Since Husserl the whole of phenomenology is the promotion of the idea of 
horizon, which for it plays a role equivalent to that of the concept in classical 
idealism; an existent arises upon a ground that extends beyond it, as an 
individual arises from a concept.
68
         
 
Heidegger‘s philosophy does not escape this criticism either. Though Heidegger‘s shift 
from the transcendental intentional ego to Dasein questions the primacy of 
consciousness in our everyday engagement with the world, Levinas is still dissatisfied 
with this starting point.  The view of the modern subject may be redefined by Heidegger, 
but Levinas believes his approach remains within the dominant philosophical 
framework that he is challenging because there is still no accountability to, or presence 
of alterity, hence no ethics.  
To affirm the priority of Being over existents is to already decide the essence of 
philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is existent, (the 
ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of existents, which, impersonal, 
permits the apprehension, the domination of existents (a relationship of 
knowing?), subordinates justice to freedom.
69
 
 
Levinas explains that ‗freedom‘ in this instance does not mean the freedom of the will, 
rather it means remaining the same and unaffected by the other.
70
  Heidegger‘s 
philosophy, despite questioning the supremacy of the modern conscious subject, still 
preserves the pre-eminence of the Same.  
As Heidegger prioritises the question of the meaning of Being above all else, 
and overlooks the unique singularity of every existent in favour of the being of that 
existent, Levinas sees his philosophy as unethical.  Not only is ontology as a branch of 
philosophy deficient when it comes to describing a fundamental moment in the life of 
the existent, that is pre-theoretical and pre-conceptual, but Levinas also believes that it 
leads to dangerous and unethical political and social consequences.  Ontology is not 
only a philosophy of injustice but it is also a philosophy of power.  Levinas reiterates 
his claim that thematization and conceptualization represent the possession of the other 
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and the eradication of all otherness, by seeking to contain the other within the set 
parameters of a concept.  Through promoting the dominance of the Same, and the drive 
to know and possess being, ontology is therefore egoism.  Levinas believes that this 
egoism is not contained within philosophical discourse but can be further demonstrated 
in the attempt to possess not only knowledge but the very earth itself.  ‗Possession is 
pre-eminently the form in which the other becomes the same, by becoming mine.‘71  
Hence, for Levinas, this underlying egoism accounts for Heidegger‘s distrust of 
technology and his nostalgia for pre-technological man who was more firmly rooted to 
the soil.  Levinas once again links Heideggerian thought with paganism.
72
  To further 
demonstrate the anonymity of the other within this approach Levinas emphasises that 
ontology becomes an ontology of nature, ‗impersonal fecundity, faceless generous 
mother‘.73  This obedience to an anonymous force, be that faceless mother earth or 
Being in general, for Levinas, logically leads to the submission to another power, the 
domination of a imperialist tyrannous State.  
Tyranny is not the pure and simple extension of technology to reified men.  Its 
origin lies back in the pagan ―moods‖, in the enrootedness in the earth, in the 
adoration that enslaved men can devote to their masters.  Being before the 
existent, ontology before metaphysics, is freedom (be it the freedom of theory) 
before justice.  It is a movement within the same before obligation to the other.
74
 
 
For Levinas it is imperative that this view of freedom as sovereignty, egotistical, and 
primarily for the self, does not go unchallenged.  There is far too much at stake.  
Levinas goes on to say that these terms, the ‗same‘ before the ‗other‘, ‗freedom‘ before 
‗justice‘, must be reversed.  Not only in order to present a more accurate account of 
subjectivity, and a more accurate account of the origins and justification of freedom, but 
also to avoid the devastating political and social consequence that have arisen partially 
as a consequence of this approach to philosophy and this view of the human condition.  
Ethics must be given its rightful place, at the bases of not only all other philosophical 
thought, but also the origins of the human person.
75
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§ 4.2.3 SEPARATION AS DESIRE 
 
In Totality and Infinity Levinas challenges the view that describes the subject‘s 
relationship with exteriority as one based on any kind of need that stems from a 
privation or lack.  Although the subject undeniably has basic needs, Levinas argues that 
primarily the subject‘s way of living in the world is the pursuit of enjoyment and 
pleasure, and not the fulfilment of a need.
76
  The existent eats for enjoyment, and not for 
sustenance.  In section II we explore Levinas‘s description of the economic life of the 
separated self, and how this description relates to the freedom of the self.  For now, it is 
necessary to acknowledge both the methodological and logical importance of Levinas‘s 
account of separation based on desire and not need, for his overall analysis in Totality 
and Infinity and, in particular, his justification of freedom.   
In several passages throughout the text Levinas reiterates the importance of an 
absolute separation between the same and the other, and why it is that the idea of 
infinity and the structure of desire requires this separation.  Levinas is well aware, and 
acknowledges, that in accounting for the separation in being through desire, and not 
through need, he is breaking with a long philosophical tradition.  Levinas specifically 
mentions Parmenides, Hegel and Spinoza as privileging unity over difference, but many 
other unmentioned philosophers could fit this description.
77
  Philosophers within this 
tradition cannot help but begin with the empirical reality of separation, but this 
separation is accounted for as an illusion, a fault, or a fallenness that, in the end, will 
ultimately be overcome when difference is reconciled and unity is achieved.
78
  Such a 
description of being, as ultimately a unity, leads to an understanding of separation as 
explained in terms of a lack or a need.  By describing separation as a need, the 
difference in being is seen and evaluated as a space in the totality that will ultimately be 
filled when unity is achieved or returned to once again.  One of the reasons that Levinas 
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Dasein‘s engagement with the world as based on utility, ‗[t]he things we live from are not tools, nor even 
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describes separation in terms of metaphysical desire is that he wishes to avoid a 
description of separation that leads to a complete unification, or the consuming of the 
other into the same to fill a void.
79
  In order to safeguard alterity and to avoid a totality, 
Levinas must think separation in such a way that, on the one hand, separation is 
maintained in its own right, and not based on a negation or correlation, and, on the other 
hand, in such a way that still allows for an encounter with what is outside of the 
separated being.  Levinas achieves this through his account of metaphysical desire and 
the idea of infinity. 
Levinas maintains that only when separation is described as complete and whole 
is desire possible.  In his descriptions of desire Levinas moves away from a formal logic 
of need and dependency, whereby the goal is assimilation and unity.  In many sections 
throughout Totality and Infinity Levinas both implicitly and explicitly argues against the 
formal dialectical logic of Hegel, who is an obvious antagonist on this very point.
80
  In a 
direct challenge to Hegelian dialectic Levinas argues for a distinct separation that is not 
based on an opposition, nor as a result of a correlation, or negation, that together form a 
closed system.
81
  
[T]he relationship with the Other does not have the same status as the relations 
given to objectifying thought [of the other], where the distinction of terms also 
reflects their union. The relationship between me and the Other [qua fellow 
human being] does not have the structure formal logic finds in all relations. The 
terms remain absolute despite the relation in which they find themselves. The 
relation with the Other is the only relation where such an overturning of formal 
logic can occur.
82
  
 
Although Levinas logically needs to explain separation based on metaphysical desire, if 
the idea of infinity and the alterity of the Other are to remain outside of a noema noesis 
correlation, in order to avoid substituting one logical totality for another, Levinas 
explains that the relationship with infinity is not reducible to, and so, goes beyond a 
logical totality.
83
  As outlined by Levinas in the passage quoted above, ‗the relation with 
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the [recognition of the absolute existence of the] Other is the only relation where such 
an overturning of formal logic can occur‘.  In contrast to Hegelian dialectic logic 
Levinas argues that, ‗the atheist separation is required by the idea of Infinity, but it is 
not dialectically brought about by it‘. 84  Levinas‘s appropriation of Descartes‘ 
descriptions of the idea of ‗infinity‘ reflects this attempt to avoid a logical totality, by 
arguing that when the same encounters infinity it encounters an idea that surpasses all 
attempts to fully know and contain it.  With infinity, the Same is said to think more than 
it can think.  The Same encounters an alterity that is beyond the powers of the self, and 
puts those very same powers into question, which for Levinas is the source of ethics or 
‗metaphysics‘.  ‗Infinity opens the order of the Good.  It is an order that does not 
contradict, but goes beyond the rules of formal logic.‘85  For Levinas, the concrete way 
in which this metaphysical idea is encountered everyday is in the reality of sociality.
86
  
 
But the order of Desire, the relationship between strangers who are not wanting 
to one another — desire in its positivity — is affirmed across the idea of creation 
ex nihilo.  Then the plane of the needy being, avid for its complements, vanishes, 
and the possibility of a sabbatical existence, where existence suspends the 
necessities of existence, is inaugurated.
87
  
 
 
§ 4.2.4 FREEDOM AND CREATIO EX NIHILO 
 
In contrast to the philosophical notion of being as unity, Levinas draws on a different 
understanding of how to think being that is rooted in a tradition older than the 
philosophical origins of being as unity, namely, that of the idea of creation presented in 
the creation narratives in the Hebrew Bible.
88
  This is another example of Levinas‘s rich 
religious heritage informing his philosophical thinking, in this particular instance, on the 
way in which we can think separation in being that is not reducible to a deficiency.  In 
the biblical tradition the creator creates beings that are distinct and separate and who 
also, even when in relationship with the creator, do not diminish the distance between 
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them, nor are they taken into God.
89
  ‗Infinity is produced by withstanding the invasion 
of a totality, in a contraction that leaves a place for the separated being. Thus 
relationships that open up a way outside of being to take form.‘90  It is a relationship 
that leaves room for desire (for the infinite), but that is not based on dependency and 
need (between each other).    
One implication that stems from understanding separation as a lack or a fallen 
state, which Levinas wishes to avoid, pertains directly to freedom.  By positing the 
separated beings relationship with exteriority as based on need and lack, the self is 
situated in a closed system, wherein it is reliant on exteriority to fulfil its needs.  Within 
such an understanding the freedom of the self is already limited and compromised.  
‗Need indicates void and lack in the needy one, its dependence on the exterior, the 
insufficiency of the needy being precisely in that it does not entirely possess its being 
and consequently is not strictly speaking separate.‘91  Within such a perspective it is 
difficult to argue for the origins and justification of moral freedom (and moral 
responsibility), as from the beginning the separated being‘s relationship with exteriority 
is one based on need and dependency.  This view of freedom as compromised from the 
start could also be said to support a Hobbesian view of the basic condition of the human 
being in the state of nature, wherein freedoms must compete with one another in the 
struggle to meet their needs.
92
  In place of such a view that curtails freedom from the 
start Levinas describes the separated being as desiring the infinite, but not in need of the 
infinite, and therefore even in a relationship with the same the infinite can remain 
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exterior to the self.  ‗For an existent is an existent only in the measure that it is free, that 
is, outside of any system, which implies dependence.‘93  
A different but related consequence of viewing freedom this way is that since 
the separated being is described as radically separate and self-sufficient, the encounter 
with alterity can offer a genuine possibility of novelty, as it introduces something 
entirely distinct and new that comes from outside of a totality.  In alterity, as genuinely 
separate and distinct, the ‗new‘ is not taken into the same to fill a deficiency but opens 
up wider possibilities previously impossible for the separated self alone.  Levinas again 
makes a loose reference to the monotheistic religious tradition as informing this view.  
‗Creation ex nihilo breaks with system, posits a being outside of every system, that is, 
there where its freedom is possible‘.94  As the freedom is created out of nothing it is also 
not dependent on the infinite in such a way as to limit the self, and in this sense can be 
said to be free.
95
  
Levinas‘s thinking on the necessity of an understanding of separation based on 
desire also sheds additional light on why, logically, Levinas must posit a separated self 
that exists prior to the encounter with the Other, even though it does not have to be 
interpreted as an empirical historical event that results in a progression from selfish 
living to being for the Other.  Only an already self-sufficient being can ‗desire‘ infinity.  
‗Here the relation connects not terms that complete one another and consequently are 
reciprocally lacking to one another, but terms that suffice to themselves.‘ 96   It is, 
therefore, of methodological importance for Levinas‘s argument that he describes the 
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self as a self-sufficient separated self who ‗lacks nothing‘.97  Levinas describes Desire 
as, ‗the need of him who lacks nothing, the aspiration of him who possesses his being 
entirely, who goes beyond his plenitude, who has the idea of Infinity‘.98  If separation is 
described as a result of a deficiency or as a lack, then any description of the relationship 
with the other would ultimately result in a formal totality, and the preservation of the 
dominance of the Same.  As was shown in the previous chapter, such a relation for 
Levinas is violent and unethical, as all alterity is ultimately done away with.  In order to 
avoid such a problem, and maintain the alterity of the Other, Levinas explains the 
structure of being as separation, and as metaphysical desire for the infinite.  Only a 
separated self can encounter the Other, and only a separated self can be affected by the 
Other, while leaving the alterity of the Other intact.
99
  By describing being as plurality 
and exteriority, therefore, Levinas avoids an account of separation that rests on a fall, or 
deficiency, that will eventual result in unification and integration into ‗the same‘ once 
again.        
A consequence of this description of radical separation, which adds support to 
Levinas‘s description of the separated economic self concerned only with its own self, 
is that the separation required is so radical that the separated self can ‗forget‘ infinity 
entirely, and come to live an ‗atheistic‘ life, removed from any participation from 
being.
100
  
But we then understand that the idea of infinity, which requires separation, 
requires it unto atheism, so profoundly that the idea of infinity could be 
forgotten.  The forgetting of transcendence is not produced as an accident in a 
separated being; the possibility of this forgetting is necessary for separation.
101
  
 
The ‗forgetting‘ of infinity which is necessary for separation, in empirical terms, 
translates as a separated self who lives a life devoid of ethics concerned only with its 
own satisfaction and happiness.  Levinas will further describe this separation within the 
same as requiring a place, a localization, and he will name the body as the mode in 
which a being exists separately, and will go on to describe the way in which the body 
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‗dwells‘ in the world.  These aspects of the life of the separated self will be further 
explored later in this chapter when we focus on Section II of the text, for now, we will 
turn to another consequence of separation that holds importance for the place of 
freedom in Levinas‘s philosophy, interiority.      
 
§ 4.2.5 SEPARATION AS INTERIORITY 
 
Levinas tells us that as the idea of infinity necessitates a separated self that does not 
derive its separation based on any opposition or correlation to infinity, but is complete 
and separate in its own right.  Thus separation does not rest on an logical opposition to 
the Other, it rather must be firstly accomplished as the result of a positive movement.  
Levinas names this positive movement, that produces the separation of the Same, ‗an 
inner life, a psychism‘.102  Separation as interiority, therefore, is a resistance to totality 
because it carves out a space for the separated being to have an inner life, for 
‗thought‘.103  Levinas explains that the way in which the psychism is described in 
abstract terms leads to what appears to be a logical paradox.  This logical paradox has 
two distinct but closely related dimensions; the first, which is merely raised here, is the 
logical problem of how the separated self can appear to precede its own cause (of being 
a separated self).  Interiority as thought is produced by separation and offers a resistance 
to the totality since it is an inner time and life of a separated self, however, the 
improbable phenomenon of thought, what Levinas notes as a ‗revolution‘ in being, 
requires an explanation.
104
  As consciousness constitutes the world, it appears to the 
mind that the transcendental subject is the source of the world and of meaning, that 
representation conditions life.  Although this is how it may appear to consciousness, 
Levinas will argue that life (pre-)conditions representation.  We shall focus on this 
paradoxical point presently, what Levinas calls the posteriority of the anterior, by 
turning our attention to the place of time and representation, and intentional 
consciousness in Levinas‘s clarification of this complex issue.  We will firstly turn to 
the second paradoxical consequence of Levinas‘s description of interiority, which he 
proceeds to develop here; although the separated self exists as a single self, the self is 
never fully with its self.  
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Thought keeps the being at a distance from itself, ‗for by virtue of time this 
being is not yet‘, the self is not all at once.105  In distinction to a non-thinking being, 
such as a stone, which is solely at the mercy of the elements and the external world, the 
thinking self has memory and anticipation of the future to inform its actions.
106
  ‗[B]y 
virtue of the psychism the being that is in a site remains free with regard to that site; 
posited in a site in which it maintains itself‘.107  Interiority and thought affords the 
separated being a position, a perspective on existence, what Levinas terms an ‗as-for-
me‘.108  As a thinking being with interiority the human being can transcend its material 
historical circumstances.  Thus the value of a human life cannot be judged or 
understood completely from an objective historical standpoint, which reduces 
individuals to numerically equal actors, and judges them from a distance, after the event.  
Such a viewpoint only has access to the external actions of such actors.   
Interiority is the very possibility of a birth and a death that do not derive their 
meaning from history.  Interiority institutes an order different from historical 
time in which totality is constituted, an order where everything is pending, 
where what is no longer possible historically remains always possible.
109
  
 
 
                                                          
105
 Ibid. 
106
 This triadic view of time as retention and pretention in the present is of course not new to 
phenomenology, and is rooted in Husserl‘s discussions of the internal time-consciousness of the subject.  
It is also important for the work of many other thinkers in the phenomenological tradition such as 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre.  See, Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness: 
‗We find many streams, inasmuch as many series of primal impressions begin and end.  However, we 
also find a connecting form, inasmuch as, for all, not merely does the law of the transformation of the 
now into the no longer and, on the other side, of the not yet into the now function separately, but also 
something akin to a common form of the now exists, a likeness generally in the mode of the flux.‘ 
Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, trans. by James S. Churchill 
(Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 102.  Levinas views Husserl‘s theory of 
temporality as merely a modification of the present and as such a prioritising of representation and 
presence.  When asked by Kearney if Husserl‘s theory of temporality points to an otherness beyond being, 
Levinas replied: ‗However radically Husserl‘s theory of time may gesture in this direction, particularly in 
The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, it remains overall a cosmological notion of time; 
temporality continues to be thought of in terms of the present, in terms of an ontology of presence. [...] To 
be more precise, the past, Husserl claims, is retained by the present, and the future is precontained in, or 
protended by, the present.‘ Levinas and Kearney, ‗Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas‘, p. 26.  Heidegger, 
however, gives an existential twist to this concept of time, stressing the interconnectedness of the 
experience of present-past-future in our lived expectation of the future and understanding of the past. 
Since one‘s own death is what is anticipated in Angst, and one‘s own death is outside (a ‗not-yet‘) of 
one‘s self, this points in Heidegger‟s thematization of ‗time‘ some notion of ‗otherness‘ to ‗presence‘ but 
which Heidegger does not develop in his thought in Being and Time (or in later works).  Here is a 
possibility for Levinas to engage in a radical immanent critique of Heidegger‘s (and Husserl‘s) respective 
phenomenological reflections and analysis of time-consciousness. 
107
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 54. 
108
 ‗Life permits it an as-for-me, a leave of absence, a postponement, which precisely is interiority‘. Ibid., 
p. 55. 
109
 Ibid. 
  
267 
The description of the separated self as always being at a distance from itself is 
similar to Heidegger‘s description of Dasein as being out ahead of itself, yet the 
significance that Levinas gives to interiority, and the crucial role interiority plays in 
Levinas‘s description of freedom, distances him from Heidegger‘s analysis of Dasein‘s 
historicity.  Dasein is primarily defined by what it does, ‗Dasein finds ―itself‖ 
proximally in what it does, uses, expects, avoids — in those things environmentally 
ready-to-hand with which it is proximally concerned.‘ 110   In contrast to the 
Heideggerian thesis that Dasein‘s freedom lies in Dasein‘s resolute acceptance of the 
finite circumstance in which Dasein finds itself thrown into, Levinas emphasises the 
freedom that interiority grants the self.
111
  Dasein‘s freedom lies in Dasein‘s willingness 
to resolutely accept the historical circumstances that Dasein finds itself in, and to 
embrace Dasein‘s ownmost possibility, which is ultimately, for Heidegger, that of being 
a ‗Being-towards-death‘.112  Thus, for Heidegger, 
[t]he resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical 
possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage 
which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over.  In one‘s coming back resolutely 
to one‘s throwness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities 
that have come down to one [...].  The more authentically Dasein resolves — 
and this means that in anticipating [its own] death it understands itself 
unambiguously in terms of its ownmost distinctive possibility — the more 
unequivocally does it choose and find the possibility of its existence, and the 
less does it do so by accident.
113
    
 
 
In place of this reading of Heidegger, within which an emphasis is a placed on 
the concrete historical conditions that determine the fate of Dasein, Levinas argues that 
such history overlooks the unique interiority that separates thinking beings from one 
another, and their ability to transcend such situations.  When History constructs a 
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unified narrative, it reduces separated thinking beings to mere objects determined by 
history, creating a unified linear time, ‗the chronological order of the history of the 
historians outlines the plot of being in itself, analogous to nature‘.114  Human persons 
also exist beyond the confines of objective historical time, and have a vast interiority, 
and as such they are not entirely at the mercy of unfolding historical events.  It would be 
impossible to record the inner life that is lived by every separated being that lived 
through the moments that are recorded in history, as chronological time could never 
account for, or capture, the inner time of each separated self.  This is why Levinas 
argues that the life of the separated self is not purely determined by the trajectory of 
history.  As each separated self has its own unique time in the form of its own interiority, 
it has possibilities that go beyond those made available by the course of history.  
The real must not only be determined in its historical objectivity, but also from 
interior intentions, from the secrecy that interrupts the continuity of historical 
time.  Only on the basis of this secrecy is the pluralism of society possible.
115
 
 
In the attempt to construct a history from a so-called neutral position each individual‘s 
alterity is overlooked, and when viewed as numerically equal from a detached position 
one can neither encounter alterity nor give an account of the pluralism of society.
116
  
‗The time of universal history remains as the ontological ground in which particular 
existences are lost, are computed, and in which at least their essences are 
recapitulated.‘117  Levinas‘s point is that the meaning and value of a human life is lived 
beyond and transcends what could be encapsulated in a unified historical narrative, 
which not only overlooks the interior life of each individual but also undermines their 
freedom.  Thus it is of importance to address the issue of ‗freedom‘ in Levinas‘s work 
as it is integral to his philosophizing.  
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§ 4.2.6 FECUNDITY: LIFE BEYOND THE POWER OF THE I 
 
If interiority alone was emphasised as the way in which the separated individual can 
escape fatalism dictated by the progression of history, we would be left with a lone 
individual.  How would this lone individual, however, know that self to be alone?  In 
other words, one must ask the critical question how interiority as ‗thought‘ is possible at 
all?  For Levinas, ultimately it is the interruption of the Other that gives rise to thought 
and interiority.  Later we will examine how, for Levinas, the encounter of the Other is 
the condition for the possibility of rational thought and objectivity.  Here, however, we 
will first look at how Levinas introduces an additional way in which the Other enables 
the self to escape a purely objective historical understanding of time, and which also 
gives a significance to human life that cannot be captured by an objective historical 
viewpoint, and that transcends the individual life span of that particular individual, 
namely, through fecundity.  
Informing Levinas‘s analysis of fecundity and of how life transcends historical 
time, is his wider description of time as historical and eschatological, first raised in the 
Preface.  Fecundity enables Levinas to further argue that time is infinite and to question 
the adequacy of Heidegger‘s description of time as finite and Heidegger‘s reduction of 
time to (and so, an extension of) Dasein‘s mineness (Jemeinigkeit).      
A human life is not lived in isolation, but is lived with others, it is 
intersubjective.  We are inter-dependent beings.  This is the human condition.  The 
value of an individual life, therefore, is not confined to the historical time-span in which 
it is lived, nor is it confined to that physical life span, or as a member of a logical genus 
(society) for it has significance for others who live on.  For Levinas, the birth of a child 
— he exclusively refers to a son — brings with it the possibility for the self to triumph 
over death, and hence to be freed from fate.
118
  
This is why the life between birth and death is neither folly nor absurdity nor 
flight nor cowardice.  It flows on in a dimension of its own where it has meaning, 
and where a triumph over death can have meaning.  This triumph is not a new 
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possibility offered after the end of every possibility — but a resurrection in the 
son in whom the rupture of death is embodied.
119
    
 
In section four of the text, ‗Beyond the Face‘, Levinas specifically examines filiality 
and fecundity, and how procreation enables the I to continue beyond its biological life 
and to see a significance in life beyond biological life.  This analysis also reveals, for 
Levinas, categories of subjectivity that are not reducible to the power and the freedom 
of the subject, hence it is of importance in our attempt to understood freedom in the 
work of Levinas to briefly examine this section of the text.
120
  
From the viewpoint of the natural scientist, of that of the biologist and the 
physician, death is the end of the organism and the culmination of life.  Leaving the 
natural scientific worldview aside, even from the existential-phenomenological 
perspective on death given by Heidegger in Being and Time, death is seen as strictly 
final, as the end of all possibilities for Dasein.
121
  Both of these definitions capture very 
little of the meaning of death that goes beyond the view of death which considers only 
the death of the isolated lone individual.  When in our analysis we do not overlook the 
fundamental intersubjective dimension of a human life the meaning of death widens 
significantly, be that from the first person perspective of either the one who is dying, or 
that of their loved ones.  For Levinas, death is not reducible to the end of being.  Whilst 
accepting that as death approaches the individual is prevented from projecting 
possibilities into the future, that belong strictly to the subject, and hence this is why 
death is agonising and suffocating, because the being has no more time, Levinas 
believes that this is only part of the story.  In contrast to Heidegger who focuses on the 
individual, Levinas does not overlook ethical intersubjectivity, and argues that it is our 
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relationships with others that ensure our freedom, beyond a fate that is determined by 
the historical circumstances of our life and the possibilities they present us with.  
Without multiplicity and discontinuity — without fecundity — the I would 
remain a subject in which every adventure would revert into the adventure of a 
fate.  A being capable of another fate than its own is a fecund being.  In paternity, 
where the I, across the definitiveness of an inevitable death, prolongs itself in the 
other, time triumphs over old age and fate by its discontinuity.
122
  
 
The meaning and significance of an individual biological life transcends that of the 
individual‘s own lifetime, and opens up onto a future that continues on beyond the life 
of the I.  This perspective extends the freedom of the I beyond the immediate powers of 
the I, localised within one lone individual.  Levinas‘s analysis reveals yet another 
significant aspect of human life that is not reducible to the freedom of the self.  In this 
text Levinas focuses on biological fecundity, and the birth of a child, ‗it is the child, 
mine in a certain sense or, more exactly, me, but not myself‘.123 
Levinas devotes a sizeable portion of the text to a phenomenological analysis of 
Eros, and erotic relations, which can result in this illogical possibility whereby the child 
is in a sense both the self and yet not the self.  We will not examine these sections of the 
text, as they do not pertain directly to our study, except to mention a couple of aspects 
of Levinas‘s description of the erotic relation, which relates directly to his 
understanding of freedom.  Levinas‘s description of the erotic relation adds to his 
challenge of the primacy, and exclusivity, of the understanding of subjectivity whereby 
the subject‘s engagement with the world is always mediated by intentional 
consciousness.  The erotic relation is described as an aspect of the life of the subject that 
is outside of the paradigms of knowledge, power and possession, as the feminine other 
(the beloved) eludes the grasp of the masculine subject (the lover).  
In voluptuosity the Other, the feminine, withdraws into mystery.  The relation 
with it is a relation with its absence, an absence on the plane of knowledge — 
the unknown — but a presence in voluptuosity.  Nor power: there is no initiative 
at the birth of love, which arises in the passivity of its pangs.  Sexuality is in us 
neither knowledge nor power, but the very plurality of our existing.
124
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The place of the feminine and of women in Levinas‘s philosophy has received 
some criticism, most famously by Simone De Beauvoir in The Second Sex.  More 
recently Levinas‘s philosophy has had a more varied feminist reading of his work, not 
all of which have been critical.
125
  Some of the criticism has been directed at the 
description of the feminine as mystery, a reading that is also applied to Time and the 
Other.  Although Levinas‘s descriptions of the woman in the erotic relation does 
deserve some criticism, an aspect of a particular criticism addressed to the ‗mystery‘ of 
woman overlooks the point that Levinas makes in Totality and Infinity, that the erotic 
relationship is outside of intentionality and hence escapes the totalizing gaze of 
consciousness, hence remaining mysterious.  A feminist reading of these sections of 
Totality and Infinity is complicated further by Levinas‘s comments in an interview with 
Nemo, in which Levinas remarked that ‗feminine‘ and ‗masculine‘ do not have to be 
understood as consistent with the gender male and female, but are an attribute of ‗every 
human being‘.126  This clarification by Levinas also provides a possible reading beyond 
the heteronormativity that seems to pervade the text, as it moves away from a reading 
that equates feminine with female, and describes the object of one‘s erotic desire as 
mysterious, be that male or female.  The possibility of moving away from a strictly 
biological and gendered reading of the text is further supported when read alongside 
Levinas‘s later comment in the same interview, that despite the emphasis on biological 
reproduction in the text ‗biological filiality is only the first shape filiality takes; but one 
can very well conceive filiality as a relationship between human beings without the tie 
of biological kinship‘.127  There are ways in which a paternal attitude with regard to the 
Other is manifest in human relationships beyond the concrete example of a parent and a 
child.  The essential point is that such a relationship enables the subject to transcend its 
own individual life, biological existence, and material substance, to have possibilities 
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that reach beyond that subject, and even that subject‘s own lifetime.   It demonstrates 
that being is plurality and not unity.  
The inability to grasp the Other of the erotic relation is not due to a deficiency 
on the part of the subject, but because the erotic relation is outside of the paradigm of 
knowledge and intentional consciousness.  
To love to be loved is not an intention, is not the thought of a subject thinking 
his voluptuosity and thus finding himself exterior to the community of the 
sensed [...].  Voluptuosity transfigures the subject himself, who henceforth owes 
his identity not to his initiative of power, but to the passivity of the love received.  
His passion and trouble, constant initiation into a mystery rather than initiative.  
Eros can not be interpreted as a superstructure having the individual as basis and 
subject.
128
    
 
This description of Eros falls outside of the view of subjectivity wherein the subject is 
described in terms of autonomous freedom, knowledge and power.  The passivity of the 
sensible subject is also apparent in Levinas‘s descriptions of the erotic act, and adds to 
Levinas‘s descriptions of the subject as primarily sensing itself in the world, as opposed 
to being mediated through a cognitive activity.  Sensation is the primary way that the 
self engages in the erotic act.  It is a tactile act that is centred on caressing and being 
caressed.  One feels the other, feels itself feeling the other, and is also felt.  The act is 
not mediated by, nor belongs primarily to, intentional thought, which for Levinas is 
always totalizing.  
The ‗transcendence of fecundity‘ does not have the structure of intentionality, 
does not reside in the powers of the I [...] the erotic subjectivity is constituted in 
the common act of the sensing and the sensed as the self of an other.
129
  
 
 
In his descriptions of Eros Levinas revisits an idea first raised in Existence and 
Existents; that the subject is chained to itself, and so paradoxically freedom and the 
burdensome responsibility for its own existence together constitute the I.  Eros, however, 
brings a new freeing dimension to his analysis, as it offers the subject a way out, that 
does not result in a return to the self once again, it ‗arrests‘ the return of the I to itself.  
This occurs in two ways, one, through the love one has for the Other their pain and 
pleasure is intimately linked with the self‘s own, and two, through the birth of a child.130  
‗In eros the fundamental exigencies of the subjectivity are maintained — but in this 
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alterity the ipseity is graceful, lightened of egoist unwieldiness.‘131  Elsewhere in the 
text Levinas explains that erotic desire cannot be described as a clash of powers, and nor 
does it result in the I possessing and negating the Other, it is an encounter that is prior to 
freedom understood as knowledge and power, ‗it [erotic love] takes place beyond all 
pleasure, all power, beyond all war with the freedom of the other‘.132  It is an encounter 
between two separate and distinct beings that despite coming together remain separate 
and distinct.  Erotic desire is based on a plurality that far from being eradicated, through 
procreation, results in the generation of a third.
133
  Building on his critique of erotic love 
outlined in ‗The Ego and the Totality‘, the birth of a child, which is the introduction of a 
third, can open up the closed, self-referential, society of two.
134
  Self-interest or other 
interest between two can never produce an ‗ethic‘, in Levinas‘s sense, but care for the 
other, outside of you and me does.  Levinas argues that the continuation of the next 
generation, the birth of the young, shows that death is not the end, even if it brings an 
end to the power of the subject.  Fecundity frees the subject from fate as it opens up a 
future that is entirely unknown and unforeseeable.  ‗It is not the finitude of death that 
constitutes the essence of time, as Heidegger thinks, but its infinity.‘135  This is a radical 
critique of Heidegger‘s account of death, which is blind to this crucial intersubjective 
dimension of a human life that transcends the powers and the freedom of the I, even 
after death.  
 
§ 4.2.7 SEPARATION AND TIME: HEIDEGGER AND BERGSON REVISITED 
 
Reminiscent of his work of the 1930‘s, wherein Levinas was critical of the view of 
freedom presented in the work of both Heidegger and Bergson, Levinas returns to his 
criticisms only now he has a more developed philosophical position of his own.  In 
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response to the perceived fatalism in Heidegger‘s Being and Time Levinas argues that it 
is the encounter with the Other that disturbs the predetermined trajectory of historical 
conditions, by presenting new possibilities to the self that do not have their origin in the 
individual alone.  When possibility is restricted to the lifespan of the individual, viewed 
in isolation from genuine relations with others, the individual‘s freedom is reduced to 
fate.  Without the interjection of the Other the self is slave to an isolated destiny, 
trapped in a self-referential circle.  ‗His freedom writes his history which is one; his 
projects delineate a fate of which he is master and slave.‘136  Through emphasising the 
ethical intersubjective dimensions of life, not fully seen or appreciated by Heidegger, 
Levinas widens the analysis of a human life beyond the life and death of the individual, 
to include the broadening of possibilities that the Other brings, and the continuation of 
time made possible by the next generation and the legacy that the self leaves behind.
137
  
For Levinas, fecundity opens up an infinite and discontinuous time, ‗it lifts from the 
subject the last trace of fatality‘.138  The future that is not yet cannot be determined by 
the historical conditions of the subject alone, the Other brings a future that transcends 
such historical conditions.   
The Other is also said to condition time, and save the self from fate in another 
sense.  Expanding further on his critique of fatalism in Being and Time, Levinas here 
reflects on the possibility of pardon and how pardon can free the subject from the past.  
This analysis develops an idea alluded to in Levinas‘s ‗Reflections on the Philosophy of 
Hitlerism‟ (1934), whereby freedom in the pagan tradition is shown as reducible to fate 
and contrasted with an understanding of freedom derived from the monotheistic 
tradition that ultimately rests on repentance and redemption.  Whereas in the 1930‘s this 
redemption rested on the monotheistic God, now in Totality and Infinity pardon can 
come to the self from the Other, and in doing so alter the definitiveness of historical 
time.  When the Other forgives the subject for an act they committed the subject is 
somehow freed from the act, ‗[pardon] permits the subject who had committed himself 
in a past instant to be as though that instant had not past on [...] pardon acts upon the 
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past, somehow repeats the event, purifying it‘.139  Pardon or forgiveness (for wrong 
done) does not erase the past (wrong done), does not cancel or raise it to a different 
meaning in any Hegelian sense; but it does raise and deepen what it is to be a human 
being, human subjectivity, and therein increase human ‗freedom‘.  The objective events 
of historical time do not have the final say, time is not a linear sequence of events which 
‗link up with one another indifferently‘. 140   Through reconciliation events can be 
pardoned and time can be altered and given by the Other to the subject.  Levinas tells us 
that pardon ‗represents an inversion of the natural order of things‘ as historical time is in 
a sense undone, or, at least the domination of the historical time is overcome.
141
  Thus 
the time of messianic peace can rupture the time of history.  
At different places in the text Levinas argues that the Other conditions time, and 
one senses that this is the case due to the novelty made possible by the Other.  Time is 
saved from being ‗but the [mere] image of eternity‘, and saved from the totalizing gaze 
of history.
142
  In this section of the text Levinas describes this time, which transcends 
the evidence of history, as made possible by paternity.
143
  As was shown in chapter one, 
Levinas was very taken by Bergson‘s defence of free will through his account of 
duration, but for Levinas Bergson‘s intuition lacked the theoretical philosophical force 
necessary to account for freedom.  Whilst acknowledging his depth to Bergson, moving 
on from Bergson, Levinas shows that the refusal of the totalization of time, and hence 
the avoidance of fate and the justification of freedom, rests on the encounter with the 
Other.
144
  Time as duration may constantly add something new, such as the flowers in 
springtime, but only the human Other can definitively break with the past, whilst 
connecting up with it once again.  The child, for Levinas, offers a reprieve for the self 
and accounts for the infinity of time.  It is a chance to begin again, to be afresh, without 
taking up the burden of the past.  In distinction to Bergson‘s continuous duration, 
Levinas explains infinite time in terms of a discontinuous duration: ‗The past is 
recaptured at each moment from a new point, from a novelty that no continuity, such as 
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that which still weighs on the Bergsonian duration, could compromise.‘145  The I will 
die, but through fecundity and the relation with the Other, what is created in that 
relation will continue on.
146
   
The discontinuous time of fecundity makes possible an absolute youth and 
recommencement, while leaving the recommencement a relation with the 
recommenced past in a free return to that past [...] and in free interpretation and 
free choice, in an existence as entirely pardoned.
147
   
 
 
This description of fecundity and time adds further weight to Levinas‘s 
description of being as plurality, against the view of being as one, and it has 
implications for the proper way to understand ‗freedom‘.  ‗Being is no longer produced 
at one blow, irremissibly present.  Reality is what it is, but will be once again, another 
time freely resumed and pardoned.‘148  Infinite being is produced as a plurality of times, 
and not just one unified homogeneous time.  The relation with the Other introduces new 
possibilities that would not be possible for the subject alone.  The future that is not yet 
cannot be determined by the historical conditions of the past precisely because the Other 
brings a future that transcends such historical conditions, and ultimately with the birth 
of the child transcends even the empirical life of the subject.
149
  Although in this section 
of the text the discussion of time relates directly to fecundity, Levinas‘s point that time 
is both within and beyond the purely historical view, is an important ongoing discussion 
that is raised throughout the text in different contexts, first raised in the Preface.  What 
is of importance to each of these contexts is that his description of time incorporates a 
relation with the transcendent that breaks through a linear historical view of time.  Time, 
for Levinas, is both within and beyond history.  It is interesting to note that the very last 
line of this section, which is the final section of the text, before Levinas moves onto his 
overall conclusions, he explicitly once gain raises this issue of the juxtaposition of the 
time of history and messianic time first raised in the Preface.  
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The completion of time is not death, but messianic time, where the perpetual is 
converted into eternal.  Messianic triumph is the pure triumph; it is secured 
against the revenge of evil whose return the infinite time does not prohibit.  Is 
this eternity a new structure of time, or an extreme vigilance of the messianic 
consciousness?  The problem exceeds the bounds of the book.
150
  
 
Just as in the Preface, here we have Levinas alluding to his earlier point that the time of 
messianic peace ruptures the time of history, and in doing so transcendence breaches 
immanence.
151
  Despite the subtle prevalence of this central point throughout the text, 
here on the final line, when Levinas raises it once again, he seems to accept certain 
limitations to the extent to which we can fully articulate this point and answer this 
question, at least within the confines of the current study.
152
  
Levinas‘s description of time as the juxtaposition of both eschatological time 
and historical time, indirectly relates to the overlap of both the transcendental and 
empirical reading of the text.  As this breach of finite historical time is outside of 
experience, and yet conditions human experience as we know it, Levinas believed the 
term ‗transcendental‘ to at least closely resemble what it was that he was trying to 
articulate.  This is not to say that it is a once for all event, that operates as an ultimate 
foundation on which to build experience, on the contrary, human experience is 
continuously saturated with this juxtaposition of the finite and the infinite, the historical 
and the eschatological.  Levinas does not want to choose between a philosophy of 
transcendence, that situates the ‗true life‘ elsewhere, or between a philosophy of 
immanence, which would eradicate all otherness and result in a totality at the end of 
history.  He wishes, rather, to describe how the relationship with the Other, with 
transcendence, takes place within ‗terrestrial existence‘.153  The metaphysical desire for 
the infinite is concretely enacted in the world, and witnessed in historical time, through 
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the subject‘s encounter with the face of the Other.154  Likewise the subject‘s response to 
the Other should be a very real and concrete action, such as offering food and shelter, 
the giving of the goods of one‘s economic existence.155   The possibility of ethical 
behaviour, such as a pardon for a wrong done, or sacrifice made for a stranger, or 
simply the welcoming of the Other into one‘s home, point to the continual presence of 
the time of eschatology.  However, this essential empirical dimension of the encounter 
does not capture the underlying metaphysical relationship of desire between the 
separated self and the infinite, for that can only be glimpsed as a passing interruption, 
which is outside of the order of freedom understood as consciousness and cognition and 
is not reducible to representation and knowledge.
156
  Not only is the encounter outside 
of the order of freedom understood in this way, but importantly for Levinas the 
encounter invests the subject with the freedom of consciousness, objectivity, and hence 
choice.   
This important premise, at the very centre of Levinas‘s work, that consciousness 
is not the primordial way that the existent relates to being, leads us back to the second 
paradoxical aspect of separation as interiority and thought mentioned above.  Currently 
we will examine Levinas‘s displacement of Idealism, and his criticisms of the primacy 
of representation, carried on from his earlier work.  We shall then turn to his concrete 
descriptions of the sensible affective separated self to be found in Section II of the text.  
  
§ 4.2.8 THE FREEDOM OF REPRESENTATION 
 
In the section ‗Separation as Interiority‘ discussed above, Levinas writes that ‗[t]he 
cause of being is thought or known by its effect as though it were posterior to its 
effect‘.157   This is related to a central aspect of Levinas‘s thought that is familiar to us 
from our examination of his previous work.  A main tenant of Levinas‘s thinking is his 
questioning of the primacy of consciousness, the directionality of sense, and the 
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possibility that not all meaning must be actively constituted by the subject [Sinngebung].  
Rather, prior to the conscious constitution of the meaningfulness of the world the self 
receives meaning passively from the outside.  This primary passivity of the self, 
nonetheless, is hidden by the prominence of reflective consciousness, and by the very 
fact that this underlying primordial engagement with being is beneath, or one could say 
prior to, reflective consciousness.
158
  Through intentional consciousness the ego 
represents objects to its self, and constitutes the world, as though it were the source of 
the meaning of that object.  The underlying hidden passivity of subjectivity and the 
dominance of intentional consciousness partially accounts for the unquestioned 
prominence of the modern subject within philosophy, until relatively recently.  It 
appears as though representational thought conditions life, however, Levinas argues, it 
is in fact the reverse. 
Even its cause, older than itself, is still to come.  The cause of being is thought 
or known by its effect as though it were posterior to its effect. [...]  But this 
illusion is not unfounded; it constitutes a positive event.  The posteriority of the 
anterior — an inversion logically absurd — is produced, one would say, only by 
memory or by thought.
159
   
 
It is ‗memory‘ and ‗thought‘ that are responsible for this illusionary order of the 
meaning of being, whereby consciousness seems to be at the foundation of that which it 
comes to constitute.  Levinas does not simply take memory and thought as an 
unquestionable property of subjectivity, he describes this phenomenon rather as ‗a 
revolution in being‘ that therefore calls for an explanation.160  The explanation he gives 
is the calling into question of the Same by the infinite, which in concrete terms is 
brought about through the encounter with the face of the Other.
161
    
Thought, as a revolution in being, is an effect of the event that consciousness 
comes too late to constitute, and in doing so consciousness seems to precede the event.  
Separation is not reflected in thought, but produced by it.  For in it the After or 
the Effect conditions the Before or the Cause: the Before appears and is only 
welcomed [...].  The present of the cogito, despite the support it discovers for 
itself after the fact in the absolute that transcends it, maintains itself all by itself 
— be it only for an instant, the space of a cogito.162   
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Levinas once again brings out the similarities between his approach and that of 
Descartes, pointing out that just as in Descartes‘s third meditation the cogito comes to 
know that the idea of the infinite is the cause of its own being, known after the effect, so 
too is the infinite in Levinas‘s analysis the cause of thought, and yet encountered after 
the fact.  Levinas explains to the reader that in one way there is little we can do about 
the apparent logical absurdity of the position that he is trying to articulate, as it resists 
such logic.  This tension will inevitably arise when the metaphysician seeks to articulate 
the metaphysical, as the metaphysician is limited by language.
163
  
In a later section of the text, ‗Freedom and Representation as Gift‘, Levinas 
returns to this question of how we can account for the freedom and sovereignty of 
representation, which for him appears as ‗an exceptional possibility of this separated 
existence‘.164  Levinas dismisses two possible ways of accounting for human life that 
includes both the freedom of representation and action.  He maintains that it is equally 
difficult to derive action and desire from theoretical consciousness as it is to derive the 
freedom of representation from action.  Levinas‘s answer is that representation is itself 
conditioned, as it rests on the disturbance by the Other to the primordial pre-reflective 
sensible life of the self. 
Representation is conditioned.  Its transcendental pretension is constantly belied 
by the life that is already implanted in the being representation claims to 
constitute.  But representation claims to substitute itself after the event for this 
life in reality, so as to constitute this very reality.  Separation has to be able to 
account for this constitutive conditioning accomplished by representation — 
though representation be produced after the event.
165
  
 
In Section II below, we will examine Levinas‘s description of the separated self as the 
body, affective sensibility, and the preconscious life of enjoyment.  Representation and 
thought ultimately rest on this prior relation of enjoyment, but without the Other 
consciousness would not spontaneously arise out of the immediacy of the life of 
enjoyment.  Representation requires a degree of distance and time that comes through 
being put into question through the encounter with the Other.
166
  As we shall see below, 
this mode of existing as a separated self is beneath the level of reflective consciousness, 
                                                          
163
 ‗[A]ll this articulates the ontological separation between the metaphysician and the metaphysical.‘ 
Ibid., p. 55. 
164
 Ibid., p. 168. 
165
 Ibid., p. 169. 
166
 ‗Appropriation and representation add a new event to enjoyment.  They are founded on language as a 
relation among men.‘ Ibid., p. 139.  
  
282 
but consciousness itself is unaware of this fact, as it seems to precede the very life it 
comes to constitute.  This, Levinas argues, is the constant oversight of Idealism.
167
  
Levinas uses the analogy of a wave that when it returns to wash upon the strand would 
strangely wash beneath the mark it left behind.
168
  
Throughout the text Levinas explicitly refers to the work of Husserl, which he 
reads as having an ‗excessive attachment to theoretical consciousness‘ and, as a result, 
views the object of consciousness, through the primacy of representation, as if it were 
an achievement (Leistung) of consciousness.
169
  Hence, Levinas views intelligibility and 
knowledge as the total adequation of the thinker with what is thought.  As was shown in 
previous chapters, this complete eradication of all that is other, through the freedom of 
representation, leaves the free exercise of the same unquestioned.  Levinas believes that 
this privileging of the freedom of representation must be placed into question, if we are 
to make sense of morality.  If morality must be seen to rest on the freedom of the ego 
then we are indeed duped.  By pushing back before the freedom of consciousness, and 
describing an affective life that is outside of the order of freedom and nonfreedom, 
Levinas can avoid a clash of freedoms, a master-slave dialectic, or a purely naturalistic 
explanation that explains morality as a socially evolved phenomenon that serves the 
survival of the species.
170
  In the conclusion of the text Levinas makes it clear that he 
cannot find a justification for the phenomenon of morality if he begins with freedom.  
If freedom were posited outside of this [metaphysical] relation [with the face], 
every relation within multiplicity would enact but the grasp of one being by 
another or their common participation in reason, where no being looks at the 
face of the other, but all beings negate one another.
171
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If freedom were taken as the unquestioned starting point, one of two things is possible, 
knowledge or violence, with no room left for a justification of morality outside of those 
two systems.  The self would either entirely assimilate the other as an object of 
knowledge, or would clash with the other as an obstacle to be dominated or 
eradicated.
172
  Levinas, therefore, does not take freedom to be at the foundation of 
subjectivity, but in his questioning of freedom he does not argue against freedom.  Far 
from it, by describing freedom as invested through the encounter with the Other, both 
freedom and morality are justified.     
 
§ 4.2.9 THE ORIGINS OF OBJECTIVITY 
 
For Levinas, if we were to ground the freedom of representation in a principle of 
cognition, this would be to ground freedom in itself, which not only seems to imply an 
infinite regress, but such a response also avoids the question that seeks an explanation 
and grounding of freedom.  This position would still take the freedom of representation 
as a given.
173
  
Knowing becomes knowing of a fact only if it is at the same time critical, if it 
puts itself into question, goes back beyond its origin — in an unnatural 
movement to seek higher than one‘s own origin, a movement which evinces or 
describes a created freedom.
174
  
 
In the text Levinas contrasts this view of a created freedom, a freedom that has been 
invested from the outside, with that of what he terms a ‗causa sui‘.  ‗Causa sui‘ is 
sometimes said of God in traditional metaphysics, but the human being is not (a) God, it 
is not self-generated.  Levinas uses the term to represent the position within philosophy 
that takes the freedom of reflective consciousness as a given.
175
  Levinas argues that this 
view of freedom as ‗causa sui‘ is deficient for several reasons, most notably for his own 
                                                          
172
 As De Boer notes, ‗no one can be a slave of the Good. Slavery exists only within the sphere of the 
totality, in which autonomous beings limit and dominate each other‘, ‗Beyond Being. Ontology and 
Eschatology in The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas‘, p. 38. Levinas situates the encounter with the 
Other prior to the freedom of the self, thus he avoids the problem of a clash of freedom or a master slave 
relation.  Levinas first made this point in his article ‗Freedom and Command‘ (1953), see, Ch. III, §3.2. 
173
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 85. 
174
 Ibid., p. 82. 
175
 Levinas says of such a tradition, ‗The spontaneity of freedom is not called in question; its limitation 
alone is held to be tragic and to constitute a scandal.‘ Ibid., p. 83.  It is an obstacle (scandalum) that trips 
one up, and gets in the way of giving a proper account of subjectivity.  
  
284 
purposes, as it can only lead to a clash of freedoms and so undermines morality.
176
  
Such a view cannot account for any limitation to freedom, as this would seem to 
diminish freedom, and so this position views the limitations put on such a freedom from 
exteriority as an affront to freedom.  In order to not dismiss morality and the moral life 
as a genuine phenomenon within the life of the human person, Levinas cannot and does 
not begin from the idea of freedom.  The Other does not oppose or limit my freedom, 
but invests freedom.  ‗It is therefore not freedom that accounts for transcendence of the 
Other, but the transcendence of the Other that accounts for freedom‘.177    
Freedom, be it that of war, can be manifested only outside of totality, but this 
‗outside totality‘ opens with the transcendence of the face.  To think of freedom 
as within totality is to reduce freedom to the status of an indetermination in 
being, and forthwith to integrate it into a totality by closing the totality over the 
‗holes‘ of indetermination.178 
 
For Levinas the notion of independence and separation must be grounded elsewhere 
than freedom.  Levinas grounds separation in the description of the separated self as 
affective sensibility and not as a conscious free subject.  This enables him to argue for 
the investment of freedom as critical consciousness.  Hence he describes this freedom as 
a created freedom in contrast to a freedom understood as causa sui.   
Objectivity, for Levinas, is not a natural way for the separated self to exist, as it 
does not account for why a freedom unlimited would begin to distance itself from that 
which it is immediately engaged with.
179
  As Levinas says, ‗[t]he objects are not objects 
when they offer themselves to the hand that uses them, to the mouth and the nose, the 
eyes and the ears that enjoy them‘.180  In enjoyment there is no significant distance 
between the I and the object of its enjoyment, as it can be completely assimilated and 
can become mine.  The life of enjoyment is prior to objectivity and intentional 
representative consciousness.  Objectivity is a property of consciousness, which itself 
requires an explanation.  For Levinas, speech, rather, is the basis of all signification and 
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objectivity.  Without that initial address from the Other the self would be void of 
objectivity, reflective consciousness and language.
181
  ‗The objectivity of the object and 
its signification comes from language‘, which in keeping with his previous work, 
Levinas argues is primarily an address to someone, a discourse.
182
  This function of 
language comes before any attempt to communicate knowledge or to verbalise one‘s 
internal life.  Speech is vocative before it is nominative.
183
 
In contrast to his earlier work, in this text Levinas describes speech primarily as 
teaching, and the first thing that the Other teaches to the self is the very presence of the 
Other.
184
  Language is also taught to the self by the Other, and along with language 
perception as objectification is taught.  Hence this rules out all naturalistic explanations 
of both language and perception as products of stimuli and effects.  ‗It is because 
phenomena have been taught to me by him who presents himself [...] — by speaking — 
that henceforth I am not the plaything of a mystification, but consider objects.‘185  The 
immediacy of enjoyment is broken up by a distance that objectivity brings, along with a 
shared world that one can speak about with others and have its own views of the world 
confirmed or denied.
186
  In being confronted by something that the I cannot contain and 
completely assimilate, the I comes to know that there is a complete distance and a 
separation between itself and exteriority.  The predominant view in modern philosophy 
equates freedom with knowledge, and as knowledge rests on certitude Levinas argues 
that freedom in this tradition is therefore solitary and cannot be a basis for an adequately 
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full description of human life as we live it.
187
  In contrast to this Levinas argues that 
truth comes from plurality, ‗the locus of truth is society‘.188 
Knowledge, objectivity and representation, are aspects of the life of the self 
because they were addressed by the Other, and in that address invested with freedom 
understood as reflective consciousness.  The existent becomes conscious through a 
relationship with a radical alterity that calls its spontaneous freedom into question.  
Thus Levinas calls this calling into question the freedom of the I ‗conscience‘.  The 
metaphysical condition for the possibility of consciousness is therefore conscience and 
desire, and this is concretely encountered through the welcoming of the Other.  
‗Conscience and desire are not modalities of consciousness among others, but its 
condition. Concretely they are the welcoming of the Other across his judgment.‘189    
By not accepting the conscious subject as a given Levinas breaks with the 
tradition of transcendental thinking, and yet, Levinas also pushes empirical thinking as 
far as it can go.  The dimension of human life that he wishes to describe, despite its 
mundane reality and everyday occurrence, is not directly open to the gaze of intentional 
consciousness.  The encounter with infinity transcends concrete experience, whilst also 
being encountered in a very real way in the everyday social occurrences in the world.  It 
takes place within the interval between the sensible event and representation.  Hence 
consciousness is blind to it.  Consciousness arrives on the scene too late to capture 
certain crucial aspects of human life, and yet by its very nature, will never notice these 
dimensions that escape its own totalizing gaze.  There is an unbridgeable gap that exists 
between the encounter with the infinite at the level of the pre-reflective sensible self, 
and the intentional ego that comes too late to constitute that event.
190
  As Hanlon 
phrases it, ‗consciousness arrives on the scene too late to objectify the experience‘.191  
What is essential for Levinas is that the very event that conditions and produces 
reflective consciousness is beyond what can be known and captured by consciousness.  
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This is what makes the event so crucial, and what founds reflective consciousness.  It is 
the very fact that it is an excessive event that is greater than anything consciousness can 
contain, that places the power and sovereignty of consciousness into question, and 
hence a radical separation between the same and the Other can exist, and the freedom of 
representation can come about.
192
  Hence Levinas argues: ‗Representation derives its 
freedom with regard to the world that nourishes it from the relation essentially moral, 
that with the Other‘.193  By describing the life of the affective self outside of the order of 
freedom and nonfreedom, Levinas does not indicate the limitation of the freedom of 
representation, as he pushes back before such a distinction.  By asking what gives rise to 
the freedom of representation and reflective consciousness in the first place, Levinas 
believes himself to have presented a proper defence of freedom. 
De Boer regards the sections of the text that deal with the founding of the theory 
of knowledge as among the most fascinating of the whole work, and they inform his 
transcendental reading of the text.  For De Boer, part of the reason why he reads 
Levinas as arguing that the Other is the transcendental condition of the Same, is because  
without the Other objectivity and critical awareness would not be possible.  
Of itself, human freedom is uninhibited.  To know is to exercise freedom‘s 
power.  Why, then, should this power be hampered by objectivity, why should it 
let itself be arrested by inconvenient truths?  According to Levinas, there would 
be no objectivity if the Other were not watching; it is he who interferes with our 
spontaneous naiveté and prompts critical awareness.  This breach in natural 
dogmatism would be impossible without the presence of the Other‘s face, before 
whom arbitrariness shies back and is ashamed. [...] Knowledge cannot be 
founded in itself — Levinas turns against the entire tradition of the autonomy of 
thought.
194
 
 
Within the sections of the text that deal with the founding of the theory of knowledge, 
Levinas makes it clear that it is the relationship with infinity, concretely enacted as the 
encounter with the Other, that founds critical consciousness and objectivity.  Given that 
without the encounter with the Other the self would be devoid of objectivity, language, 
reflective consciousness and time, it is difficult to support a strictly empirical linear 
reading of the text, as it is hard to imagine such a life of the separated self prior to this 
empirical encounter.  
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It is in Section II that Levinas turns to his description of the life of the separated 
self.  Given that it is devoted to describing the life of the separated self it is unsurprising 
that this section is seen as supporting the empirical reading of the text.  It is to this 
description of the preconscious life of the separated self to which we now turn.  Here we 
will see how Levinas develops a description of the separated self as affective sensibility.  
This description enables him to argue that the self, through a relationship of enjoyment 
with exteriority, is susceptible to the ethical encounter with the Other, prior to any 
engagement with the world at the level of reflective consciousness.  Something spoils 
the self satisfied happiness of the life of enjoyment of the separated self and brings the 
unnatural facility of critical consciousness, and with it, a created freedom.  
 
§ 4.3 ‗INTERIORITY AND ECONOMY‘ 
 
As was outlined in the earlier section of this chapter, at this stage in Levinas‘s thinking 
he believes that it is necessary to maintain a self sufficient separated self, and one that 
has its own identity, prior to the encounter with the Other, in order for him to be able to 
argue for metaphysical desire.
195
  Levinas needs to be able to describe this self as self- 
sufficient, and as not in ‗need‘ of the Other to fill a deprivation or lack — hence the self 
and the Other can maintain separation even in relation — and yet, he also needs to leave 
an opening for the purposes of making sense of how such a self-sufficient self can be 
disturbed from the outside.  Levinas finds this opening in his description of the self in 
terms of passive affectivity, grounded in sensibility and not mediated by cognition.  
This provides an opening to exteriority precisely because the self is already in a relation 
with the other.  Through grounding this immediate engagement with existence in 
sensibility, understood as a love of life, rooted in enjoyment and not need, Levinas also 
avoids presenting the self as deficient and needing to assimilate and dominate 
exteriority.
196
  Thus Drabinski rightly characterises his evaluation of the text:  
It is our basic contention that Totality and Infinity must be read as a 
phenomenological rethinking of sense and transcendentality, but one that first 
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must break with the nucleus of meaning constituted by the free subject.  Levinas 
accomplishes this break in part by situating the founding condition of experience 
in the sensible.
197
 
 
This description of the pre-reflective sensible life of the self, that is prior to 
representational consciousness, and hence prior to freedom understood as representation, 
also enables Levinas to avoid a master-slave relation, or a clash of freedoms, and hence 
a foundation on which to ground morality and in the process justify freedom.  Just as in 
‗The Ruin of Representation‘ (1959), when Levinas argues that representation removes 
the subject from the wider horizons in which the subject is embedded, in this text 
Levinas examines one such horizon in greater detail, the horizon of the sensible. 
Levinas‘s descriptions of the separated self as primordially living a life of 
enjoyment, free of any awareness of responsibility to the Other, does not have to be read 
as an historical event that occurs in one‘s own life prior to any empirical encounter with 
the Other.  We must keep in mind that the title of the text is totality and infinity, as both 
are crucial elements of human life.  The sensate life of enjoyment, prior to the subject‘s 
cognitive engagement with the world, is an ever present primordial element of human 
life.  As is the interruption of the face of the Other that takes place at this level, which is 
outside of experience understood as mediated by intentional consciousness, and yet is 
the condition for such awareness and objectivity.  Both of these dimensions of human 
life, the affective sensible passive self and the consciously-engaged subject, run 
concurrently to one another.  The descriptions of the life of the same are not of a life 
before, that will cease after the encounter, but of the elements of life that are lived blind 
to the Face of the Other.  The sensible life of enjoyment is an ever present reality of 
corporeal living that is not eliminated through the encounter with the Other, but can be 
justified and made good.  As Levinas remarks: 
The description of enjoyment [...] assuredly does not render the concrete man.  
In reality man has already the idea of infinity, that is, lives in society and 
represents things to himself.
198
  
 
An important question, therefore, to ask of this section of the text, is the question of 
whether or not freedom is part of the description of the separated self prior to the 
encounter with the Other, and in what sense does Levinas use the term freedom in this 
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context.  In answer to this question what we note is that Levinas makes a significant 
difference between the limited sense in which he uses the term freedom to describe the 
separated self prior to the encounter and the sense in which freedom is used to describe 
that which is invested by the Other.  
 
§ 4.3.1 SEPARATION AND ENJOYMENT 
 
In Section II Levinas sets out to further describe the structure of the Same by turning to 
a concrete description of relations that remain within the Same.
199
  Here Levinas 
reminds us that although what he is seeking to describe is prior to representational 
consciousness and objectification, he does not mean for it to be read as a criticism of 
intellectualism but as its condition. 
But we maintain that the social relation is experience pre-eminently, for it takes 
place before the existent that expresses himself, that is, remains in himself.  In 
distinguishing between the objectifying act and the metaphysical we are on our 
way not to the denunciation of intellectualism but to its very strict 
development.
200
  
 
Distancing himself from the approach of both Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas states 
that the metaphysical relation that he is seeking to describe cannot be understood in 
terms of intentionality nor will it be founded in the existent‘s relation to the world, such 
as Dasein‘s care.  Both of these descriptions begin too late for Levinas, who tells us that 
‗[d]oing, labour, already implies the relation with the transcendent‘.201  Dasein‘s ‗care‘ 
for existence already implies some level of awareness of one‘s own existence.  
Levinas‘s description of the life of enjoyment begins prior to any such awareness.  
Levinas‘s reading of Husserl, that the basic act of consciousness is seen as 
representation, also applies to enjoyment, as every other act is rooted in this originary 
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act of representation.
202
  By prioritising consciousness, such representation will always 
be cut off from non-objectifying acts such as breathing, eating, sleeping etc.  De Boer 
makes an interesting observation on this point: ‗In a way the sovereignty of enjoyment 
is greater than that of constituting consciousness, for the mastery of absolute 
consciousness is naked and poor‘.203  Consciousness may be the only way that the self 
can come to know the world, but consciousness can never enjoy the world.  
Levinas finds Heidegger‘s approach likewise deficient at describing sensible life, 
as it priorities our mortality, and Dasein‘s care for being in order to preserve its own 
being.  In doing so, Heidegger overlooks the relation of enjoyment.
204
  Levinas does not 
detach the vital components for maintaining life from the love of life.  Eating is not 
merely done for sustenance; in fact we very rarely eat purely to stay alive, for eating is 
done for the joy of eating.  By describing this relation with exteriority as enjoyment the 
self is already rising above purely ontological categories, as life is lived for enjoyment 
and not purely for the preservation of being.  Levinas tells us that ‗[t]o be an I is to 
already be beyond being in happiness [or unhappiness]‘. 205   Levinas also views 
Heidegger‘s approach as deficient on moral grounds: ‗Food can be interpreted as an 
implement only in a world of exploitation‘.206  Food is seen purely as an implement of 
survival when our more immediate engagement with food as enjoyment is overlooked.  
By prioritising the utility of food, in terms of ensuring our survival, food is interpreted 
as a resource that potentially each must struggle against one another for, or can be used 
to exploit others.  In his interview with Kearney, Levinas compares Heidegger‘s work to 
an interpretation of the work of Darwin, as on his reading both emphasize the drive to 
preserve one‘s own being as the primary motive in the human condition.207 
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Levinas‘s affective sensible self does not represent itself to itself through 
thought.  Rather, the corporeal self non-cognitively feels itself in existence prior to 
thinking.  ‗One does not know, one lives sensible qualities: the green of these leaves, 
the red of this sunset‘.208  Levinas describes this sensible immersion in existence as 
primarily the enjoyment of life.
209
  ‗Separation is first the fact of a being that lives 
somewhere, from something, that is, that enjoys.‘ 210   Adding to his description of 
separation as interiority explored in Section II, Levinas explains that concretely the 
separated being first and foremost has a position in being, a presence in which it is ‗at 
home with oneself (le chez soi)‘. 211   The mode by which the self is concretely 
positioned in existence is the body.  By describing the self as first and foremost an 
affective body Levinas moves beyond the dualist tradition inherited by Descartes.
212
  
Levinas begins from the living body, from incarnate life, and so, rejects the idea of 
embodied consciousness.  This also enables Levinas to avoid the position that the 
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corporeal nature of subjectivity, and all of the needs that come with it, are seen as a 
restriction to the freedom of the conscious subject, as the self is primarily described as a 
sensate body.  The body embedded in the world, that is the source of its enjoyment, is 
prior to the freedom of representation.  
The world I live in is not simply the counterpart or the contemporary of thought 
and its constitutive freedom, but a conditioning and an antecedent.  The world I 
constitute nourishes me and bathes me.
213
 
 
Levinas‘s description of the corporeal self‘s engagement with exteriority as the love of 
life, then, undermines the position that the needs of the body are an affront to 
freedom.
214
  This very approach to the mind-body problem is as a result of the dualist 
tradition, whereby the body and its needs are superfluous to consciousness, and hence 
undermine its autonomy.  In Levinas‘s approach such a concern loses its validity, 
through the very enjoyment of life lived in corporeality.
215
  The relationship between 
the self and the other-than-the-self is seen in terms of enjoyment.  The body as the 
concrete separation of the self brings life, which, for Levinas, is primarily the love of 
life.  Eating is a pleasure and not a chore.  The life of enjoyment is life lived from the 
other, the elements, and not a life dependent on lack and need.  ‗The elements do not 
receive man as a land of exile, humiliating and limiting his freedom.‘216  Even the basic 
material needs of the I are not a limitation to freedom, as the order of freedom and non-
freedom are outside of this paradigm.  
In the pain of needs reason does not revolt against the scandal of a given pre-
existing freedom.  For one cannot first posit an I and then ask if enjoyment and 
need run counter to it, limit it, injure it, or negate it.
217
  
 
The concrete separation of the self described as enjoyment, therefore, is an 
important step in Levinas‘s overall attempt to ground freedom in morality, in opposition 
to a tradition that grounds morality in freedom.  If the separated self was described as 
primordially dependent on exteriority and in need, then this would easily lead to a 
                                                          
213
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 129. 
214
 ‗What we live from does not enslave us; we enjoy it‘. Ibid., p. 114. ‗The sensible world, overflowing 
the freedom of representation, does not betoken the failure of freedom, but the enjoyment of a world.‘ 
Ibid., p. 140. 
215
 In his article ‗Enmity, Friendship, Corporeality‘ De Boer discusses the relationship between the body 
and freedom in Totality and Infinity, and argues that freedom exists precisely as body.  ‗In a concrete 
sense freedom consist in the suppleness and the agility of the body, in deft anticipation of a blow, in 
fleetness of foot.‘ De Boer, ‗Enmity, Friendship, Corporeality‘, p. 138.  De Boer convincingly argues that 
for Levinas the reliance of the body on the external world, for the fulfilment of bodily needs, is not seen 
as depletion of the subject‘s autonomy or freedom. 
216
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 140. 
217
 Ibid., p. 144. 
  
294 
Hobbesian description whereby the state of nature is a war of all against all.  By 
describing the separated self in a relationship with exteriority characterised as desire, 
and enjoyment, Levinas avoids beginning from a place of need and deficiency, and 
hence the self is not in competition with others but wrapped up in its own selfish 
enjoyment.  Though this description is far from the Hobbesian war of all against war, it 
is not yet ethical either.  Separation as enjoyment, nonetheless, is a necessary condition 
for the possibility of both the encounter with the Other and also the possibility of a 
genuine meaningful response.
218
  In Section III Levinas goes on to argue that the 
concrete separation of the self understood as enjoyment, conditions the possibility of the 
self responding to the Other in a meaningful material fashion.  
Speech is not instituted in a homogenous or abstract medium, but in a world 
where it is necessary to aid and to give.  It presupposes an I, an existence 
separated in its enjoyment, which does not welcome empty-handed the face and 
its voice coming from another shore.
219
 
 
If it were not for the life of enjoyment the self would have nothing to offer the Other 
and nowhere to welcome them.  The material character of responsibility, therefore, is 
central for Levinas, of what use is an open heart but closed hands.  A genuine response 
to the Other must consist of a physical gesture and a material giving, be that abdicating 
your place for the Other, welcoming them into your home, or offering the food you 
intend to eat to the Other.  
The level at which the separated self dwells in existence as enjoyment, is devoid 
of the ethical significance of life that comes from being confronted by the Other, it does 
not yet involve an awareness of one‘s responsibility for the Other.  In fact it involves 
practically no ‗awareness‘ at all.  As Duyndam writes, ‗[e]njoyment is not a relationship 
with an object [...] enjoyment is the relationship with this relationship‘.220  We can add 
to Duyndam‘s reading presented in the article that this immediate unmitigated 
immersion in enjoyment is partially due to the fact that the life of enjoyment lacks 
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objectivity.  The self reference of interiority is concretely accomplished as enjoyment, 
because in enjoyment, although the self is in relation with exteriority, it results in a 
complete return to the self.
221
  While through enjoyment the self is in a relation with the 
non-self, the other, this other poses no shock to the self‘s being at home with itself, as it 
is not sufficiently other enough and is entirely consumed.  Through nourishment the 
other is consumed and becomes ‗mine‘, ‗my own energy, my strength, me‘.222  The 
radical otherness of the Other is required to shock the self into the realisation that there 
is an alterity not reducible to the Same.  The Other is not a threat to the freedom of the 
self but what prompts the self to become aware of their egotistical enjoyment and in the 
process invests freedom understood as representation and objectifying thought.       
There is a fundamental passivity to this description of the self that enables 
Levinas to explain how it is possible for such a self-sufficient existent to be put into 
question from the outside.  By describing the sensibility of the body Levinas articulates 
a fundamental openness and passivity, prior to constituting consciousness.  Initially the 
body is fundamentally a position in being, a place, and as sensible it cannot but be 
affected by exteriority.  The ground under your foot, the sun in your eyes and the breeze 
on your skin, all affirm exteriority prior to any constitution of it.  The self is passive 
before it is active.  Even the act of grasping by the hand is conditioned by the position 
of the body.  It is not the constituting ego that is primary, but the sensible body.  ‗To 
posit oneself corporeally is to touch an earth, but to do so in such a way that touching 
finds itself already conditioned by the position [...] as though a painter would notice that 
he is descending from the picture he is painting.‘223   
 
§ 4.3.2 FREEDOM AS A ‗NULL‘ FREEDOM 
 
There is wide agreement amongst commentators on Totality and Infinity that Levinas‘s 
description of the self, prior to the encounter with the Other, is of a self that lives a 
purely egotistical free life and one that, through the encounter with the Other, is re-
orientated, turning that self away from a self-centred preoccupation, and to Other-
centred responsibility, from egotistically free to ethically free. 
 
The self is judged by the 
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Other and hence given the opportunity to begin anew and to have the possibility of a 
moral life.
224
  Many critics see this as a transition from an unethical freedom to an 
ethical freedom.  Visker, for example, summaries this view, when he remarks:  
Indeed it seems Levinas‘ entire philosophy is based on this contrast between a 
pre-ethical freedom which is disoriented, like a compass needle at the Earth‘s 
poles that has only itself as a point of reference, and a freedom that is imposed 
upon us from outside and is thus able to provide us with the orientation we 
need.
225
 
 
Outside of the encounter with the Other, the self lives in the categories of the same, 
living purely for itself and without any purpose other than its own enjoyment.  The 
Other interrupts the self, in an act that has not been freely initiated by the self, yet the 
self must respond to this imposition.  This is, partially, why Levinas maintains that 
responsibility is older than freedom, pre-dates one‘s exercise of freedom.  The focus in 
the existing literature has mainly been on the ethical reversal to the freedom of the self 
that the Other brings.
226
  This focus is unsurprising given the nature of Levinas‘s 
thought, and of course it is a fundamental aspect of his thought, and so, one that should 
be highlighted.  This, however, is not the full picture.  By turning our attention 
specifically to the sense in which Levinas uses the term ‗freedom‘, both to characterise 
the egotistical life of the self, and to characterise that which is invested by the Other, we 
will see that there is more to the ‗freedom‘ invested by the Other than the ethical 
reorientation that is generally given attention.
227
  To clarify this point, let us turn 
specifically to how the ‗freedom‘ of the self is described in Section II of the text.    
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When Levinas uses the term ‗freedom‘, and ‗sovereignty‘, to describe the 
egotistical life of enjoyment it is used in the very minimal sense of the possibility of 
commencement, meaning the minimal requirement of having a position in being.
228
  
Levinas describes this egotistical existence as like a hungry stomach without ears, as it 
is entirely consumed with its own immediate enjoyment, and lacks any awareness of 
anything beyond that. 
In enjoyment I am absolutely for myself.  Egoist without reference to the Other, 
I am alone without solitude, innocently egoist and alone.  Not against the Others, 
not ‗as for me ...‘ — but entirely deaf to the Other, outside of all communication 
and all refusal to communicate — without ears, like a hungry stomach.229  
 
Levinas compares this way of existing to an animal existence, as it lives only for the 
present and is absorbed by its own immediate pleasure, lacking any critical 
consciousness or solitude.  
The ‗sovereignty of enjoyment‘ is a material independence that comes from 
being a living body, and as a living body it can undergo influences.  The affective 
sensibility of the body is what brings joy, but this porous nature also brings 
vulnerability and the possibility of sickness and danger.  This inherent vulnerability that 
comes with being a body rules out the possibility of a self-initiated idealist freedom, or 
what Levinas refers to as a causa sui, which cannot be affected from the outside.  Nor 
should it be thought of as a ‗limited or finite freedom‘.230  By beginning with the body 
Levinas shows that the understanding of freedom as consciousness, almost independent 
of the body and independent of the context of any particular situation, is an intellectual 
abstraction.
231
  ‗The insecurity of the morrow, hunger and thirst scoff at freedom.‘232  
This ‗freedom‘ that comes from being a body, with a position in being, is so minimal 
that Levinas calls it a ‗null freedom‘.  It is merely a by-product of life that is shared with 
all beings.  
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Freedom as a relation of life with an other that lodges it, and by which life is at 
home with itself, is not a finite freedom; it is virtually a null freedom (une liberté 
nulle).  Freedom is as it were the by-product of life (le sous-produit de la vie).
233
 
 
This ‗freedom‘ bears very little resemblance to Levinas‘s use of the term freedom when 
referring to critical consciousness and the freedom of knowledge, which is the 
possession of objects through concepts.
234
  Although both descriptions of freedom 
involve possession of the other — one literally consumes exteriority through 
nourishment and the other assimilates objects through knowledge — the vital difference 
is the distance that objectifying consciousness brings, and that is invested by the Other.  
This possibility of moving beyond this animal-like egotistical existence is brought 
through the encounter with the Other, when the egotistical life of sovereignty is 
disturbed.
235
     
Levinas states that the very minimal freedom, understood as a commencement, 
is necessary in order to have the possibility of creating a world in which a greater degree 
of freedom, such as a freedom from the immediacy of needs and the higher social 
freedoms that can come from social institutions and mutual cooperation, can be 
achieved.  However, such possibilities are built upon the encounter of the Other, 
without whom our ‗freedom‘ would be no more than that of any other form of ‗life‘.  
Trapped in the present, an existent may have the feelings of fear and danger, but 
Levinas describes these as ‗feeling par excellence‘, as they are limited to the present 
they are not consciousness which is described as the ‗possibility of making use of 
time‘.236  Human beings, who take up habitation, build a home, and dwell on the earth 
are in the privileged position of being able to build a world, a society, social institutions, 
which enable us to establish infrastructure that can bring social freedoms.  Levinas tells 
us, ‗[t]o be free is to build a world in which one could be free‘.237  The establishing of a 
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home, and labour, which point to a withdrawal from the immediacy of enjoyment, and 
therefore require time, require an explanation.
238
  This sense of time, and the possibility 
of postponement, comes to the self from the relationship with infinity, concretely 
described as the encounter with the Other.
239
  Representational consciousness removes 
us from the immediacy of the body, brings time, by bringing a distance from the 
present.
240
  
Levinas goes on to further describe the concrete structures of the Same by 
describing the economic life of the self.  We are once again reminded that human 
existence as we know it, including meaning, critical consciousness, awareness of time, 
the freedom granted by social institutions, language, and society, all rely on the 
metaphysical relationship of Desire that is enacted concretely through the encounter 
with the Other.  Without whom none of this would be possible.  The economic life of 
the self is built upon the more fundamental life of enjoyment, and adds a complexity to 
life that would not be possible for the self alone.  Although the economic life of the self 
is founded on the encounter with the Other, Levinas describes it is within the structures 
of the Same and outside of the ethical-metaphysical relation to the Other.  
 
§ 4.3.3 ECONOMIC LIFE AND FREEDOM 
 
Already in Section I of the text Levinas explains that our economic life in the world, 
such as the home, labour, and the economy, articulate the structure of the Same. 
This reversion of the alterity of the world to self-identification must be taken 
seriously; the ‗moments‘ of this identification — the body, the home, labour, 
possession, economy — are not to figure as empirical and contingent data, laid 
                                                                                                                                                                          
111). Moral freedom entails a freedom to do better than previously, hence, in principle, it must unfold as 
a permanent critical calling into question whatever we have responsibility for and that includes the 
existing laws and order in any given society.  
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over the formal skeleton of the same; they are the articulations of this 
structure.
241
  
 
Levinas calls the identification of the Same ‗the concreteness of egoism‘.242  In Section 
II Levinas describes these concrete elements of the habitation of the ‗I‘ in the world.  
Economic life belongs within the description of the structure of the Same as it is blind 
to the face of the Other and centres around the self, but this is not to say that it is prior 
to the encounter with the Other, and therefore before the Other invests the self with 
freedom.  Levinas makes it clear that the economic life of the subject, presupposes the 
disruption to the Same by the Other, put differently, presupposes a relation with infinity, 
a relation with the transcendent: ‗Labour, however, already requires discourse and 
consequently the height of the other irreducible to the same, the presence of the 
Other.‘243  The complexity of economic life presupposes language, sociality, the home, 
and objectifying thought, all of which rest on the freedom of representation, which the 
Other invests.
244
  
Economic life is a continuation of the life of enjoyment, although it incorporates 
a level of complexity that is absent from the immediacy of the sensibility of the body.  
In economic life, ‗I maintain myself egoist and separated, identifying in the diverse my 
own identity as the same, through labour and possession.  The Other signals himself but 
does not present himself‘.245  Economic life is blind to the face of the Other because in 
labour I work to maintain myself, and in the realm of commerce other human persons 
are reduced to their utility.  I can avoid the Other, and fulfil my needs through the use of 
my labour.  The radical otherness of the face remains hidden, even though one works 
alongside others.  There is an anonymity to economic life that hides the face.  I cannot 
approach someone in their unique singularity through their work, as products of labour 
hide the alterity of the maker.  Also, the Other is beyond the power of the self in a way 
that is profoundly different from external objects that the self can mould and bend to 
their will through labour and work.  ‗But the stranger also means the free one.  Over 
him I have no power (...je ne peux pouvoir).‘246  Such objects do not disturb the ‗I‘‘s 
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being at home with oneself (le chez soi).  Other people can also be controlled by the 
power of the self in economic life, but when the self treats people like other objects, the 
self is blind to the face.  The Other eludes the power of the self.  
Levinas‘s descriptions of work reveal ways in which the freedom of the 
individual is restricted in economic life.  Although labour is the means through which 
the I can procure wages, and can maintain its interiority and its home, paradoxically 
work is also a means by which the I can be exploited.  Within the economy the I 
becomes an anonymous wage-earner.  ‗Thus the product of labour is not an inalienable 
possession, and it can be usurped by the Other.‘247  Not only is the product of the I‘s 
labour usurped, but the I also has very little control over how the work will be 
interpreted and used by others.
248
  In this sense, the product of one‘s labour is abortive, 
as it has a destiny beyond the control of the I.  The power of the subject does not 
accompany the product beyond its production.
249
  As a will and a freedom the I can 
produce products, and through the procurement of those products by others, its freedom 
is compromised.  ‗The labour which brings being into our possession ipso facto 
relinquishes it, is in the very sovereignty of its powers unceremoniously delivered over 
to the Other.‘250  Levinas clarifies that this restriction to the freedom of the I does not 
stem from an action of any other but from the fact that it is beyond the power of the I to 
be able to see the future.  
 
§ 4.3.4 SEPARATION: FORGETTING OF THE INFINITE 
 
The economic life of the separated self obviously does not cease as a result of the 
encounter with the Other, as economic life is an integral part of human life.
251
  For 
Levinas, the life of enjoyment will remain an ever present reality for the separated self.  
It is of importance to note, however, that the ethical reorientation to the egotistical life 
of the self that the disruption by the Other can bring can be short lived, for, just as in 
Section I, where Levinas argued in more abstract terms that the same can forgot infinity, 
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so too in concrete terms the separated self can forget the Other.
252
  This point helps us to 
understand how the Other is the condition for representational thought, which is evident 
in the economic life, and yet at the same time the Other is absent from economic life.  
The I that lives in economic life has the freedom of representational thought — 
language and society are testament to that — but the moral orientation given to the 
freedom of the Same to be a freedom for the Other, is lacking.  One way in which 
Levinas explains this is by arguing that separation of the self is so radical that the self is 
separated to the point of forgetting the infinite.  This also accounts for the very real 
possibility of the self to display truly selfless behaviour, and yet for this behaviour to be 
short lived.  The self needs to be continually put into question by the face of the Other 
in order to be reminded of its responsibility to the Other, and to have the possibility of 
readjusting its behaviour accordingly.  As Levinas tells us in his title, life is lived 
between both totality and infinity.  
As we have seen throughout this chapter, Levinas‘s thinking at the time of 
Totality and Infinity was that this description of the separated self was a necessary step 
in his argument.  As he says, 
[e]goism, enjoyment, sensibility, and the whole dimension of interiority — the 
articulations of separation — are necessary for the idea of Infinity, the relation 
with the Other which opens forth from the separated and finite being. 
Metaphysical Desire, which can be produced only in a separated, that is, 
enjoying, egoist, and satisfied being, is then not derived from enjoyment.
253
  
 
This description of the separated self describes the self at the level of affective 
sensibility, and although it is ‗before‘ the cognitive conscious aspects of the self this 
before is not to be understood in an historical sense, it is rather an ongoing dimension of 
the human person, and at the level at which the Other confronts the self.  Levinas also 
views it as a methodological and logical necessity that enables him to avoid positing 
separation as a non-dialectical relation, and thus move beyond a description of the self 
that is deficient and in need of exteriority, and also, give an explanation for how it is 
that a fully separated self can be disturbed by the Other.  Levinas tells us that the 
interiority that ensures separation must produce a being that, on the one hand, is 
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absolutely ‗closed over upon itself‘, guaranteeing its self-sufficiency and separateness, 
and, on the other hand, this ‗closedness‘ must not prohibit exteriority from speaking to 
the separated self.  ‗In the separated being the door to the outside must hence be at the 
same time open and closed.‘254  The Other knocks on that door. 
 De Boer convincingly argues that another more subtle problem that Levinas 
avoids by positing a self-sufficient existent that exists prior to the encounter with the 
Other, is a problem that has been raised to criticise the dialogical tradition in general 
and Buber in particular, when he argues that ‗I become through you‘ (Ich werde am Du).  
When we begin to scratch the surface of Buber‘s position, the argument quickly 
descends into circularity.  In order to have a genuine encounter one would have to 
presuppose a self, but how can we have a self, prior to this encounter, if selfhood only 
arises as a result of the encounter?  Another question this approach raises is how did the 
Thou become prior to this encounter?  To be consistent one would have to maintain that 
it was a result of a prior encounter.  But what of the Thou of that encounter?  The 
argument quickly descends ad infinitum, needing an original Thou to found the first ‗I‘.  
De Boer notes that in his Der Andere M. Theunissen deals with this problem by positing 
the becoming of a true self in this encounter, however, De Boer does not hold this 
position to do away with the problem, as in doing so Theunissen reverts back to the 
solitary ego of the transcendental view.  De Boer maintains that Levinas, in contrast to 
Buber, deals with the problem by positing a self-sufficient self prior to the encounter 
with the Other: 
Levinas‘s articulation is clear.  Becoming oneself through the Other is 
‗investiture‘.  In the encounter a transformation from egoism to altruism takes 
place.  I am not ‗constituted‘ by the Other, for in my joyous existence I already 
was an independent being.  I am judged by the Other and hence given the 
opportunity to begin anew.  Encounter does not mean that my freedom is 
restricted but that I am awakened to responsibility.
255
 
 
A consequence of such a radical separation is that the separated being ‗forgets‘ 
infinity.  
But the separated being can close itself up in its egoism, that is, in the very 
accomplishment of its isolation. And this possibility of forgetting the 
transcendence of the Other — of banishing with impunity all hospitality (that is 
all language) from one‘s home, banishing the transcendental relation that alone 
                                                          
254
 Ibid. 
255
 De Boer, ‗An Ethical Transcendental Philosophy‘, p. 31.   
  
304 
permits the I to shut itself up in itself — evinces the absolute truth, the 
radicalism, of separation.
256
 
 
Although it is only as a concrete separated being that the self can encounter the Other 
and also have something to give, paradoxically, separation also involves the possibility 
of shutting oneself up in one‘s own home, not only shutting out the Other in the process, 
but forgetting the Other completely.  Levinas tells us that to do so is to take advantage 
of the possibilities that are afforded to the self as a result of the relationship with the 
Other, such as objectivity, society, and a home, and yet to not acknowledge the 
responsibility that one has to the Other.  A renunciation of your debt to, and your 
responsibility for, the Other, is possible due to separation.  One may be able to forget 
and close themselves up in their home, but they cannot undo the responsibility to the 
Other.  As Levinas says, it is like accepting the benefits of a game while deciding that 
you are personally exempt from the rules.  To illustrate his point Levinas makes 
reference to Gyges, who in Plato‘s Republic tells the story of a ring that turns the wearer 
invisible and subsequently permits the wearer to behave in any way that they may wish, 
free from any repercussions or the judgement of others.   
Gyges‘s ring symbolizes separation.  Gyges plays a double game, a presence to 
the others and an absence, speaking to ‗others‘ and evading speech; Gyges is the 
very condition of man, the possibility of [both] injustice and radical egoism, the 
possibility of accepting the rules of the game, but cheating.
257
   
 
Gyges need not give an account of his actions precisely because he has made himself 
invisible in those actions therein knowingly abdicate his responsibility towards and for 
the others whom he cheats.  
The encounter with the Other, just like the life of enjoyment of the self, are both 
situated at the level of the sensible, which is outside of representational consciousness.  
This ‗forgetting‘, therefore, is to be understood as a renunciation of the responsibility 
one has for the Other and thus is a possibility of an ontological being.  Just as human 
life is lived between the time of history and messianic peace, human existence is 
defined by both a propensity for living for oneself and the metaphysical desire for the 
infinite.  It is not a question of either being for yourself or being for the Other, since 
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both are possible.  It is rather, aside from the rare examples of a life lived predominantly 
governed by self-interest or the interest of the Other, that each of us at times act in ways 
that speak to both sensibilities.  On this point we are in agreement with Peperzak, who 
tells us: 
Levinas‘s philosophy does not fix the opposition between a narcissistic ego and 
a moral law of altruism that should be urged upon its egoism.  Ego is at the same 
time turned and returned to itself by the spontaneous egoism of its being alive (a 
zooion or animal) and transcendent, that is, exceeding its own life by desiring, 
i.e., by a nonegoistic ‗hunger‘ or generosity for the Other.  This duality is not the 
classical twofold of the body and spirit. The reflexivity of ego‘s self-
identification is as corporeal, sensible, and affective as ego‘s orientation and 
dedication to the Other.
258
  
 
Both of these possibilities are present simultaneously, the self is both a spontaneous 
freedom, in the sense of a mere commencement in being, and in a relation of desire with 
the infinite which calls this very ‗freedom‘ into question.  As Levinas puts it early on in 
the text, ‗[t]he miracle of creation lies in creating a moral being.  And this implies 
precisely atheism, but at the same time, beyond atheism, shame for the arbitrariness of 
the freedom that constitutes it.‘259  Later in the text, Levinas makes a similar point, 
‗metaphysical thought, where a finite has the idea of infinity — where radical separation 
and relationship with the other are produced simultaneously‘.260   
 Despite that fact that both of these sensibilities are present in the self, using the 
medium of language Levinas must explain both separately.  Towards the very end of 
this chapter we will briefly acknowledge the limitations of language that complicate 
Levinas‘s attempt to articulate what is beyond constituting consciousness and not 
reducible to concepts.  This is something that Levinas will continue to struggle with far 
beyond this early major work.  For now, it is to the second simultaneous sensibility, still 
at the level of affective sensibility, and therefore prior to the freedom of representation 
and reflective consciousness, that we shall examine.  Not only does the human Other 
call this spontaneous null freedom into question, but through this questioning the Other 
brings the distance necessary for objectivity and time, and hence invests the freedom of 
representation and the possibility of a moral life.  
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§ 4.4 ‗EXTERIORITY AND THE FACE‘ 
 
Section III of the text ‗Exteriority and the Face‘ has by far received the most attention in 
the secondary literature.  Levinas‘s description of how the encounter with the Other 
disturbs the self‘s egotistical life, and through this encounter the self is opened up to 
living for-the-Other, is by now a familiar reading.  As this mostly empirical description 
dominates the readings of this section, we will not revisit what has become familiar 
ground.  Our reading, rather, will focus on Levinas‘s description of the investiture of 
freedom that the Other brings to the self, a freedom that can never, in principle, be self-
generated by that self.  We will keep in mind the question of whether or not the self is 
free prior to the encounter and as a result of the encounter is made ethically free, or, that 
the self, prior to the encounter, has no more ‗freedom‘ than any other form of life, a 
mere commencement in being not even worthy of the name ‗freedom‘.  This makes a 
straightforward empirical reading of this issue problematic, as what kind of empirical 
life is possible without language, objectivity, time, critical consciousness and self-
awareness?
261
  It would be a strange life indeed, and Levinas‘s comparison to an animal 
existence would be quite appropriate.  As this is the case, Levinas‘s self assessment of 
his affinity with Kant‘s transcendental approach seems quite fitting, though there are 
significant differences.  Levinas, in places, undeniably describes the encounter with the 
Other in empirical terms, but it an empirical reading informed by a transcendental 
approach.
262
  Although the encounter conditions subjectivity, the concrete encounter 
with the Other can happen time and again, but it is an event that in a sense has always 
already occurred.  This is the strange logic of the anterior-posteriori.  The Other is said 
to be prior to the freedom of the self because the encounter occurs at the pre-cognitive 
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level of sensibility, which is below the level of the freedom of representation.  The 
Other is said to ‗invest‘ the self with freedom, as without the Other the self would lack 
objectivity, language, time, and the freedom of representation.       
 
§ 4.4.1 SENSIBILITY FOR THE FACE OF THE OTHER 
 
In the opening pages of Section III Levinas once again uses language that resonates with 
the transcendental method, whilst also distancing his starting point significantly from 
that of Kant‘s.  When describing sensation, Levinas emphasises that sensation is 
primarily enjoyment, and should not be understood as sense ‗content‘ there to facilitate 
objectification.  Levinas is distancing his approach from the dominant position in 
modern philosophy that takes the subject as both primary and a given.   Levinas tells us,  
Rather than taking sensations to be contents destined to fill a priori forms of 
objectivity, a transcendental function sui generis must be recognised in them [...]; 
a priori formal structures of the non-I are not necessarily structures of objectivity 
[…]. The senses have a meaning that is not predetermined as objectification. 263  
 
Having described this immediate life of enjoyment in the preceding section, remaining 
at the precognitive level of affective sensibility, Levinas moves on to describe a 
sensibility that is profoundly different from the sensibility of enjoyment, that of the face 
of the human Other.  The face disturbs the self‘s being at home with itself in a way that 
the other which is consumed through enjoyment never could.  The face speaks to the 
self, and in doing so opens up a dimension of transcendence that would never come 
through vision, as vision is an all-consuming grasping.
264
  ‗The relation with the Other 
alone introduces a dimension of transcendence, and leads us to a relation totally 
different from experience in the sensible sense of the term, relative and egoist.‘265  
 Drabinski, in agreement with Lingis, reads Totality and Infinity as describing 
two different sensibilities that share the same logical structure, that of sense from the 
outside.  One, a sensibility of sensuous enjoyment, which Lingis describes as 
appropriation, and the other a sensibility for the face of the Other, which Lingis 
                                                          
263
 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 188. Levinas explicitly refers to Kant‘s The Critique of Pure Reason 
and compares Kant‘s approach to his own, which he here refers to as a ‗transcendental phenomenology of 
sensation‘.  
264
 ‗Vision is not a transcendence‘. Ibid., p. 191. 
265
 Ibid., p. 193.  
  
308 
describes as expropriation and responsibility.
266
  This is an important distinction to 
make, as it raises the question of the radical difference between these two sensibilities, 
and why it is that it is the face of the Other alone that can disturb the egoistic self-
referential life of enjoyment.  Drabinski remarks, correctly, that it is only the human 
Other that is capable of marking the relation of separation.  And we can add that this 
separation is necessary to bring about the distance from the immediacy of enjoyment 
that is necessary for time, objectivity and critical consciousness to appear.  Not only 
does the face stimulate the calling into question of the spontaneity of the self, the ‗null‘ 
freedom of the self, enabling the possibility of a life lived in consideration of Others, 
but this interruption also brings with it objectivity and reflective consciousness.
267
   
 Levinas emphasises that the human Other is more radically other than the other 
of the world, as it is ‗prior to every initiative, to all imperialism of the same‘.268  The 
otherness of the exteriority of being of nature is not quite radical enough to bring the 
self to question its own self, such a realisation can only come when the self is 
confronted by an alterity that is cannot consume.  In the immediacy of enjoyment, the 
self lives from the other, which is completely consumed.  The Other resists such 
possession, and it is this passive resistance that makes it different from the other of 
exteriority in the life of enjoyment.  What is striking about the face is that it speaks to 
the self, addresses the self, and in doing so obligates the self to respond.  Only the 
human Other can address the self in this way, ‗the face speaks to me and thereby invites 
me to a relation incommensurate with a power exercised, be it enjoyment or 
knowledge‘.269  Just as in his earlier work, even though Levinas uses the term ‗face‘ to 
describe the Other, the sensibility of the face is an auditory stimulation rather than a 
visual one.  Language, which comes from the Other, is the first teaching and the 
beginning of objectivity.
270
  In the address, the self is confronted by an alterity that 
cannot be consumed, and in the confrontation the self is made aware that the Other is 
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not the self, and cannot be taken under the control of the self.  This brings self-
awareness, which is necessary for objectivity.
271
  
 The major difference between the Other and the other (qua empirical other) is 
the dimension of height that characterises the Other, what Levinas terms, the 
‗asymmetry of the face‘.  This is an important point for it explains how Levinas avoids a 
Hobbesian clash of freedoms or a Hegelian master-slave dialectic in one‘s encounter 
with the Other.  The Other does not contest or cancel the freedom of the I but 
simultaneously calls that self into question and invests that self with freedom to act 
responsibly for the Other.  
To posit being as Desire and as goodness is not to first isolate an I which would 
then tend toward a beyond.  It is to affirm that to apprehend oneself from within 
— to produce oneself as I — is to apprehend oneself with the same gesture that 
already turns towards the exterior to extra-vert and to manifest […] it is to 
affirm that the becoming-conscious is already language, that the essence of 
language is goodness, or again, that the essence of language is friendship and 
hospitality.
272
  
 
Before we turn to the investiture of freedom which the encounter with the other presents 
to the self, we will briefly examine the asymmetry of the relation, as this will help to 
clarify how it is that Levinas avoids a clash of freedoms, and opposes a tradition that 
grounds morality in freedom in favour of grounding freedom in morality qua 
responsibility for the Other.      
 
§ 4.4.2 ASYMMETRY OF THE INTERPERSONAL AND FREEDOM 
 
One initial point to make about the asymmetrical nature of the relationship is that due to 
Levinas‘s phenomenological heritage the description is given from the first person 
perspective of the self that is encountered.  It is the self that is interrupted, disturbed, 
and called to respond to the Other, therefore, the weight of responsibility falls on that 
self.  The self cannot escape its own self and cannot reverse the encounter.  From a 
neutral third person perspective the Other and the self may appear as a numerically 
equal, but from the perspective of the self in the moral encounter the Other is higher 
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and demands a response.  The self cannot undo the disturbance to their life by the Other, 
and no one can take their place.  
[These differences between the Other and me] are due to the I-Other conjuncture, 
to the inevitable orientation of being ‗starting from oneself‘ toward ‗the Other‘. 
The priority of this orientation over the terms that are placed in it (and which 
cannot arise without this orientation) summarizes the theses of the present 
work.
273
    
 
The Other addresses the self in order to elicit a response, the burden of responding is 
therefore placed on the subject who is addressed, even if they did not initiate or 
encourage such an encounter.  The other puts a claim on the self – and that claim cannot 
be self-generated by that self. 
 A more important factor that explains the asymmetry of the relation is that the 
disturbance of the self by the Other, brings the self concretely into contact with the idea 
of infinity, which overflows the power of the I, and calls this power into question.
274
  In 
contrast to his earlier work, in this text Levinas emphasises that the Other is the poor, 
the widow and the orphan.  The Other is in need.  The resistance of the Other to the 
power of the self is a passive resistance; paradoxically, it is the vulnerability of the 
Other that places the demand on the self to respond, and this adds a dimension of ethical 
height.
275
  ‗To hear his destitution which cries out for justice is not to represent an 
image to oneself, but is to posit oneself as responsible [before the Other]‘.276  One must 
respond to the Other, as they cannot undo the disruption, but Levinas tells us that one 
cannot expect from the Other what they can expect from him/herself.  One can only 
respond from their own position, and in this sense the asymmetry is further 
preserved.
277
  
 As noted by many commentators on Levinas‘s text, in the encounter the Other 
calls the spontaneous freedom of the self into question.
278
  In this calling into question 
the Other becomes aware of its egotistical living and feels ashamed.  ‗Freedom then is 
inhibited, not as countered by a resistance, but as arbitrary, guilty, and timid; but in its 
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guilt it rises to responsibility.‘279  The self becomes aware that it is guilty of living only 
for itself, and as a result, the self feels ashamed, and with this new awareness, the 
arbitrary freedom of the self can be given an ethical reorientation.   
My arbitrary freedom reads its shame in the eyes that look at me.  It is 
apologetic, that is, refers already from itself to the judgment of the Other which 
it solicits, and which does not offend it as a limit. […] It is not a causa sui 
simply diminished or, as it is put, finite.
280
  
 
We should keep in mind that the encounter with the Other takes place outside of the 
paradigm of power and freedom, as it occurs at the level of affective sensibility.  The 
Other does not limit the freedom of the self but invests it.  As we outlined above, 
Levinas argues that the freedom of the subject is created, invested, and not self-caused, 
its freedom, then, is not a given but a gift.  
 Throughout the text Levinas argues against the age old idea of being as one, and 
in its place argues for a multiplicity in being that is not reducible to a totality of beings.  
This multiplicity, however, does not result in a clash of freedoms or in a war of all 
against all precisely because Levinas does not take freedom as a given and situates the 
face-to-face relation outside of the order of freedom and non-freedom.  A pivotal 
premise to Levinas‘s philosophy is that the freedom of the self is not primary, but is 
invested from the outside, through a transcendental relationship with infinity.  Hence, in 
the conclusion Levinas remarks, ‗[m]orality is not a branch of philosophy, but [qua 
metaphysics] first philosophy‘.281  In his later work he will develop his argument that 
claims metaphysics precedes ontology.  Levinas opened Totality and Infinity wondering 
whether we are duped by morality, and if morality was founded in freedom then he 
believes this would indeed be the case.  Consistent with his attempt throughout the text 
to show that this is not the case, when Levinas describes the face-to-face encounter, he 
explains that what he is describing is not a Hobbesian war of all against all, or a 
Hegelian clash of freedoms, but a discourse, an address.  The face is presented as a 
stranger but does not oppose the self.  The face is not an obstacle, or an enemy.  ‗The 
being that presents himself in the face comes from a dimension of height, a dimension 
of transcendence whereby he can present himself as a stranger without opposing me as 
obstacle or enemy.‘282 
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 Levinas, again, highlights a deficiency in the approach which takes freedom as 
primary.  Reason is universal, and if reason were to be taken as primary, how then could 
we account for moral reasoning, which entails the ability to put oneself into question, 
and how could we account for society, which is based on plurality?  ‗[B]ut they 
[Hegelians] have yet to make understandable how a rational animal is possible, how the 
particularity of oneself can be affected by the simple universality of an idea, how an 
egoism can abdicate?‘283  Levinas‘s solution is not to take rationality as primary, but to 
seek for it a justification.  For Levinas, the pluralism of society is the condition for 
reason.  How can an existent that is purely for its own self and immersed in being as 
enjoyment, step back from its own enjoyment and be rational, objective, and set its own 
enjoyment aside.  For Levinas, this is possible because in the encounter with the Other 
the self has been put into question, judged by the Other, and comes to feel ashamed of 
its naïve self-centred living.  The Other puts into question the ‗brutal spontaneity‘ of the 
self, ‗introduces into me what was not in me‘.284  This putting into question by the Other 
brings not only the possibility of living a moral life, but also founds the freedom of 
reason.  ‗But this ―action‖ upon my freedom precisely puts an end to violence and 
contingency, and, in this sense also, founds Reason.‘285  Paradoxically freedom arises 
through the event that places my freedom into question.  The resistance of the Other is 
not a violence, as it is a passive resistance.  It is not a struggle between freedoms as in 
the encounter freedom is invested.  The face, as the idea of infinity, resists all 
appropriation by the self and is beyond representation.
286
  ‗But the other absolutely 
other — the Other — does not limit the freedom of the same; calling it to responsibility, 
it institutes (instaure) and justifies it.‘287  We shall turn now to analyse this idea of 
freedom as founded, justified, and ‗invested‘.   
 
§ 4.4.3 FREEDOM INSTITUTED 
 
There is no denying that Levinas describes the separated self that is prior to the 
encounter as ‗free‘, but as we argued above, the meaning of the term in this context is 
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significantly different from the meaning of the term when used to describe what the 
Other invests.  Both the freedom of representation and the minimal freedom of 
commencement, described by Levinas as a ‗null‘ freedom, imply possession.  However, 
there is a vital difference between them, which requires the distance from immediacy 
that the Other brings to the self by introducing self-awareness and time.  In the life of 
enjoyment the self consumes exteriority in a mindless immediacy, through the 
immersion of the body in sensual pleasure.  At this level not only does the self lack an 
awareness of the Other, but the self also lacks an awareness of its own self.  When the 
Other disturbs the self, and the self becomes aware of an alterity that it cannot consume, 
a vital distance is introduced that brings with it, time, self-awareness and critical 
consciousness.  Rationality is founded in this ethical event.  When the self is brought to 
feel ashamed of a life governed by sensual pleasure, simultaneously this awareness 
brings with it the distance necessary for thought.  The freedom of representation only 
comes from the relation with infinity, the ethical relation with transcendence.  
 In places Levinas‘s description of the self gives the impression that the self is 
‗free‘ prior to the encounter, and in the encounter the self becomes responsible, for 
example: ‗Freedom then is inhibited, not as countered by a resistance, but as arbitrary, 
guilty, and timid; but in its guilt it rises to responsibility‘.288  Although Levinas does 
describe the self prior to the encounter with the Other as ‗free‘, he argues that through 
the encounter freedom is instituted, and so, freedom begins with the encounter.  ‗This 
presentation [the face] is pre-eminently nonviolence, for instead of offending my 
freedom it calls it to responsibility and institutes it.‘289  Lingis translates ‗l‟instaure‘ as 
founds, and though this is not wrong ‗institutes‘ is closer to the root of the word in both 
the French and English, as it derives from the Latin instituere meaning in- ‗towards‘ and 
statuere ‗to set up‘, as in, to initiate something, to set something up, to establish it.290   
What is of importance about the use of this verb is that something new, that was not 
there before, is brought about, not just given an ethical orientation.  
 In his overall conclusion, in a section called ‗Freedom Invested‘, Levinas states 
that the I is at the same time arbitrarily free, and maintains a relation with exteriority 
that is beyond the power of the I, and that calls the power of the I into question.  
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 Freedom, the event of separation in arbitrariness which constitutes the I, at the 
 same time maintains the relation with exteriority that morally resists every 
 appropriation and every totalization in being.
291
  
 
This description of the I is particularly important given that it appears in the last few 
pages of the work, wherein Levinas is summing up his overall approach.  Levinas goes 
on to add that in order to explain sociality and to make sense of morality, without 
reducing it to some ulterior end or function, freedom must be understood as posited 
within this relation.  If freedom were taken as a given, or if freedom were posited prior 
to the relation with the Other, this would result in the violence of war or knowledge, 
whereby multiplicity would be eradicated either by force or by the unity of knowledge.  
Within either system, be that knowledge or war, beings would be reduced to objects.
292
  
 
§ 4.4.4 ALREADY, BUT NOT YET 
 
Given the linear description in certain places within the text of a self that is egotistically 
free and then, through the encounter, it is re-oriented to become ethically free, it is easy 
to see where the empirical, linear reading of the text comes from.  The way in which 
Levinas describes the encounter, and perhaps even the very structure of the book — the 
section on exteriority and the face come after the section that describes the life of the 
separated self — both contribute to the empirical reading of the text.  However, we must 
keep in mind that at this stage of his work Levinas believed that it was necessary to 
posit a fully separated self, even if this was for methodological purposes, and it does not 
need to be read as an empirical description of the life of the self prior to the encounter.  
His description of the time of both messianic peace and that of history, also help us to 
think through this problem.  The self lives in an ontological world, but it is one in which 
the time of eschatology and messianic peace constantly breaks through. The 
metaphysical relationship with infinity is there from the beginning, as is the propensity 
to live an egotistical life, wrapped up with one‘s own enjoyment.  It takes the radical 
otherness of the poor, the widow, and the orphan to remind the self of its relationship 
with infinity, which causes it shame for its own egotistical life.  The shame comes as the 
self is reminded that the life it lives is owed to the Other, and to forget that, is to accept 
the benefits of the game but refuse to play by the rules, just like Gyges.  However, it 
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will be forgotten once again.  In this regard, we could describe the encounter as an event 
that is already, but not yet.     
 We should also keep in mind that the encounter with the Other happens at the 
level of affective sensibility, which is not before consciousness in a linear sense, but is 
an ever present reality of the human being.  It is a passive openness to exteriority that is 
outside of the realm of freedom and nonfreedom, that not only makes the enjoyment of 
life possible, but also makes it possible for the Other to disturb the Same.  This is how 
the self is responsible before it is free.  Drabinski argues that when Totality and Infinity 
is read as a text about sense, a straightforward empirical reading becomes problematic, 
if not unsupportable, as it reveals structures that come before and founds the empirical 
descriptions.  
The empirical character of his descriptions cannot be taken in absence of the 
transcendental problematic. The intertwining of the empirical and the 
transcendental languages describes exteriority as sense and attaches the genesis 
of that sense to the alterity of sensibility.
293
  
 
Drabinski argues that the Other bestows meaning on the self, and one such meaning the 
self receives from the Other is its own sense of its self.  Even though in places Levinas 
himself describes the encounter as if the I was already a subject prior to the encounter, 
subjectivity is founded through the encounter.  This is precisely why Levinas calls the 
freedom of the I a created freedom and not a casa sui.  Drabinski calls this novel 
approach by Levinas, which is both critical of the modern subject, whilst incorporating 
transcendental and empirical language into his descriptions, a ‗postsubjectivistic 
transcendental [approach]‘.294    
 In a similar manner, Bernasconi argues that the question should not be whether 
the empirical or transcendental approach most accurately describes Levinas‘s account of 
the face-to-face encounter, rather, for Bernasconi, Levinas is trying to find a way 
between these two options.  
The empirical and the transcendental have their place in Levinas‘s Totality and 
Infinity in the discussion of the intentionality of enjoyment and of representation 
[...]. Levinas does not choose between them or attempt to reconcile them.
295
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Bernasconi rightly points out that Levinas‘s description of the separated self as 
primarily a sensible body, and not a constituting consciousness, challenges the 
traditional understanding of the transcendental method, whereby the transcendental ego 
is primary, but that is not to say that the transcendental method must be entirely 
rejected.
296
  As Bernasconi himself notes, early on in the text Levinas claims that his 
method resembles the transcendental method.  What both approaches have in common 
is that the condition for experience is itself beyond experience.  What distinguishes 
Levinas‘s approach is that even though that which conditions experience transcends 
experience, this particular transcendental event continues to disturb consciousness, 
through the empirical encounter of the face of the human Other, despite the event 
always lagging just behind constituting consciousness.  The life of enjoyment, just like 
the encounter with the Other, takes place in this strange space between the happening of 
an event and the constituting of that event by consciousness.  Despite this lag, 
consciousness appears to underlie that which it comes to represent.  This is what 
Levinas calls the absurd logic of the anterior posterior.  Bernasconi summarises how 
this point relates to Levinas‘s unusual application of both transcendental and empirical 
argument: 
Levinas follows the transcendental method to the point where it is halted and in 
order to sustain itself must draw on that which is radically exterior to it.  This 
exteriority is itself therefore the condition both for that which had been revealed 
in transcendental thought and for transcendental thought itself.
297
   
 
 
Already, but not yet, captures the strange logic of the anterior posterior, as the 
event will appear to consciousness as though consciousness was the source of its 
meaning, even though the meaning has come to consciousness already from the outside.  
Thought can never capture the face of the Other, even though experience will bear the 
mark that the face has left behind.  Paradoxically, the object that consciousness can 
never constitute, the face, is what gives rise to constituting consciousness and the 
freedom of representation.    
The method practiced here does indeed consist in seeking the condition of 
empirical situations, but it leaves to the developments called empirical, in which 
the conditioning possibility is accomplished — it leaves to the concretization — 
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an ontological role that specifies the meaning of the fundamental possibility, a 
meaning invisible in that condition.
298
  
 
 
 Our reading of the text shows that although Levinas does describe the separated 
egotistical self as free prior to the encounter with the Other, to characterise his early 
position as arguing that the already free egotistical and separated self is made ethically 
free in the encounter with the Other, only captures part of this complex picture.  We 
could of course place the blame for the confusion and the ambiguity within the text in 
the hands of Levinas, as he is the author.  Keeping in mind that this text is in many ways 
only the beginning of his mature work, and not the end, perhaps he had no choice but to 
work through this problem in order to try to find an alternative way of expressing what, 
by his own admission, is beyond the all-consuming grasp of constituting consciousness.  
Perhaps even in his later work the problem of a linear reading does not completely 
disappear.  When discussing substitution in Otherwise Than Being, Jill Stauffer makes 
the point that although in some respects Levinas cannot help but describe the emergence 
of subjectivity in an almost linear fashion, it should not be read as linear. 
The narrative cannot be construed as linear — though, of course, one difficulty 
is that it can only be written as linear.  Rather than thinking of becoming-subject 
as a past event already accomplished, Levinas describes it as an affective 
movement that has never concluded.  It‘s not that I was at first self-sufficient 
and then consented to be affected by others, but nor is it the case that at first I 
was riddled with unchosen responsibility only then to be offered some autonomy.  
The other is always already there, but it is also the case that, in order to be 
interrupted by the other‘s proximity, I have to have been an ego coiling in on 
itself, complacent in its enjoyment, enjoying its sufficiency to self.  Levinas will 
not give us an origin on which to hang our theory.
299
     
 
Granted this point is made in relation to a later development in Levinas‘s thought, but in 
some respects the same point could be made in relation to Totality and Infinity.  As an 
earlier text Levinas had not yet worked through and developed these more nuanced 
ways of describing the responsibility of the self towards the Other.  However, the 
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tension between the empirical and transcendental language, the strange logic of the 
anterior posterior, his description of the time of history and the time of messianic peace, 
and the ever present passivity of affective sensibility, all show that within Totality and 
Infinity Levinas was already beginning to think of the encounter with the Other as an 
already, but not yet.  Before we turn to our conclusion, we will lastly consider if part of 
the problem of the ambiguity within the text is the paradox of language.  We will 
address the point that perhaps in attempting to try to think the unthinkable, and to use 
language to express that which he is trying to think through, this problem of both the 
articulation and the interpretation of the event as liner, reflects not just the nature of 
consciousness but also a fault of language.    
 
§ 4.4.5 PARADOX OF LANGUAGE 
 
In his study The Foundation of Phenomenology. Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a 
Rigorous Science of Philosophy, Marvin Faber discusses the paradoxes of 
phenomenology, as discussed by Fink in an article that was fully endorsed by Husserl, 
‗The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary 
Criticism‘.300  Among them is the paradox of language.  This paradox states that the 
communicating phenomenologist cannot but use language, and yet phenomenology 
cannot be sufficiently communicated using natural language, as doing so makes it 
difficult to avoid a naturalistic interpretation.  If in an attempt to avoid this problem one 
was to apply another language then they run the risk of a mystical interpretation, or 
simply communicating nonsensically, as they would go beyond any regular usage of the 
words.  Faber paraphrases Husserl: ‗Expressing his belief that the mundane meaning of 
all available words cannot be entirely eliminated, Husserl concludes that no 
phenomenological analysis […] can be presented adequately‘.301  Faber warns that a 
reader may only grasp the mundane meaning of the word and overlook the 
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transcendental significance, and as a result, ‗[i]t follows that one may even quote the 
text of Husserl correctly, and still have a wrong interpretation‘.302  
 Although this observation is made in relation to Husserl‘s writings, setting aside 
the question of the status of Levinas as a phenomenologist, the problem of language is 
one that also troubles Levinas‘s work.  This problem is perhaps particularly pertinent 
for Levinas, not only because he too is trying to avoid the natural attitude, but also, as 
he challenges the primacy of consciousness and is trying to describe a situation that is 
prior to consciousness, and outside of all attempts by consciousness to grasp it, the 
problem is of particular relevance to his work.  Levinas‘s struggle with language is 
therefore of great significance.  When trying to describe an event that is somehow 
outside of experience, and yet has a profound effect on experience, Levinas only has the 
language he, like all of us, have been given by others.  This language comes to him 
from the very tradition that he is seeking to circumvent, and given that to name 
something, and to identify a concept, is to limit it, the language he uses cannot but 
commit the very problem that he is seeking to avoid.  The suppression of alterity by the 
Same.  Even the very sequence of the words on the page lends themselves to a linear 
interpretation, and a two-dimensional view, but as Stauffer reminds us above, this does 
not mean that what the author is describing must be interpreted as linear.  Levinas is 
trying to explore the depths to the person that although are beneath consciousness, they 
are ever present.     
 In the German preface to Totality and Infinity, written by Levinas in 1987, he 
writes,  
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence already avoids the ontological — or 
more exactly, eidetic — language which Totality and Infinity incessantly resorts 
to in order to keep its analyses, which challenge the conatus essendi of being, 
from being considered as dependent upon the empiricism of a [naturalistic-
empirical] psychology.
303
  
 
A much commented on development from Totality and Infinity to Otherwise than Being 
is the way in which Levinas shifts his use of language, and tries to deal with the on-
going problem of trying to say what cannot be captured in words or represented in 
concepts and knowledge.  Through Levinas‘s own admission, he is still constrained by 
ontological language in Totality and Infinity.  The problem of language adds to the 
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difficulties we face when trying to interpret the text, even when reading sections 
interpretable as a linear description, from egotistical freedom to ethical freedom, we 
should be mindful of this problem.  Levinas spoke about this topic in length in his 
interview with Kearney.  Despite his struggle with the ontological ‗Greek‘ language of 
philosophy, Levinas acknowledged that in some respects this problem might never be 
overcome.  ‗We can never completely escape from the language of ontology and politics. 
Even when we deconstruct ontology we are obliged to use its language.‘304  Not only 
does language present a problem for Levinas in that it restricts him from expressing 
what it is he wishes to say, but this is also an ethical problem, as ontological language is 
totalizing and absolute in nature, it implies that we can know with complete certainty.  
Nevertheless it is a restriction that he must work within.  
 We have no option but to employ the language and concepts of Greek 
 philosophy, even in our attempts to go beyond them.  We cannot obviate the 
 language of metaphysics, and yet we cannot, ethically speaking, be satisfied 
 with it: it is necessary but not enough.
305
 
 
Levinas, however, remains optimistic.  
 I disagree, however, with Derrida‘s interpretation of this paradox.  Whereas he 
 tends to see the deconstruction of the Western metaphysics of presence as an 
 irredeemable crisis, I see it as a golden opportunity for Western philosophy to 
 open itself to the dimension of otherness and transcendence beyond being.
306
  
 
Once we acknowledge the particular baggage that comes with the language of Western 
philosophy, by struggling to find another way to express philosophy, as Levinas will 
continue to do in Otherwise than Being, we are in a position to change it. 
 In his work after Totality and Infinity Levinas will continue to try and find a way 
to express what is almost inexpressible.  Although it cannot be denied that his thinking 
undergoes development, the question around the extent to which his position radically 
changes is an ongoing one.  One can wonder if it is his position that he fundamentally 
alters, or if it is not more the case that the biggest shift is in the way in which he 
expresses his thought.  In an article on Levinas‘s philosophy Blanchot remarks:  
In each of his books Levinas continually refines, by an ever more rigorous 
reflection, what was said on this subject in his Totality and Infinity: what, 
properly, had been said, that is, thematized, and thus was always already said, 
instead of remaining to be said.  From this one of the persistent and insoluble 
problems of philosophy derives: how can philosophy be talked about, opened up, 
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and presented, without, by that very token, using a particular language, 
contradicting itself, mortgaging its own possibility?
307
  
 
Blanchot‘s point, that Levinas struggles with a new way to say what has already been 
said, is shared by De Boer, who notes that Levinas‘s shift in terminology from Totality 
and Infinity to Otherwise than Being should be seen as a deepening of earlier notions 
and not so much a critique.
308
  As De Boer says, ‗[i]n his later writings Levinas is 
increasingly preoccupied by the problem of what can and what cannot be articulated.  
He speaks about the ―pain of expressing‖ and the need to ―abuse‖ language.‘309    
At one point in Otherwise than Being Levinas says of substitution:  
Substitution frees the subject from ennui, that is, from the enchainment to itself, 
where the ego suffocates in itself due to the tautological way of identity, and 
ceaselessly seeks after the distraction of games and sleep in a movement that 
never wears out. [...] It [this liberation] is brought out without being assumed, in 
the undergoing by sensibility beyond its capacity to undergo.  This describes the 
suffering and vulnerability of the sensible as the other in me.  The other is in me 
and in the midst of my very identification.
310
  
 
This idea of the other in me contrasts greatly with the idea of a fully separated egoistical 
self, but at the same time this is very close to the position Levinas puts forward in 
Totality and Infinity.  A consistency between the two positions is the fundamental place 
of the sensible, which has both methodological importance and is of significance to 
Levinas‘s philosophical position.  The sensible, what is described above as ‗the other in 
me‘, and the stress on the self as an affective sensibility that is never not in a 
relationship with exteriority, is present in Levinas work from as early as On Escape, 
although it is not expressed in the same manner.  A question that is asked of Levinas‘s 
later work is if he abandoned the idea of a radically free subject in favour of a subject 
that is persecuted from the start.
311
  By paying close attention to the two senses Levinas 
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gives to the term ‗freedom‘, in relation to the subject in Totality and Infinity, we can see 
that within the text the separated self is at the same time in a metaphysical relation of 
desire and wrapped up in its own egotistical living, as the infinite is forgotten.  The 
question of the continuity between Totality and Infinity and his later work, on the 
question of freedom, would require much further study, and would bring us beyond the 
bounds of this study. 
 
§ 4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
From as early as his dissertation, wherein he raised the question of what gives rise to the 
Homo philosophus, Levinas was beginning to re-think the foundation of critical, self-
reflective thought.  He continued to increasingly question the acceptance of the free 
rational meaning-giving subject as a given; instead, he wanted to discover what gives 
rise to the freedom of representation and rationality.  In Existence and Existents and 
Time and the Other Levinas began to formulate his answer, that it is the ethical 
encounter with the face of the human Other that brings time, self-awareness, and 
representational consciousness.  In the work of the 1950‘s, alongside a growing 
preoccupation with the ethical significance of that encounter, his argument began to 
take on a more definite shape and definitive voice.  As this is the case, why, then, in his 
first major work Totality and Infinity, would Levinas argue that the separated self is 
‗free‘ prior to the encounter?  
Granted that the self is described as ‗free‘ at the level of affective sensibility that 
runs ‗beneath‘ consciousness, this freedom, however, is no more than any other form of 
life, a mere position in being, a ‗null‘ freedom.  It is at this level that the self is 
disturbed by the Other, before it has time to constitute the event, give it meaning, or 
choose for it to happen.  Nevertheless, the self must respond, even if that response is to 
ignore the interruption.  As we have seen, without such an interruption the self would 
remain trapped in the present, lacking the distance necessary for time, objectivity, 
representation, rationality and the meaningful freedoms that such qualities can bring.  
To borrow a phrase from Daniel Dennett, the Other invests a freedom worthy of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
change considerably.  Hofmeyr‘s summation of Levinas position, which is similar to many other scholars, 
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name, a freedom worth wanting.
312
  A strictly empirical reading, which focuses on the 
ethical reorientation that the Other brings, overlooks Levinas‘s argument that proposes 
that the encounter with the Other also brings the freedom of representation and not just 
the possibility of a moral life.  
Just as we seen with Existence and Existents and Time and the Other, the 
confusion stems from the ambiguity of the term ‗freedom‘, which is used in more than 
one sense throughout the texts.  Also, contributing to this confusion is the way in which 
Levinas must struggle with language to express his description of the subject that 
resides between ‗totality‘ and ‗infinity‘, between eschatological and historical time.  A 
self that as a result of the structures of consciousness appears to its self as though it 
were the foundation of meaning, as though nothing came before, as all exteriority 
appears to be constituted.  It seems that the encounter with the Other is somehow 
always an already, but not yet.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
On the question of freedom in Levinas‟s work, the emphasis in the scholarship to date 
has mainly been on the place of freedom in relation to his ethical/metaphysical interest.
1
 
This is not surprising given the direction that his thought took after the war and the 
focus of his mature work.  This tendency in the scholarship is also understandable given 
that much research has concentrated on his mature work.
2
  However, as this thesis has 
demonstrated, of equal importance in Levinas‟s thought is his understanding of freedom 
as critical self-reflective thought.  In tracing the development of Levinas‟s thought in 
relation to freedom from his earliest work up to Totality and Infinity the importance of 
this lesser appreciated view of freedom has been demonstrated, and consequently the 
role of ethics in Levinas‟s work has been modified.  Looking back over this study, we 
can see that the question of freedom had concerned Levinas prior to his more well-
known interest in ethics.  Levinas‟s philosophy contains both an argument for, and a 
justification of the freedom of the subject.
 3
  We have become accustomed to the view 
that for Levinas it is through the encounter with the Other that the freedom of the self is 
made good, and so, we can be saved from being arbitrary and egotistical. While this 
view is not incorrect, we have seen that it is by no means the complete picture.  Further 
to this, what Levinas argues, is that without the Other the self would not be free, at least 
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not in any meaningful sense of the term.  The Other brings to the self far more than the 
possibility of an ethical re-orientation.  To read Levinas in this way is to place ontology 
(viewed as the study of beings in their being as understood in their being) before the 
study of beings as beings, where the Other, one‟s own fellow human being, is not 
known at all but greeted. To read Levinas in this way, then, is to place ontology before 
„metaphysics‟ (in Levinas‟s sense of that term).  Levinas‟s attempt to argue against this 
very totalitarian-ontological approach to the determination of the self and the Other, one 
that eclipses the radical alterity of the Other, epitomizes his whole philosophical 
approach.  
Throughout this study, we have seen that Levinas does not use the term freedom 
in an univocal sense.  Despite this, Levinas has been consistent with the meanings that 
he does apply, however difficult at times that may be to uncover.  These meanings are 
also interconnected.  As Levinas was heavily influenced by both the phenomenology of 
Husserl and the work of Heidegger, in keeping with phenomenology, Levinas began his 
reflections with the hope of describing human life, setting aside questions that pertained 
to the natural attitude, and yet, through Heidegger‟s influence, Levinas did not take the 
isolated conscious modern subject as his starting point.  An important aspect of the view 
of the modern subject, from Descartes through to Kant and beyond, despite the many 
variations, is to understand freedom as rational self-governance and meaning-giving 
thought.  By pushing back before consciousness, or, perhaps, one could also say under 
consciousness, Levinas also pushed back before the freedom of the subject, understood 
as critical consciousness, objectivity and rational agency.  In placing this understanding 
of freedom into question, and not just accepting it as a given, Levinas never intended to 
argue against freedom, or to undermine its importance; he sought, rather, to find an 
explanation and justification for this freedom.  In doing so, Levinas has also shown that 
this freedom is a complex phenomenon.  Against the tradition that has viewed freedom 
as autonomy, Levinas argues that freedom is heteronomy.
4
  
 We have seen that, in this period of Levinas‟s work at least, Levinas believes 
that without the initial interruption by the Other the self would be trapped in the present, 
in a self-referential circle, consumed by its own enjoyment and lacking the distance 
necessary for objectivity.  It is the Other that interrupts this life and disturbs the self by 
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calling it into question.  The Other confronts the self with an alterity that resists all 
attempts at assimilation.  This interruption brings with it the distance necessary for 
language, time, objectivity and rationality.  Despite this claim of the Other on the self, 
the self lives in an ontological world and, as such, can get caught up in its own 
egotistical living.  It takes the radical alterity of the infinite Other — described in 
Totality and Infinity as the poor, the widow, the orphan — to rupture this self-centred 
existence, even for just a moment, confronting the self with the arbitrariness of a life 
preoccupied with its own pleasure.  This moment in the life of the self is not of the self‟s 
making or choosing, it escapes the all-encompassing gaze of consciousness, and occurs 
in a time outside of the powers of consciousness, and at the level of the affective 
sensible body.  Nevertheless, the self must respond to the Other.  As Levinas sums it up,   
 
[e]thics redefines (my emphasis) subjectivity as this heteronomous 
responsibility, in contrast to autonomous freedom.  Even if I deny my primordial 
responsibility to the other by affirming my own freedom as primary, I can never 
escape the fact that the other has demanded a response from me before I affirm 
my freedom not to respond to his demand.  Ethical freedom is une difficile 
liberté, a heteronomous freedom obliged to the other [...].  The other haunts our 
ontological existence and keeps the psyche awake, in a state of vigilant 
insomnia.  Even though we are ontologically free to refuse the other, we remain 
forever accused, with a bad conscience.
5
 
 
 It is not only moral conscience that is granted in and through the encounter with 
the Other, but so too is critical representative consciousness.  The Other, in other words, 
brings the freedom of representation, self-awareness and critical consciousness, by 
introducing ethical consciousness prior to intentional consciousness.
6
  Such capabilities 
are the bedrock of self-governance, the ability to make rational choices and the ability to 
decide how one ought to live and ought to have lived (but did not, or did not want to).  
Hence, furthermore, political and social freedoms are also possible through the 
encounter with the Other precisely because the Other not only invests rationality and 
time but also because it is through mutual cooperation that social institutions are built 
and maintained.  Levinas views such institutions as necessary for freedom, understood 
as the freedom from the immediate needs of the body, and the social and political 
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freedoms that can come from such a society.  As Levinas states in Totality and Infinity, 
„[t]o be free is to build a world in which one could be free‟.7  However, Levinas is by no 
means naïve enough to hold that the freedom of rationality is sufficient for safeguarding 
such political and social freedoms.  His experiences of the first half of the last century, 
and his critical reading of the dominance of the Same in the intellectual history of the 
West, taught him too well that the unquestioned freedom of reason can be a very 
dangerous thing.  Freedom must be continuously called into question, and one should 
never become complacent, and never feel that they are good enough,  
the moral justification of freedom is neither certitude nor incertitude.  It does not 
have the status of a result, but is accomplished as movement and life; it consists 
in addressing an infinite [ethical] exigency to one‟s freedom, in having a radical 
non-indulgence for one‟s freedom.8         
 
 From his earliest writings, it is evident that, for Levinas, freedom involves the 
possibility of novelty, a possibility that can only be brought by a difference that 
breaches the totality of the Same.  It may seem contradictory to think that it is 
paradoxically a disturbance to the life of the self, not of the self‟s own choosing, that 
brings freedom, but without such a disturbance the self would not have the infinite 
possibilities that the Other brings.  Freedom is again shown, for Levinas, to rest on the 
transcendental metaphysical relation of desire, and is also once again shown to be a 
difficult freedom. The Other may bring such possibilities, and with them genuine 
freedom, but the self can always ignore their responsibility to the Other and act like 
Gyges, who profits from the rules of the game but refuses to play by them.  
 Like many great philosophers, Levinas describes, what on reflection, are 
obvious and mundane aspects of human life, leaving the reader wondering how they 
overlooked a simple truth that was hidden in plain sight.  The centrality of the body in 
Levinas‟s thought is one such observation.  The significance of his insights into 
existential phenomena such as fatigue, nausea, insomnia, illness and sensual enjoyment, 
point to the existence of implicit meaning that is not reducible to intentional 
consciousness and beyond the powers of the self.  Such reflections prompt us to rethink 
the idealist understanding of the self as primarily free, self-sufficient and the foundation 
of all meaning.  The old idealist understanding of the primacy of consciousness would 
seem to be an intellectual abstraction when faced with the everyday reality of sickness, 
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famine and disease.
9
  To posit freedom with no regard for our concrete lived life and the 
reality of what it is to be a human person, leads to a detached formal concept.
10
  In 
contrast to a tradition that begins with the thinking subject, and advocates for the self‟s 
reflection on itself, Levinas begins his reflection at the level of the sensate body.  It is at 
this level that the self is disturbed by the Other, in a moment prior to freedom 
understood as rationality and conscious self-governance.  
The affective sensible nature of the body also blurs the lines between the body 
and exteriority.  The air we breathe, the food we consume, the sun on our face, are 
continuous elements of human life.  One could say the same of sickness and disease.   Is 
the tumour that grows within, or the blood clot that causes a stroke — each hastening 
death unbeknownst to the afflicted individual — foreign bodies or exterior constraints 
to freedom?  So many human experiences reveal the idea of complete sovereign control 
to be farcical.  Events happen to us that are completely beyond our control and outside 
of our power to undo them, but we are still free to respond.  One such reality is the 
everyday presence of other people, who interrupt, address us, make requests and disrupt 
our plans without our consent.  Levinas‟s work reveals the significance of some of the 
many human experiences that reveal a fundamental passivity that underlies the 
conscious subject‟s engagement with the world.   In doing so, Levinas does not wish for 
this line of inquiry to conclude that we are not free, but to point out that it is not so 
simple. This fundamental passivity does not lead to hopelessness, or even to 
helplessness. For Levinas, it is that which brings humanity to human life.  This 
passivity, which is initially lived as an immediate enjoyment of life, is what enables the 
encounter with the Other to take place.  Levinas‟s work helps us to begin to think 
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 329 
differently about our lived reality, and freedom‟s place within that context.  His 
questioning of freedom does not do away with freedom, it raises it, rather, to higher 
heights, justifies it and gives it meaning.  
In his work, Desmond raises similar concerns about the modern view of freedom 
understood as autonomy and complete self-determination in an idealised sense, and the 
implicit unquestioned primacy that it holds.
11
  His questioning is also partially 
motivated by ethical concerns, one of which is the far reaching implications that such a 
view gives rise to, many of which may take centuries to unfold.  The devaluing of the 
self‟s relationship to other-being is one of the main worrying implications that Desmond 
names.  Desmond‟s description of this view of freedom is similar to Levinas‟s own,  
[i]t makes straight the way for our determining power as the sole source of 
value.  And so we are a determining origin that passes into and through other-
being as a means to itself as the true end.  Other-being becomes the medium of 
our own self-determination.  This tends to be the dominant logic of modern 
freedom, and not in any merely negative sense of freedom from external 
restraint.
12
 
 
Desmond calls such a view of freedom, „at best equivocal, at worst delusionary and 
megalomaniac‟.13  Just like Levinas, who in questioning such a view of freedom does 
not by any means wish to deny freedom, so too Desmond tell us, „[m]y point is not to 
deny freedom, but to question any absolutizing of autonomy as the fullest truth of 
freedom‟.14  Similarly to Levinas, Desmond makes the point that there is a passivity to 
being that precedes the self‟s endeavour to be. 
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For we are given to be before we give ourselves to be.  There is a passio essendi, 
a patience of being, more primordial than our conatus essendi, our endeavour to 
be. [...] we are first as having received our being rather than as having 
determined it for ourselves, through ourselves.  The passio essendi is closer to 
the more ultimate energizing sources of our conatus essendi but it also defines 
the vulnerability of our finitude.
15
       
 
When self-determination is idolized, and autonomy is seen as absolute, the passio 
essendi is overlooked and the view of freedom as conatus essendi is incorrectly given 
free reign.  As a consequence, when the primary stress is on autonomy the other will 
always be seen as a means to the end of the goal of self-determination, „the other will 
always be secondary, serving for the self‟.16  Setting aside the question of whether such 
a view is morally reprehensible due to the many political, social, and ecological 
inequitable consequences, Levinas has shown us that such a view is also empirically 
incorrect.  
Levinas reminds us that outside of a time when we are caught up with our own 
enjoyment, and wrapped up in our own concerns, there is an older time that calls this 
time into question, and reminds us that we are responsible before we are free.  As 
Levinas says in „As Old as the World?‟  
[m]en are not only and in their ultimate essence „for self‟ but „for others‟ [...].  
You are a self, certainly.  Beginning, freedom, certainly.  But even if you are 
free, you are not the absolute beginning.  You come after many things and many 
people.  You are not just free; you are also bound to others beyond your 
freedom.  You are responsible for all.  Your liberty is also fraternity.
17
  
    
Levinas presents us with an opportunity to re-think freedom, and our fundamental 
relation to one another, which not only broadens our understanding of what it means to 
be human, but can potentially alter our human relations.  In his interview with Nemo 
Levinas remarked: 
It is extremely important to know if society in the current sense of the term is the 
result of a limitation of the principle that men are predators of one another, or if 
to the contrary it results from the limitation of the principle that men are for one 
another.
18
  
 
Though it may not be self-evident from this particular quotation, central to this concern 
is the question of the meaning of freedom of the individual.  To highlight this point we 
                                                 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid., p. 22.   
17
 Emmanuel Levinas, „“As Old as the World?”‟ in Nine Talmudic Readings, trans. by Annette 
Aronowicz (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 70-88 (p. 85).   
18
 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, p. 80.   
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could phrase this problem differently: Is the human being primarily free for itself and in 
competition with others, or is the human being only made free by being put into 
question from the outside, through the encounter with the Other?  Levinas believes that 
if we begin by unquestioningly positing the freedom of the subject, we can then never 
account for the phenomenon of goodness.  How can we make sense of the fact that it is 
possible — indeed occurs to a lesser and greater degree on a daily basis — for one 
person to put the needs of the Other before their own.  For Levinas, if we begin with an 
autonomous free and independent subject, we cannot avoid explaining society as a 
curtailing of a clash of freedoms, a war of all against all, or an evolutionary 
advantageous trait that has enabled the survival of our species.
19
  Such views 
downgrade morality to an instrument of social regulation, an attempt to postpone war 
indefinitely.  Levinas found such explanations unsatisfactory, because in the attempt to 
explain morality, these arguments simply explain it away.  Levinas provides us with an 
account of freedom and morality that lies elsewhere.   
An integral part of Levinas‟s justification for this position lies in his equally 
important, yet often overlooked, understanding of freedom that we have focused on in 
this study.  For Levinas, without the ethical interruption of the face of the human Other 
the self would never have the impetus to place its self into question and hence could 
never question its own behaviour and could never judge its own actions.  For Levinas, 
without such an event, the freedom of self-reflective critical thought could not of itself 
arise.  Even if one wished to defend a Kantian approach to ethics, which similarly to 
Levinas calls for the self-limitation of the subject, one would still need to account for 
how it is that the subject can come to place its self into question in the first place.  The 
freedom to place oneself into question, which is the very freedom that makes morality 
possible, is for Levinas a consequence of the ethical event. A freedom that is the result 
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a challenge to Dawkins account, and a challenge in general to the view that nature is inherently selfish, 
from the standpoint of a fellow evolutionary natural biologist, see, Joan Roughgarden, The Genial Gene. 
Deconstructing Darwinian Selfishness (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California 
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of a preceding responsibility, and one that allows for the possibility of both recognising 
and responding to this prior responsibility.  
  It could be argued that although Levinas‟s thought can be used to contribute to 
a rethinking of this view of humanity, as a war of all against war, his own thinking 
remains somewhat within this paradigm.  Although Levinas‟s thought offers a challenge 
to this tradition by emphasising the saving grace that comes through the face of the 
Other, Levinas does not completely step outside of it.  It seems that to some extent he 
accepts the basic premise that humanity has a predisposition towards egotistical living. 
Granted, for Levinas, such predispositions are connected to ontological structures, 
which Levinas claims are at least momentarily subverted by the metaphysical relation to 
the infinite.  However, for Levinas, if it was not for the Other the self would remain 
wrapped up in the immediacy of narcissistic egotistical living.  Levinas still views 
Being, and our egotistical ontological existence, as essential negative.
20
  Ultimately, for 
the later Levinas, it is the grace of God that „calls our ontological will-to-be into 
question‟ and „turns our nature inside out‟.21  As being is viewed in such negative terms, 
God as beyond being is necessary to account for what little goodness there is.  In this 
way Levinas‟s own thinking still falls prey to old metaphysical presuppositions that can 
be seen to dilute his overall thesis.  Setting this point aside, there is much potential in 
Levinas‟s work to contribute to the rethinking of this dominant view of humanity.  We 
could utilize Levinas‟s work to critique this view of humanity that Levinas himself 
seems to fall victim of.  Like all great philosophical growth, the potential is there to 
move through and beyond such thought. 
Levinas teaches us that perhaps society is not built upon the need to curtail 
aggression, the will to dominate, or the power to control others, but comes from the 
need to facilitate and negotiate our responsibility to Others in a complex world.  This of 
course is not to ignore the many abhorrent deeds that human beings commit to their 
fellow humans, other species and the planet itself, on a daily basis, but, perhaps this 
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with Emmanuel Levinas‟, p. 24-25.     
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behaviour cannot be attributed solely to a propensity within the human person.  Perhaps 
partial blame can lie with the implicit metaphysical assumption and morally 
questionable idea that humanity is inherently concerned only with its own being.  If we 
take seriously this observation by Levinas, that at the most basic level the self harbours 
an openness to the Other that leads to mutual cooperation and not to a conflict that must 
be mediated by competition, then perhaps we could be more hopeful about the potential 
of human relations.  Far from Levinas‟s philosophy causing a problem for the view of 
the subject as free, by claiming that we are responsible before we are free, Levinas gives 
an account of not only how we are free but also why we are free.  And so, he provides 
an answer to the profoundly thought-provoking platonic moral question, „why be 
moral?‟          
 In closing, I hope that this study contributes to the ongoing research into the 
work of Levinas.  Our work is shaped and informed by the work of others that have 
come before us, contributing to an ongoing dialogue, and to the work that remains to be 
done. Levinas has taught us that knowledge and understanding is a collective 
endeavour, which can trace its beginnings to the primordial event of having been placed 
into question from the outside.  Just as any individual subject is not the origin of the 
meaning of the world, no one individual will definitively answer the questions that face 
us.  All we can do is offer the product of our work, which once it is written is beyond 
our control to dictate or governor how it will be received, or control the meaning it will 
be given by others.  Our power and freedom does not stretch that far.  
Between You and all of us 
We do not have the 
First word 
We are spoken to first 
 
The first word comes 
In the cooing of the mother 
& we are wooed into words 
Coming into conversations 
Long under way 
Without us 
 
Wooed into words 
We come too early 
To presumption 
And complaint 
 
William Desmond
22
 
                                                 
22
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